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ABSTRACT 
 
The revolutionary reforms of Peter the Great in 1721 radically changed 
the whole Russian State. The changes which affected the Church’s 
canonical and juridical status for the entire Synodal period during the 
early twentieth century’s social and church-cultural metamorphosis, 
raise significant questions from the viewpoint of Orthodox canon law 
regarding marriage and divorce. The study’s main focus is how were 
these questions treated during the Pre-Conciliar period and in the All-
Russian Church Council of 1917–1918. The All-Russian Church Council 
of 1917–1918 was in many ways a unique and unparalleled phenomenon 
in the Russian Orthodox Church, State and in Russian social history. The 
Pre-Conciliar movement of the early twentieth century in Russia 
included the first and only experience in the Russian Orthodox Church of 
an open discussion with elements of dialogue touching all sides of 
Church life.  
The sources of this study, the documents and decrees of the Holy 
Synod and the preparatory bodies of the general Council of 1917–1918, 
raise the following questions regarding marriage and divorce:  
 
1. How did the Russian Orthodox Church understand the state law 
in relation to its own ecclesiastical law? 
2. How was the ancient canonical tradition concerning matrimonial 
issues interpreted in Russia? 
 
By examining the canonical views of matrimonial matters in the 
Russian Orthodox Church in the early 1900s, especially through secular 
laws and canonical commentaries, it is possible to create a picture of a 
canonical marriage model eventually formed in the Russian Orthodox 
Church after the General Council of 1917–1918.  
The bureaucracy appeared to be a permanent barrier between the 
Church and the people, as well as between the Church and the State. 
Ecclesiastical regulations were joined to civil law, creating norms of 
marriage law that conformed to the State’s viewpoint. This led to a 
situation before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution where divorces were 
difficult to obtain. Eventually, the religious institution of marriage, 
which had been protected by the Russian judiciary from the eighteenth 
to the early twentieth centuries, was destroyed by the Revolution. 
Animosity towards traditional Christian family values began to pervade 
the social climate in Russia after the Revolution, and the laws of the 
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Russian Orthodox Church came to reflect this. 
The study argues that after the All-Russian Church Council of 1917–
1918, a new “divorce model” of the Russian Orthodox Church appeared. 
The Orthodox Church did not immediately abolish its previous 
bureaucratic model, especially when resolving the divorce cases in the 
Soviet State in 1918, but new pastoral aspects nevertheless were 
incorporated. The form of a petition was retained: one of the approved 
reasons for divorce had to be stated, as well as a detailed and correct 
statement of the circumstances under which the collapse of the marital 
union took place. The canonical spirit and the norms established in the 
Pre-Conciliar period were retained in this matter. Thus, any reasons that 
were not justified by the canons and their authoritative commentaries 
were not accepted as lawful causes for ecclesiastical divorce. However, 
the final resolution concerning the grounds for the dissolution of 
marriage appear as if the Council expected the Church to remain as it 
was in the past, namely with complete jurisdiction over marriage. 
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Jelisei Heikkilä 
  
                                                
1 [In front of us are, on the one hand, cries and sorrow coming from life, on the 
other – certain requirements of "canonical antiquity."] ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. 
Д. 316. Л, 184. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview of the Synodal Period of the Russian 
Orthodox Church 
 
 
Along with other undeniably key events in Russian history – the baptism 
of Rus’ by Saint Vladimir and the Tatar conquest of Russia – the 
revolutionary reforms of Peter the Great in 1721 should be recognized as 
events that opened a new period in the history of the Russian Church, 
known as the Synodal2 period. The Synodal period was a peculiar time in 
the development of the Russian Church, and Peter’s reform of the Church 
was not an incidental episode. In fact, it was quite the opposite. As the 
famous Russian theologian Georgi Florovski noted, “It constituted the 
principal and the most consequential reform in the general economy of 
the epoch: a powerful and acute experiment in state–imposed 
secularization, and it was, so to speak a transfer from the West of the 
heresy of state and custom.”3 
The basis of the reforms lies in the fact that legal and cultural 
principles were imported into Russian society from the West.  V. Kartašev 
holds that this novelty fundamentally changed the “symphony” of Church 
and State that had been operative in the East.4 Florovski, however, noted 
that Muscovite Russia turned toward the West much earlier than the 
actual reform in the eighteenth century. In Moscow an entire generation 
was educated in its thoughts about the West by the Kievan scholars. In 
such an environment Peter discovered an initial sympathy toward his 
cultural enterprises. What was innovative in Peter’s Church reform was 
                                                
2 A period in the Russian Orthodox Church which was started by the reforms of 
Peter the Great in 1721 and introduced into Russia by Feofan Prokopovitš, when 
the Patriarchal See was changed into the Holy Synod. It lasted until the election 
of a new Patriarch in 1917. The term “Synodalis” comes from the Greek root 
“σύνοδος” (council) and the Latin suffix “-al.” In parallel with the Latinized 
official term the eighteenth-century Russificated form “синодский” was used 
with the Russian suffix “-ck,” although it was eventually replaced with the term 
”синодальный.” Карташев 1992, 311. 
3 Florovsky 1979, 114. 
4 Карташев 1992. 311. 
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not westernization, but secularization, as seen later in the Code of Laws 
of the Russian Empire.5 
What were then the actual Church reforms of Peter the Great? After 
the death of the eleventh Patriarch of Muscovite Rus, Adrian, in 1700, 
Peter refused to appoint a successor to the Patriarchal See. Instead, a few 
years later he formally abolished the Patriarchate and established the 
Holy Synod, along with Spiritual Regulation and Ecclesiastical 
Consistories to govern the Russian Church. After the patriarchs, Peter 
wanted to organize Church administration in Russia along the lines of 
Protestant countries, a totally new situation in the Orthodox world. The 
patriarchate was not revived until the All-Russian Church Council elected 
a new patriarch in 1917. The abolition of the patriarchate had no effect on 
the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox 
Churches. The Emperor, with his growing power and the title of emperor 
that he had assumed, became the highest authority of the Church and 
was regarded more than ever as the Protector of the Orthodox Church, or 
“chef de l’Eglise,” as Catherine the Great called herself.6  
The Church was in a metaphorical and technical sense beheaded. 
When viewing Peter’s reform from the canonical point of view, it is clear 
that it was not only a turning point, but a revolution. He produced a real 
metamorphosis or transformation in Russia,7  so that the canons of the 
Orthodox Church lost their status. In ecclesiastical legislation, of decisive 
importance were now the interests of the state and the mission of the 
Church to serve these interests. The rights of the Holy Synod and its 
power over the bishops did not arise from the canonical foundation of 
Orthodoxy, and the Spiritual Regulation of 1721 was recognized as the 
supreme authority over the bishops.  
The government introduced the practice of transferring bishops from 
one diocese to another, which offered great opportunities for replacing 
them with more compliant clergy and getting rid of the unwanted. 8 
Accordingly, the authority of the Church was supplemented by certain 
executive, and to some extent, political government functions. These 
                                                
5 Article 64 says that the Emperor, “as the Christian Emperor, is the supreme 
defender and the keeper of the dogma of the dominant faith and the guardian of 
Orthodoxy.” Свод законов Российской империи 1912, Т. 1, Ч. I, 5. 
6 Белякова 2004, 24. 
7 Florovsky 1979, 114. 
8 Белякова 2004, 24. 
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functions included leadership in primary education, civil registration and 
monitoring the political trustworthiness of the faithful. The clergy were 
obliged by oath to communicate actions that might be “harmful to the 
civil authorities.”9 In the Holy Synod, such empty titles as “president” 
and “vice–president” were introduced, being then replaced by the equally 
nominal title of “primatial member.” In the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, power was instead transferred to the ministerial 
figure of the Holy Synod, the chief procurator.10 The Church and its 
faithful nonetheless did not disappear.  
Compared with the previous Patriarchal period, the Church, which 
consisted of 20 dioceses with twenty bishops, grew almost tenfold during 
the Synodal period. The Russian population during Peter the Great’s time 
numbered 21 million, approximately 15 million being Orthodox 
Christians.  By the time of Nicholas II, according to the census of 1915, of 
182 million Russians, 115 million were Orthodox Christians.11  
In 1722, Russia contained 15,761 church buildings, 12  in 1908 the 
number was 61,959 with 20,610 chapels. At the end of the imperial 
period, the Russian Orthodox Church had 64 dioceses and about 40 
vicariates, led by more than 100 bishops.13 The total number of clergy in 
1722 consisted of 61,111; in 1908 there was 48,879 priests, 14,779 deacons 
and 44,248 lower clerics. However, the number of monasteries, when 
compared to 1701, fell more than three times in the first 40 years of 
reforms from a total of 1,201 (965 male and 236 female) to 387 (319 male 
and 68 female). In 1724 there was 25,207 monks and nuns, but in 1796 
only 5,861. Over the time monasticism rose again in the Russian Empire, 
for example in 1914 there was already 1,025 monasteries (550 male and 
475 female) with 94,629 monastics (11,845 monks and 17,283 nuns). In 
1738 Russian Orthodox Church had two theological academies, one in 
Kiev and one in Saint Petersburg, 17 seminaries with a total of 2,589 
students. By 1807 the number of academies doubled, with one added in 
Moscow and one in Kazan; the number of seminaries rose to 46 with 
24,167 students in all. By 1914 the number of seminaries had increased by 
                                                
9 Православная энциклопедия 2007, T. XVI, 433. 
10 Карташев 1992. 312. 
11 Карташев 1992, 317. 
12 The number of chapels is unknown. 
13 Карташев 1992, 317. 
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eleven and the total number of students annually was more than 50,000, 
adding to the count of students from 185 diocesan schools.14  
This quantitative growth was not only the automatic result of 
population growth. This was the result of active and systematic internal 
and external missionizing by the Russian Church to an extent never 
practiced before. Missionary acquisition of new church members by the 
Russian Church outside the hereditary growth of the Russian Orthodox 
population accounted for a few million, as Professor Pospielovsky noted, 
albeit not giving any detailed numbers. Traditional religious tolerance 
towards all religions, nationalities and tribes forming a part of Russia did 
not deter the Russian Orthodox Church from rapidly expanding 
missionary work among them. Traditionally, Islam, Judaism and 
Buddhism (Lamaism) enjoyed special privileges of immunity from 
foreign missionaries, although Orthodox missionary work among the 
Islamic Tatars in Kazan in the nineteenth century was very active. In the 
areas and regions that rejoined the Russian Empire, missionary work was 
even more active. Naturally, during the three partitions of Poland and the 
reunification with the Orthodox Church, the primordially Russian 
population, which at one time was in union with Rome, increased the 
Russian population by 5 million. The gradual conquest of the 
Caucasus began the restoration of former ancient Christianity there. 
Consequently, missionary work of the Russian Orthodox Church became 
one of its major achievements during the Synodal period; it had activities 
in Siberia, the Far East, Alaska, Japan, China and Korea, as well as 
among the Nestorian Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire.15 
The Russian Church began to build ecumenical ties with the other 
Western Churches, which began a new page in the history of the Russian 
Orthodoxy. The Protestant world, represented by Anglican priests in the 
nineteenth century, started the dialogue with the Russian Orthodox 
Church aiming in a union with them. This was, as Florovski pointed out, 
the first application of ecumenical relations.16 After this, the Old Catholic 
                                                
14 Цыпин 2006, 793–796. 
15 Pospielovsky 1998, 159–173. 
16 Pospielovsky 1998, 173. The rapprochement of Anglicans with the Orthodox 
Church was the result of the bull “Apostolicae Curae” in 1896, in which Pope Leo 
XIII announced the invalidity of Anglican ordinations. Representatives of the 
Church of England turned to Orthodox theologians to give their opinion on the 
matter. Unlike A. I. Roždestvenski and other theologians, Professors V. A. 
Sokolov and A. I. Bulgakov criticized the papal bull, and came to the conclusion 
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movement of the nineteenth century established close ecumenical ties 
with the Russian Orthodox Church, although the Old Catholics and 
Orthodox theologians never achieved any consensus. 17  Ecumenical 
dialogue was continued in the twentieth century; contacts with the 
Anglicans were once again renewed shortly before World War I. On 
September 20, 1918, the All-Russian Church Council declared in its 
resolution on ecumenism that it “authorizes the Holy Synod to organize a 
Permanent Commission with departments in Russia and abroad for the 
further study of Old Catholic and Anglican obstacles in the way of union, 
and for the furtherance […] of the speedy attainment of the final aim.”18  
An educational and theological rise in the Russian Church can be also 
seen in connection with another original cultural phenomenon, which 
became a hallmark of Russian Church history: a prominent part of 
theological studies was made by the Russian lay people, by non-
professionals from theological academies, who represented the secular 
culture and became authors of many classical works in the field of 
Orthodox theology and religious philosophy. These “secular” theologians 
were, for example, the Slavophiles Homjakov, the brothers Aksakov, the 
westernizer Vladimir Solovjov and his followers the brothers Trubetskoi. 
Parallel to this should be placed the religious–orthodox element in 
Russian literature, which became equally well known worldwide.  
The Russian Orthodox Church during the Synodal period, beheaded in 
the canonical and juridical sense, was forced to cope with its new 
bureaucratic–administrative status in the State, which underwent 
massive reforms as well. The Church’s power was centralized and was 
seen as no more than an empirical institution that organized religious life 
for Orthodox citizens. The Spiritual Regulation, the highest law of the 
Church was however only a program for reform – not the achievement of 
reform as such. This is why the reform did not succeed in its entirety: it 
                                                                                                                    
that, under the principle of “oikonomia” (leniency), the Orthodox Church can 
recognize Anglican ordinations. The Russian Orthodox Church eventually 
decided to laicize all Anglicans on their acceptance into Orthodoxy. 
Православная энциклопедия 2001, T. II, 314. 
17 Карташев 1992, 319. Old Catholics were a group of Roman Catholic clergy and 
theologians that in 1871 rejected the newly–formulated doctrine on papal 
infallibility and broke communion with Rome. In contrast with the Anglicans, 
the Old Catholics had a much clearer theological connection with the Orthodox 
Church once they rejected the papacy. Pospielovsky 1998, 173.  
18 Pospielovsky 1998, 174. 
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was not carried through because not everything proved practical, as 
Florovski noted. 19  Nevertheless, this period of the Russian Church 
revealed in many ways its spiritual forces and achievements and became 
a “golden era” in two theological–religious spheres: theological education 
and missionary work. 
 
 
 
1.2 Matrimonial Norms of the Russian Orthodox 
Church at the Beginning of the 20th Century as a 
Subject of Study  
 
 
The All-Russian Church Council of 1917–1918 itself was a unique, in 
many ways, unparalleled phenomenon in the Russian Orthodox Church, 
the State and in Russian social history. Church and society had been 
approaching this Council for a long time if not throughout the entire 
Synodal period, when the Church was deprived of the opportunity to hold 
councils, then at least during the last few decades of this era.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were approximately 
115 million adherents of the Orthodox confession in Russia. Non-
denominational status in the country during that period was not possible. 
The Church was entrusted to manage the parish registers. Patriarchal 
governance of the Church had been abolished by Emperor Peter the Great 
in 1721, and from 1721 until 1917, the Holy Synod was the supreme state 
body of ecclesiastical administrative power in the Russian Empire. 
Criticism of the Synodal structure of the Church and the reforms of Peter 
the Great from the canonical point of view started to be expressed in the 
public press at the beginning of the twentieth century.20 
During the great reforms of Alexander II, the first open discussions 
about conciliarity in the Russian Church and the need to transform its 
administrative system began.21 At the same time diocesan congresses 
(which initially treated only the economic problems of the estates) began 
to gather regularly; this was an important step towards conciliar church 
                                                
19 Florovsky 1979, 120. 
20 Белякова 2004, 38. 
21 Евлогий 1994, 154. 
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administration as well. 22  Perhaps the most significant development 
regarding the reform of the Church occurred in February 1905, when the 
Chairman of the Committee of Ministers Sergei Juljevitš Witte published 
a memorandum “The Present Situation of the Orthodox Church,” which 
was in fact composed by the professors of the Saint Petersburg’s 
theological academy. The memorandum stated that due to the freedom of 
and protection by the State, the Orthodox Church was enmeshed in heavy 
chains. Rejection of the principle of conciliarity in Church life led to a 
change in its spirit. The main reason for disorganization was attributed to 
Peter's Church reform, meaning that Church administration had became 
one of the “numerous wheels complex state machine.”23  The bureaucracy 
appeared to be a permanent barrier between the Church and the people, 
as well as between the Church and the State; and the only way to “wake 
up non-viable life” was a return to the earlier canonical norms of 
administration.24  
Witte’s memorandum repeatedly demanded reorganization of the 
ecclesiastical structure. A slogan for the time could very well have been 
“returning to the canonical norms.” Judging from  documents from the 
mentioned period this “return”  was often understood, in the first place, 
as the criticism of the Synodal structure and the need for convocation of 
the All-Russian Church Council to solve the acute problems of the 
Church.25 However, the Church faced a great problem in understanding 
how it should return to these canonical norms.  
The Pre-Council Presence26 started its work on March 8, 1906, holding 
regular sessions March 14 – June 13 and November 1 – December 15 of 
the same year, for a total of four and a half months. A possible reason for 
this was an unstable social situation in the country, a result of the 
Revolution of 1905.27 The work took place in the general meetings of 
seven departments; the third department addressed issues such as 
                                                
22 Савва 2011, 31.  
23 Фирсов 2002, 151. 
24 Фирсов 2002, 151. 
25 Белякова 2004, 39. 
26 A literal translation from the ”Предсоборное присутсвие,” a body of the 
Russian Orthodox Church that prepared the Council of 1917–1918 that time. 
27  Possible causes for the Russian Revolution of 1905 were: the agrarian 
problem, the nationality problem and the labor problem. 
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reasons for dissolution of marriages, which undoubtedly was the most 
painful question that had a direct effect on the personal lives of believers. 
The preparatory period of the All-Russian Church Council was reflected 
in the canonical debates of bishops and canon lawyers in theological 
publications and in the Church press. Those involved brought forth a 
number of views and models for reforming Russia’s obsolete divorce and 
marriage law. Later, the All-Russian Church Council aimed to solve these 
problems and to find a new canonical model for married life in a new 
anti-religious society. Apart from traditional grounds for divorce, namely 
the adultery of a spouse as specified in Scripture, other proposed reasons 
given in the Pre-Council Presence were: the incapacity for conjugal 
relations, a disease which eliminated the possibility of conjugal relations 
and had a detrimental effect on the offspring (leprosy, syphilis, 
postnuptial madness, etc.); prolonged absence of one of the spouses; 
malicious abandonment by one of the spouses that lasted for five years or 
more; administrative exile decided by the court; and spousal abuse with 
the determination of guilt given by a civil court.28 
Despite the great amount of work carried out by the participants of the 
Pre-Council Presence in a relatively short period, its results were not 
utilized at the time, since in May 1907 Emperor Nicholas II decided to 
postpone the convening of the Council. The preparatory work of the 
Council resumed in 1912 when the Holy Synod established Pre-Conciliar 
meetings, but the Council did not met regularly and worked slowly. By 
the beginning of 1917, its work still remained unfinished. These events 
undoubtedly affected the history of the preparation of the All-Russian 
Church Council of 1917–1918. Strangely, the leaders and enthusiasts of 
this preparatory work did not know exactly when the actual Council 
would gather. The Revolution of February-March 1917, may have added a 
stimulus to the urgent setting up of the Council.29 
The Spring of 1917 was a decisive period in Pre-Conciliar history. On 
the one hand, the measures taken by the Holy Synod for the immediate 
preparation of the Council and the results of the work of the Pre-Conciliar 
Board made a special, albeit small step in the modern history of the 
Russian Church. On the other hand, the documentary heritage of the 
Board was transferred to the Office of the Council and became a part of 
the archives of the Council. The preparation for the Council was carried 
                                                
28 Фирсов 2002, 232. 
29 Кривошеева 2012, 6. 
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out primarily by the Holy Synod, the supreme body of ecclesiastical 
administration and the chief procurator of the Holy Synod. According to 
the decision of the ecclesiastical authority, the duty of immediate 
elaboration of materials for the Council was given to the Pre-Conciliar 
Board. The official publication of documents of the Pre-Conciliar Board 
became impossible after their meetings came to an end in September 
1918.30 
The All-Russian Church Council of 1917–1918 was the culmination of 
the reform movement in the Russian Orthodox Church, which had begun 
in 1905. The Council itself started to project a relaxed model of the strict 
divorce practice of that time. Just before the end of the Council, an 
amended decree on the rules on marriage was adopted. In the 
ecclesiastical law department of the Church Council of 1917–1918, an 
extensive discussion was held regarding the acceptable definitions of 
divorce matters. It is noteworthy that the Council’s academics, bishops, 
lawyers, procurators of the Holy Synod, and most of the clergy, supported 
extending legal reasons for divorce. At the same time they also supported 
partial transfer of the divorce process to the civil courts. The Council’s lay 
people, as well as the clergy from the countryside, forcefully opposed 
these reforms.31 
In ancient Russia, marriage was regulated by the law borrowed from 
the Church of Constantinople. Initially, all marital affairs, as we know 
from the first Russian Church statutes, were recognized in Russia as 
purely ecclesiastical. That was because the government at that time had 
neither a reason nor the means to introduce popular marriage customs 
into the institution of Christian marriage.32 Until the 18th century all 
marital matters were managed by the church. Under Peter the Great, the 
canons of the Church and its regulations were joined to civil law, 
including some partly new norms of marriage law in accordance with the 
State’s view. This “matrimonial model” was used in Russia until the early 
20th century.33 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russian marriage law, in 
comparison with that of other European countries, was strict. The State 
                                                
30 Кривошеева 2012, 6.  
31 Белякова 2004, 279–280. 
32 Павлов 1902, 325. 
33 Горчаков 1909, 249. 
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recognized only marriages between persons in the religious communities 
sanctioned by the State. Therefore, marriages between Old Believers34 
and other “dissenter”35 groups were prohibited. However, in 1874, a new 
form of marriage for dissenters was introduced into Russian civil law. 
These marriages were recorded in special parish registers that were 
managed by the State police. In the opinion of some Orthodox canon 
lawyers, this legal accommodation established the first civil marriages in 
Russia.36 
Divorces were difficult to obtain before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. 
From the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian 
divorce law was stricter than it was in Ancient Russia. The State granted 
divorces only with the support of the Holy Synod. The Department on 
Church Discipline took up reasons for divorce as one of its most 
important projects. Various plans to reform the divorce process 
continued to surface until 1916, after which they were introduced in the 
All-Russian Church Council of 1917–1918. The 1917 Revolution brought 
about many legal reforms in Russia, including reform of the old marriage 
law. On December 16, 1917, the Russian Central Executive Committee 
and the Council of People’s Commissars revised the law regarding divorce 
and civil marriage. The reformed law did not address the possible causes 
                                                
34  Old Believers (“староверы; старообрядцы”) are a religious group that 
separated after 1666 from the official Russian Orthodox Church as a protest 
against church reforms introduced by Patriarch Nikon between 1652 and 1666. 
Old Believers continue liturgical practices that the Russian Orthodox Church 
maintained before the implementation of these reforms. There are two major 
strains of Old Believers: “Priestless,” (“Безпоповцы”) – a group that rejects a 
number of sacraments of the Orthodox Church, such as the Eucharist, marriage 
and priesthood, and “Priested Ones” (“Поповцы”) – a group who recognize the 
same sacraments as the Orthodox Church. See Paert 2004, 556. 
35  The Russian term “раскольник,” which literally means “one who brings 
disorder,” is usually used in an official context when talking about Old Believers. 
It can be translated as dissenter, splitter or schismatic, ultimately meaning a 
member of a non-established church or a nonconformist. 
36 Heikkilä J. “Redefining the Legal and Canonical Role of the Old Believers 
Marriage in 19th Century Russia: A History of One Case.” – Suomen 
kirkkohistoriallisen seuran vuosikirja, 23–28. Vol. 103. Helsinki: SKHS. 2013; 
Белякова E. B. Церковный суд и проблемы церковной жизни. Москва. 2004, 
210. This debate led to the re–evaluation of the thoughts of two professors of 
Orthodox Canon law, Ilja Berdnikov and Nikolai Zaozerski on dissenters’ 
marriage. Their debate consisted of a total of six articles in the journals 
Orthodox Interlocutor and Theological Journal, between 1895 and 1897. 
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of divorce: it was enough that the two parties decided to divorce. This 
created a large discrepancy in existing practice, since marriage was a 
sacrament of the Orthodox Church. The Church was forced to deal with 
the State’s new divorce law, which it ended up protesting in the All-
Russian Church Council.37 
Eventually, the religious institution of marriage, which had been 
protected by the Russian judiciary from the eighteenth to the early 
twentieth centuries, was destroyed by the Revolution. Animosity toward 
traditional Christian family values would pervade the social climate in 
Russia, and the law and canonical practice of the Russian Orthodox 
Church came to reflect this. 
 
 
 
1.3  Study Task and Methods 
 
 
Reforms that changed the whole Russian State in 1721 affecting the 
Church’s canonical and juridical status for the entire Synodal period, and 
later during the early twentieth century’s social and church–cultural 
metamorphosis, raises some questions from the viewpoint of Orthodox 
canon law regarding marriage and divorce. In particular, how these 
questions were treated during the Pre-Conciliar period and in the All-
Russian Church Council of 1917–1918. We shall ask the following 
questions: 
 
1. What was the general marriage law in the Russian Empire at the 
beginning of the twentieth century? Did it have a canonical 
foundation? Did the Holy Synod decree regulations that conflicted 
with the matrimonial practice at that time? 
2. What were the canonical views of the preparatory commissions of 
the All-Russian Church Council, as well as the views on 
matrimonial matters of the General Council itself in 1917–1918? 
What matrimonial norms were eventually reformed? 
3. What type of foundation did the canons themselves, as well as 
their primary and contemporary commentaries, establish for 
matrimonial issues? How did Russian canonists at the time 
                                                
37 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 4–5. 
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interpret canons when marriage issues were considered? What 
was the relationship between interpretation and practice? Did the 
revised model of marriage differ significantly from the canonical 
tradition of the Orthodox Church? 
 
The second chapter of the study concentrates on matrimonial norms 
and divorce according to the canons of the Orthodox Church. This 
chapter will give an overall picture of canonical regulations regarding 
marriage and divorce.  
The third chapter studies the Russian legal practice on marriage and 
divorce at the beginning of twentieth century, including the introduction 
to the particular laws of the Russian Orthodox Church at that time.  
The fourth chapter analyzes the canonical views of the preparatory 
commissions of the All-Russian Church Council on matrimonial matters. 
The chapter is divided thematically to discuss the conditions for marriage 
and reasons for divorce. These conditions for marriage and reasons for 
divorce are analyzed from the canonical point of view, using primary 
Greek and contemporary Russian canonical commentaries from that 
time. Differences are examined as well.  
The fifth chapter studies the resolutions regarding marriage and 
divorce of the All-Russian Church Council, comparing them to the past 
decrees and practice of the Holy Synod. 
The study is limited to the period of 1900–1918, which is central to the 
practical reforms of matrimonial matters in the Russian Orthodox 
Church. The canonical perspective in the present study refers to canons, 
canonical commentaries and particular laws of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, which were constituted for the practical guidance and 
government of the Church and its members. When the canonical praxis 
of marriage and the particular Russian laws are analyzed in the present 
study, attention is paid to their original purpose, as well as how they were 
applied in practice. Only then is it possible to find a creative synthesis of 
the examples that are generally applicable to the matrimonial questions 
of the Orthodox Church.  
A thorough presentation of the history of matrimonial matters in 
Russia, patristic thoughts and as well the liturgical aspects of the 
matrimonial service are excluded from this study. The purpose of the 
study is not to give a unified canonico–dogmatical presentation on 
Orthodox marriage. Instead the study focuses on the subject’s recent 
history. 
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1.4  Methodology of the Study 
 
 
The present study takes a historical–analytical approach. The nature of 
the study combines historical, juridical and dogmatic perspectives on 
marriage in the context of the twentieth-century Russian Empire. The 
research strategy includes a number of different methods of use, which 
are selected for each specific research area or goal. The questions of this 
study are examined from the point of view of the canonical tradition of 
the Orthodox Church. The canonical regulations of marriage confront us 
with a dual problem:  
 
1. How did the Russian Orthodox Church understand the state law 
in relation to its own ecclesiastical law? 
2. How was the ancient canonical tradition concerning matrimonial 
issues interpreted in Russia?  
 
By examining the canonical views of matrimonial matters in the 
Russian Orthodox Church in the early 1900s, especially through secular 
laws and canonical commentaries, it is possible to create a picture of a 
canonical marriage model eventually formed in the Russian Orthodox 
Church after the General Council of 1917–1918. Therefore, for this study 
it is essential to analyze the canons which were used as a primary source 
for Russian marriage law. 
The purpose of this study of the primary source material and literature 
is to find an overall thematic structure which supports the whole data. 
The documents and decrees of the Holy Synod and the preparatory 
bodies of the General Council of 1917–1918 regarding matrimonial 
questions are the sources for this study. The material is taken from the 
Russian Federation State Archive (ГАРФ) and the Russian Historical 
State Archives (РГИА). The information provided by literature explores 
the study of canon law, especially concerning marriage issues.  
The canons of the Orthodox Church are used to assess the sources of 
this study. English translations of the canons of the first seven 
ecumenical councils are collected from the second series, volume 14 of 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, edited by Philip Schaff and Henry 
Wace. English translations of Apostolic canons, the canons of the local 
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councils and Holy Fathers, are collected from the Rudder.38 Translations 
of canons and their commentaries into English are also checked against 
the original Greek sources; canonical commentaries however are 
collected almost exclusively from the Greek source, Syntagma of Canons, 
compiled by G. Ralles and M. Pottles between 1852 and1859. 39  The 
Syntagma includes the Nomokanon of Fourteen Titles 40  with the 
commentary of Balsamon, 41  the Alphabetical Collection of Matthew 
Blastares,42 Apostolic canons,43 the canons of the Holy Fathers,44 the 
                                                
38 In Greek Πηδάλιον, is a collection of canons with the commentaries of Saint 
Nicodemus of the Holy Mountain. It was translated into English in 1957 by D. 
Cummings. 
39  Σύνταγµα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων τῶν τε ἁγίων καὶ πανευφήµων 
Ἀποστόλων, καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν Οἰκουµενικῶν Συνόδων καὶ τῶν κατὰ µέρος ἁγίων 
Πατέρων, ἐκδοθέν, σὺν πλείσταις ἄλλαις τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν κατάστασιν 
διεπούσαις διατάξεσι, µετὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐξηγητῶν, καὶ διαφόρων ἀναγνωσµάτω, 
is an extensive body of the main sources of the Byzantine canon law, published 
in Athens in 1852–1859 by two Greek scholars – lawyers Γ. Ράλλη (1804–1883) 
and M. Ποτλῆ (1812–1863). The first volume contains Nomokanon of Fourteen 
Titles with the commentaries of Theodore Balsamon. The second volume the 
Apostolic canons and canons of the ecumenical councils, with the addition of the 
rules of the 869 and 879 Synod of Constantinople, with the commentaries of 
Balsamon, Zonaras and Arsitenos. The third volume contains the canons of the 
local synods, the fourth volume the canons of the Holy Fathers with the 
commentaries of the aforementioned exegetes. The fifth volume contains the 
conciliar decisions of archbishops and the patriarchs of Constantinople and the 
novellas of the Byzantine Emperors, as well as answers, letters, and information 
on various canonical issues. The sixth volume contains The Alphabetical 
Collection of Matthew Blastares. The textual basis of the Σύνταγµα is the 
manuscript of the National Library of Athens of the Trebizond Codex of 1311, 
against which all canonical editions appearing until 1852 were compared. Ohme 
2012, 27. 
40 Compilations of secular laws (nomoi) and ecclesiastical regulations (kanones). 
The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 1490–1491. 
41 Theodore Balsamon (born in Constantinople between ca. 1130 and 1140 and 
died after 1195) was a canonist, patriarchal nomophylax and chartophylax, and 
the patriarch of Antioch (although he remained in Constantinople). The Oxford 
Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 249. 
42 Σύνταγµα κατά στοιχεῖον [του Ματθαίου Βλάσταρη] is a canonical collection 
made by Matthew Blastares in 1335. The author arranged his matter in 
alphabetical order. He made 24 general divisions, each marked off by a letter of 
the Greek alphabet. These sections he then subdivided into 303 titles. Matthew 
Blastares was a canonist and theologian, monk and priest in the monastery of 
Kyr Isaac in Thessalonika; he died in Thessalonika after 1346. The Oxford 
Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 295. 
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canons of the local synods45 and the canons of the first seven ecumenical 
councils 46  with the commentaries of Zonaras, 47  Balsamon and 
Aristenos,48 Byzantine exegetes of ecclesiastical rules. It also includes a 
number of letters (encyclicals) of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, 
resolving some canonical problems regarding marriage. Civil law 
collections of the Byzantine Empire like Basilika, 49  Procheiron, 50 
                                                                                                                    
43 Κανόνες τῶν Ἀποστόλων is, a collection of 85 canons, whose authorship is 
attributed to Apostles; they form an appendix to the Apostolic Constitutions. The 
Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 141. 
44 The canons of the Holy Fathers according to the Rudder include rules from: 
Saint Dionysius the Alexandrian († 265), Saint Gregory of Neocaesarea († ca. 
270), Saint Peter the Martyr († 311), Canonical Epistles of Saint Athanasius the 
Great († 373), Saint Basil the Great († 379), Saint Gregory of Nyssa († 394), Saint 
Gregory of Nazianzus († 390), Saint Amphilochius of Iconium († ca. 394–403), 
Saint Timothy of Alexandria († 384), Saint Theophilus of Alexandria († 412), 
Saint Cyril of Alexandria († 444), the Canonical Epistle of Saint Gennadius of 
Constantinople († 471), Saint John the Faster († 595), the Canonical Epistle of 
Saint Tarasius of Constantinople († 806), Saint Nicephorus the Confessor († 
828) and canonical questions and answers concerning the Patriarch Nicholas († 
1152). 
45 Local councils included the following synods in: Ancyra (314 AD), Neocaesarea 
(ca. 314–315 AD), Gangra (340 AD), Antioch (341 AD), Laodicaea (ca. 363–364 
AD), Sardica (343 AD), Constantinople (382 AD) and Carthage (397 AD).  
46 The First Seven Ecumenical Councils are: First Council of Nicaea (325 AD), 
First Council of Constantinople (381 AD), Council of Ephesus (431 AD), Council 
of Chalcedon (451 AD), Second Council of Constantinople (553 AD), Third 
Council of Constantinople (680 AD), Second Council of Nicaea (787 AD). 
47 John Zonaras (died probably after 1159) was a historian, canonist, theologian 
and high–ranking official at the court of Alexios I. The Oxford Dictionary of 
Byzantium 1991, 2229. 
48 Alexios Aristenos was a mid twentieth century canonist. Under Emperor John 
II Komenos, Aristenos wrote a commentary on the Nomokanon that probably 
antedated that of Zonaras. The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 169. 
49 Basilika (τὰ Βασιλικά) is an extensive collection of Byzantine [imperial] laws 
divided into six volumes or 60 books, begun under Emperor Basil I and 
completed in the first years of the reign of Leo VI. The Oxford Dictionary of 
Byzantium 1991, 265. 
50 Procheiros Nomos (Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος), literarily, “Handbook,” or “The Law 
Ready at Hand,” is a Byzantine law book divided into 40 titles that used to be 
dated to 870–879, but must be regarded as a revision of the Epanagoge ordered 
by Leo VI in 907. The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 1725. 
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Ekloga, 51  and Epanagoge 52  are used to demonstrate how the 
ecclesiastical regulations and the Byzantine civil law influenced each 
other concerning matrimonial matters. They were brought up as well in 
the commentaries of Russian canonists. In this study Byzantine civil law 
is also referred to in cases where there is a need to crystallize various 
aspects of matrimonial matters. 
 
 
 
1.5  A Note on Terminology 
 
 
When considering matrimonial issues, especially divorce, it should be 
noted that Roman law uses both, divorce and dissolution, in reference to 
the termination of marriage. This is the case in the Digest of Justinian, 
where it is said that “Marriage is dissolved by divorce, death, captivity, or 
other kind of slavery of either of the parties.”53 The word divorce is 
derived either from the diversity of views it involves or because those who 
dissolve their marriage go in different ways.54 Hence, “divorce” applies to 
the procedural act. “Dissolution” is used after the fact, to describe a 
marriage which has dissolved as a result of an impediment which could 
make the marriage null or external circumstances which impede the 
realization of the aims of marriage, such as captivity of one of the 
spouses, prenuptial impotence or an infectious disease which could make 
the marriage nullifiable. Acts caused by one of the spouses, such as 
adultery or the prolonged absence in Roman law, may entitle the 
aggrieved spouse to initiate the procedure for a judicial act of divorce, 
which may result in the dissolution of the marriage. The term divorce 
(развод) can be found in Russian literature and even in manuals on 
canon and civil law as if it was synonymous with dissolution 
                                                
51 Ekloga (Ἐκλογὴ [τῶν νόµων]) literarily “selection of the laws,” a Byzantine law 
book divided into 18 titles, issued in March 741 by Leo III and Constantine V. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 672. 
52 Epanagoge (Ἐπαναγωγή) literarily means “Return to the Point,” a Byzantine 
law book of the emperors Basil I, Leo VI, and Alexander, divided into 40 titles. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 703–704. 
53 Dig. XXIV, 2, 1. Watson 1985, Vol. 2, 714. 
54 Dig. XXIV, 2, 2. Watson 1985, Vol. 2, 714. 
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(расторжение). However, the Charter of Diocesan Consistories (Устав 
духовных консистории) uses it more precisely. The term “divorce” is 
used only in two instances as grounds for dissolution: adultery and 
prenuptial impotence.55  
“Dissolution” is applied to all other terminations of marriage except in 
the case of death, and is even used to terminate an invalid or illegal 
marriage. This distinction is very important in determining whether the 
ecclesiastical court was acting as one of the judicial parts of the 
government, or whether it was carrying out the pastoral function of the 
Church.56 This can be seen especially in the fact that claims of adultery 
could have a dual purpose: either private prosecution of the party who 
was guilty of adultery, or these claims were intended to dissolve the 
marriage and were subjected to ecclesiastical punishment.57 
 
 
 
1.6  An Overview of the Most Important Sources 
  
 
“РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 422” (Журналы заседаний Совещания о 
пересмотре поводов к расторжению браков и проект устава о 
расторжений браков и признаний браков незаконними и 
недействительними) Fund 796, Register 445, Case 422 is a collection of 
materials from the Russian State Historical Archives from the meeting of 
May 11–13, 1917, treats the review of reasons for divorce and the project 
of rules for divorces and recognition of some marriages as illegal and 
invalid. Archive materials are divided into two parts: the project of rules 
and the memorandum of the debate between different academics, doctors 
and theologians about the foregoing case.  
“РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417” (Журналы заседаний Совещания 
по выработке законопроекта о поводах к разводу и материалы к 
нему) is a collection of materials from the Russian State Historical 
                                                
55 Article 241, 245. Устав духовных консистории 1843, 92–93. However, Article 
256 of the Charter of Diocesan Consistories speaks about dissolution of the 
marriage if impotence or adultery is proven. Устав духовных консистории 
1843, 96. 
56 Smirensky 1995, 83–84. 
57 Победоносцев 2003, 103. 
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Archives, dated January 1908 – 1917, concerning a special meeting of the 
Holy Synod to discuss the question of grounds for divorce. Some projects 
had been sent to the Holy Synod as early as 1907, but as Fund 796, 
Register 445, Case 417 suggests, their handling started in 1908. This file 
also contains an important canonical study of Professor Ilja Berdnikov 
(1839–1915), who published his findings in the study “Concerning the 
Question of the Reason for Divorce” on March 5, 1909, regarding the 
draft of a special meeting of the Holy Synod in 1907.  
“РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227.” (Журналы заседаний 
Междуведомственной комиссий Предсоборного Совещания о 
выработке проекта устава о расторжении браков и признаний их 
незаконными и неидействительными) is a collection of materials from 
the Russian State Historical Archives from January 16–20, 1916, 
considering a Pre-Conciliar meeting of the Interdepartmental 
Commissions on the drafting of the statute of divorces and the 
recognition of some marriages as illegal and invalid. This archive file is 
primarily a continuation from the previous meeting. The 43–page–long 
material is a diary of the debate about the final form of the foregoing 
project. 
“РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780.” (Определение Собора 
Православной Российской Церкви по поводу декретов о 
расторжении браков и о гражданском браке) is a collection of 
materials from the Russian State Historical Archives, which holds the 
definitions of the All-Russian Church Council on the decrees of 
dissolution of marriages and civil marriage. The material differs from all 
the previous material in that the source of the decrees was the Holy 
Synod and the supreme head of the Church, the Patriarch himself. These 
decrees were issued between March 4 and September 17, 191858 and were 
the final legislations of the Church, before the repressions of the 
Bolshevik government began.  
“ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 316.” (Протоколы заседаний Отдела о 
церковной Суде) is a collection of protocols during the meetings of the 
Department on Church Discipline from August 29, 1917 – April 19, 1918. 
These protocols contain discussion about kinship and affinity. These 
protocols are from the Russian Federation State Archive.  
                                                
58 It should be noted that the decree regarding dissolution of marriages and 
about civil marriage, first introduced on March 4 and approved on March 10, 
1918, can be also found in ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. Оп. 1. Д. 264, 22–23. 
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“ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264.” (Запросы с мест о порядке 
расторжения церковных браков), materials about the general 
regulations on dissolution and invalidation of marriages that have been 
blessed by the Church. This file is stored in the Russian Federation State 
Archive and considers the period August 17–20, 1918. Журналы и 
протоколы Высочайше учрежденного Предсоборного 
Присутствия is a four–part book series containing the material of the 
Pre-Conciliar Presence from 1906–1907. The present study uses the 
fourth part of the book from 1907, which concentrates on matrimonial 
issues. 
Сборник церковных и гражданских законов о браке и разводе, 
узаконение, усыновление и внебрачные дети, a collection of 
ecclesiastical and civil laws on marriage and divorce, legalization, 
adoption and illegitimate children, compiled by S. P. Grigorovski 
(Григоровский, С. П.). It comes with the additions and clarifications to 
the circular or individual decrees of the Holy Synod, a separate article 
about kinship and affinity and an attached table which presents degrees 
of kinship up to 1908. Циркулярные Указы Святейшаго 
Правительствующаго Синода 1867–1900, circular decrees of the 
Holy Synod between the period 1867–1900. A collection of separately 
printed decrees by which the Holy Synod informed institutions and 
individuals within its jurisdiction. The collection consists of imperial 
commands, new laws, instructional rules and administrative orders of the 
Holy Synod. The book was compiled by A. Zavyjalov. 
Алфавитный указатель действующих и руководственных 
канонических постановлений, указов, определений и распоряжений 
Святейшего Правительствующего Синода, an alphabetical index 
and guide to existing canonical regulations, decrees, rulings and civil laws 
concerning the Office of Orthodox confession and the orders of the Holy 
Synod between 1721–1901. The collection was compiled by S. V. 
Kalashnikov, whose other work Сборник духовных и гражданских 
законов по делам брачным и о законности рождения, a collection of 
spiritual and civil laws regarding marriage cases and about the legitimacy 
of birth, is also used in this study.   
“РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 115–123.” (О разрешении…) is a collection 
of nine cases from the Russian State Historical Archives regarding 
different matrimonial issues that were observed in the Holy Synod 
between the end of 1917 and the end of 1918. The cases were: permission 
to enter into a fourth marriage; permission to marry a sister of his 
brother’s wife; permission to marry a sister of a brother–in–law; 
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permission to marry a cousin; permission to marry the sister of a 
deceased wife; permission to marry a niece of a deceased wife; 
permission to marry a deceased wife’s nephew’s widow;  and permission 
to marry the widow of a brother.  
“РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 456.” (О Выработке новых правил 
делопроизводство по расторжению церковных браков, с целью 
облегчение бракоразводного процесса), considers the development of 
new rules on the dissolution of religious marriages, with the aim of 
facilitating the divorce process. This material, collected from the Russian 
State Historical Archives, contains a manual of rules regarding revoking 
the blessing of a religious marriage and a new edition of the fourth 
chapter, third section of the Charter of Diocesan Consistories regarding 
the dissolution of marriages. 
 
 
 
1.7  Significance of the Study 
 
 
The scientific, social and ecclesiastical innovation of the documentary 
and creative heritage of the All-Russian Church Council is an urgent and 
still uncompleted task. The subject under discussion is innovative both 
nationally and internationally, since there are no critical studies from the 
canonical point of view which consider the matrimonial issues of the 
Council of 1917–1918 and its preparatory commissions. This work will 
provide new information on rarely studied issues and will hopefully serve 
as a guide in situations where matrimonial questions relating to the 
Orthodox Church are discussed in the 21st century. This study will 
hopefully illustrate the field of Russian civil law and its jurisdictional 
relation of matrimonial questions during the 20th century as well. The 
commissions, meetings and working groups of the preparatory period of 
the Council of 1917–1918 included a number of canon law scholars and 
professors from religious academies and universities. Their opinions 
provided in-depth interpretations of Orthodox canon law which are still, 
for the most part, unknown in the academic world to this day. 
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2. THE FOUNDATION, CONDITIONS AND 
IMPEDIMENTS FOR ENTERING INTO 
MARRIAGE AND NORMS FOR DIVORCE IN 
THE CANON LAW OF THE ORTHODOX 
CHURCH 
 
2.1  The Nature of Marriage 
 
 
One can be justified in saying that marriage is without doubt the most 
important institution of family law, including ecclesiastical institutions. 
Marriage, as a complex social phenomenon comprises several facets: 
biological, moral, legal, economic, and religious.59  Human and salvation 
history begins and ends with marriage, as can be seen in the Bible. From 
the first couple, Adam and Eve, this history ends with marriage between 
the Bride and the Lamb (Rev. 19:7–960). The Orthodox Church interprets 
this as earthly marriage fulfilled in heaven, showing the eternal nature of 
the sacrament.61 
As a sacrament, marriage joins husband and wife in the image of the 
mystery of the union of Christ with His Church for full communion of 
undivided life and shares with them the gifts of God’s grace. Saint 
Gregory the Theologian says: “it is good for a wife to honor Christ in the 
person of her husband, and for her husband not to disgrace the Church in 
the person of his wife.” Marriage, according to Saint John Chrysostomos, 
                                                
59 Бондач 2009, 127. 
60 The Orthodox Study Bible gives us the following interpretation: “The Church 
is betrothed to Christ by faith. She awaits the coming of the Bridegroom for the 
marriage supper of the Lamb, the final eschatological union of Christ and His 
Church.” Orthodox Study Bible 2008, 626. 
61 For Orthodox Christians marriage is a sacrament. It is defined through the 
prayers and actions of Orthodox wedding rites and through them the Church 
proclaims the presence of Christ in the Spirit and believes that it is the Lord who 
unites a man and a woman in a life of mutual love. The Sanctity of Marriage 
1978, 318; Никодим 1897, 573. 
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is “the mysterious image of the Church and Christ.” It was fulfilled in the 
Church from its very origin (Ephesians 5:22–24; 1 Corinthians 7:39).62  
The perfecter of the sacramental rite of marriage is a bishop or 
presbyter. Entering into the marriage, the bride and the groom in front of 
the priest and the Church make a promise of mutual fidelity. The priest 
asks God’s grace for them in everything and the blessings of fertility and 
Christian parenting. The necessity of a priestly blessing of marriage in the 
ancient Church is testified by Saint Basil the Great, Saint Gregory the 
Theologian, Saint John Chrysostomos, Hieromartyr Methodios of Patara 
and other fathers of the Church as well.63 
Hieromartyr Ignatius of Antioch in his Letter to Hieromartyr 
Polycarpos, Bishop of Smyrna wrote: “But those who marry and get 
married should enter into alliance with the approval of the bishop, so that 
the marriage was in the Lord and not in lust.” Marriages that are not 
made known to the Church community, according to Tertullian, were 
equal to fornication and adultery; “True marriage,” he says, “was 
undertaken in the front of the Church, sanctified with the prayer and 
fastened with the Eucharist.”64 Saint Basil the Great wrote “adultery is 
not a marriage, or even the beginning of marriage.”65 In the time when 
Saint Basil wrote this rule, there was not yet a legalized binding form of 
marriage, as a conditio sine qua non.66 
                                                
62 Православная энциклопедия 2003, T. VI, 147.  
63 Православная энциклопедия 2003, T. VI, 148. The Roman Catholic Church’s 
teaching on seven sacraments, which also includes marriage, was adopted in the 
Council of Trent (1545–1563). It refers to the resolution of the second Council of 
Lyons (1274) and the Council of Florence (1439). In the Latin rite, ministers of 
the sacrament of marriage are considered to be celebrant themselves, when the 
priest or deacon serve as “assistants.” If there is no priest, then the “assistant” 
can be a lay person delegated by the bishop. In special cases (e.g. under threat of 
death), marriage may be concluded exceptionally in front of witnesses; such a 
marriage is also considered valid by the Roman Catholic Church. Here we should 
also note that the Eastern Catholic Churches have the same doctrine and practice 
as the Orthdodox Churches. 
64 Православная энциклопедия 2003, T. VI, 150. 
65 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 159. 
66 Павлов 1897, 199–200. However, the civil law given by Balsamon in the 
interpretation of Basil the Great, canon 6 allowed for the possibility of 
considering as a valid marriage those sexual unions which started without any 
formalities, as simple affairs, but in their continuation received external signs of 
legitimate marriage. Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 109. 
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All other norms concerning family life are regulated by various 
consequences of marriage or different aspects of marital life. In the 
Roman world marriage was an agreement between two parties. To have 
the character of marriage, the union of a man and a woman should 
receive a public vocation. For this reason it was necessary that the 
marriage was publicly contracted with the knowledge and consent of the 
concerned parties, in compliance with the form established in the law or 
custom.67 The best way to summarize Roman marital law is the following 
principle: “It is not coitus that makes marriage, but consent” (nuptias 
non concubitus, sed consensus facit).68  
Later the Roman marital law was accepted by the Christian Church. A 
good example of this can be found in Title 12, Chapter 13 of the 
Nomokanon in Fourteen Titles of Patriarch Photios, where marriage as 
the “optimal” (τά µάλιστα) is defined as “a union of man and woman, an 
association for an entire lifetime, a communion of both divine and 
human law” (γάµος ἐςὶν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συνάφεια, καὶ συγκλήρωσις 
πάσης τῆς ζωῆς, θείου τε και ἀνθρωπίνου δικαίου κοινωνία).69  These 
three facts are taken from the teaching of non-Christian Roman lawyer 
Modestinus: “Nuptiae sunt conjunctio maris et foeminae, consortium 
omnis vitae, juris divini et humani communicatio.”70 The first point of the 
definition (Nuptiae sunt conjunctio maris et foeminae) points to the 
natural aspect of marriage. The second point (consortium omnis vitae) 
indicates the domestic and public aspect, and the third point (divini et 
humani juris communicatio) demonstrates the legal side of the marriage. 
This meant that in the marriage contract, a woman acquired personal and 
material rights within the husband’s family and joined the religious cult 
of his household.71  
                                                
67 Бердников 1913, 312. This is also the case in canon 1 of Laodikeia, where the 
canon states that marriage should be concluded freely and legally (ἐλευθέρως καὶ 
νοµίµως). Ράλλη 1853, T. III, 171. 
68 Meyendorff 2000, 16. 
69 Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 271. This exact paragraph is also cited in 28 title, 4.1 chapter 
of Basilika. Zhisman 1864, 93: see the translation in Viscuso 2008, 91. 
Epanagoge 16 title, 1 chapter gives us the following definition: “γάµος ἐστίν 
ἁνδρός καί γυναικός συνάφεια καί συγκλήρςσις πάσης τῆς ζωῆς εἲτε δἰ εὐλογίας 
εἲτε διά στεφανώµατος ᾔ διά συµβολαίου.” Zachariae 1852, 106. 
70 This reference is also given in the Digests of Justinian. Павлов 1902, 317. 
71 A woman who lived in a legal marriage with a man for one year came under her 
husband’s authority. However, if the woman did not wish to remain under her 
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Thus, the aforementioned definition of an old pagan Roman marital 
law was formally adopted in Byzantine legal works and in the canonical 
collections of the Church: in the Syntagma of Matthew Blastares,72 in 
the commentaries of Basil the Great73 and in the Slavic version of the 
Nomokanon, Kormtšaja Kniga,74 adopted from the Procheiron nomos, a 
collection of laws of Basil the Macedonian.75 Judging by the character of 
the aforementioned Roman law, some canonists have even held that it 
was compiled under Christian influence and did not represent the 
authentic development of Roman pagan law.76 Indeed, in this definition 
are indicated all the essential features of marriage as an institution, 
which has its foundation in the very nature of man.  
In the first place, this law specified the natural or physical nature of 
marriage – the difference between the sexes that is established by nature 
with the purpose of becoming one, is a fact without which the human race 
could not continue to live and exist. This marital connection in 
Modestinus’ teaching represents the union of one man with one woman. 
                                                                                                                    
husband’s authority, she had every year to leave her husband’s house for three 
days. Бердников 1913, 317. 
72 Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 153–154. 
73 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 472–473; Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 188–189. 
74 Kormtšaja Kniga defines marriage as follows: “Брак есть мужеви и женe 
сочетание, и сoбытие во всей жизни, божественныя же и человеческия 
правды общение.” [Marriage is a partnership of husband and wife and a 
lifetime bond; it is the union of divine and human truth] (Громогласов 1907, 
72.) Kormtšaja Kniga (Кормчая книга), the “Book of the Rudder,” was the 
foundation of canon law in Slavic countries; in Russia it was used until the 
eighteenth century. After the reform of Peter the Great it was replaced with the 
Charter of Spiritual Consistories. For a complete study of Kormtšaja Kniga, see 
Zuzek, Ivan. Kormcaja Kniga. Studies on the Chief Code of Russian Canon Law. 
Roma, 1964; Павлов, А. С. 50–я глава Кормчей книги, как исторический и 
практический источник русского брачного права. Москва, 1887; 
Громогласов, И. M. Определения брака в Кормчей и значение их при 
исследовании вопроса о форме христинаского бракозаключения. Москва, 
1908. 
75  It should be noted that canonist A. S. Pavlov in his book A Course in 
Ecclesiastical Law refers to the fact that the fourth title, the first chapter of the 
Procheiron, was the 49th chapter of the Kormtšaja Kniga, whereas in I. M. 
Gromoglasov’s study of the same law it is given as the 48th chapter. Павлов 
1902, 317; Громогласов 1908, 35. 
76 Громогласов 1908, 36. For a complete historical–canonical study of this law, 
see Zhisman 1864, 93. 
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Second, this definition also states the ethical nature of marriage, 
which consists in full and unbroken communion between spouses and, in 
particular, the communion of religion and law, which is possible only in 
the union of one man and one woman. The Church, adopting this 
definition in the Nomokanon, based it on the direct regulations of the 
positive law of God and gave it honorable Christian meaning, as the 
canonist Pavlov notes.77 
Finally, divine revelation clearly shows us that marriage is blessed by 
God and the married couple is the image of Christ and the Church 
(Genesis 2:22–24, Matthew 19:4–6, Mark 10:6–8; Ephesians 5:22–33). 
Where the Roman lawyers took into consideration only the realization of 
a marriage contract, the practice of priestly blessing of marriage and the 
early Church Fathers’ teaching of marriage as a mystery became the 
foundation of the Orthodox Church’s teaching about marriage as a 
sacrament. At the end of the twelfth century, Church father and canonist 
Theodore Balsamon considered spouses to be both participants in a 
sacrament and the subjects of marital relations. His theological teachings 
of marriage are summarized in Patrick Viscuso’s study Theodore 
Balsamon’s Canonical Images of Women as follows:  
 
Marriage was characterized as the sharing of one human nature 
by two hypostases with more or less the same soul. Female and 
male were viewed as possessing human nature according to a 
particular mode of existence (τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως), two different 
realizations of humanity, with distinct characteristics that at once 
unite and distinguish them in their hypostatic relations. The 
hypostases of male and female after the marital union manifested 
their continued existence by a difference of sexual roles and 
functions, different modes of existence for the same humanity; 
and yet were united by these very same functions through their 
marital relations in which they mutually partook of their common 
human nature.78 
 
There is no doubt that the ancient Church regarding the direct 
instruction of Apostle Paul, “This is a great mystery: but I speak 
concerning Christ and the Church” (Ephesus 5:32), always saw in 
marriage one of the sacraments of the new covenant, i. e., a Christian way 
                                                
77 Павлов 1902, 318. 
78 Viscuso 2005, 318. 
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of life that must be made under the redeeming grace of Christ. This 
reality of Christian marriage cannot be reduced to Roman legalism – it is 
a choice and the task given to spouses to metamorphose their marital 
agreement into the reality of the Kingdom.79 The Church was not granted 
any definite form by which to celebrate marriages as a sacrament, it only 
confirmed the law of marriage as a union joining husband and wife in one 
flesh. This law had been spoken by the Creator of the world through the 
mouth of the first created man, whose wife was bone of his bones and 
flesh of his flesh (Genesis 2:23–24, Matthew 19:5–6).80 In this sense, the 
Church always believed that the union between man and women has its 
own foundation in the divine plan of the creation of the world. The 
creation of the first human couple is the beginning of mankind and a 
union which should remain unchanged for all time.81 
Thus the natural nature of marriage as defined by this law in the sense 
of an indissoluble union of two and only two people of different sexes, 
remained the same in the New Testament. Rebellion against God, i. e., 
sin, is a reality as long as man lives in the present “fallen world.” This is 
understood by the Church and that is why the “mystery” of the Kingdom 
disclosed in marriage, to which the apostle Paul refers, is not reduced in 
Orthodox practice to a set of legal rules, as John Meyendorff notes. 
Without appreciating the eschatological dimension in the 
correspondence of apostle Paul (“Time is short, so that from now on, 
those who have wives should be as though they had none” 1 Corinthians 
7:29), the canonical rules of the Orthodox Church would be impossible to 
understand. 82  However, true understanding and justified disdain of 
human weakness are possible only in such cases if the absolute norm of 
the New Testament’s doctrine of marriage is recognized as a sacrament, 
Meyendorff concludes.83    
 
 
                                                
79 Meyendorff 2000, 18. 
80  Павлов 1887, 57. Gen. 2:24 is interpreted in the Orthodox Church as 
prefiguring the mystery of the union of Christ and the Church. Stylianopoulos 
1977, 282. 
81 Павлов 1902, 318. 
82 Meyendorff 1990, 99. 
83 Meyendorff 2000, 20. 
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2.2 The Jurisdiction of Legislation on Matrimonial 
Matters 
 
 
We have above viewed both the natural-legal and moral-religious aspects 
of Christian marriage. Marriage is determined by legislation, but the 
moral and religious aspect of marriage concerns the unrevealed, spiritual 
side of man and his conscience, and this is a spiritual or ecclesiastical 
matter. The purely civil, secular elements of marriage are determined 
exclusively by secular or civil authorities, but the jurisdiction of the 
legislation on matrimonial matters is divided between the Church and the 
state. 84   In the early times of the Church and for several centuries, 
marriage had a civil meaning and was subject to civil jurisdiction, with no 
direct relationship to the Church. Roman legislation concerning marriage 
was jus sacrum [sacred right], when the marriage was concluded per 
confarreationem [marriage through a religious rite, involving a sacrifice], 
and then when confarreatio had gone out of use, Roman legislation on 
marriage was exclusively civil.85 
Christians entered into religious marriage under the existing civil 
laws. Only if a marriage conformed to the requirements of the law, if 
there was legitimum, justum matrimonium (legitimate, valid marriage], 
was it recognized by the Church.  A Christian marriage did not have a 
civil meaning in the Roman State and was considered in the eyes of the 
law to be non-existent. In order for a Christian marriage to have civil 
effects, it needed to be concluded according to the requirements of civil 
law, regardless of the Church’s blessing. Under these circumstances, the 
Church itself offered to its faithful a civil marriage to maintain  proper 
political relations with the state, and afterwards the Church faithful could 
receive a blessing for their marriage from the priests.86 
Canon 102 of the Council of Carthage (407) ordered the emperor to 
enact a law which prohibited self-imposed separated couples from 
entering into new marriages.87 In such a case where the Church took the 
initiative to publish norms of marriage law, it acted in the belief that the 
                                                
84 Павлов 1902, 323–324. 
85 Горчаков 1909, 249. 
86 Никодим 1897, 575. 
87 Ράλλη 1853, T. III, 548. 
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State would approve published norms, as was usually the case. It is also a 
well-known fact that all the norms adopted by the Eastern Church 
concerning divorce law were established by secular, not ecclesiastical 
legislation, that is, by the legislation of Justinian.88 In the fifth century, 
Emperor Justinian took the first step towards concordance of civil 
marriage with ecclesiastical marriage regarding the marital relations of 
middle class persons in the Roman State. Leaving upper class persons 
with the old formalities of the civil law the right to marry as before for 
without any formalities, Justinian allowed middle class persons to go to 
the Church and make a statement about their intention to enter into 
marriage for the ekdikos [ecclesiastical lawyer].89 
After this Justinian law, religious marriage gradually started to spread 
in the Byzantine-Roman State.90 Eventually in 893 Emperor Leo the Wise 
published Constitution 89, which made marriages blessed by the Church 
solely legal ones, stating that “marriages shall not be confirmed without 
the sacred benediction.”91 In 1095 the law was extended by Emperor 
Alexios I Komenos by Constitution 35 to involve marriages of the poor as 
well (which had not been not included in Leo’s Constitution 89).92 In 
                                                
88 Павлов 1902, 324; Бердников 1913, 327. 
89 Никодим 1897, 575. Ekdikos (in Greek Έκδικος) was an ecclesiastical lawyer 
in the Byzantine Empire. 
90Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος IV, 5–19. Zachariae 1837, 27–30. 
91 Zachariae 1857, 185. Constitution 89 declares that: “Just as antiquity neglected 
the general formalities of adoption, which it considered an important act, 
although it allowed it to take place without the offering of prayer and the 
celebration of sacred rites, so also, it appeared to have neglected the most 
important part of marriage, since it permitted it to be consummated without the 
bestowal of the nuptial benediction. But while the ancients may, perhaps, have 
had good reason for doing this, We, aided by Divine grace, have preferred to 
adopt a mode of life much more honorable and holy, and have not failed to 
observe the things above mentioned. Therefore, as We have directed that prayers 
shall accompany the act of adoption, We desire that marriage shall likewise be 
confirmed by the bestowal of the holy benediction, so that if anyone should be 
married without it, he cannot be said to have entered the matrimonial state, or to 
enjoy its rights. For there is no medium between marriage and celibacy which 
should not be considered reprehensible. Have you a desire to embrace conjugal 
life? If you do, it will be necessary for you to observe the laws relating to 
marriage. Do the annoyances of the marriage state deter you? You may live 
unmarried, but do not disgrace matrimony, and conceal your faults under the 
mask of a spurious celibacy.” Scott 1932, 277. 
92 Zachariae 1857, 404. 
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1306 Patriarch of Constantinople Athanasios I and Еmperor Andronikos 
II Palaiologos established perpetually in Constitution 26 that a marriage 
could not be contracted without the blessing of a parish priest.93 Thus 
Christian marriage had ecclesiastical and civil value; therefore the 
contracting of marriages naturally came under the control of the Church, 
which had the right to give or withhold its blessing for one or the other 
party.94 
Regarding fundamental competence in marital legislation, the decree 
of Patriarch Athanasiоs and Emperor Andronikos, developed in some 
countries into а particular private law. This was also the case in Russia, 
where Church and State authorities worked together in the formation of 
marriage law. One of the most known Orthodox canonists, Nikodim 
Milaš, Bishop of Dalmatia, summarized his views on matrimonial law in 
the Orthodox Christian State as follows: 
 
1. To the Church belongs the right to decree rules regarding 
marriage matters, but it recognizes the right of the State in regard 
to civil and, in particular, the economic aspects of marriage 
contracts. 
2. The State cannot overrule a marriage recognized by the Church. 
3. Only the Church has the right to recognize the marriage as valid 
or invalid as a sacrament. The State has the right to evaluate a 
marriage only as a social contract. 
4. In matters of marriage impediments, the Church and the State act 
in harmony and the regulations of one side are obligatory for the 
other.95 
 
 
 
2.3  Internal Condition for Concluding Marriage 
 
 
In the notion of Orthodox marriage in civil relations, but also as a 
sacrament, the first and most essential condition regarding marriage is 
                                                
93 Zachariae 1857, 632. 
94 Никодим 1897, 577. 
95 Никодим 1897, 577. 
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internal consent, συναίνεσις, consensus. 96  This is how a man and a 
woman, in a manner recognized by law, express their free will to enter 
into a marital union. Therefore, marriage is considered to be contracted 
at the moment when the will of a man and a woman externally express 
that their decision is made in consensus. In order for this free consent to 
be the essential foundation of marriage, it must correspond to all the 
requirements of the law, and above all, that the contracting parties 
possess all the necessary moral and physical qualities.97 When all these 
moral and physical qualities exist and when mutual consent has been 
expressed in the established form, only then does this mutual agreement 
serve as the basis of marriage and correspond to its internal condition. 
This first condition is associated with a second, namely the complete lack 
of any impediments to entering into marriage recognized by ecclesiastical 
(and civil) authorities. These are the so-called marriage obstacles. They 
can occur due to lack of conditions, without which the marriage is not 
possible.98 
If the marriage cannot take place without the mutual consent of the 
spouses, it follows that neither from the ecclesiastical, nor from the civil 
perspective could a marriage be considered valid, if: 
 
1. It is contracted under duress (either physical or moral).99  
2. Marriage is contracted by mistake, perhaps in most cases as a 
result of fraud, i.e. the substitution of one person for another. 
Respected Russian canonist A. C. Pavlov gives the following 
examples of such cases of fraud: “contracting marriage of a blind 
or unconsciously drunk person, or when the marriage is 
contracted at night or when the bride is covered with a thick 
blanket.100 In Russia, deception of a person into marriage was 
regulated by the Penal Code,101 but only as a crime sui generis [of 
                                                
96 Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος IV, 17. Zachariae 1837, 29. 
97 To physical qualities Zhisman adds “appropriate age and the ability to perform 
conjugal duty.” Zhisman 1864, 195. 
98 Никодим 1897, 578. 
99 Only the first case can be proven in court. In Russia, forced marriage was 
subject to a secular court, but the judgment about the validity of marriage 
contracted by duress to a ecclesiastical court. See chapter 3. 
100 Павлов 1902, 328. 
101 See Article 1551, Уложение о наказаниях 1897, 628. 
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its own kind] without prejudice to the marriage itself, because the 
validity of the marriage in such a case was decided on the basis of 
ecclesiastical laws.”102 
 
From the ecclesiastical perspective, the mistake of one of the spouses, 
or both, no matter whose fault or by what accident it occurred, precludes 
a valid marriage between them, since marriage is established only 
between certain individuals who intended to become spouses. Hence, 
if consent to the marriage is given to one person, in reality, it refers also 
to another. In such a case, the marriage will be imaginary, mistaken, 
invalid; it does not matter whether one party was mistaken in the other 
or both together, because marriage is contracted only by mutual 
agreement of both parties.103 Canonist Gortšakov, however, believed that 
in the above cases marriage is still valid. If there is one of the aforesaid 
obstacles which belongs to the impedimenta prohibitae, i. e. where 
marriage is unlawful but not invalid, it is considered to be illegal, 
although it is not extinguished on account of invalidity, but entails 
punishment of perpetrators who have neglected the law. This might be, 
for example, marriage without the parents’ permission.104 
 
 
 
2.4  Absolute Impediments to Marriage 
 
 
Matrimonial impediments (κώλυµα τοῦ γάµου) are cases that prevent the 
contracting of marriage, or, if a marriage has already been 
contracted, will be deprived of legitimate marriage. Marriage 
impediments in general are divided into absolute (ἀπόλυτα κωλύµατα) 
and relative impediments (σχετικά κωλύµατα), according to whether 
they prevent contracting marriage with any person without distinction or 
just with certain persons. Among the first type of impediments certain 
contracted marriages are eliminated. Such cases are called dissolving 
impediments (ἀνατρεπτικά κωλύµατα). Others do not eliminate the 
                                                
102 Article 218, Устав духовных консисторий 1843, 85–86. 
103 Павлов 1902, 328. 
104 Горчаков 1909, 251. 
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marriage, but only make them unlawful. Such cases are called prohibitive 
impediments (ἀπαγορευτικά κωλύµατα).105 
 
 
Incapacity for conjugal relationship  
 
Besides having children, an essential purpose of marriage is the fact that 
the husband and wife can meet their physical needs, and therefore be 
capable of complete sexual intercourse with each other. The inability to 
meet this goal makes its absence an absolute impediment to marriage. 
There are no canonical rules about this particular impediment, but 
Novella 98 Emperor Leo the Wise prohibits the marriage of eunuchs.106 
This rule was included in the Alphabetical Collection of Matthew 
Blastares, and thus also received canonical value in the Orthodox 
Church.107  
 
 
Mental deficiencies  
 
Wishing to enter into marital union, the spouses must be aware what is to 
be done and what legal obligations they are responsible for. It is required 
from everyone when concluding any contract. According to this, 
Byzantine civil and ecclesiastical law formally forbids  the marriage of 
those who are affected by madness.108 
 
                                                
105 Никодим 1897, 590. The terminology behind the Greek word “κώλυµα” was 
first used by Patriarch John VIII of Constantinople in Synodal decrees from 
April 26, 1066 and from March 19, 1067. (Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 52, 54.) After him, 
Byzantine commentator of canons, Theodore Balsamon used the term 
“παρεµποδισµός,” with the meaning of obstruction, obstacle, in his commentary 
to Canon 68 of Basil the Great. (Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 223.) However, the above 
terminology was rarely used in the Orthodox Church’s canon law and was 
replaced by the more frequently used term “γάµοι κεκωλυµένοι,” as seen from 
the texts of Demetrios Syngellos – “τά πρός γάµου κοινωνίαν κωλυόµενα 
πρόσωπα.” (Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 359.) For a more complete study of the 
terminology of impediments, see Zhisman 1864, 212–213. 
106 Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος XI, 2. Zachariae 1837, 73. 
107 Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 297. 
108  Viscuso 2008, 125; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 184. 
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Already existing legal marriage 
 
Since ancient times, marriage with one wife (µονογαµία) was considered 
the only one that fulfilled the objectives and the essence of the marriage 
union. The Church of the Old Covenant proclaimed it as divine law 
(Genesis 2:22, 4:19). Under this influence, Roman law ruled that anyone 
who wishes to have two wives was without honor and should be 
punished. 109  Prohibition of polygamy gained new strength in the 
Christian Church, which regarded every man’s sexual relations with a 
woman other than his legitimate wife as fornication.110 Because of this, 
the existing legal marriage became an unconditional obstacle to a new 
marriage.  Therefore, the man who remarried during the lifetime of his 
wife or a woman who remarried another man when her husband was still 
alive, were subject to both ecclesiastical and civil penalties.111   
Remarriage was permitted only when for whatever reason the existing 
marriage was terminated according to law and one of the spouses 
received from the authorities permission to remarry. A spouse who 
remarried out of ignorance was not subject to punishment, assuming that 
                                                
109 Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 275–277. 
110 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 64; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 160. Matthew Blastares gives Novella 
93 of Leo in his Alphabetical Collection, chapter Γ, Article 15, “if the wife has 
been discovered to be impregnated from semen belonging to another,” which 
states that: “This is not mentioned in any of the ancient laws, but We, supplying 
the deficiency, do hereby decree that marriage shall be dissolved not only on 
account of a difference of religious opinion, and because of insanity, or for other 
reasons, but also for the one which We have just stated, because nothing is more 
adverse to marriage than this; since, under these circumstances, husband and 
wife are only united nominally and not in fact. For how can true matrimony exist 
in a union where there is nothing genuine or natural, where licentiousness, 
which is a source of discord and hate, and an alienation of minds prevail (a 
condition which has great influence in inducing women to seek intercourse with 
strangers)? How can matrimonial concord and pure conjugal love be maintained 
under such circumstances? Moreover, reason does not permit anyone to have a 
child belonging to another under his control. Nor is it just that he who has taken 
a wife into his house, in the expectation of the enjoyment of a chaste and 
honorable marriage, should be obliged to recognize as such a woman who has 
deceived him; who insults the laws of marriage, and delivers herself without 
hesitation to the lascivious embraces of another? (Scott 1932, 280; Viscuso 
2008, 123.) See Balsamon’s commentary on Canon 98 of Trullo: Ράλλη 1852, T. 
II, 541. 
111 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 505; Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος XXXIX, 70. Zachariae 1837, 253; 
Никодим 1897, 591,  
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the person to whom he or she was married was not alive. This new 
marriage in any case would cease to exist.112 In Roman law, however,  a 
widow should not marry before a year of mourning had passed.113 This 
rule also applied in Russia and was even followed by the project of the 
Civil Code of the Russian Empire.114 
 
 
Priesthood and monastic order  
 
The question of the second marriage of priests and their celibacy can be 
observed from hermeneutical, patristic and canonical point of views. This 
study, however, will focus on the canonical praxis of the Orthodox 
Church, leaving aside the question of allowing second marriage for 
clerics. One of the main sources for the question about married clergy is a 
verse in the New Testament in which the Apostle Paul advises Timothy 
regarding the organization of the new Church of Ephesus “A bishop must 
be the husband of one wife” (νά εἶναι µιᾶς γυναικός ἀνήρ) (1 Timothy 
3:2). The prohibition of marriage after ordination is of a different nature 
than the requirement which insists that a priest can only be married once 
and that his wife should have a good reputation. In the first case, the 
Church requires pastoral propriety and discipline; in the second case, the 
absolute monogamy of the clergy protects the scriptural, doctrinal and 
sacramental teaching on marriage in the Orthodox Church.115 
                                                
112 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 523; Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 196.  
113 Бердников 1913, 347. 
114 Проект гражданского уложения Российской Империи 1810, 62. According 
to Article 159, a widow can enter into a new marriage after sixth months of 
mourning.  If she is pregrant, the time will be reduced to three months. Article 
160 says that a widowed man can enter into a new marriage after six weeks of 
mourning. 
115 Meyendorff 2000, 67. These regulations are also repeated in Canon 14 of the 
fourth Ecumenical Council and in Canons 3 and 6 of Trullo. It should also be 
noted that the Apostolic Canon 26 speaks about those who are already part of the 
clergy as unmarried and for those only marriage is prohibited. It does not, 
however, require celibacy from all who join the clergy. Canon 3 of Trullo 
underlines that priests, deacons, and subdeacons who have married a widow or 
married after ordination have to do penance. After that they can be restored to 
their former rank with the prohibition of applying for any higher degree. Monks 
cannot marry according to their vows (celibacy and complete separation from 
the world). According to the canons, marriages of such individuals are 
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Lack of consent of parents  
 
As in ancient civil and ecclesiastical law, one of the greatest obstacles to 
marriage was a person who did not have an independent position in 
society, but wanted to marry without the knowledge and consent of those 
who had power over them. Roman laws were strict in their requirements 
in this respect.116 Ecclesiastical law, in view of the Christian character of 
the marriage and responsibilities for youth to respect elders (Ephesus 
6:2, Matthew 15:4, Mark 7:10), was also strict in its regulations in this 
matter. Basil the Great, in his canon 42, regards as fornication every 
marriage concluded without the consent of the parents.117 This canon, 
together with any similar regulations of Byzantine law, can be found in all 
the canonical collections of the Orthodox Church.118 
 
 
Widowhood after the third marriage 
 
A second marriage is allowed by divine right (1 Corinthians 7:8, 39–40, 
Romans 7:3). Over  time, when the Church began to look at a celibate life 
as a higher state than married life, the second marriage was already 
deemed a sign of incontinence.119 The Church requires that:  
 
1. Anyone who wants to marry a second time is subject to a certain 
penance.120 
2. The second marriage is not celebrated like the first one, but 
with its own particular rite.121 
                                                                                                                    
considered equivalent to adultery. Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 333–336, 369; Ράλλη 1854, 
T. IV, 217–218. 
116 Никодим 1897, 593. 
117 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 489. Compare with Basil the Great Canon 38: Ράλλη 1854, 
T. IV, 482; Viscuso 2008, 103. 
118 “The independent son who finally reaches adulthood marries even without the 
father’s consent.” Viscuso 2008, 92; Номоканон Константинопольского 
патриарха Фотия 1899, 543; Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 310; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 154; 
Epanagoge 16, 4. Zachariae 1852, 106; Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος IV, 12. Zachariae 
1837, 28. 
119 Никодим 1897, 594; Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 275. 
120 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 438. 
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3. The priest must not participate in the marriage celebration of a 
second marriage.122 
4. The holy orders are not permitted for those who enter into a 
second marriage.123 
 
If the Church was strict regarding second marriages, it was even 
stricter with regard to the third. Ecclesiastical legislation considered a 
third marriage quite inexcusable and regarded it as immoderate 
fornication.124 In Saint Basil’s Canon 4, it is said that the third marriage 
(τριγάµων) is no longer to be called a marriage, but polygamy 
(πολυγαµία) disguised under the pretense of marriage (κεκολασµένη 
πορνεία). Church practice judged severely these kinds of marriage.  Saint 
Basil, along with other Fathers, condemned trigamists to be 
excommunicated for five years, but not be excluded from the church 
entirely; instead they were obliged to abstain from communion. 125 
Balsamon in his commentary to the above-mentioned canon, concludes 
about fourth marriages: a person who decides to enter such cohabitation 
(συνοικέσιον) will be disqualified even from entering a church as long as 
the cohabitation continues. He makes it clear that fourth marriages are 
foreign to a Christian community126 and what Saint Basil in his Canon 80 
considers the greatest of sin and even bestiality (ώς κτηνώδη).127 This 
teaching of Basil was common in the entire Church at that time and was 
also recognized by Byzantine civil law.128  
                                                                                                                    
121 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 427; Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 441 
122 Ράλλη 1853, T. III, 81. 
123 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 399; Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 59, 211; Viscuso 2008, 93–95.  
124 Никодим 1897, 594. 
125 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 402. 
126 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 103–106. 
127 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 242. 
128  The canons never made it absolutely clear whether the unlawful fourth 
marriage should be re-considered when receiving a violator back into the church. 
This loophole in Byzantine canon law had been made use of during the 
tetragamy dispute in order to find arguments to support Emperor Leo VI’s 
(886–912) fourth marriage. For more about Leo VI’s fourth marriage, see 
Nicolas Oikonomides. “Leo VI’s Legislation of 907 Forbidding Fourth Marriages: 
An Interpolation in the “Procheiros Nomos”” – Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 
30, 175–193. Washington, D.C., 1976; Nicholas I, Patriarch of Constantinople, 
Letters, ed. R. J. H. Jenkins and L. G. Westernik, Washington, D.C. 1973; L. G. 
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In terms of ecclesiastical law, Byzantine legislation also treats this 
issue, prescribing miscellaneous rules about third marriages which are 
subject to canonical penalties. This was also the case in Novella 90 of Leo 
the Wise.129 
Therefore, widowhood after the second marriage was not a complete 
impediment to marriage, but only a conditional impediment. After 
Emperor Leo, with the approval of the Church, entered into a fourth 
marriage after the death of his third wife, the Constantinople Patriarchal 
Synod assembled in 920 and decreed that no one should enter into a 
fourth marriage. However, if persons did so, such a marriage should be 
considered null and void, and such individuals should be punished with 
excommunication, including  the prohibition of entering a church while 
they remain in that marriage.130 The above tetragamy case of Emperor 
Leo VI provoked long disputes in the Church and ended with the 
publication of Ο Τόµος ενώσεως (920). The Τόµος contains seven rules, 
the first three of which refer to questions about the right to re–marry 
more than twice. The first rule states that thereafter no one can enter into 
a fourth marriage. However, if someone does enter into one, the marriage 
is not recognized and the culprit will lose any connection to the church 
and is even forbidden to enter one, as long as the illegal cohabitation 
continued.131 
Regarding third marriages, the second rule states that these marriages 
must be considered prohibited, allowing exceptions only in certain cases. 
Prohibitions and exceptions concerning a third marriage were as follows: 
 
1. A person who is 40 years old and does not have children after 
entering the third marriage is prohibited from participating in 
Holy Communion for five years; 
2. A person who is 40 years old and has children is forbidden to 
marry for a third time;  
3. A person who is 30 years old and has children from a previous 
marriage after entering the third marriage is prohibited from 
participating in Holy Communion for four years;  
                                                                                                                    
Westernik, Nicholas I Patriarch of Constantinople, Miscellaneous Writings. 
Washington, D.C. 1981.  
129 Scott 1932, 277–278. 
130 Никодим 1897, 595. 
131 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 4–10.  
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4. A person who is 30 years old and does not have children is 
allowed to marry for a third time, but will be subject to penance 
(επιτίµιον). 
 
The third rule gives seven years of penance for those who enter a first 
or second marriage in cases where they have lived with each other before 
the wedding.132 
 
 
Age for marriage  
 
According to the ethical and physical purpose of marriage, it is necessary 
that those who are willing to be married be of legal age. The age for the 
physical and the spiritual ability for marriage, presumes by its very 
nature in a state of sexual maturity. Since there is no way in each 
individual case to predetermine when individual persons achieve 
puberty, a legitimate need for the presumption of such a condition is 
required.133 
Roman and ecclesiastical law required that only adult men and women 
can marry. The lowest age for entering into marriage in Roman law was 
determined at 12 years for women and 14 for men.134 However, in the 
Ekloga of Leo and Constantine the age was increased by one year for both 
spouses. 135  Later, the Procheiron nomos, a Byzantine law book, 
nevertheless changed back to the Justinian law, where age was 
determined at 12 years for women and 14 for men.136 Both of these 
Byzantine sources were later included in the Slavic Nomokanon. 137 
According to these laws, the Russian metropolitan Photios in the early 
fifteenth century wrote a letter to the people of Novgorod that girls 
should not enter into marriage before the age of 12. Such was a practice 
                                                
132 Zachariae 1857, 232. 
133 Павлов 1902, 329. 
134 Павлов 1902, 329; Горчаков 1909, 252; Никодим 1897, 596; Бердников 
1913, 327. 
135 Ekloga II, 1. Zachariae 1852, 15.  
136 Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος IV, 3. Zachariae 1837, 25. 
137 Павлов 1902, 329. 
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in Russia before the Council of а Hundred Chapters 138 (1551), which 
forbade a man from marrying before 15 years of age.139 
If the marriage was contracted before the legal age, it was considered 
invalid, but as soon as the spouses reached the legal age and wished to 
stay in the marital union, then the marital impediment of underage is 
eliminated and the marriage is considered legal. 140  Contrary to the 
marital impediment of minority, ceasing with time, an extreme old age is 
also considered a marital impediment, and recognized as ethically and 
physically impossible. Old age was mentioned by the Byzantine-Roman 
law as well.141 Physically it is impossible, because the ability for sexual 
intercourse is not possible in old age. Ethically it is not possible, since the 
advanced age of a person should make that person think about life after 
death, not about the jubilation of a honeymoon, as canonist Pavlov 
expresses it.142 
Roman law in the first centuries set the age limit for a man at 60 and 
for a woman at 50. However, Emperor Justinian changed this rule and 
granted the right for old people to marry freely at any age.143 The Church 
disapproved of the Justinian regulation about marriage at old age and in 
its canons ruled the age limit after which marriage is considered 
improper or not possible. In Canon 24 of Basil the Great, a widow is not 
allowed to marry after the age of 60.144 For a man, Canon 88 of the same 
saint established the age at 70,145 and in the same spirit the Holy Synod of 
                                                
138 In Russian “Стоглавый Собор,” translated variously as the Hundred Chapter 
Synod, the Council of a Hundred Chapters, etc. This church council was held in 
Moscow in 1551, with the participation of Tsar Ivan IV, Metropolitan Macarius, 
and representatives of the Boyar Duma. In 1551 the tsar summoned a synod of 
the Russian Church to discuss the ritual practices that had grown up in Russia 
which did not comply with the practice of the Greek Church. The decrees issued 
by the Synod, known as the Stoglav, rule that they were all correct. This evoked 
much criticism; the monks of Athos protested against the decisions, while the 
Russian monks went even further and regarded the decisions of the council as 
invalid. Runciman 2003, 325. 
139 Бердников 1913, 327. 
140 Горчаков 1909, 252. 
141 Никодим 1897, 597. 
142 Павлов 1902, 330. 
143 Бердников 1913, 329. 
144 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 155. 
145 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 269. 
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the Russian Orthodox Church ruled that after 80 years of age marriage 
was not possible.146 
 
 
 
2.5  Conditional Impediments to Marriage 
 
 
Conditional impediments are factors that impede marriage with certain 
persons. Of these, some obstacles are raised concerning the concept of 
kinship, while others are outside this concept. In the theological thinking 
of Eastern Orthodoxy, the primary purpose of marriage is to establish 
two separate individuals as one entity, “one flesh.” When children are 
born from these relationships, they will also aid in establishing a new 
bloodline. The ideal situation is when a couple is not so closely related to 
the point where they come close to being duplicates of each other, since 
this is a health issue as well. One can say that when the degree of blood 
relationship between the couple is closer to being homogenous, then they 
are further and further from the aims of marriage, both natural and 
spiritual.  
 
 
Kinship 
 
Kinship is a natural bond (φυσική συγγένεια), a relationship between two 
persons arising from the birth of one or the other, or from the birth of 
such persons from one ancestor, or the consequence of marriage between 
two persons relations, similar to kinship. Therefore, kinship in general 
terms is divided into blood relation, the relationship that arises from the 
union of two or three generations, spiritual kinship, semi-relationship 
and adoption.147  
                                                
146 Павлов 1902, 330. In this context, the apostle Paul’s teaching should be also 
noted “Let not a widow be taken into the number under threescore years old, 
having been the wife of one man” (1 Timothy 5:9). 
147 Никодим 1897, 601. Constitution 24 of Leo decreed that “those who become 
brother and sister by adoption cannot change this relationship through 
matrimonial union.” Scott 1932, 227. 
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Kinship was considered to be an impediment to marriage in Mosaic 
Law (Leviticus 18: 6–17; 20: 17–21; 27: ,20, 22, 23) and in Roman law.148  
Byzantine and Roman law assimilated this requirement of ancient 
legislation and, under the influence of the Church, issued a regulation 
concerning both the ethical and the physiological conditions of marriage. 
This is why the Church canonized such conditions, incorporating them 
into the canonical collections.149 Marriage impediments in relationship by 
blood in both vertical lines are forbidden, unlike in the lateral line to a 
certain degree of relationship. Until the late nineteenth century the 
ecclesiastical laws of the Church of Constantinople generally forbade 
marriages in the lateral line up to the seventh degree.150 Exceptions to 
this were made in some local churches, such as in Russia. With the 
encyclical letter of 1873 the Greek Orthodox Church forbade marriages to 
the seventh degree, allowing, for example, a marriage of a man to his 
second cousin’s daughter.151 Kinship in the sense of an impediment to 
marriage is divided into natural (blood relationship) and artificial 
(spiritual and civil).152 Individuals in a natural relationship are called 
blood relatives (συγγενεῖς). To identify the limits and make an accurate 
determination of blood relations, Byzantine law imposed certain definite 
forms, separating kinship by lines and degrees. The Byzantine theory of 
degrees (βαθµολογία) is the distance from one person to another by 
birth. The uninterrupted continuing relationship of these degrees is 
determined by lines and steps (τάξις, γραµµή).153 A step which results in 
two or more lines is a generation. Lines are divided into:  
 
1. Vertical (ευθεῖα), which are subdivided into  
                                                
148 Basilika XXVIII, 4–5. Scheltema 1962, 1325–1353. 
149  See the study of Demetrios of Kyzikos in Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 354–366; 
Demetrios Chomatenos and Michael of Thessaloniki’s commentary on kinship in 
Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 421–427, 397–398. 
150 Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 127–128. 
151 Никодим 1897, 609. 
152 Павлов 1902, 336. 
153  Zhisman 1864, 217. See Balsamon’s commentary on kinship by sideline: 
Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 556, 560; and Demetrios Chomatenos study in Ράλλη 1855, T. 
V, 421–422. 
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2. Ascending (ἀνιύσα) lines, which are from the known person to his 
or her parent, in continuous relation degrees, hence, to his or her 
grandfather, great-grandfather, etc. 
3. Descending (κατιούσα) lines, which are from the father to his son 
or daughter, to his grandson/granddaughter and great-
grandson/great-granddaughter, etc. 
4. Lateral (πλαγίαι) lines, which go from the known person to the 
others who have common individual ancestors.  
 
A lateral line does not connect directly with a vertical line. These lines 
go from the person to his brothers, uncles, nephews, etc. In the thirteenth 
century Byzantine canonist Demetrios Chomatenos, Archbishop of 
Bulgaria, wrote that “three lines that connect the descents are arranged 
clearly into ascending, descending and lateral lines.”154 In the last years of 
the Roman Empire, cousins were permitted to marry. Emperor Claudius, 
in order to marry Agripina, issued a law allowing his marriage to his 
brother’s daughter (his niece).155 The Christian Church from the very 
beginning forbade marriages by blood in the lateral line of kinship up to 
the third degree, as seen in Canon 19  of the Apostolic Canons .156 This 
was also the case in the imperial laws of Constantine the Great. Emperor 
Theodosius I ordered the execution of those who married even in the 
fourth degree of kinship. However, in 405 Emperor Arcadius annulled 
this prohibition for the Eastern Roman Empire; and such marriages were 
allowed later under the laws of Justinian until the Council of Trullo, 
which forbade marriages between the children of brothers in Canon 54.157 
This decision was also adopted in the civil laws.158 In 1057 under the 
Patriarch Michael I Cerularios of Constantinople restrictions can be 
found about marrying up to the seventh degree. These restrictions were 
made law one hundred years later in 1168 under Patriarch Luke of 
Constantinople.159 
                                                
154 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 422. Compare with Nomokanon XIII, 2 Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 
280; and with the Alphabetical Collection of Matthew Blastar, B, 8, Ράλλη 1859, 
T. VI, 126. 
155 Бердников 1913, 334. 
156 The Rudder 1983, 30. 
157 Бердников 1913, 334. 
158 Basilika XXVIII, Title V, 1. Scheltema 1962, 1342–1343. 
159 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 95–98; Бердников 1913, 334. 
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Distance of relationship between two individuals is measured by birth. 
Every birth is counted as one degree. Therefore, as many births between 
the two parties, so many relation degrees.160 Birth shows the distance 
between known individuals. The fewer births and, therefore, the degrees 
of relationship between them, the closer the relationship. Consequently, 
with more births and degrees, the more distant the relationship is. To 
determine the degree of relationship between two known individuals, 
Byzantine and Roman lawyers established a special “στέµµατα,” a family 
tree which was also published in the Justinian Institutions and in chapter 
45 of the Basilika.161 According to these sources, the Greek and Slavic 
“στέµµατα” diagrams were relatively expansive in the manuscripts and 
included a great number of different family tree variations. This is, 
however, understandable because the Eastern Church had connected 
with the Byzantine and Roman law in the calculation of degree.162 Degree 
calculation is best seen in Scheme 1 below, which follows the calculations 
found in the teachings of Demetrios Chomatenos from the thirteenth 
century.163 An explanation of some names found in the Scheme 1 are:  
 
1. In the ascending line: Great-uncle – great-aunt (µέγας θεῖος – 
µεγάλη θεῖα) = brother/sister of grandfather – grandmother; 
First cousin of great-grandfather – great-grandmother (θεῖος 
µείζων – θεῖα µείζων) = brother/sister of great-grandfather – 
great–grandmother; First cousin of uncle – aunt (µικρός θεῖος – 
µικρά θεῖα) = fathers/mothers cousin; First cousin of grandfather 
– grandmother (ὁ ἐξαδελφος – ἡ ἐξαδελφη τοῦ πάππου – τῆς 
µάµµης).  
2. In the descending line: First cousin of grandson – granddaughter 
(ἐξανεψιός – ἐξανεψιά) = son/daughter of nephew – niece; 
Great–nephew – great–niece (ὁ υἱός – ἡ θηγάτηρ τοῦ ἐξανεψιός – 
τῆς ἐξανεψιά) = son/daughter of cousin.  
3. In the lateral line: Second cousin (δισεξάδελφος – δισεξάδελφη) 
= children of first cousin of uncle/aunt.
                                                
160 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 421; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 125. 
161 Ferrini 1897, 9. 
162 Zhisman 1864, 219–220. 
163 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 422–423; Никодим 1897, 605. 
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For the designation of persons among whom kinship is examined, this 
research uses the following symbols:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When calculating degrees in a vertical line, the number of births 
including the person, and those included in the calculations the degree of 
kinship, the number of births is the same as the number of degrees. For 
example, from A to great–grandfather D by an ascending vertical line 
there are three births: D → C → B → A, that is why A in relation to his 
great–grandfather is the third degree of kinship; D in relation to A is the 
same degree.  
When calculating degrees in a lateral line of birth, the same rule as 
calculating in a vertical line applies.164 When it is necessary to find the 
degree of relationship between persons, one of whom is in the vertical 
line and the other in the lateral, those persons who do not originate from 
one another and are not directly related by birth, go up to the closest 
common ancestor or to the  person in which the degree of relationship is 
sought. The total number of births in these lines shows the degree of 
kinship between individuals.165 With this calculation from B to A one 
birth can be found, hence, one degree. From A to C one birth can also be 
                                                
164  Demetrios Chomatenos writes in his canonical teaching that ”Δύο 
αὐτάδελφοι, διότι ἐκ δύο γεννήσεων προέρχονται, καί δύο ἀποτελοῦσι βαθµούς” 
[Two brothers, because they come from two births and have two degrees]. Ράλλη 
1855, T. V, 422. 
165 Павлов 1902, 338. 
THE PROGENITOR FEMALE MALE
HUSBAND  
AND WIFE
VERTICAL 
ORIGIN, BIRTH
DECEASED  
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found, i.e. one degree, but altogether two births, hence, two degrees.166  
From A to D we can find three births, hence three degrees which is shown 
in Scheme 2. The fourth degree of kinship, four births in the descending 
vertical is shown in Scheme 3. 
 
 
       SCHEME 2                        SCHEME 3 
                                                
166 The rest of the degree of kinship can be found using the above calculation: 
nephew and uncle are in the third, cousins are in the fourth, second cousins are 
in the sixth, and the third cousins are the eight degree of kinship. 
SCHEME 2                SCHEME 3 
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4. Children of one father and different mothers, or one mother and different fathers, are considered 
as brothers and sisters. 
5. Relatives of the female line are calculated in the same order as the relatives of the male line. 
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The calculation of kinship degrees follows the rules below:  
 
1. Husband and wife are not related with each other in different 
degrees, because they are seen to be one body.  
2. Children are always considered to be in the first degree in relation 
to their parents. 
3. Brothers and sisters are always considered to be in the second 
degree in relation to each other 
4. Children of one father and different mothers, or one mother and 
different fathers, are considered brothers and sisters. 
5. Relatives of the female line are calculated in the same manner as 
the relatives of the male line. 
6. The limits of kinship are usually limited to seven degrees: in the 
vertical line this is explained by the fact that according to the laws 
of nature, it is impossible for someone to survive beyond the 
seventh degree of kinship; therefore there is no need to define this 
degree of kinship further. In the lateral line, the definition of the 
relationship, while it would be very difficult, would have passed 
the boundaries of the rules about kinship because the mutual 
relation of kinship after the seventh degree is too distant to fear 
the unnatural mixing of blood or it would be impossible to 
establish them based on some sort of rules.167 
 
 
Affinity  
 
Affinity (ἀγχιστεία) is a relationship between two families that occurs as a 
consequence of marriage. It is equivalent to kinship by blood, because the 
husband and wife by ecclesiastical law make one flesh.168 Affinity, the 
connection of two families by marriage, is referred to in the canonical 
sources as “cousin relations” (ἀγχιστεία ἐκ διγενείας), unlike the 
relations of another form that occur between the three families due to 
two different marriages. This is called second cousin relations (ἀγχιστεία 
ἐκ τριγενείας), or trilineage affinity. Canonical foundations of affinity are 
                                                
167 Никодим 1897, 609. 
168 Красножен 1900, 134. 
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found in Apostolic Canon 19: “Whoever marries two sisters, or a niece, 
may not be a clergyman,”169 and in a more complete form in the canons of 
Basil the Great. Canon 87 was originally a Basil epistle to Diodore, Bishop 
of Tarsus, which can be seen from his Canon 23, where he writes: 
“Concerning men who marry two sisters, or women who marry two 
brothers, a little epistle has already been addressed to you, a copy of 
which we sent to your reverence.”170  
During the period when Basil’s epistle was written, Roman law did not 
prohibit such marriages, nor did Mosaic Law examine them directly. 
Therefore Bishop Diodore considered them to be lawful marriages.171  
However, Basil the Great refutes this, stating in Canon 87:  
 
For what could be more nearly related, or near of kin, to man than 
his own wife, or rather to say his own flesh? Through the wife her 
sister attains to a state of close familiarity with the husband. For 
just as he must not take the mother of his wife, so must he not 
take her daughter either, because he is not allowed to take either 
his own mother or his own daughter to wife. Thus he is not 
allowed even to take a sister of his wife, because neither is he even 
allowed to take his own sister to wife, and vice versa, neither is a 
woman permitted to cohabit with relatives of her husband; for the 
rights of both and to both are held in common, by both sides of 
the relationship.172  
 
Hence, marital cases that combine a third line are permitted more 
easily than those combined from two lines. This is the case in marriages 
which are less than two degrees than those of two-line marriages. As a 
result, they are permitted in the fourth degree.173  
In the first division when determining the degree of affinity between 
the persons of two genera (διγενεία), ecclesiastical as well as Byzantine 
law follows the same rules that apply to the relations of kinship by blood. 
These bases are included in the concept of the unity of husband and wife 
                                                
169 The Rudder 1983, 30. 
170 The Rudder 1983, 810. 
171 Павлов 1902, 346. 
172 The Rudder 1983, 843. 
173 Viscuso 2008, 75; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 133. 
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and their mutuality in all personal relationships that each has 
individually.174 
Because of the unity and mutuality of spouses, the husband’s relatives 
are not only considered kin in relation to the husband’s wife. The 
relatives of the wife in relation to her husband are in exactly the same 
degree as the in–laws are in relation to him; they stand in relation to his 
wife in the same degree and vice versa. The only difference is that the 
relatives (συγγενεῖς) of one spouse are called cousins–in–law (ἀγχιστεῖς) 
and the relationships between the two genera are not considered to be 
close relatives in the strict sense (συγγένεια), but rather an affinity, as 
canonist Nikodim Milaš describes it. 175  Therefore, the degree of 
relationship a certain person to one of the spouses is the degree of affinity 
in which he or she stands to another. 
Similar to kinship, affinity is also divided into vertical and lateral lines. 
Τherefore, the affinity can occur between one spouse and the ascending 
and descending relatives of another; between one spouse and relatives on 
the lateral line of the other; between the relatives of one spouse and 
family members of another; between a husband and his relatives on the 
one hand, and the relatives of the spouse by the first marriage on the 
other.176 
The number of degrees in affinity are the same as in kinship: for as 
many births, so many degrees. Therefore, when one wishes to determine 
the degree of affinity between two parties in a direct or lateral line, as in 
the determination of kinship, one counts birth from a given relative by 
blood of the spouse and continues the count by the corresponding line to 
a certain family member by blood of another spouse. The resulting 
number of births will show the degree of affinity between these two 
parties, i.e., between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood 
relatives of the other. 
For example: my wife and I make one body. In relation to her, her 
mother is a first degree relative, since between them there exists one 
birth. So, I stand to my mother–in–law in the first degree of affinity. To 
my wife and I my sister–in–law stands in the second degree of affinity, 
because between us exist two births. My father in relation to my sister–
                                                
174 Горчаков 1909, 263. 
175 Никодим 1897, 610. 
176 Никодим 1897, 611. 
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in–law is in the third degree of affinity, since between him and me exists 
one birth, one between my mother–in–law and my wife, one between my 
mother–in–law and my sister–in–law, a total of three births, i.e., three 
degrees. My grandfather and my sister–in–law are in the fourth degree of 
affinity, since between him and my father there is one birth, between my 
father and me one, then between my wife and her mother or my mother–
in–law one, between my mother–in–law and her second daughter or my 
sister–in–law there is one birth: four births, i.e., four degrees. 
My cousin is in relation to my mother–in–law in the fifth degree of 
affinity, and to my sister–in–law in the sixth. My cousin, by taking as his 
wife a widow, who had by the first husband a daughter (who is now his 
stepdaughter), therefore, is with her in the first degree of affinity, because 
in the same degree of kinship is his stepdaughter to her mother, who is 
now his wife and therefore is one with him.177 The results are the same 
when calculating the degrees of affinity with the other calculation 
method, that is when the first birth is calculated in one kinship of a 
known person up to another spouse. This is followed by a different 
kinship from one spouse to the other person, and then the total of these 
births is considered. According to the first calculation method, my cousin 
is in the fifth degree of affinity to my mother–in–law. Calculating by the 
second method, we counted in my relationship from me to my nephew, 
four births, therefore, four degrees; from my wife to my mother–in–law 
is therefore one degree. Adding all the degrees found in the current and 
in the other kin, we get 4 + 1 = 5, i.e. the fifth degree.178 The degrees of 
affinity are drawn up in Scheme 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
177 B, 8. Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 134. 
178  Никодим 1897, 613. Compare these two calculation models with the 
teachings of Patriarch Eustathios of Rome, Ὑπόµνηµα περί δύο ἐξαδέλφων 
λαβόντων δύο ἐξαδέλφας [A note concerning two cousins marrying two cousins] 
(Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 341–353.) and Joseph Zhisman’s study Bestimmung der 
Nähe oder der Entfernung Schwägerschaft [Determination of the distance or 
closeness of the affinity], in the book Das Eherecht der Orientalischen Kirche. 
Zhisman 1864, 298–305. 
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SCHEME 4 
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The Church has prohibited marriages since ancient times in the 
second degree of affinity, more specifically between a man and the sister 
of the wife and with the wife of a deceased brother.  Around the end of 
the seventh century, the Council in Trullo prohibited marriages in the 
fourth degree of affinity (canon 54). 179  With the publication of the 
conciliar tome (τόµος συνοδικός) 180  of patriarch Sisinianos on 996, 
marriages of two brothers with two cousins, i. e. the sixth degree of 
affinity, were forbidden for the first time. Here it should be noted that the 
Slavic translation of the conciliar tome in the Kormtšaja Kniga 
(соборный свиток) 181  goes even further in the determination of the 
possible combinations of affinity, wherein marriage is not possible. 
Kormtšaja added two more cases to the original conciliar tome from 996, 
where the canonical teaching included the seventh degree of affinity. 
Hence, Kormtšaja forbids marriages of two cousins (брату чадома 
двема) with an aunt (тетку) and a niece (сестричну); or an uncle 
(стрыеви) and grandson (сестричищу) with two cousins (двою брата 
чада).182 In the Greek Church, this combination was never forbidden. A 
good example of this is the canonical teaching of an unknown author, 
which can be found in some Greek collection with the name “Περί γάµων 
γνώµη συνοδική” (De matrimoniis decretum synodale).183 The respected 
Russian canonist, Pavlov, has however published the aforesaid original 
Greek text in his study about the Fifty Titles of Kormtšaja as a historical 
and practical source of Russian matrimonial law. The aforementioned 
unknown canonical author solves the problem concerning the seventh 
degree of kin and affinity differently, because of their internal 
differences.184 This view is also supported in the writings of another 
unknown author-patriarch, whose teaching was stated by Ioannos 
“bookkeeper” of Ioanopoulos. In the writings attributed to an unknown 
metropolitan, the patriarchal decision concerning marriages concluded in 
                                                
179 Красножен 1900, 135. 
180 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 11–19. 
181 Кормчая 1913, 1219. 
182 Павлов 1887, 109. 
183 Bandinius 1764, 80. 
184 Павлов 1887, 110–113. 
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the seventh degree of kinship: these marriages will stay in force, but the 
spouses are subject to two years of penance.185 
The purpose of the Orthodox canon law in determining the degrees of 
affinity as marriage impediments also lies in the fact that persons who 
are related by affinity, do not cause confusion with their names. By this is 
meant that the result of the marriage will not change the name and the 
natural relationships between the two parties. The older relatives cannot 
take the place of the younger and vice versa. The principle of such order 
supposedly has its origin in Canon 87 of Basil the Great,186 stating that: 
“to which of the two sexes shall they ascribe the offspring? Shall they say 
that they are brothers and sisters of each other, or that they are 
cousins.”187 The canon itself was not used in a specific legal context.188  
To emphasize the importance of understanding the kinship and 
affinity degrees, the Russian theological journal Orthodox Interlocutor 
(Православный собеседник) in 1852 provides an excellent example of 
how close ties can create canonical impediments to marriage, such as 
who is related to whom: 
 
A marriage of an uncle and a nephew with two sisters results in 
the following: The former remain related to each other by blood 
and now are related ex digenia (from two families) as brothers–
in–law. Their wives, while remaining sisters, now become aunt 
and niece to each other. The uncle’s children becomes nephews to 
his nephew as well as cousins. The nephew’s children become 
nephews to his uncle and grandchildren ex digenia through the 
father.189  
 
Likewise, in kinship by blood in a vertical line, all marriages are also 
prohibited in accordance with the affinity between the ascending and 
descending persons. Even after the death of one spouse, the other spouse 
is not allowed to marry relatives in the vertical line of the deceased. This 
                                                
185 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 92–93. Zhisman, as well as the compilers of the collection of 
canons known as “syntagma,” put this act between the years of 1043–1156. 
Zhisman 1864, 38.  
186 Troianos 2012, 166. 
187 The Rudder 1983, 844. 
188 Troianos 2012, 166. 
189 English translation in Smirensky 1995, 62. 
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rule can also be found in ecclesiastical and Byzantine law.190 In the lateral 
line, marriage is forbidden up to the fifth degree. Marriage is allowed in 
the sixth degree if there is no confusion over names. Therefore, my 
stepson could take the daughter of my cousin as his wife, since they are in 
the sixth degree of affinity and there is no confusion about names. But 
my grandson cannot marry my wife’s cousin, although he is in the sixth 
degree of affinity with her, because in that case a cousin of my wife would 
have been my granddaughter, and my wife would be the grandmother of 
her cousin. Therefore, there would be some confusion over names and 
marriage would not be possible between them.  
With regard to the trilineage affinity, in the fourteenth century the 
Eastern Church established a practice to prohibit such marriages in the 
third degree. 191  After entering into a second marriage the widowed 
husband forms a union of one body with his new wife. In-laws of the 
husband from his first marriage are related by affinity with the relatives 
of the second wife.192 In trilineage affinity, the relationship is determined 
in consequence of two separate marriages between three kins (τριγενεία). 
The definition and calculation of the degree of affinity follows the same 
rule as the definition of affinity in the cases of one marriage. Canonist 
Matthew Blastares included in his alphabetical collection a law treating 
trilineage affinity which was compiled from the various sources of 
Byzantine imperial laws, such as Basilika, 193 Epanagoge, 194  and 
Procheiron nomos:195  
 
I am not able to take the former wife of my stepson, nor can a 
stepmother take the former husband of her stepdaughter, because 
there is trilineage in these cases. Because a stepson and a 
stepdaughter hold the position of son or daughter in relation to a 
stepfather or stepmother, and because his wife or her husband 
hold the position of daughter–in–law or son–in–law in relation to 
                                                
190 See Canons 79 and 87 of Saint Basil the Great; Canon 54 of Trullo; Basilikа 
XXVIII, 5, 1.  
191 Красножен 1900, 135. 
192 Горчаков 1909, 264. 
193 Basilika XXVIII, 5, 4 (3). Scheltema 1962, 1346. 
194 Epanagoge XVII, 11–12. Zachariae 1852, 111. 
195 Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος VII, 13–14. Zachariae 1837, 55. 
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them, such marriages are unlawful. The husband and wife, the 
closest point of two lineages, do not hold a degree either among 
themselves or in relation to the intermediate lineage. For we do 
not assign the union of husband and wife a degree, but reckon it 
to be a unity seen by itself. Indeed the wife of my brother, on 
account of her close union with him, holds a second degree in 
relation to me, through careful consideration of the law uniting 
them. However when the degree is sought for another person 
related to her, we do assign the union of husband and wife a 
degree. Thus my sister–in–law’s sister is of the second degree in 
relation to her sister, but of the fourth in relation to me. My 
sister–in–law’s aunt in relation to the sister is of the third degree, 
but is of the fifth in relation to me. Likewise also in other cases. 
Thus, it is not possible that a brother is also reckoned one flesh 
with his sister–in–law, as if he was a husband, and by a device of 
thought is joined with her through the power of the law. For they 
do not occupy the first lateral decree but, begin from the second. 
Therefore the law has prohibited only trilineal marriages of the 
first degree, as has been said. However, prevailing custom does 
not hold things in accordance with what is unprohibited beyond 
the first degree of trilineage.196  
 
Affinity in consequence of two separate marriages will exist in the 
following cases: between a spouse and the spouse of another relative’s 
spouse (Scheme 5); between a spouse and a person consisting in affinity 
of a remarried spouse from his first marriage (Scheme 6); among family 
members of the two parties, who one after the other married a third 
person (Scheme 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
196 Viscuso 2008, 76; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 134. 
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SCHEME 5 
 
 
 
As seen above, there are three families: mine (father, sister, me), my 
brother–in–law and my wife. My brother–in–law and my sister are one 
as husband and wife, like my wife and I.  My sister and I are in the second 
degree of kinship as family members by blood. A husband’s or wife’s 
relatives are in the same degree of affinity, hence my brother–in–law will 
be in the second degree of trilineage affinity with my wife, as seen before 
in the Alphabetical collection of Matthew Blastares.197 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
197 Viscuso 2008, 76; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 134. 
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SCHEME 6 
 
 
 
When the degrees are calculated in Scheme 6 between the stepfather 
and the second stepdaughter of his stepdaughter, i.e., the first 
stepdaughter: the first stepdaughter is in the first degree of kin to her 
mother and in the first degree of affinity with him. The second 
stepdaughter is in the first degree of kin with his father and in first degree 
of affinity with his stepmother. From this calculation we can see that the 
stepfather is in second degree of affinity with the second stepdaughter. 
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SCHEME 7 
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In Scheme 7, the degree of affinity is calculated between the brother–
in–law from the husband’s first marriage and the sister–in–law from his 
second marriage as follows: his brother–in–law is in the second degree of 
kin to his sister; likewise, the husband’s second wife is also in the second 
degree of kinship to his sister. This makes altogether four degrees, i.e. the 
husband’s brother–in–law from the first marriage is in the fourth degree 
of affinity to his sister–in–law. The husband, who represents alone a 
third relation, cannot be taken into account when calculating degrees, 
since one person in the affinity in itself does not create any degree. 
Therefore, based on the above–stated rules, in relation to the relatives of 
the first or second wife, a husband in the above case cannot constitute a 
separate degree.  
Until the middle of the thirteenth century matrimonial impediments 
in the second division of affinity were included only to the first degree, 
namely the affinity between the stepfather and the stepson's wife, and 
between the stepmother and the stepdaughter's husband. After the 
thirteenth century canon lawyers started to pay attention to confusion 
over names (σύγχυσις τὦν ὀνοµάτων). Marriage was forbidden in the 
third degree of second trilineage affinity. 198  
 
 
Spiritual affinity  
 
Spiritual affinity (πνευµατική συγγένεια) designates a relationship which 
arises as a consequence of baptism between the godfather and his 
relatives from the one side, and between the godson and his relatives 
from the other. The basis for such a relationship is a spiritual one – the 
relationship between the godfather and the newly baptized person.  In 
view of responsibilities, the relation between the godfather and the 
godson was seen as equal with the relationship between the father and 
his child, where the godfather replaced the godson’s own father. From 
                                                
198 Павлов 1887, 162; Никодим 1897, 615. See also the “answers” of Demetrios 
Syngellos concerning the illegal aspect of trilineage marriages (Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 
366–369.); Teaching of Matthew Blastares “Περί τῶν ἐχ τριγενείας” (Ράλλη 
1859, T. VI, 133–134.); the law VIII, 127 of Procheiron Auctum and the 
commentary to it: “ὡς ἐκ τριγενείας συνιστάµενον ἀκωλυτον ἔδοξεν εἶναι. ἔχει 
δὲ οὓτω. θεῖος καὶ γαµβρὸς ἐπ’ ἀνεψιᾶ πρώτῃ ἔλαβον εἰς γυναῖκας ἀδελφὰς δύο.” 
Zachariae 1870, 103 
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this appeared the concept of spiritual kinship, which, according to the 
Trullan Canon 53, should be considered more important than a blood 
relationship, as seen in the following:  
 
Since it has come to our knowledge that, in some places, certain 
persons who become sponsors to children in holy salvation–
bearing baptism, afterwards contract matrimony with their 
mothers (being widows), we decree that in the future nothing of 
this sort is to be done. But if any, after the present canon, shall be 
observed to do this, they must, in the first place, desist from this 
unlawful marriage, and then be subjected to the penalties of 
fornicators.199  
 
When the concept of spiritual affinity was confirmed in the early 
Christian Church as analogous with a blood relationship, the Church 
began to take into consideration the appropriate degree of affinity in 
which a godfather and his family stood to his godson and his godson’s 
relatives. Since kinship by blood was determined by the known degrees 
regarding the matrimonial impediments, the same thing was done in a 
spiritual kinship. According to the tradition of the Church of the first 
centuries, the Emperor Justinian in 530 ruled that godfathers cannot 
later marry the newly baptized child.200  
The publication of this canon resulted in increasing the number of 
matrimonial impediments. The publication of Basilika established in this 
regard the constant boundary, and marriage in the spiritual affinity were 
prohibited in the following cases: between godfather and godchild; 
between the godfather and the mother of the baptized person; between 
                                                
199 Schaff 2007, 390; See Balsamon’s commentary on Canon 53 of Trullo: Ράλλη 
1852, T. II, 428–429. 
200 “Nevertheless, he that receives a female godchild from holy baptism cannot 
afterward take her in marriage because she now becomes his daughter. Nor may 
he marry his godchild’s mother or daughter. This also applies to the sponsor’s 
son. Nothing else can introduce a paternal state and impediment of marriage like 
this bond by which God mediates the joining of their souls.” (Viscuso 2008, 80.) 
See the law 7, 28 in Procheiros nomos: “Ὁ µέντοιγε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου βαπτίσµατός 
τινα δεξάµενος οὺ δύναται αὐτὴν ὔστερον πρὸς γάµον ἁγαγέσθαι, ὡς δῆθεν 
θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ γεωοµένην, οὐδὲ τὴν ταύτης µητέρα ἤ θυγατέρα˙ ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ 
υἱὸς αὐτοῦ. ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ἂλλο οὕτως δύναται εἰσαγαγῖν πατρικὴν διάθεσιν καὶ 
δικαίαν γάµου κώλυσιν πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον δεσµὸν, δι’ οὗ θεοῦ µεσάζοντος αἱ 
ψυχαὶ αὐτῶν συνάπτονται.” Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος VII, 28. Zachariae 1837, 58. 
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the son of godfather and his goddaughter; between the godfather and the 
daughter of the baptized person; between the son of the godfather and 
the daughter of the baptized person.201 This Byzantine practice was later 
introduced in nineteenth-century Russia, where on January 19, 1810 the 
Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church decreed that the Church 
should follow the dictate of Trullan Canon 53 literally, thereby 
prohibiting marriages between godchildren and their parents and 
sponsors. Later with the decree from December 31, 1837 the Holy Synod 
prohibited marriages between two sponsors, the godfather and the 
godmother.202  
This was motivated by the early Christian tradition and rules that 
allowed only one sponsor for baptized persons. The Russian canonist A. 
S. Pavlov notes that the practice of sponsorship in the early Church did 
indeed require only one sponsor – a male or female, depending on the 
sex of the baptized person. This was mentioned in the Apostolic 
Constitutions (Διαταγαί τῶν ἁγίων Ἀποστόλων) and in the works of 
Dionysius the Areopagite. Emperor Justinian and the early records of the 
baptismal rite also knew the practice of only one sponsor. Pavlov without 
hesitation assumed that this was the practice followed during the Council 
in Trullo. 203  However, another respected Russian canonist, Ilja 
Berdnikov, saw some conflicts in this presupposition, since Pavlov 
mentioned later in his study of Kormtšaja that before the Council in 
Trullo existed in some cases when the baptized person was received by 
two sponsors, male and female, namely by the married couple.204 In this 
                                                
201 Basilika XXVIII, 5.15 (14). Scheltema 1962, 1348. 
202 Горчаков 1909, 264. 
203 A newborn male should be received by the deacon and the female by the 
diaconess. (Павлов 1887, 169.) Symeon of Thessalonika allowed baptism of 
children of non-Christian parents if the newly baptized child was raised as a 
Christian by his or her sponsors. Павлов 1897, 292. 
204 Бердников 1892, 4–5. The debate between two professors regarding spiritual 
affinity as an impediment to marriage has been published in the following 
ecclesiastical journals: Чтение Общество любителей духовного 
просвящение 1891 – Май–Июнь; Март–Апрель 1893, and as an appendix to 
the Православный Совбеседник from 1893, with the title Ответ проф. 
Павлову на его продолжающиеся недоумение по вопросу о 
восприемничестве, as well as with the separate brochure from 1892 О 
восприемничестве при крещении и духовном родстве, как препятствии к 
браку. 
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sense, the law from 1837 could be seen only as a requirement of ancient 
practice, not as a necessity. Professor Gortšakov noted that the law of 
1837 was formally followed until 1873 when the Holy Synod decreed that 
the sponsors could enter into marriage with the children of their 
godchildren only if they were of different sex from their parents.205  
The aforementioned decree of the Holy Synod is difficult to 
understand in the light of Trullan Canon 53, which prohibits marriage 
between the sponsors and mothers of godchildren, i.e., it forbids 
marriage in the second degree of spiritual affinity. It is true that Canon 53 
provides only one example regarding the relationship in the second 
degree. However, the following calculations of the second degree should 
also be included when interpreting the aforementioned canon: Marriages 
between 1. Sponsor and the children of the godchildren; 2. Children of 
the godchildren and children of the sponsor; 3. Two godparents of the 
same godchildren, which makes them spiritual brothers and sisters. Such 
an understanding of the Trullan canon, namely expanding its meaning to 
all three aforementioned combinations, is justified not only by the 
positive ecclesiastical regulations found in the different canonical 
collections, but by the general nature of all the ancient laws of the 
universal Church regarding marriages that are prohibited in the specified 
degree of affinity or kinship. Canons and ancient practice do not 
recognize situations in which marriages are prohibited in the second 
degree of affinity in one case, but allowed in another. Metropolitan 
Filaret (1782–1867) of Moscow and Kolomenskoe noted such a problem 
of double standards in his report to the Holy Synod, while president. 
Despite the laws from January 19, 1810 and December 31, 1838, 
Metropolitan Filaret did not allow marriages that conflicted with the 
Trullan Canon 53 during his presidency.206   
The Ekloga of Leo III the Isaurian, which influenced the law regarding 
spiritual affinity in Basilika, 207  also forbade marriages in the same 
degrees as already mentioned.208  Over the centuries on the basis of the 
Trullan Canon 53, where it is said that the spiritual relationship is greater 
than blood affinity, matrimonial impediments concerning spiritual 
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affinity were given nearly the same status  as marriage forbidden by 
blood, i.e., up to the seventh degree. Both the Church fathers and the 
canon lawyers Balsamon and Blasters indicated this.209 One can argue 
that the practice of the Church followed the laws set by the Basilika and 
Ekloga. However, Balsamon, in his commentary to Trullo’s Canon 53, 
included all the previous rules concerning spiritual affinity. His 
statements follow the full text of the Synodal act of Patriarch Nicholas, 
who already knew the calculation of degrees of spiritual affinity and 
prohibited such marriages in the fifth degree.210 Balsamon repeated the 
conclusions in his answers to the Alexandrian patriarch Mark, however 
emphasizing this time that spiritual affinity is calculated in the same way 
as the blood relations.211  
Blastares followed Balsamon’s position and asserted that spiritual 
affinity is determined to be stronger than blood relationship and that it is 
necessary for those who are united spiritually to observe the degrees that 
impede marriage up to the seventh degree.212  This fourteenth–century 
attitude towards the important role of godparents made the Church 
gradually calculate degrees of spiritual kinship as follows: the degrees are 
calculated only in the direct descending line, i.e. from the godfather to his 
descendants and from the baptized to his direct descendants. In the 
ascending line only the mother of the baptized counts, with whom the 
godfather and his descending relatives cannot marry. Calculating degrees 
of spiritual birth is identical with that of the blood relationship; the same 
general rule applies: the number of births between the parties constitutes 
the number of degrees. This is demonstrated in Scheme 8: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
209 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 429; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 138. 
210 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 430–431. 
211 “γέγονε σηµείωµα συνοδικόν ἐπι τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου ἐκείνου πατριάρχου κυρίου 
Νικολάου κατά µῆνα Μάϊον τῆς ιέ. ἐπινεµήσεως, ἐπἱ ἐρωτήσει τοῦ ὐπερτίµου 
ἐκείνου κυρίου Γρηγορίου τοῦ Ξηροῦ, διοριζόµενο τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὃροις 
συσφίγγεοθαι και ὑφαπλοῦσθαι τὴν διά τῆς συντικνίας συστᾶσαν πνευµατικὴν 
συγγένειαν, οἷς καὶ αἱ σωµατικαὶ συγγένειαι περιορίζονται.” Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 
482. 
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SCHEME 8 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between the godfather and the baptized there is one birth; thus, they 
are in the first degree of affinity. The godfather along with the mother of 
the baptized is in the second degree of affinity, because there is one 
spiritual birth between the godfather and the baptized and one birth by 
blood between the mother and the baptized. Likewise, the son of a 
godfather and the baptized person are in the second degree of affinity. 
The godfather is to the daughter of the baptized person in the same 
second degree, and the godfather’s son to her in the third degree. 
Professor Berdnikov notes that the Greek Orthodox tradition also knew a 
practice whereby the baptized persons from two different families and 
their descendants entered into a spiritual relationship with each other if 
they were baptized by the same godfather. These persons were called 
“spiritual brothers” (αδελφοί πνευµατικοί) and they, along with the 
descendants, could not marry each other in the seventh degree of 
spiritual affinity.213   
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Canonist Pavlov also includes a sworn brotherhood (ἀδελφοποιΐα) 
under the category of spiritual affinity, known as “brother adoption,” 
common to all Indo-European nations of antiquity. It consisted in the 
fact that two persons, who had no blood relationship between them, gave 
each other a vow of fraternal love and mutual support. The union was 
solidified with vows and with the exchange of crosses and other external 
rites. From here arose different impediments for marriage, namely, 
between the sworn brothers, if into this union were joined man and 
woman, between one sworn brother and the wife, or with a close relative 
or another person, etc.  However, since Byzantine civil laws did not give 
any legal value to sworn brotherhood, the Church did not hesitate to take 
the same view, especially since the spiritual brotherhood often concluded 
with direct criminal purposes or led to crimes. 214  Matthew Blastares 
considered adoption of a brother an illegal act. 215  From the above 
perspective, brother adoption can be considered a late addition to 
Orthodox canon law without having a genuine canonical or legal 
foundation.  
 
 
Half affinity  
 
Half affinity (quasi adfinitas, οιονεί αγχιστεία) designates relations that 
occur after the engagement between the groom or bride with the relatives 
from the one side, and between the groom or bride from the other. 
Engagement is the foundation of half affinity and arose from the concept 
of identical meanings of engagement and marriage.216 As it is seen in the 
concept of affinity and blood relationship which arise from the marriage, 
the degrees of half affinity are calculated in the same way. The Byzantine 
law books, namely the Basilika knew as well the concept of half affinity 
and prohibited marriage between a son and the engaged bride of 
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his father and vice versa; between the person and his brother’s engaged 
bride and between the engaged groom and the bride’s mother.217  
Canon 98 of Trullo decrees that: “He who brings to the intercourse of 
marriage a woman who is betrothed to another man who is still alive, is 
to lie under the charge of adultery.”218 This Trullan canon served as a 
source for the Synodal decree of the Patriarchate of Constantinople of 
1868, wherein the marriages between the betrothed groom and the 
widowed mother of his deceased bride was prohibited.219 The provisions 
of this decree can be seen in Scheme 9.  
 
 
 
SCHEME 9  
 
 
We can see that between the betrothed groom and the widow there is 
one birth, i.e. they are in the first degree of half affinity. As seen in 
Scheme 10, the decree of the Patriarchate of Constantinople rules also 
that the betrothed bride cannot marry a son of his deceased groom, who 
is in the first degree of half affinity or the brother of groom, who is in the 
                                                
217 Basilika XXVIII, 5.1–2. Scheltema 1962, 1342–1345. Russian canon lawyer 
Ilja Berdnikov mentions that these same rules are also found in the Procheiron 
nomos. Бердников 1913, 339. 
218 Schaff 2007, 406. 
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second degree of half affinity. Marriages in the third degree of half 
affinity are permitted.220 
 
 
 
SCHEME 10 
 
 
Particularly interesting is Professor Berdnikov’s opinion that divorced 
spouses after the divorce are also considered to be related in half affinity. 
In his opinion, since Byzantine law restricted such affinity to one degree, 
it prohibited marriage between one of the divorced spouses and children 
of the other spouse from his new marriage.221 Proof for such a restriction 
in Byzantine law is, however, hard to find and no ecclesiastical rules 
recognize specific regulations on this subject. In the Russian canon law 
books from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, only Professor 
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Berdnikov and Bishop of Dalmatia Nikodim mention the case of half 
affinity. 
 
 
Adoption  
 
From adoption arise an affinity that is called legal or fictional kinship 
(νοµική ή πλασµατική συγγένεια). 222  Such an affinity is between the 
adoptive parents and their relatives, and between the adopted son or 
daughter and their relatives. A legally adopted person has the same 
degree of affinity with his stepparents as a blood relationship would.223 
Basilika, 224  Procheiron 225  and Epanagoge 226  defined the law on 
adoption in more detail:  “I am not able to take aunts on my father’s or 
mother’s side for a wife, even if indeed they are adopted, because these 
who happened to be adopted by my grandfather hold the rank of mothers 
and occupy the position of sister in relation to my father, and of aunt to 
myself. A stepfather cannot marry the daughter or granddaughter of a 
                                                
222 Никодим 1897, 620. 
223 Novella 24 of Emperor Leo states that: “Adoptions formerly were devoid of 
pomp or ceremony and took place without sacrifices or any sacred melodies, and 
the law permitted those who desired to be adopted to do so in an extremely 
informal manner. The result of this was that the name of sister was frequently 
changed into that of wife; that of daughter into that of daughter–in–law; that of 
son into that of son–in–law; and then adoptive sons or daughters contracted 
matrimonial alliances with their natural brothers or sisters, which could take 
place because the service of the Church not being employed in adoption, no 
hindrance was offered to them. But although marriage was, under such 
circumstances, considered to some extent disgraceful, there was nothing 
criminal about it, since adoption was accomplished without any religious rites. 
But at present, as it is accompanied with all due solemnity, as the names of 
adoptive father and son are bestowed during the holy sacrifice, there is no longer 
any reason why marriage between natural and adoptive children of the same 
father should be permitted. Hence, We decree that those who become brother 
and sister by adoption cannot change this relationship through matrimonial 
union.” Scott 1932, 227. 
224 Basilika XXVIII, 5.2, 5.9. Scheltema 1962, 1344, 1347. 
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226 Epanagoge XVII, 5, 20–21. Zachariae 1852, 111–112. 
 
 
 
 
77 
stepson; nor can an adopted son marry the spouse of a stepfather, or her 
mother, her sister, or her granddaughter by son.”227 
In Byzantine law practice, adoption was soon replaced with the 
ecclesiastical custom of adoption, which included a specific ritual and 
prayers. As might be expected given the cultural context, the 
ecclesiastical form of adoption was considered more permanent than 
juridical adoption. In the eleventh century, Emperor Leo the Philosopher 
decreed that an ecclesiastically adopted person could not marry children 
of the adoptive family. Adoption through the Church was similar to 
spiritual affinity. After the Byzantine Church practice established 
regulations regarding impediments to marriage in spiritual affinity, 
including the seventh degree, the same practice was followed in the 
regulations regarding adoption.228 
 
 
 
2.6  Other Impediments to Marriage  
 
Different religions 
 
Impediments to marriage that arise from differences in religion between 
two spouses are divided into two groups: a) marriages between the 
Orthodox Christian and non-Christian spouse, and b) marriages between 
the Orthodox Christian spouse and the spouse who belongs to another 
Christian confession. The first case is entirely prohibited in Orthodox 
canon law; the second case is accepted under certain conditions. 
Marriages between Christians and non-Christians existed in the first 
centuries of Christianity. The Church tolerated these marriages, hoping 
that the non-Christian spouse would eventually convert to Christianity, as 
seen in 1 Corinthians 7:12–14, 16. As soon as Christianity became the 
dominant religion in the Roman Empire, a fear that the Jews would 
convert Christians to their religion arose. This led to a Constantinian law 
in 339, which forbade marriages between Christians and Jews. The 
Emperors Valentinian II, Theodosios I and Arkadios later confirmed the 
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Constantinian law. 229  The law was first published in the Codex 
Justinianus and later in the Basilika in following form: “Ἰουδαίοις 
Χριστιανοὶ πρὸς γάµον µὴ συνερχέσθωσαν τὸ περὶ µοιχείας ἐντεθεν 
ὑφορώµενοι δηµόσιον ἔγκληµα. 230  Οἱ τόν οὐρανὸν σεβόµενοι, εἰ µὴ 
Χριστιανοὶ γένονται, ὡς αἱρετικοὶ τιµωρείσθωσαν καὶ τὰς τούτων ἡ 
ἐκκλησία συναγωγὰς ἐκδικείτω.”231 This law was later included in the 
ecclesiastical law books of the Orthodox Church, e.g., Nomokanon of 
Fourteen Titles and the Alphabetical Collection of Matthew Blasters.232 
The Council of Laodicea in Canon 10 states that, “the members of the 
Church shall not indiscriminately marry their children to heretics.”233 
Zonaras and Balsamon believed that the restriction only applied to the 
children of the clergy.234 Zeger Bernhard van Espen, a Belgian canonist 
and Roman Catholic bishop, noted, however, that there is no doubt that 
the marriage of children of the clergy to heretics would be indecent 
according to this Canon. Marriage with heretics was universally 
condemned and to be avoided.235  This ruling was also confirmed with 
Canon 31 of the same council.236  Canon 14 of the fourth ecumenical 
council dealt with a case wherein readers and singers were not allowed to 
marry a heterodox and were not to give their children in marriage to a 
heretic, “unless the person marrying the Orthodox child shall promise to 
come over to the orthodox faith.”237 Matthew Blastares commented on 
this canon stating that marriages between heretics and those of the 
Orthodox faith should be delayed until the promise of a heretic is 
confirmed by action. Roman Catholic men who marry Orthodox women 
are also required to do the same things. Those who do not comply with 
these rulings are subject to canonical penalties.238 Balsamon at the end of 
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the aforesaid canon commented that apparently (ὡς ἔοικεν) on the basis 
of this rule, Orthodox believers (τὸ µέρος τῆς ἐκκλησίας) obliged Roman 
Catholics to renounce their faith when they wanted to take wives from the 
Eastern Empire.239  
Pavlov notes that the imprecise tone in which this comment was 
expressed suggests that Balsamon did not mean the general ecclesiastical, 
firmly established practice of his time, but some local practice from which 
it was impossible to derive a general rule. Further, there was no formal 
reason to recognize Roman Catholics as heretics at the time. The 
establishment of such a general rule was not favored in the Greek Church 
and there are frequent examples of marriages between Byzantine queens 
and Western Catholic sovereigns. They were not expected to convert, nor 
was a conversion to Orthodoxy required of the spouse.240  Examples of 
such marriages are also known in ancient Russia, although there from the 
very beginning they generated condemnation from ecclesiastical 
authorities. Already in the eleventh century Metropolitan Ioann II, in his 
canonical responses to monk Iakov, stated that to give daughters of a 
faithful prince to the non-Orthodox, who take communion in the form of 
unleavened bread, is an unworthy and very improper thing to do. 
Because the prince was a pious Orthodox, his children would be ordered 
to undergo the canonical penance for entering into such marriages.241 
Later, such opposition of the Church hierarchs regarding such 
marriages is reflected in the fact that the Russian form of an episcopal 
oath included a special article by which the newly ordained bishop 
pledged not to allow into his diocese marriages between the Orthodox 
and Armenians or Latins, except with the special permission of the 
metropolitan.242  The “special permission” clause shows that marriages of 
Russians with Christians of other denominations were not forbidden 
absolutely.  In fact, they were quite frequent in southwestern Russia, 
which during the fourteenth century was under the authority of Catholic 
(Polish and Lithuanian) sovereigns. A completely different social 
situation existed in northeast Russia. Due to the known condition of 
political life there, this part of Russia was kept in strict isolation from the 
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Christian West in religious and social terms. During the so-called 
Moscow period of Russian history, the canonical principle of not 
allowing marriages with non-Orthodox was violated only once: the 
marriage of the daughter of Grand Duke Ivan III Helena with the 
Lithuanian Grand Prince Alexander.243 
But this exception only proves the vital necessity at the time to comply 
with the general rule that both spouses have the same faith. All further 
attempts of Western European sovereigns to marry their children with 
the Russian royal family generally remained unsuccessful due to the fact 
that every seeker of the hand of a Russian princess was required to 
become an Orthodox. Only in the era of political and social reforms of 
Peter the Great did the canonical principle lose its binding authority in 
Russia. In 1721 the Holy Synod, shortly after it opened at the insistence of 
the tzar, published an extensive discourse on interdenominational 
marriages as a supplement to its Spiritual Regulation. On the basis of 
numerous examples from Greek and Russian history it permitted such 
marriages under two conditions that were observed until the Revolution 
of 1917: a) the free exercise by the Orthodox spouse of his faith, and 
b) raising the children in the Orthodox faith.244 
The question regarding weddings between an Orthodox and a Roman 
Catholic became important after some Polish provinces were returned to 
the Russian Empire, where the Latin priests often crowned such 
marriages without dealing with the Orthodox clergy and without noting 
the marriage in the register when baptizing children into the Orthodox 
Church. Regarding this, an imperial order was issued in 1832: such 
marriages were not deemed valid until an Orthodox priest wed the 
couple. This rule as a general law was introduced into the Russian Civil 
Code of Laws. In 1846, there was a proposal to redraft the article, but it 
was rejected due to the opinion of Metropolitan Filaret. Among the 
arguments was the idea that the marriage, crowned by a Roman Catholic 
priest might not be appropriate under the terms of Russian Orthodox 
ecclesiastical law. It would seem that for the execution of the law, there 
should have been a rule that a Roman Catholic priest, under pain of law, 
should not bless such a marriage before it was contracted in the Orthodox 
Church. But there was no such a provision in the law and the sanction of 
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the annulment of marriage proved in many cases to be not entirely 
consistent.245 
Canon 72 of Trullo confirmed all the previous rules.246 It generally 
forbids marriages between an Orthodox and heretics, but since they did 
in fact take place, the Church accepted them as legal and therefore 
accepted so-called mixed marriages. The terminology about “heretics” 
(αἱρετικοὺς) is mainly used in both Roman law and in the language of 
canons when speaking about the heterodox and non-Christians. This can 
be seen in Justinian law, where he includes among heretics Nestorians, 
Acephali, and Eutychians,247 and Mathew Blastares in his commentary to 
Canon 14 of the fourth ecumenical council which calls “heretic” those 
who receive the sacraments, but who are mistaken in some things.248  
Another term used to distinguish Orthodox from heterodox is 
“schismatics” (σχίµατικοὺς), which is frequently accompanied with the 
word “heretic.” 249  In the Byzantine Empire, civil law made it a 
requirement that marriage between schismatics and members of the 
official Church would be prohibited. In the original Latin versions of the 
Synod of Hippo of 393, Canon 12 forbade the sons of bishops and clergy 
to marry gentiles (non-Christians), heretics or schismatics. This canon is 
found in a modified form, with the omission of the term “schismatics” in 
Canon 21 of the Synod of Carthage.250 The permissibility of marriage with 
schismatics is based on the Church’s interests, in the concept of 
                                                
245 Победоносцев 2003, 66. 
246 “An orthodox man is not permitted to marry a heretical woman, nor an 
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appear to have been done by any [we require them] to consider the marriage 
null, and that the marriage be dissolved. [...] But if any who up to this time are 
unbelievers and are not yet numbered in the flock of the orthodox have 
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right and coming to the light of truth and the other remaining still detained by 
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oikonomia (οἰκονοµία), dispensation, since otherwise the Church would 
need to forbid such marriages in much larger numbers.251 In this sense, 
by virtue of oikonomia, marriages with the heterodox might be 
permitted, since Canon 72 of Trullo even allowed intermarriages between 
believers and non-believers.  
Orthodox canonists later concluded that the distinction between 
heretics and schismatics, which was made at Hippo, should also be 
assumed to be made at Carthage and elsewhere. Since other canons 
which forbid marriages with heretics speak more broadly regarding the 
intermarriages of Orthodox Christians who are not the children of 
clergymen, this could be interpreted to mean that marriages with 
schismatics was permitted.252 As canonist Nikolai Suvorov noted, Canon 
72 of the Trullan Council was established when multiple Christian 
Churches did not exist. There existed one universal Catholic Church, 
which was faced with Christian heresies and sects. 253  Although 
intermarriages were eventually tolerated, as we have seen, Byzantine civil 
law insisted that the children of such marriage unions must be baptized 
in the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox spouse should enjoy all the 
benefits in the case of divorce.254  
From the pastoral-canonical point of view, disagreement over faith 
and spiritual matters resulted from the absence of Eucharistic 
communion of one of the spouses.255 Herein lies the canonical anomaly – 
the non-Orthodox spouse may not take part in Eucharistic communion 
due to the fact that the spouses do not share the same faith.256 Zonaras 
asked on this matter that if the condition of the soul concerning faith is in 
contradiction for the spouses, how will they be one soul?257 The canonical 
discipline of the early Church, which later became a practice in the 
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Orthodox Church regarding marriage with the heterodox, can only be 
understood in the light of the theological teaching articulated in the 
Epistle to the Ephesian 5:23: ”marriage mirrors the union of Christ and 
the Church.”258 
 
 
Adultery 
 
In contrast to the notion of fornication (πορνεία), adultery (µοιχεία) is 
the case when someone has intercourse with another person who is not 
his or her spouse. If adultery is proved, then it is an impediment to 
marriage. The canons consider adultery to be a more serious crime than 
fornication and require strict punishment for it. Canon 20 of Ancyra 
states that “If the wife of anyone has committed adultery or if any man 
commit adultery, he must for seven years undergo the different degrees 
of penance. After this he shall be restored to full communion.”259  This 
interpretation can be somehow problematic from the textual point of 
view, since the sentence “αὐτὸν τύχειν” in the Greek text can refer only to 
the husband.260 The simplest way to understand this canon is that “an 
adulteress and an adulterer are to be cut off for seven years.” In this case 
“αὐτὸν” means only the guilty party and can be applied to either a man or 
a woman. Basil the Great in his Canon 58 excludes from Holy 
Communion for fifteen years a man guilty of having committed 
adultery.261 The length of the penance is, however, changed in his Canon 
77.262  
Apostolic Canon 61 forbids a man who has committed adultery, 
fornication or any forbidden act, to enter into the clergy at all.263 Canon 8 
                                                
258 Regarding the modern discussion of the topic, the aforesaid Epistle was cited 
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of Neocaesarea goes even further and decrees that the husband of an 
adulterous woman shall not enter into a ministry of any degree 
whatsoever. However, if a priest’s wife committed adultery, the priest 
could either be divorced from her or, if he did not wish to separate, he 
should leave the priesthood.264    
Byzantine law interprets adultery in the same sense as the canons of 
the Orthodox Church. Procheiron includes the law which forbids a man 
who is accused of adultery with a woman from marrying her: “Ὁ ἐπὶ 
µοιχεία γυναικὸς κατηγορηθεὶς οὺ δύναται ταύτην γαµετὴν 
ἀγαγέσθαι.” 265  The same law is also included in the Alphabetical 
Collection of Matthew Blastares,266 in Basilika267 and in Epanagoge.268 
Justinian Novella 134, chapter 10 ordered that if the adulterer has a wife, 
the dowry and prenuptial donation shall be returned to her. The 
adulteress shall suffer corporal punishment and be confined in a 
monastery. If her husband desires to take her back within two years, he 
can do so; he can cohabit with her without subjecting himself to any risk 
on this account.269 Emperor Leo thought that the crime of adultery is one 
of those for which a most severe and terrible penalty should be exacted, 
and one not less appalling than that for homicide. Emperor Leo decreed 
that both guilty parties shall have their noses slit after being beaten and 
sheared and as the husband must be indemnified for the injury which he 
has suffered, it was ordered that he shall be entitled to his wife’s dowry. 
Moreover, the guilty party was forbidden to marry again. As already seen 
in the Justinian Novella 134, Emperor Leo also ordered that the 
adulteress should be confined in a convent, where, by repentance, she can 
lessen the severity of the penalty, just as if she had been sent into exile.270 
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Instigation to divorce 
 
Both ecclestical and civil law allow for a legally divorced person to marry 
again, yet the new person with whom the divorced person will conclude a 
new marriage cannot be involved in a divorce process. This is clearly said 
in Canon 1 of Laodicea: “By concession, communion should be allowed to 
those who have liberally and legally contracted a second marriage, but 
not a clandestine one, after a short time has passed, and they have spent 
it in praying and fasting.”271 Zonaras, Balsamon and Aristenus treated 
second marriage that is contracted legally, identically, giving a penance of  
one year in such cases.272    
 
 
 
2.7  Conclusion of Marriage 
 
Betrothal 
 
Betrothal (µνηστεία) is a promise of a man and a woman to enter into 
marriage. Betrothal according to Church custom before the wedding was 
borrowed from Roman law. According to this law, betrothal was 
performed as soon as the decision to get married was made. For the 
marriage itself it had no legal value, though there was no doubt that after 
the betrothal a marriage would take place and although the promise was 
made mutually in front of witnesses, nevertheless the betrothed persons 
were not yet obliged to fulfill the promise to marry, and they were given 
the power to break the engagement and marry another person. This was a 
logical consequence of the basic teachings of the Roman law – a marriage 
can be terminated as soon as one party so desires. However, the one who 
becomes betrothed again without a formal statement that he or she 
refuses the former marital union, according to the law was subjected to 
dishonor, and moreover, if during the betrothal were given gifts by both 
                                                
271 See the note for the correct translation for this canon in The Rudder 1983, 
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sides, a divorcing party had to return twice as much as was received 
before without the right of claiming back the former gifts.273 
As the Church required from its members to enter into marriage only 
with its blessing, so it required the same respect for the betrothal. The 
Church subjugated to its jurisdiction the marriage just as it subjugated 
the betrothal. The freedom from obligation to enter into marriage in 
Roman law was restricted by the Church from the beginning of its 
legislative activities and its blessing for the betrothal gave it moral 
significance, similar to the meaning of marriage. In Canon 69 of Saint 
Basil the Great and in Balsamon's commentary on the same canon we can 
find expression of the idea that the betrothal should be strictly kept and 
be compulsory for every engaged party.274 Canon 98 of Trullo continues 
in the same spirit with the aforementioned canon and goes even further 
by giving a penance like for adultery to those who marry a person who is 
already engaged to somebody else.275 
This requirement of the Trullan Council was adopted in Byzantine law 
as well. The strictness in respect of betrothal was relaxed, however, by 
Emperor Leo the Wise, who by his two laws ordered that in order to get 
engaged a person should have reached an age that is prescribed by law, so 
that promises given at the betrothal were firmer and less likely to be 
broken. In his 74th (Ὁ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς στυλιανῷ τῷ αὐτῷ) and 109th 
(Περὶ τοῦ µὴ γίνεσθαι µνηστείαν ἔνδοθεν τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, εἴτε ἱερολογίαν 
ἔνδοθεν τεσσαρεσχαιδεκαετοῦς χρόνου, καὶ τοῦ τρισκαιδεκάτου ἐπὶ 
γυναικῶν) Novella he decided that a betrothal had the same force as a 
marriage and that dissolution could only take place according to the same 
reasons by which a marriage was dissolved.276 
This was confirmed with Novellas 24 and 31 of Emperor Alexius I 
Comnenus. In light of the definition of the Synod under Patriarch John 
VIII, according to which kinship and originating from the kinship 
impediments should have exactly the same meaning in the betrothal as in 
the conclusion of marriages, it was decreed that a person who was 
engaged in the Church, and after the death of the betrothed married 
another, was considered as married as if  the before betrothed person was 
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married to the first espoused.277 Borrowing from Roman law the concept 
of betrothal, the Church gave its blessing to a promise (ἐπαγγελία) 
accompanying engagement, so that the promise was started to be seen as 
sacred, as given before God and accepted by God. In this sense the 
betrothal is the beginning of the marriage, since it already has the 
necessary condition which constitutes the essence of marriage, namely, 
mutual consent of the spouses concerning marital life. Therefore, just like 
the Mosaic, so too the New Testament law considers the betrothed person 
to be the wife or husband of the betrothed. Moses refers to “a wife of his 
neighbor’s" damsel, who was engaged with a known man (Deuteronomy 
22:23–4). In the New Testament, the Blessed Virgin, being only 
betrothed to Joseph, is called his “wife,” and Joseph her “husband” 
(Matthew 1:18–20). 
The time between the betrothal and marriage is not precisely defined 
either in ecclesiastical or in civil law. It was left for the betrothed to 
decide, who usually allowed some time to elapse after the betrothal 
before the wedding, following what was then prohibited by the laws, 
namely  celebrating both at the same time, since they were understood 
essentially as two different things.278 Subsequently, in order to avoid 
cases that could arise in the already mentioned Trullan canon, the 
Church established that an engagement was made simultaneously with 
the wedding. 
 
 
Time of concluding the marriage 
 
The time of concluding the marriage in the Orthodox Church is related to 
the fasting periods and to important religious holidays, during which 
Christians are advised to leave all earthly things and spend time in 
spiritual celebration and gladness. In view of this, the days when there 
should not be such feasts, and therefore, when marriage could not be 
sealed, were precisely defined by ecclesiastical legislation. With the 
gradual legalization of days of fasting and major holidays, the time when 
                                                
277 Zachariae 1857, 359, 376; Zhisman 1864, 154. 
278  See Novella 24, Article 2 of Alexius Comnenus. Zachariae 1857, 363; 
Syntagma of Matthew Blastares, chapter Γ, Article 15 on “περὶ µνηστείας” 
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someone can or cannot enter into marriage was set. The first record 
regarding this question can be found in Canon 52 of Laodicaea: Ὃτι οὐ δεῖ 
ἐν τῇ Τεσσαρακοστῇ γάµους ἢ γενέθλια ἐπιτελεῖν”279 (That weddings and 
birthday celebrations must not be held during Great Lent). Later 
Theodoros Balsamon affirmed this practice in his 57th canonical 
answer280 and Mathew Blastares clarified this rule by stating that it is not 
fitting that one should participate for pleasure–seeking reasons during 
the (Church’s) feasts and festivals.281 Canonist Pavlov notes that by the 
time when the aforementioned canon was interpreted by Blastares, 
Apostolic Canon 69 and Canon 15 of Peter the Martyr (Alexandrian) 
ordered Wednesday and Friday as fasting days, and later in the twelfth 
century the Orthodox Church had established all the fasts which exist to 
the present time.282 
 
The established days when wedding ceremonies were prohibited were:  
 
1. From November 14, the beginning of Christmas lent until January 
6; 
2. From the Sunday of Cheesefare week until the first Sunday after 
Easter; 
3. From the first Sunday after the day of Holy Trinity until June 29; 
4. During the lent of Dormition of the Mother of God, i.e., from 
August 1 – August 15; 
5. On the days of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist (August 
29), the Feast of the Cross (September 14), and on every 
Wednesday and Friday of the year.283 
 
However, should a wedding be celebrated on a day when the Church 
prohibits it, the marriage remains valid and does not lose its legal value if 
nothing else contradicts the existing laws on marriage. The priest who 
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contracted the marriage on such a day is subject to penance.284 The 
Russian Orthodox Church at the beginning of twentieth century 
prohibited contracting marriages also on the feasts of the Protection of 
the Blessed Virgin Mary, Our Lady of Kazan, the Beheading of Saint 
Nicholas, as well as on the eve of the temple and other honored local 
parish holidays.285 
 
 
Weddings 
 
Weddings, when there are no impediments to marriage and all the 
prescribed preconditions are fulfilled, must be performed in public with 
witnesses and established ecclesiastical rites. The very character of 
marriage requires this, as a foundation of social life and as a great 
sacrament of the New Testament. A secret marriage (λαθρογαµία) is 
strongly condemned by the canons; it is considered illegal,286 and the 
priest who secretly weds someone is condemned to the most strict 
punishments.287 In connection with these ecclesiastical regulations on 
secret marriages, they were condemned by the laws of the Byzantine 
Emperors as well, and adopted to the canonical collections of the 
Orthodox Church, where they became a general law for the Church. This 
can be seen in the second section of chapter Γ of Synatagma kata 
stoicheion of Matthew Blastares288 and in the fourth chapter, section 27 
of Procheiron.289 
Later, the practice and rules of the Church indicated that the place of a 
wedding must be a parish church to which both spouses belonged.290 The 
fourth canonical answer of Peter Chartophylax states that it is forbidden 
for monks to wed, or to celebrate weddings in monasteries (Ἐρώτηµα. 
                                                
284 See the teaching of Patriarch Manuel II of Constantinople († 1254). Ράλλη 
1855, T. V, 116. 
285 Нечаев 1915, 234. 
286 See Canon 1 of Laodicaea and its interpretation. Ράλλη 1853, T. III, 172. 
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Ἒστιν ἂξιον, µοναχὸν εὐλογῆσαι γάµον; Ἀπόκρισις. Οὔτε µοναχὸν, οὔτε ἐν 
µοναστηρίῳ). 291  In exceptional cases a marriage could be celebrated 
outside the Church building, as Balsamon illuminates in his fourteenth 
canonical answer. In his answer, Balsamon quotes the fourth Novella of 
Emperor Leo the Wise and says that some Church rituals, baptism for 
example, can be celebrated outside the Church.292 This interpretation is 
analogical to his commentaries in Canons 31 and 59 of Trullo,293 which he 
also cites in the commentary to Canon 58 of Laodicaea.294 As the fiftieth 
title of Kormtšaja Kniga indicates, in Slavic Churches a practice was 
established in which the wedding must be celebrated before midday after 
the liturgy, or before the liturgy.295 
The legitimate marriage requires witnesses, in front of whom the 
celebrants testify their free will to enter into marriage. The number of 
witnesses in the wedding is standardized in the ecclesiastical regulations 
according to the teaching in the Scriptures, which points out cases when 
witnesses are required.296 Besides this, the canons indicate that only one 
witness is not sufficient.297 The canonical collections of the Orthodox 
Church decreed that weddings must be celebrated in front of no less than 
two witnesses. Witnesses were required to be of legal age and to fulfill all 
the conditions that were needed regarding any agreement.298 
Balsamon in his commentary to Canon 70 of Trullo also points out 
that women were prohibited from being witnesses in marriages.299 The 
right to wed belongs to priests and weddings must be concluded by the 
rite of the Church found in the prayer book in accordance with set 
prayers for the first time or the second time of marriage. The Orthodox 
Church does not recognize as legal any other form of marriage, even if it 
                                                
291 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 369. 
292 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 458. 
293 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 372, 400. 
294 Ράλλη 1853, T. III, 224. 
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296 See Matthew 18:16. 
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follows all the precedent conditions and there are no marital 
impediments.300   
 
 
 
2.8  Divorce 
 
Divorce is an act carried out by competent authorities, consisting in the 
dissolution of a legal and valid marriage. In order that this act takes 
place, such justification is required that would, so to speak, outweigh the 
idea of the indissolubility of marriage as a union entered into for a 
lifetime. Among the Jews and the Romans extensive freedom to divorce 
existed. According to Roman law, the basis of a divorce could serve as a 
legitimate reason, but also simply the mutual agreement of the spouses 
was adequate. When Christianity became the dominant religion in the 
Roman Empire, the Roman emperors, due to the insistence of the 
Church, tried to limit arbitrariness in the case of divorce. But a decisive 
prohibition against the divorce commonly found in the Roman Empire 
namely  divorce by mutual agreement, against which the teachers of the 
Church revolted, can be found for the first time in the legislation of the 
Emperor Justinian.301  
Legal standards concerning the dissolution of marriage in the 
Byzantine Church before the end of the ninth century were expressed to 
the full extent in the Nomokanon of Patriarch Photios. Rules concerning 
divorce are placed in the fourth chapter of the thirteenth title, with the 
heading “About those who divorce” (Περὶ τῶν διαζευγνυµένων). Under 
this heading all the canons related to this issue are mentioned.302 From 
the canons mentioned in the Nomokanon, the fifth Apostolic canon 
forbids bishops, priests and deacons from divorcing their wives under 
pretext of reverence, threatening those who are found guilty of this with 
excommunication (ἀφοριζέσθω),303 and those who disobeyed would be 
removed from office.304  
                                                
300 Милаш 1897, 588. 
301 Красножен 1900, 142–143. 
302 Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 294. 
303 It should be noted that in Orthodox canon law, “ἀφορισµὁς,” when speaking 
about the laity, means excommunication from the Holy Mysteries, from 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
Byzantine exegetes of the Holy canons, such as Zonaras, explained 
that this rule prohibited divorce in which no reasons for dissolving the 
marriage were given (χωρὶς αἰτίας). Aristine for his part spoke about the 
blessed reason (ἂνευ εὐλόγου αἰτίας), i.e. false imaginary motives as a 
cause for anathema, as if marriage in this case were impure 
(ἀκαθαρσία).305 The second rule that Nomokanon mentions is Canon 14 
of the Synod of Gangra, which decrees anathema to a wife (ἀνάθεµα 
ἔστω) who abominates her marriage, abandons her husband and wishes 
to depart from him. Regarding this rule, Theodore Balsamon refers to 
Apostle Paul.306 A wife who abandons her husband on account of his 
hatefulness, was not considered a reason for divorce in Balsamon’s view. 
Zonaras in his turn added that if a wife leaves her husband who did not 
want to live separately, or a husband puts away his wife who did not want 
to divorce (τὸ διαζύγιον), in such case if one of the spouses wants to 
dissolve the marriage (λύειν τὸν γάµον), avoiding legal cohabitation as an 
impurity, then the spouse will fall under anathema.307 Canon 14 of Synod 
of Gangra hereby prohibits the separation of spouses, not to mention 
divorce. 
The third rule which is added to Nomokanon under the title of 
divorce, is Canon 102 of the Synod of Carthage. In this case, a willful 
termination of joint married life, from the side of the husband or the wife, 
is not consistent with the teachings of the Holy Scriptures. Byzantine 
commentators of canons considered that this rule was based on the 
                                                                                                                    
participation in some prayers, and placing a layperson in the rank of penitents 
for a set period. When speaking about the priesthood, “ἀφορισµὁς” means 
prohibition in ministering, removing from office and place of service, but it does 
not prohibit participation in the Holy Mysteries and communion with the 
Church. See the Apostolic Canon 25, Canon 36 of the Synod of Carthage, and 
Canons 3, 32 and 51 of Basil the Great. 
304 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 7. 
305 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 7–8. 
306 “Do not deprive one another except with consent and the wife does not have 
authority over her own body, but the husband does. And likewise the husband 
does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does (1. Corinthians 7:4–
5).” 
307 Ράλλη 1853, T. III, 110. 
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words of Christ.308 Carthagean fathers saw that adultery was the only 
valid reason for divorce, and a spouse who committed adultery was to live 
either in celibacy, or to be reconciled with the other spouse.309 When this 
rule was violated, Zonaras and Aristine thought that the perpetrators 
must be subjected to repentance in having committed the sin of adultery. 
In order to make everyone follow this rule, the Synod of Carthage asked 
for the publication of the corresponding royal law (νόµον βασιλικὸν).310 
Regarding the dissolution of marriage by the aforementioned 
Carthagean rule, besides adultery, if there was good reason for it, this 
rule did not apply. One could conclude that neither the husband nor the 
wife could ever remarry, despite the fact that there was just cause why 
their marital life had stopped. In the conclusion of this rule, the 
Carthagean fathers spoke of the necessity to apply to the State the right to 
publish a particular royal law concerning a regulation that they compiled. 
This can be regarded as proof that the Christian Church recognized 
certain rights of civil law in relation to marital issues, since only the State 
could guarantee all the civil implications of marriage as a legal contract. 
Nomokanon continues to observe Canons 9, 35, 48 and 77 of Saint 
Basil the Great. In the ninth canon Saint Basil points out that Christ’s 
dictum regarding the impermissibility of divorce, except in cases of 
fornication which apply equally to husband and wife, according to the 
established tradition (συνήθεια), was not accurate. The tradition refers to 
wives more strictly (πολλὴ ἀκριβολογία) than to husbands; but even if the 
husbands were the adulterers, Basil the Great recommends that wives 
keep them. Consequently, a wife becomes an adulteress if she leaves her 
husband for another man. The husband is worthy of leniency 
(συγγνωστός ἐστι) and the woman cohabiting with him in the new 
                                                
308 “Whoever divorces his wife for any reason except sexual immorality causes 
her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits 
adultery” (Matthew 5:32); “Now to the married I command, yet not I but the 
Lord: A wife is not to depart from her husband. But even if she does depart, let 
her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. And a husband is not to 
divorce his wife” (1 Corinthians 7:10–11); and “The one bound to a wife should 
not seek divorce. The one released from a wife should not seek marriage” (1 
Corinthians 7:27). 
309 Here it should be noted that the Slavic Nomokanon recognizes divorce only in 
cases when the wife has committed adultery, and does not mention husbands. 
Павлов 1902, 385.   
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marriage will not be condemned. In this case the guilt is on the shoulders 
of the first wife who left her husband, no matter for what reason. If, for 
example,  the wife left her husband because she was subjected to beatings 
and could not stand the blows, then she was advised to bear them better 
rather than divorce her husband.311 
Further, if the divorce was motived with the reason that the wife could 
not take the beatings, this excuse (πρόφασις) was not worthy of respect. 
In addition, if a wife abandoned her husband because he was living in 
fornication (ὲν πορνείᾳ), this was not a valid reason either, because in 
that case she had to live with her husband in order to save him (1 
Corinthians 7:16). When then did Saint Basil give a wife a reason to 
legally leave her husband? If the husband left his wife and took another 
woman, in that case not just the husband but the new wife as well would 
be guilty of adultery. This rule characterizes the ecclesiastical custom or 
divorce practice  in force in Saint Basil’s time . The essence for such strict 
divorce practice can only be the fact that husband and wife have equal 
rights in a Christian marriage. The holy father does not, however, 
recognize reasons for divorce, such  as  spousal abuse, dissolution of 
property, different beliefs, or the fact that a husband is living in sin.312 
In view of the fact that Saint Basil the Great in his Canon 9 and 21 
speaks about the dominant custom of that time whereby a husband who 
has engaged in fornication with another woman after leaving his first 
wife, is given leniency before taking this woman as his second wife after a 
given penance. We can assume that the Church father understands here 
the so-called concumbinatus, i.e. the permission given by Roman law to 
the long-term sexual union of an unmarried man with an unmarried 
woman, who did not become his wife. Undeniably it was contrary to good 
morals to have a concubine and at the same time to live with a wife. 
Concubinage became a sort of quasi-legal relationship that was not 
                                                
311 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 120–121. Compare the subject of beating to Justinian 117 
Novella, 14th chapter, which says that: “If a man should beat his wife with a whip 
or a rod, without having been induced to do so for one of the reasons which We 
have stated to be sufficient, where the woman is at fault, to cause dissolution of 
the marriage, We do not wish it to be dissolved on this account; but the husband 
who has been convicted of having, without such a reason, struck his wife with a 
whip or a rod, shall give her by way of compensation for an injury of this kind 
(even during the existence of the marriage) a sum equal in value to the amount 
of the antenuptial donation to be taken out of his other property.” Scott 1932, 59. 
312 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 120–121. 
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adulterous (since that would be a crime in Roman law) but also did not 
entitle the concubine to anything; any children would follow her status. 
The practice of concubinage in the Roman Empire was confronted with 
the problem, namely how to determine whether a given relationship was 
marriage or concubinage.313 Saint Basil, though condemning concubinage 
and giving penance for the husband’s fornication, did not recognize  
adultery as the only legitimate reason for divorce. The custom of the time 
was to be lenient towards a husband who cohabited with another woman 
when left by an adulterous wife, but with adultery Saint Basil blamed not 
only the husband when he left his wife and took another woman, but also 
the woman who cohabited with him.314 
Canon 35 of the same Saint says that if the husband is abandoned by 
his wife, it is necessary to consider the reason (αἰτίαν) for such 
abandonment and if it turns out that his wife has left her husband for no 
reason (ἀλόγως) then he is worthy of leniency, and his wife is subject to 
penance; leniency to the husband was given because he was in 
communion with the Church. The term “ἀλόγως” can also be understood 
as a purely technical expression, meaning a divorce without the presence 
of legal conditions and formal permission for it, i.e. without the 
compliance of legal order and process.315 In the interpretation of this rule, 
Zonaras explains that leniency for the husband is given only when his 
wife left him without any reason (χωρὶς εὐλόγου αἰτίας). This reason does 
not lie in the fact that the husband enters into another marriage, but in 
the fact that he will not be excluded from the Church. Hence, divorce, 
regarding the ninth and eighth canon of Basil the Great is possible only 
due to the fault of adultery, for which the wife bears a penance when she 
leaves her husband.316 
Canon 48 of Basil, which was also mentioned in the Nomokanon says 
that a women who was left by her husband should continue her life in 
                                                
313 Frier 2004, 51. Men normally took as concubines women of a lower social 
class than themselves – often their ex-slaves. Respectable women were not 
supposed to enter into concubinage. 
314 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 122–123. 
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celibacy.317 Balsamon’s commentary indicates that the meaning of this 
canon is whether or not a woman should unite in matrimony with a 
lawful husband while she is unlawfully divorced from her previous 
husband (εἰ ὸφείλει νοµίµῳ ἀνδρὶ συνάπτεσθαι ἡ παραλόγως διαζυγεῖσα 
τοῦ οἰκείου ἀνδρὸς). Basil, basing his opinion on the famous words of the 
Lord, stated that a wife who was left by her husband for reasons other 
than adultery, which was the only legal reason for divorce, turns out to be 
an adulteress when entering into a new marriage with the another man 
(ἐὰν ἑτέρῳ συζευχθῆ). Such a women, in Balsamon’s opinion, should live 
in silence (ὀφείλει ἡσυχάζειν), which no doubt meant living in a 
monastery. She was advised to bear the unlawful divorce and to 
encourage her husband to return to her, but if she instead of this entered 
into a new marriage with another man, then she should be condemned as 
an adulteress, though she did not give a reason for abandoning him in the 
first place, while her husband did.318 
Hence, if the husband leaves his wife without a legitimate reason, this 
marriage cannot be considered terminated. Therefore, the husband and 
wife, when entering into another marriage, both commit adultery, and in 
the Church’s opinion are considered guilty. To avoid this sin, the wife, 
even if she was left innocently, should not enter into another marriage 
until there is a legitimate reason for a valid divorce from her first 
husband. This canon was also applied vice versa in cases where a wife left 
her husband.319 
In Canon 77, Saint Basil continues to define the reason and 
consequences of divorce by stating that a man who abandons his legally 
wedded wife and marries another woman is liable to the judgment of 
adultery. Saint Basil the Great ruled that such persons must weep for a 
year, listen at the side of the Church’s doors for two years, confessing 
their sins to parishioners and asking for their prayers. They must kneel 
                                                
317 “But the woman abandoned by her husband ought, in my opinion, to stay. For 
if the Lord has said that if any man leaves his wife except on grounds of 
fornication, he is causing her to commit adultery (Matt. 5:32), since as a result of 
his calling her an adulteress he has debarred her from communion with any 
other man. For how can a husband be considered irresponsible as the cause of 
adultery, while the wife, deemed an adulteress by the Lord on account of 
communion with another man, is so denominated?” The Rudder 1983, 824. 
318 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 200. 
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(ὑποπίπτειν) and listen to the prayers that are read to them for three 
years, in the seventh year stand together with the faithful, and then be 
deemed worthy of participating in the Holy Communion, if with tears 
they do penance.320 It should be noted that Basil the Great only follows 
here the regulations of other fathers, and in his Canon 58 he already 
condemned a person as guilty of adultery by excluding him or her from 
holy communion for fifteen years. For penance the adulterer must weep 
for four years, listen to the Holy Scriptures for five years, kneel for four 
years and stand for two years with the other faithful without participating 
in Holy Communion.321 
Nomokanon also mentions Canon 87 of Trullo, which provides a 
synthesis of the already mentioned canons of Saint Basil. The canon 
states that she who has left her husband because of another man is an 
adulteress. If a wife appears to have departed from her husband without 
a reason (ἀλόγως), the husband is deserving of pardon (συγγνώµη) and 
she of penance. Pardon shall be given to the husband so that he could be 
in communion (τὸ κοινωνεῖν) with the Church. But the husband who 
leaves his lawful wife (τὴν νοµίµως συναφθεῖσαν) and takes another, is 
guilty of committing the sin (κρίµατι) of adultery. As it has been decreed 
by the Fathers, such sinners must be “weepers” for a year, “hearers” of 
the Holy Scriptures for two years, “kneelers” for three years, and in the 
seventh year stand with the faithful and thus be counted worthy of the 
Oblation [if with tears they do penance].322  
As we can see here, the discipline that Saint Basil the Great set was 
relaxed after 200 years when the Church fathers first laid down the rules 
on adultery.323 Zonaras refines the situation of the adulterous wife who 
without reason (ἀναιτίως) leaves her husband for another man, that even 
if she wanted to come back to her previous husband against the 
husband’s will (ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ), she should not be taken back because 
she has been defiled. Regarding this adulterous desecration, according to 
the Holy Fathers, she is to be ordered to do penance, and her husband 
                                                
320 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 239–240. 
321 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 216. 
322 Schaff 2007, 402. 
323 Schaff 2007, 403. 
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would suffer no punishment and would remain in communion with the 
Church.324 
Besides adultery and malicious abandonment of one of the spouses, 
some reasons for divorce can be also interpreted as impediments. 325 
Canon 53 of Trullo prohibits the marriage between a godfather and the 
godson’s widowed mother; such marriages must be dissolved if they for 
some reasons were contracted. Based on this rule, some who wanted to 
find a legitimate reason for divorce became godfather or godmother to 
their own child and in that way achieved their goals without fear of 
punishment. In order to stop such misuse, in the eighth century an 
imperial novella was published which legally established the 
aforementioned reason for divorce with the corresponding heavy 
punishment and prohibition of the perpetrator entering into a new 
marriage.326 Other well-founded reasons for divorce were ordination as 
bishop in cases where the priest’s wife allows such a separation, as 
mentioned in Canons 12 and 48 of Trullo. On the same grounds, divorce 
can also be allowed for those who entered into monkhood. 
Nomokanon included Byzantine and Roman civil laws regarding 
divorce as well. These laws were later adopted in Rus’, although they were 
not fully implemented. In Rus’ the custom and partly the law allowed 
divorces in cases which would be prohibited by Byzantine law, and vice 
versa. For example, divorce would not granted on the grounds of the 
illness of one of the spouses, but was granted in the cases of cruelty to a 
wife or when the husband drank away her property. Also in cases where 
the wife suffered from infertility, divorce was at times granted. Such a 
custom was unknown for the Slavic Nomokanon. Finally, in the case of a 
criminal offense committed by one of the spouses, the innocent wife was 
obliged to follow her husband into exile, but the husband in such cases 
did not share the fate of his wife if she was found guilty.327 
                                                
324 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 505–506. 
325 Abandonment of the Christian faith is one of them, and as pointed out in 
chapter 2.6, this is based on Canon 72 of Trullo. 
326 Compare Blastares B, 8 (Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 139.) and 15th canonical response 
of Peter Chartophylax. Ράλλη 1859, T. V, 371.  
327 Павлов 1902, 383–384. 
 
 
 
 
99 
Thus, examining the canons of the Church quoted by Patriarch Photios 
in the thirteenth title of his Nomokanon, the following conclusions can be 
made:  
 
1. Marriage should not be dissolved without an acceptable reason.328 
2. Such reasons as abominating the marriage, false piety, cruel 
treatment by the husband of his wife, embezzlement and taking a 
concubine were not considered to be acceptable reasons.329 
3. Adultery is considered a lawful reason for divorce330 and as a 
dogmatical reason for divorce has equivalent application for both 
husband and wife.331 
4. The tradition of the Church has developed a more lenient attitude 
towards the husband than the wife. 332  That is why having a  
concubine was not recognized as a lawful reason for divorce, and 
the wife should not leave her husband on account of adultery if he 
repented.333 The wife, however, could not be taken back against 
the will of her husband.334 
5. A spouse who is guilty of adultery is subjected to seven years of 
repentance, after which entrance into a new marriage is denied – 
the guilty party is only allowed to be restored to  communion with 
the Church.335  Leniency was only given to the innocent spouse, 
who could enter into a new marriage after the lawful divorce.336 
6. Divorce is considered legal as well in cases when the wife is 
willing to separate from her husband for the sake of his ordination 
                                                
328 Fifth Apostolic canon and Canon 14 of Gangra. 
329 Fifth Apostolic canon, Canon 14 of Gangra and Canon 9 of Saint Basil the 
Great. 
330 Canon 102 of the Synod of Carthage, Canon 9 of Saint Basil the Great, Canons 
48, 77 and 87 of Trullo. 
331 Canon 9 of Saint Basil the Great. 
332 Canon 35 of Saint Basil the Great. 
333 Canons 9 and 21 of Saint Basil the Great. 
334 Canon 9 of Saint Basil the Great, Canon 87 of Trullo. 
335 Canon 107 the Synod of Carthage, Canons 48 and 77 of Saint Basil the Great, 
Canon 87 of Trullo. 
336 Canon 35 of Saint Basil the Great. 
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as bishop, and for joint or separate entry of spouses into monastic 
life.337  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
337 Canon 12 and 48 of Trullo. 
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3. RUSSIAN LEGAL PRACTICE AND 
MATRIMONIAL NORMS AT THE BEGINNING 
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
3.1  Particular Laws of the Russian Orthodox Church 
 
 
The Spiritual Regulation 338  (Духовный Регламент) was the primary 
document defining the legal status of the Orthodox Church in Russia 
during the Synodal period until 1917. From a historical point of view, the 
publication of the Spiritual Regulation draws a clear distinction between 
the former and the new law of the Russian Church. In relation to the past, 
it abolished the ancient Russian Church regulations in all those cases 
where Church jurisdiction extended over cases that were non-
ecclesiastical in nature. 339  With regard to the future development of 
Russian ecclesiastical law, the Spiritual Regulation was the basis that 
directly or indirectly supported the legal system of the Russian Church.340 
It was signed by the bishops, archimandrites, senators, and finally by the 
                                                
338 Spiritual Regulation is an official translation of “Духовный Регламент.” 
“Регламент” or “regulation” is a translation of the Latin term word 
“regulamentum,” which means “rule.”  The term “регламент” is foreign to 
Orthodox canon law, and for that reason the translation of Latin words into 
Greek might be problematic. Orthodox canon law uses a Greek word “κανόνας” 
instead. In 1911 the Spiritual Regulation was translated into Greek by 
Archbishop Eugenios Bulgarisa. Бердников 1913, 880–885; Павлов 1902, 184–
185. 
339 Muller 1972, XXXVII. 
340 Православная энциклопедия 2007, T. XVI, 433. The Spiritual Regulation 
was the work of a professor at Kiev’s Theological Academy, Feofan Prokopovitš, 
who supported the concept of a Russian national Church under the authority of 
the tsar as the “supreme bishop.” Feofan argued that an ecclesiastical council 
would be more appropriate to govern the Church than a single patriarch. 
Significantly, this critical document contained much more than a mere 
justification of the decision of Peter the Great to replace the patriarchate with a 
collegial board (at first called the “Spiritual College,” but soon renamed the 
“Most Holy Synod”).  Feofan had already written a draft regulation in 1719, i. e., 
two years before the constitution of the Holy Synod.  After the tsar made the 
revisions, the draft was read twice in the senate and supplemented by new 
observations 
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tsar himself. With these signatures it was sent to Moscow and other 
places for the signatures of those who had not attended the senate. It was 
then published with the manifesto of January 25, 1721.341 
The Spiritual Regulation established the Spiritual Board as the 
highest body of ecclesiastical authority of the Church while being at the 
same time a governmental department. From the moment of opening the 
Holy Synod on February 14, 1721 the Spiritual Regulation defined the 
structure and functions of the Holy Synod, thereby establishing a system 
of state control over Church activities. The initial publication of the 
Spiritual Regulation was followed by a second publication on September 
16, 1721.342 In both form and content, the Spiritual Regulation is not only 
a legislative act, but also a literary monument. It is filled with general 
theoretical arguments, e.g., for example, the superiority of collective 
management over individual management, and contains different 
projects, such as the establishment of academies in Russia. On occasion it 
descends into absurd detail.343 
Spiritual Regulation determined the structure of the Synod: 12 
members: 3 bishops and archimandrites, abbots and archpriests. It was 
headed by the President (chairman). However, according to the 
manifesto of January 25, 1721, it included the President of the Synod, two 
vice presidents, four advisors and four assessors, i.e., a total of 11 
persons. The structure was to change often. All members of the Synod, 
including the President, had equal votes. The President only symbolically 
represented the First Hierarch; in practice the President did not differ in 
rights from the other members of the Synod. Although it was the highest 
judicial authority and administrative body of the Russian Church, the 
Synod did not have the authority of the Patriarch. However, it acted on 
behalf of the tsar; it received from him the authority to execute decrees 
and orders related to all Church affairs.344 
                                                
341 Верховской 1916, 3 
342 Православная энциклопедия 2007, T. XVI, 433. 
343 For example, such is the case when it comes to the power and honor of the 
bishop during an episcopal visitation to their dioceses. Here are explained how 
the bishops should make a visit to the diocese during the summer, because 
products are cheaper in that period of time and how the bishops should set up a 
tent near to the city, not bothering the presbyterate by finding an apartment 
during the visit. Духовный Регламент 1897, 40. 
344 Православная энциклопедия 2007, T. XVI, 433–434. 
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The Spiritual Regulation presented in a strictly legal manner only the 
general principles and procedures of Synodal administration from the 
establishment of the Holy Synod in place of the Patriarchate, the central 
Church administration, to the relationship of the Holy Synod to the 
imperial power and to diocesan administration. Everything remained in 
the same form as had been defined by Peter I, but the new regulations 
required to be submitted for imperial approval. The earliest of such 
amendments were published in 1722 and were usually printed at the end 
of the Spiritual Regulation as additions.345 The Spiritual Regulation was 
the rule for the faithful of every rank; all Church administration had 
ecclesiastical-juridical and state-juridical obligations.346 
As noted by the respected canonist A. S. Pavlov, the relation of the 
Holy Synod to the supreme power of the State was the same as the 
relations of other institutes to the supreme power: “The Holy Synod 
receives for execution imperial decrees and commands concerning all 
cases of the Russian Orthodox Church.”347 A decision of the Synod has 
the force of law only after approval by the supreme authority. In general, 
all cases provided for the Holy Synod by the Spiritual Regulation of Peter 
the Great, were expressed “by order of His Imperial Majesty”; this was 
the customary form of Synodal orders and decrees.348 
All the tsar’s edicts and manifestos were read in the parishes during 
Sunday services and parishioners were forbidden to leave the Church 
before they were read. Priests were threatened with defrocking if they did 
not apply these regulations. In addition, decrees regulating cult activities 
were issued, which can be regarded as an intrusion of secular power into 
                                                
345  Павлов 1902, 186. These additions created an ambitious program to 
enlighten and eradicate superstitions in the Church and among the laity by 
improving ecclesiastical administration and establishing seminaries to educate 
parish clergy, defining their qualities and duties (especially the duties of the 
spiritual fathers), and introducing the parish registers and rules concerning the 
monastic life, among many other regulations. 
346 Заозерский 1888, 129. 
347 Павлов 1902, 178. 
348 In fact, the Church became part of the state apparatus: the Synodal oath of 
allegiance to the imperial family pledged to uphold the public interest and to 
honor the monarch himself as the supreme judge in spiritual matters. The Holy 
Synod changed the form of oath in 1901. Православная энциклопедия 2007, T. 
XVI, 433. 
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the canonical affairs of the Church. The legislation prescribed annual 
confession of parishioners, which was recorded in the parish registers.349 
The Charter of Diocesan 350  Consistories (Устав Духовных 
Консисторий) was a body of laws governing the Diocesan administration 
of the Russian Church under the ruling bishop that operated as a 
deliberative and executive institution. Unification in the Diocesan Office 
was introduced by the Decree of the Holy Synod on July 9, 1744, which 
defined that all the diocesan administrative bodies should have the same 
name, “Diocesan Consistory.” Prior to 1768, only monastics of priestly 
ranks, i.e., archimandrites, abbots and monks, could participate in the 
Diocesan Consistory. Afterwards the secular clergy were appointed as 
members of the consistory. In 1797, Emperor Paul I decreed that half of 
the members of the Diocesan Consistory were to be monks and the other 
half were priests from the secular clergy. On March 27, 1841 (nearly 100 
years after the widespread introduction of the Diocesan Consistory as a 
body of the Diocesan Office), the Charter of Diocesan Consistories, which 
                                                
349 Полное Собрание Постановлений и Распоряжений 1869, 25, 52, 224. By 
the edict of the tsar, parishioners who did not make an annual confession were 
given a fine. Priests were strictly to account for the parishioners who had not 
made confession and were to inform not only ecclesiastical but also secular 
authorities. This measure was to identify “heretics” who evaded confession. In 
doing this, state law demanded Orthodox priests to violate basic rules of canon 
law, that is, the secrecy of the confession. For violation of the secrecy of 
confession, see Canon 132 of the Synod of Carthage; Canon 34 of Saint Basil; and 
Canon 27 of Saint Nichephoros. 
350 The word “духовных,” literally “spirituals,” is translated here as “diocesan,” 
since by “spirituals” were meant the highest administrative body of dioceses. 
Originally, consistories (Latin consistorium, “place of assembly”) were secret 
councils of the Roman emperors, first introduced by Emperor Adrian (117–138). 
The term was used to designate the emperor’s cabinet. In the Roman Catholic 
Church consistories refer to the assembly of cardinals presided over by pope. The 
name also came to be used to refer to diocesan consultative boards of the ruling 
bishop of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as to parish councils in some 
Protestant churches. In Russia in the beginning of eighteenth century, a 
consistory became known as an institution that helped in the management of the 
ruling bishop of the diocese. The first consistories were established in the 
dioceses of Novgorod and Staraja Russa in 1725; Astrahan and Jenotajevsk in 
1728; Tambov and Mitšurinsk, Nizhnyi Novgorod and Arzamas, Pskov and 
Velikiye Luki in 1730; Vladimir, Suzdal, Tobolsk and Tjumen in 1731; Irkutsk 
and Angarsk in 1732. Until 1744 there were no uniform names regarding the 
diocesan institutions. They were not only called a consistory, but also spiritual 
orders, dicastery (law-court), offices and spiritual boards. Православная 
энциклопедия 2007, T. XVI, 392. 
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had been approved by the Holy Synod, was published for the first time.351 
It was composed of 364 articles, and divided into four sections. The 
Charter was reprinted and revised for the first time in 1852 to conform 
with the latest legislation. The reissue of the Charter in 1883 did not 
bring any major changes in the new edition. In its new form, the 
Regulations for Ecclesiastical Consistories was enacted on April 9, 
1883.352 
The Book of Rules (Книга Правил) is a collection of canonical rules. 
Emperor Nicholas I proposed the renewal of the Holy Synod; as a result, 
the Book of Rules was published based on the report of Count Pratasov, 
the procurator of the Holy Synod. The drafting of the Book of Rules was 
started in 1734, but then remained an incomplete publication of the 
edition concerning canonical rules of the Orthodox Church. The Book of 
Rules contains Apostolic canons, canons of the Holy Fathers, canons of 
the local Synods and canons of the seven Ecumenical Councils. The 
translation of the edition was undertaken by a special commission of the 
Holy Synod. Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow oversaw the work of the 
commission and made necessary revisions. The work was successfully 
published in 1839. In 1840 Archimandrite Platon at the request of the 
Holy Synod, compiled the index, which, after correction by Metropolitan 
Filaret, was published separately in addition to the earlier publication of 
the Book of Rules. In 1842 it was included in the new edition.353 
Complete Collection of Regulations and Orders by the Office of the 
Orthodox Confession of the Russian Empire (Полное Собрание 
Постановлений и Распоряжений по Ведомству Православного 
Исповедания Российской Империи). The Complete Collection was 
published between 1869 and 1915. It consisted of sixteen books, which 
included all the imperial commands and decrees, the decrees of the Holy 
Synod approved by His Majesty, the reports of the Procurator and the 
views of the State Council relating to the Orthodox faith in Russia for the 
years 1721–1772, 1796–1801 and 1825–1835.354 Laws relating to various 
                                                
351 Рункевич 2005, 230. Runkevitš notes that there is evidence that the idea of 
creating uniformity among Diocesan Consistories belongs to Emperor Nikolai I 
in consideration of the report of the chief procurator, Count Pratasov 
recommending an increase in the staff of Saint Petersburg’s Consistory. 
352 Православная энциклопедия 2007, T. XVI, 392. 
353 Рункевич 2005, 228. 
354 Суворов 1889, 348. 
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aspects of the external situation of the religious institution in the State 
were placed not just in the Complete Collection, but also in the Code of 
Laws of the Russian Empire.355  
Most of the sources of Russian ecclesiastical law were scattered in 
different publications. Very few of them were related to the particular 
branches of Church government and were published in separate books 
and pamphlets similar to the Spiritual Regulation and the Charter of 
Diocesan Consistories. These were: statutes of the religious institutions, 
instructions to church warders, deans of the parishes and monasteries, 
positions of the patronages, brotherhoods, missionary societies, etc.  
Many decrees of the Holy Synod and other legal acts of the Office of 
Orthodox Confession were not codified.356 For this reason, in 1868, the 
Holy Synod established a special drafting committee for the publication 
of a Complete Collection of Regulations and Orders by the Office of the 
Orthodox Confession of the Russian Empire in chronological order, using 
material stored in the archives of the Holy Synod collections and indices 
of Russian ecclesiastical laws, drawn from the manuscripts of the period 
before the beginning of the Synodal period. 357  The committee also 
included in its publication the laws from the Spiritual Regulation of 
Peter the Great.358 However, as professor of canon law, S. V. Suvorov 
noted, the publication of the complete collection of decrees of the Russian 
Orthodox Church was difficult and challenging, and for this and other 
reasons, the project was never finished.359  
The Book of Positions of the Parish Priests (Книга о должностях 
пресвитеров приходских). Russia’s first guide to pastoral theology was 
published in Saint Petersburg in 1776. By 1833 it was reprinted twenty 
times. Most scholars recognize the authors of this work as Bishop of 
Smolensk Parfeni and Archbishop of Mogilev Georgi. 360  It contains 
instructions regarding the execution of duties of parish priests. Since 
1776 it was published under the auspices of the Holy Synod, without an 
                                                
355 Справка 1914, 150–151. 
356 Суворов 1889, 347. 
357 Павлов 1902, 187. 
358 See the foreword in Полное Собрание Постановлений и Распоряжений. 
359 Суворов 1889, 348. 
360  See the introduction to the book in О должностях пресвитеров 
приходских. 
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author's name. Along with instructions, which were mostly borrowed 
from Kormtšaja Kniga, writings of the Fathers, and the Spiritual 
Regulation, there are Synodal decrees which were compiled before the 
publication of the pastoral guide. The Book of Positions of the Parish 
Priests also contains rules that were completely new for Russian canon 
law. 361  The Holy Synod had repeatedly used the book to impose 
ecclesiastical penances for different crimes. 362  Nevertheless, Russian 
Church legislation was based on the fact that any new legislative measure 
undertaken, subject to whatever diocesan administration and court it 
belonged to, must conform  in spirit and substance with  the ancient 
ecumenical decisions, which always retain their force.363 
The Code of Laws of the Russian Empire and the Penal Code (Свод 
Законов Российской Империи) serves as a source of law for the Russian 
Orthodox Church in all those cases not defined by legislation specific to 
the Orthodox confession. 364  In the period under consideration, the 
Russian State by its legislation encroached upon the field of ecclesiastical 
law. The emphasis on the mutual influence of the Church and secular law 
dramatically shifted toward the latter. This situation stemmed from the 
fact that the Emperor, “as the Christian Emperor, is the supreme 
defender and the keeper of the dogma of the dominant faith and the 
guardian of Orthodoxy.”365 Accordingly, the religious foundation of the 
Russian Empire, as part of its social and political system, was guarded by 
the State and this approach was reflected in secular law. 
State legislation provided that within the State, only the dominant 
Orthodox Church had the right to convince other Christian 
denominations and other religious groups to accept the teachings of its 
faith. The priests and laity of other Christian confessions and religious 
groups were strictly forbidden to interfere in the religious life of others, 
under threat of criminal penalty by the law. Any influence on the 
                                                
361 For example, a rule that allowed non-Orthodox Christians to be godfathers for 
Orthodox parents, provided that the godfather read the symbol of faith as it is 
read in the Orthodox Church during the celebration of the sacrament, i.e., 
without the formula “and the Son” Павлов 1902, 186. 
362 Павлов 1902, 187. 
363 Справка 1914, 103. 
364 Павлов 1902, 188. 
365 Article 64. Свод законов Российской империи 1912, Т. 1, Ч. I, 5. 
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Orthodox Church in order to change the order of its rules was strictly 
forbidden. Religious freedom was provided to all foreigners living in 
Russia. However, freedom of religion for aliens did not mean recognition 
of the equality of religions. The propaganda of foreign faith in Russia was 
categorically prohibited. The seduction of Orthodox believers to another 
faith was punished, whereas conversion to Orthodoxy was strongly 
encouraged.366 
In the case of the proselytization of an Orthodox believer to a non-
Orthodox faith, the relevant law states that the person who abandons 
Orthodox faith in favor of another Christian or non-Christian confession 
will be sent to his spiritual superior for exhortation and admonition.367 
The convert will lose his civil rights until he changes his faith back to 
Orthodox. Converts to non-Christian faith did not enjoy civil rights. 
People that were guilty of “proselytism from Orthodoxy,” spreading 
heresies and schisms, founders of sects, people who impeded converting 
to Orthodoxy, or Orthodox parents who raised their children according to 
the teachings of another religion, were subject to criminal penalties.368 
The Penal Code (Уложение о Наказаниях) of 1845 was the first 
Russian penal code and served as a codified normative act that regulated 
the general issues of criminal law as well as establishing penalties for 
specific criminal offenses. In the 1885 edition of the Penal Code, the 
system of penalties was liberalized. In the Penal Code of  1845, under the 
title “Offenses against the faith and the violation of protecting 
regulations,” the law provided criminal penalties in Articles 182–189 for 
matters such as the following things: blasphemy, or censure of the 
Christian faith of the Orthodox Church, desecration of sacred objects, 
rude insults for clerics during a  time of worship, destruction of crosses 
                                                
366 Тимашев 1916, 115. 
367 Articles 196–197. Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 185, 188. 
368 Articles 191–193, 200. Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 184, 189. The Russian 
State, as canonist Berdnikov saw it, as a political body, should ask God’s blessing 
and protection in all important matters of public life. It saw in the Christian 
religion a guarantee of morality, and with it the prosperity of the nation.  
Therefore, the State did not seek to be the sole influence in society. The State 
honored religious saints and ensured respect for them and for the people. It was 
concerned with religious education of the faithful and provided all means 
necessary for that. It helped promote the morally educating activities of the 
Church among Christians and foreigners. It punished severe insults against the 
faith and the Church. Бердников 1889, 231–232. 
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and sacred images set in a public place done  in order to show contempt 
for the faith of Christ, insulting the Orthodox priest by foreigners or 
showing disrespect for the Church, violation of decorum during a Church 
service or in the streets, squares, or in a private home, a sacrilege, 
illegally opening  graves, robbery and desecration of dead bodies, 
destruction or damage of graves, a false oath.369  However, the State not 
only ensured respect for the Orthodox Church by criminal penalties, but 
also obliged Orthodox subjects of the Empire and parents of children who 
were more than seven years old to go to confession.370 
Judicial Statutes of Alexander II (Судебные уставы Александра II) is 
a fundamental document, related to a comprehensive reform of the 
judicial system and legal proceedings, developed between the years 1861–
1863, approved in 1864 and in force 1866–1899. The reform of Alexander 
II provided a complete change of the judicial system; the main results 
were the introduction of a unified judicial system. The reform imposed 
four Regulations: the Establishment of Judicial Settlements, Regulations 
                                                
369 Уожение о наказаниях 1845, 62–66. This showed that the Russian law by 
means of legal norms seriously tried to maintain religious and moral values.  In 
the Russian Empire could be seen a clear trend of morality and religion that was 
regulated by law in terms of absolute values. Interpenetration of the norms of 
Canon Law and State law raised many problematic issues connected with the 
delimitation of the field of regulation of public law. The State through its statutes 
concerning the Church, intervened not only in State–Church relations, but also 
attempted to regulate the internal life of the Church itself. The purpose of these 
changes from the legal point of view was to ensure a more detailed regulation of 
the life of society, which was for a long time associated with the Christian 
religion. The attempt to establish the regulation of relations by combining public 
and ecclesiastical law at the State level met with mixed results. On the one hand, 
the State had access to those areas of public life which had for a long time been 
entrusted to the Church and were regarded as purely ecclesiastical institutions. 
On the other hand, the Church lost its autonomy and control in some important 
issues, which raised some new problems. A great amount of regulatory material 
was basedupon the Russian Orthodox Church’s own canon law, meaning that  
State legislation followed in its establishments the basics of religious dogmatic 
and canonical principles. In addition, ecclesiastical legislation pointed out that 
one of the bases for Church administration was the norms of State laws that did 
not contradict with the basic principles of the Christian religion. 
370  Article 208–209. Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 196. The law required 
Christians to fulfill their duties. Religious and moral values were established on 
the basis of relations between the supreme political authority and citizens. The 
Code of Laws of the Russian Empire instructed subjects about obeying the 
Emperor's power as “God himself commanded.” Article 58. Свод законов 
Российской империи 1906, T. 1, Ч. I, 4. 
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of Civil Proceedings, Regulations of Criminal Proceedings, and 
Regulations of Punishments Imposed by Justices of the Peace.371  
 
 
The Question Regarding the Codification of the Canons 
in the All-Russian Church Council 
 
On October 28, 1917, the Board of the All-Russian Church Council 
received from the thirty members of a Council a statement which 
recommended the establishment of a commission of canon lawyers and 
jurists to draft a collection of rules, and to publish such a book as a valid 
collection of canon law alongside the Book of Rules. The Board of the 
Council saw it important and necessary not just for the work of a Council, 
but also for Church life as well to have a full and valid collection of 
canonical rules. The Board consulted the professor of canon law, V. N. 
Beneševitš regarding this question. Beneševitš noted that the codification 
of canons was a relevant issue, but considered that since such a collection 
needed the approval of a Council, the project must address the following 
problems: 
 
1. The Book of Rules itself cannot be considered to be satisfying 
from the point of view of its Russian translation, nor the value of 
the Greek text from which the translation was made. 
2. To draft another collection from the rules of Kormtšaja Kniga, 
Nomokanon, Nomokanon in the Euchologion (Номоканон при 
Большом Требнике), Synatagma kata stoicheion of Matthew 
Blastares and from the other collection will be very difficult, 
partly because some collections (for example Nomokanon and 
Nomokanon in the Euchologion) had rules that did not exist in 
the Book of Rules and vice versa. Besides, not all the rules of 
different collections were studied sufficiently.   Lastly, the Russian 
                                                
371  Articles 1001–1016. Щегловитов 1915, 564–567. The basic principles 
underlying the judicial reform among other things were: a complete separation 
of the judiciary from the administrative; procedural independence of the 
judiciary; unified court for all classes; transparency of the proceedings; the right 
of the parties and the defendants for a legal defense in court; transparency for 
the parties and defendants of all evidence brought against them; the right parties 
and convicted persons for a cassation complaint. 
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translations should be adjusted to the already extant translation 
of the Book of Rules. 
3. The existence of such a collection alongside with the Book of 
Rules would not be possible because to set it out in the form of a 
set of rules would be simply impossible, since the collection would 
need to be arranged thematically. From this fact there would arise 
inconsistencies regarding the Book of Rules. Such a collection 
would not do justice to the practical use of both collections.   
 
From another point of view, the codification of the canons would 
simply not be possible to execute in a couple of months during the 
Council. The All-Russian Church Council would not even have enough 
time to review the Russian translation of the text of the Book of Rules. 
Yet, Beneševitš saw it necessary to establish a commission for the 
codification of the canons. Such a commission could prepare for the 
Council, if not the very code of the canons, then reliable material for the 
execution of this question. After hearing these arguments, the Board of 
the Council decided to establish a commission of specialists. This 
commission was also ordered to work in the Holy Synod.372 On April 17, 
1918 members of the Council gathered to discuss the possible structure of 
the commission, and as a consequence professor V. N. Beneševitš, I. I. 
Sokolov, P. D. Lapin, I. M. Gromoglasov and N. N. Fioletov were chosen 
as members of the commission.373 However, the codification commission 
never started its work.374 
 
 
 
3.2  Marriage Law Concerning Orthodox Christians in 
Russia 
 
 
According to laws of the Russian Empire, all Orthodox subjects could 
freely contract a marriage with each other and with the other Christian 
                                                
372 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431 ОП. 1. Д. 576. Л, 7–8. 
373 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431 ОП. 1. Д. 576. Л, 11. 
374 Белякова 2004, 79. 
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denominations, without asking special permission from the government. 
However, those who wished to enter into marriage should follow all the 
rules concerning the marriage law. Marriages of Russian Orthodox 
subjects, according to Russian Law, were valid if they were celebrated by 
religious rites in the Orthodox Church and observed by two or three 
witnesses. 375  To celebrate a marriage outside the Church (i.e. in the 
chapels), permission had to be given by the diocesan bishop; all 
marriages had to be recorded in the parish registers as well.376 Witnesses 
testified to the celebration of the marriage with their signatures in the 
parish registers. Two copies of the parish registers were maintained: one 
was kept in the Consistory, the other in the parish.377  
The law which abolished the common custom – an agreement that was 
made between the parents regarding the future marriage of their children 
– was passed in Russia in 1702. To counter this custom a penalty was 
imposed that provided freedom for both sides not to marry each other, 
even for couples that were betrothed in church. However, such a civil 
resolution was contrary to the regulations of the Council of Trullo, which 
provided that ecclesiastical betrothal should be as inviolable as marriage. 
Therefore, the Holy Synod in 1775 ordered the priests to perform an 
ecclesiastical betrothal at the same time of marriage.378 In late Russian 
civil legislation the number of obstacles to marriage accepted by the 
Church was greatly reduced, especially those that appeared in the 
Kormtšaja Kniga, which outlined the concept of various types of 
relationships.379 
                                                
375  Добровольский 1903, 33; Articles 1 and 61. Свод законов Российской 
Империи 1912. T. 10, Ч. 1, 1, 6–7. 
376 Article 31. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 3. Marriages 
of Russian subjects of Greek origin in the Russian Empire could also be 
celebrated in homes. See Бердников 1913, 322. 
377  Григоровский 1908, 157. Formulation of parish registers were first 
established in 1724, there were three types of records: birth and baptism, 
matrimony and funeral. 
378 In 1867, the Senate examined the question of whether arranged marriages for 
an agreed fee could be considered a legal civil contract. The Senate resolved the 
question negatively, declaring that such a fee was contrary to the teachings on 
the purity of the marriage union, insulted dignity, potentially affected the 
morality and decorum in families, and could not be the subject of a contract, in 
the sense of Articles 1528 and 1529 of Penal Code. Победоносцев 2003, 60–61.  
379 Павлов 1912, 325–326. 
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Mixed marriages in which one of the parties was a Russian subject of 
the Orthodox or the Roman Catholic faith, were forbidden to marry non-
Christians and non-baptized. Russian subjects of the Protestant faith 
were also forbidden to marry non-baptized persons. 380   Regulations 
regarding the rules of mixed marriages can be dated as far back as June 
23, 1721, when the Holy Synod gave the right for Swedish prisoners in 
Siberia to marry local women without changing their religions. The 
practice to bless mixed marriages became simpler after Civil decrees No. 
13278 and 13906, and decrees No.  56 and No. 57 of the Holy Synod of 
1849, when parish priests were given the right to bless such marriages 
without asking permission from the local bishop.381  It should be noted 
that the maintenance of parish registers was considered an important 
duty of those responsible. “By the rules — failure to record a marriage in 
the parish register inflicts those responsible with legal accountability, but 
does not destroy the marriage itself.”382 Marriages must be celebrated in 
the parish where the bridegroom or the bride lives. 383  Legislation 
concerning conditions to contracting a marriage in the Russian Empire 
during the twentieth century is mainly found in the Russian Code of Civil 
Laws.  
The Russian Code of Civil Laws adhered to the following conditions, 
according to which it was required that: “Marriage could not be legally 
contracted without the mutual and unconstrained agreement of both 
parties.”384 The law required entering into a marriage with a free will; on 
the other hand, in some cases it restricted freedom for familial reasons 
and required that the will of a spouse be complemented in this decisive 
action with the will of another. On this basis, parental and guardian 
consent was required. Entering into marriage without this consent was 
prohibited. 385  On the other hand, it was prohibited for parents and 
                                                
380 Article 85. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 10. Articles 
1568, 1585. Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 632, 636. 
381 Шеин 1907, 232–233. 
382 Article 78. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 9. 
383 Духовный регламент 1897, 77. 
384 Article 12. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 2. 
385 Law No. 9252 from June 4, 1836. Полное Собрание Законов Российской 
Империи 1836, 651. 
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guardians of children to force them to marry against their will.386 Such a 
marriage was not legal. 
If parents prevented the marriage, the law did not indicate a direct 
means to marry without their consent. However, when persons reached 
adulthood, which was set at 21 years, they could enter into marriage 
without the consent of their parents, if the latter had abused their 
power.387  To enter marriage, a “healthy state of mental abilities was 
required from both parties”388 that did not preclude the ability to express 
one’s free will. Therefore, it was prohibited to marry an insane person. 
“Individuals employed by the State,” whether civil or military, were 
required to get permission, a written certificate from their superiors, 
allowing them to contract a marriage.389 Here should be noted that in the 
Kormtšaja Kniga and in the Byzantine laws in general no such 
regulations exist regarding individuals employed by the State and who 
could marry only with the permission of their superiors. This was not 
even possible in ancient Rus’, since it had no State employees in the sense 
of what its role was in the nineteenth and twentieth century. State service 
was introduced by the reforms of Peter the Great 1722; midshipmen were 
prohibited from marrying without the permission of the board of 
admirals. Hereafter this was expanded to concern all military 
departments, and in the Code of Civil Laws of 1833 all the individuals 
employed by the State.390   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
386 Article 1586 of the Penal Code determined the penalties in the cases, if the 
parents forced their children to marry. (Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 638.) 
Abduction of the bride was also considered a criminal offense. See Article 1549. 
Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 626. 
387 Победоносцев 2003, 33. 
388 Article 5. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 1. 
389 Article 9. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 1. The rule 
originally established for military personnel under Peter the Great and not 
before the first edition of the Code of Laws was extended to all employees in the 
civil service. (Победоносцев 2003, 33.) Violators of this rule were subjected only 
to disciplinary action. Article 1565. Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 632. 
390 Павлов 1902, 363. 
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Premarital investigation of impediments 
 
In the current practice of the Orthodox Church, a betrothal is only given 
the meaning of an ecclesiastical rite that is required to be accomplished 
before the wedding. In order that known persons can be allowed to the 
above-mentioned rite and in order to obtain assurance in the existence of 
all the prerequisites needed for a legal marriage and in the lack of 
obstacles to it, the Church in Byzantium and in Rus’ set a so-called 
premarital investigation (examen sponsorum). In Russia as in 
Byzantium, the marital process began with an appeal by the bride and 
groom petitioning the bishop to bless their marriage. The bishop issued a 
decree to the petitioner in the name of the priest with a proposal to 
conduct a pre-“search,” i.e., to identify whether there were any 
impediments to marriage. This decree was called a “crowning record,” 
(венечный память). When granting such a “crowning record,” a fee was 
collected, which was increased when second or third marriages were 
petitioned.391 
This investigation was divided into two parts: the first part concerned 
the conditions for marriage; the second part the aspect of Christian 
teaching on marriage. The first part was usually performed by the parish 
priest in the presence of parents or guardians and witnesses of the bride 
and groom, the second one with the spouses.392 
When performing the investigation, the parish priest must obtain 
information from the bride and groom that they wish to marry, that 
nobody is forcing them into this and that between them there is no 
kinship, and generally that there is no impediment to their marriage. 
Then, during an investigation in Russian practice in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the parish priest had to make sure that the bride and 
groom knew the foundations of the Christian religion and the main 
prayers. This was done in order that the spouses knew the essence of the 
sacrament and the sanctity of the union to which they were entering into 
and in order that they were able to pass on faith and piety to their 
children. If a priest noticed that the couple did not have enough 
                                                
391 Православная энциклопедия 2003, T. VI, 151. 
392  Symeon of Thessalonika (c. 1381–1429) refers to the first part of the 
investigation, mentioning that a marriage should not be concluded between an 
Orthodox and a heterodox, (Симеон 2009, 398.) later the Slavic Kormtšaja 
Kniga followed the same teaching. Павлов 1887, 81–82. 
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knowledge of faith or the main prayers, then his duty was to teach them 
and not marry them until they fulfilled this condition.393 
 
 
Freedom from the Bonds of Marriage  
 
Entrance into a second marriage was strongly considered to be illegal. It 
was subject to certain restrictions and formalities. It was necessary before 
entering into a subsequent marriage to certify the termination of the 
former (which could require special formalities, for example, in the case 
where it is not known if the former spouse is alive or dead).394 In some 
cases with the dissolution of marriage, the law by way of punishing the 
spouse for the guilt of the crime did forbid the spouse from entering into 
marriage again. Such a case was considered bigamy.395 Bigamy cases of 
army officials were tried in the Military Criminal Court. 396  The 
abandoned spouse, if he or she did not wish to restore the union with a 
former spouse, was allowed to remarry. If the fault was on both sides, 
both were condemned to celibacy. The spouse who left the other spouse 
and was hiding for more than five years was subject to the same 
punishment.  Upon the death of one of the spouses, the other partner 
could without restriction enter into marriage, but only up to the third 
marriage, i.e., neither of the parties were previously married more than 
three times. 397  The fourth marriage has always been considered 
prohibited under the laws of the Greek Orthodox Church; the norm that 
was also adopted in Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
393 Никодим 1897, 582. 
394 Булгаков 1993, 1194. 
395 Article 1013. Щегловитов 1915, 565. 
396 Калашников 1899, 54. 
397 Article 21. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 2. 
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The parties could not be related to each other by any of 
the bonds of relationship, according to the laws of the 
Church 
 
Russian civil law did not define the prohibited degrees of kinship and 
affinity, relegating this task to the Church. Accordingly, all cases 
concerning illegal marriages, contracted in forbidden degrees, fourth 
marriages and marriages between the Orthodox and non-Christians were 
subject to the ecclesiastical court. Such marriages were tried in the 
secular court.398  
 
 
The bridegroom may not be under 18 and the bride 
under 16 years old 
 
An ecclesiastical legal age of 15 for the groom and 13 for the bride was 
observed throughout Russia until 1830, after which it was changed by law 
on July 19 to 18 and 16 years of age.399  Exception was made for the native 
people of Trans–Caucasus, where the bridegroom could be 15 and the 
bride 13 years old. Diocesan bishops were empowered to decide if such 
marriages were necessary, when the groom or bride were six months 
away from marital adulthood. Army officers were not permitted to enter 
into marriage before 23 years old age. If it was found that a marriage had 
been contracted before the previously defined adulthood, then the 
married couple were separated. After they reached legal adulthood, they 
could, if they wished, continue the marriage and their union was blessed 
by the Church. Marriage was also prohibited for persons over eighty years 
old.400 Although marriages were legally permitted for persons more than 
60 years old, the parties needed permission from the diocesan bishop. 
Violations of such kinds of cases were subject to the Office of Church 
authorities.401 
                                                
398 Articles 1560, 1593–1596. Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 631, 642–644; 
Article 1014. Щегловитов 1915, 565. 
399 Темниковский 1915, 6. 
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If it was proved that a priest, deacon or reader did not take 
appropriate measures to find out the legal age of those whose marriage 
they were crowning in cases where the intended spouses were underage, 
they were punished without being removed from their positions by 
sending them to a monastery for a certain period. If, say, the couple were 
two years under the official age of marriage, then a priest would be one 
year, i.e. half that time in a monastery. Deacons and readers were sent for 
six months to a monastery. If the amount of time lacking was more than a 
year, the priest was removed from his position and reduced to the rank of 
reader until the legal age to marry was reached. Clerics who were charged 
with this crime for the second time were removed from office and 
reduced to the rank of reader for at least six months, depending on the 
circumstances of the case.402 
Upon entry into marriage it was also presumed that the spouses would 
be able to physically copulate.403 Russian civil law did not mention this 
among the legal conditions of marriage before, but in 1806 with 
the instructions to the deans of parishes, it was forbidden for mutilated 
persons and those incapable of conjugal cohabitation to enter into 
marriage.404  
 
 
Neither of the parties can be members of any monastic 
order or ordained to the priesthood 
 
According to the Charter of Diocesan Consistories, the marriage of those 
in a monastic state or in a clerical state of priest or deacon were 
considered illegal and invalid, as long as they remained in that state. 
Their marriages were allowed after laicization.405 
 
 
 
                                                
402  Григоровский 1908, 118–119; Article 140 of the ecclesiastical punitive 
statute. Документы 2012, 516–517. 
403 Articles 48–49. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 5. 
404 Победоносцев 2003, 43–44. 
405 Article 2. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 1; Article 
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Differences in Religion 
 
Obstacles to entering into marriage could also depend on the religion of 
the spouses. If in an existing marriage between non-Christians, one of the 
parties was baptized a Christian, the marriage was not invalid by virtue of 
this fact.  If the Orthodox priest blessed the non-Orthodox marriage, then 
the celebration and dissolution of the marriage must also be performed 
according to Orthodox traditions. Marriages between Roman Catholics 
and Orthodox were not valid if they were celebrated alone by Roman 
Catholic priests. Those marriages became legal after the blessing of an 
Orthodox priest.406 According to Russian law, the children of marriages 
in which one or both parents were Orthodox must be baptized and raised 
in the Orthodox faith. A non-Orthodox person who married an Orthodox 
must give a written agreement that he or she will not try to abuse or 
convert an Orthodox husband or wife to their faith. However, this only 
applied to Russian subjects.407  
 
 
Proclamation 
 
A proclamation (proclamatio) is set for the complete testimony of all who 
know the bride and groom, in order to ensure that there are no obstacles 
to the marriage. Proclamations were first established in the Western 
Church.408 Ecclesiastical rules regarding the proclamation in the Slavic 
Churches can be found in the fiftieth title of Kormtšaja Kniga. These 
rules are the following: 
 
1. The parish priest is obliged, before the betrothal and wedding, to 
announce in the Church after the liturgy the intention of certain 
known persons to enter into marriage, and this must be repeated 
three times on separate occasions, inviting the faithful to tell him 
if they know any impediments to the marriage. 
                                                
406 Калашников 1899, 12. 
407 Articles 61, 65, 67, 72, 75, 85, 87. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, 
T. 10, Ч. 1, 6–10. 
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2. If the spouses who enter into a marriage belong to different 
parishes, then the proclamation should be made in both parishes. 
3. If there is a reasonable suspicion that someone wishes to prevent 
the marriage, then the priest, with the approval of the bishop, may 
give only one announcement or conclude the wedding with two or 
three witnesses without an announcement. 
4. The priest can make the proclamation only after the established 
premarital test. 
5. If, within two months after the proclamation a wedding does not 
take place, the proclamation shall be repeated if the bishop does 
not otherwise order it.409 
 
It should be noted that the proclamation does not exist in the Eastern 
Orthodox Patriarchates of the Greek tradition, but it existed in the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and in the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom. In 
twentieth-century Russia, the proclamation was subject to civil law as 
well.410 
 
 
 
3.3  Dissolution, Illegal and Invalid Marriages 
 
 
After accepting Christianity, divorce cases were adjudicated in Russia 
according to the rules of Kormtšaja Kniga; ecclesiastical courts soon 
became the highest administrative institution for dealing with them. 
However, the Church for a long time led the fight against informal folk 
customs concerning marriage and arbitrary divorce. Divorce in Russia, as 
canonist Krasnožen noted, was permitted in those cases where no such 
permission was given in Justinian law.  On the contrary, some of the 
grounds for divorce mentioned in the novellas of this emperor, could not 
be applied in Russia. For example, according to Justinian law, a husband 
could ask for a divorce when his wife, against the will of her husband 
feasted with strange men or washed in the bathhouse with them. These 
grounds for divorce, which had meaning and consequences in Byzantium 
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due to the peculiarities of the life of that time, could not be applied in 
Russia.411 
In the upper classes, there was first of all the need to determine the 
legality of the formal features of marriage and divorce. Even here the 
conscience of individuals and public opinion had already been satisfied 
for a long time by the fact that a divorce took place with the permission of 
a simple priest, a spiritual father, even though according to the 
regulations of jurisdiction in matters of divorce this responsibility 
belonged only to the highest hierarchy. Spiritual fathers wrote and issued 
with no difficulty certificates of divorce, and, through ignorance or abuse, 
there could not be strict ecclesiastical discourse on legitimate reasons for 
divorce. Already in the eighteenth century, in 1730 and 1767, a Senate 
Order prohibited clergymen from writing certificates of divorce.412 
From the time of Peter the Great, the government aimed to establish a 
solid basis for divorce cases and identify legitimate reasons for divorce in 
civil law. Until 1805, decisions on divorce could be, at least in many 
cases, decided by the diocesan authorities without the involvement of the 
Holy Synod.413 Since 1805, it was decreed that such cases could not to 
administered without the consideration and approval of the Holy Synod 
(with a few exceptions).414 The Charter of Diocesan Consistories of 1841 
and the decree on matrimonial matters from February 6, 1850, finalized 
rules on ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction in cases of marriage.415  
A sampling of Russian literature during the Pre-Conciliar period 
clearly shows that the question of divorce was indeed a troublesome one, 
since even some canon lawyers were unsure how this question should be 
addressed. Canonist Zaozerski asked in the Ecclesiastical Public Herald 
on November 8, 1912, to whom jurisdiction over divorce belonged, the 
Holy Synod or the State Duma?416 In the same journal on January 24, 
1913, V. Pravdin noted that divorce would always be an ecclesiastical 
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matter. However, it needed to be reformed. The most important reform 
was the increase in reasons for divorce, because the number of reasons 
was too limited at that time and usually divorce cases bypassed the law in 
this matter.417 On April 4, 1913, the same author noted that the Council of 
State accepted a bill of legal separation for married women in 1913. This 
bill had a long history: it had already been examined in the period before 
the reformation of the Council of State. Pravdin praised the bill and noted 
its importance, since it gave a legal value to a common practice that was 
practiced illegally. According to the laws of that time, it was almost 
impossible for a wife to receive permission to separate if her husband was 
against it. Pravdin hoped that with the publication of the new law a time 
would come when the reform of divorce would be done according to the 
modern requirements of life.418 
Russian law generally recognized two ways of ending a marriage, 
besides the death of a spouse.419 First, recognition of marriages as illegal 
and invalid when the marriage at the very moment of its conclusion was 
illegal, and second, dissolution of marriage following its conclusion, when 
the marriage itself was for some reason practically over. 
The marriage was considered invalid when one of the persons who 
entered into it, at a moment when it was concluded, had no legal capacity 
to marry, i.e. was in a state of insanity,420 in a forbidden kinship or 
affinity, was not free from another marriage (bigamy), was under the 
legal prohibition to enter into marriage, was not of legal age, had entered 
into a fourth marriage, belonged to the priesthood or was a monastic, and 
consisted a case of an  Orthodox Christian marrying a non-Christian.421 
Marriage was considered invalid as well when there was no free 
agreement and forceful action was involved.422 The law clearly mentioned 
                                                
417 Правдин 1913a, 1–3. 
418 Правдин 1913b, 1–3. 
419 Article 43. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 5; Булгаков 
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force, but did not mention nothing about fraud. Yet there was no doubt 
that, depending on the circumstances of the case, the latter could be 
considered a reason for the dissolution of the marriage, because in 
committing fraud, knowledge and free agreement in marriage are broken 
— an essential condition for the validity of a union.  
Russian legal history at the very end of the nineteenth century knew a 
famous case of fraud, which was examined in the Moscow Trial 
Chamber’s criminal appeal department of the Senate on October 11, 1894. 
In this case, a dissenter husband entered into marriage by a schismatic 
Priestless 423  rite, but years later, he converted to Orthodoxy and 
concealed his first marriage.424 The Trial Chamber ended up accusing the 
former dissenter of bigamy, i. e. fraud, and found him to be guilty of the 
act, provided in the second part of the Article 1554 of the Penal Code. 
According to the Article 1554: 
 
Whoever among the Christians within a marital union will enter 
into a new marriage with the existence of a former, is subject to 
deprivation of all special, personal, and according to the 
condition, appropriated rights and benefits. He will be sent in 
exile to live in Siberia or returned to the penitentiary department 
in virtue of the third or fourth degree of Article 31 of the Penal 
Code. However, if it is proved that a person bound to a prior 
marriage, concealed this to enter into a new illegal marriage and 
declared himself free, then he is guilty of fraud and is subject to 
deprivation of all special, personal rights and benefits and  will be 
sent to exile to live in Siberia. When, during the perpetration of 
the fraud, a person presents any false acts or makes a forgery, 
                                                                                                                    
marriages, contracted by force, deception, or in madness of one or both spouses, 
were handled in a criminal trial. Verdicts concerning compulsion or fraud were 
reported to the ecclesiastical court for a decision on the validity or invalidity of 
the marriage. This was done to determine the responsibility of the clergy who 
blessed such a marriage. Щегловитов 1915, 565. 
423  In Russian Безпоповцы — this is one of the two major strains of Old 
Believers, one that rejects a number of sacraments of the Orthodox Church, such 
as the Eucharist, marriage and the priesthood. See Heikkilä 2013, 24. 
424 Heikkilä 2013, 28. This case started a wide debate about civil marriages in 
Russia. It was also observed from the point of view of Orthodox canon law in the 
debates between two professors, Ilja Berdnikov and Nikolai Zaozerski. Their 
debate consisted of a total of six articles in the journals Orthodox Interlocutor 
(Православный собеседник) and Theological Journal (Богословский 
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then the person is subject to punishment for forgery and for 
polygamy, according to the rules of combination of offenses. The 
perpetrator is above all, in any case, subject to canonical penalties 
at the discretion and the order of his spiritual leader.425 
 
Article 1551 of the Penal Code also threatened serious criminal 
punishment as well, as can be seen in the following: 
 
A person, who, as a result of pressure, enters into marriage 
against his or her own will, who brings him or her by means of 
drink or some other way into a state of perfect unconsciousness or 
temporary insanity, or by means of fraud will contract a marriage; 
the cheater will be subjected to deprivation of civil rights and to 
exile for settlement into distant places in Siberia. The one who 
takes advantage of someone’s madness or dementia and pressures 
him or her to enter into marriage, shall be subject to a 
punishment one degree lower, as already defined in this article.426  
 
Another case which received the attention of jurists in early twentieth-
century Russia was the case of Anna and Georgi Ju. Georgi started a 
divorce process in the local Diocesan Consistory, accusing his wife of 
adultery. However, the wife, Anna, submitted a counter claim to the same 
Consistory, in which she asked for the dissolution of her marriage based 
on the insanity of her husband, a madness which had started before the 
marriage. From the claim one can see that she was pressured by relatives 
of her husband to enter into marriage with him in 1906. Soon after the 
marriage Georgi was expelled from the army for reasons of insanity. The 
claim found its basis in Article 1551 of the Penal Code and in Article 1012 
of Regulations of Punishments.427 However, since in the claim no actual 
crime other than the pressure of relatives was mentioned, jurist I. 
Tšerkasski found that Article 1551 was not a proper one to use in this 
case, and instead Article 1571 should be applied, which decreed more 
specifically about concealment of possible impediments to marriage.428  
The question of the legality or illegality of marriage was always subject 
to the ecclesiastical court. These matters were started according to the 
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reports of public officials; matters related to secular criminal courts; 
matters related to denunciations, when the marriage was connected to 
the crime. Cases concerning minors, however, could only be initiated by 
the minor spouse, and not until marital adulthood had been reached and 
no pregnancy was involved.429 Cases concerning violence could only be 
initiated by the coerced person or the parents of a spouse and by the 
guardians within six months of the day of marriage or termination of the 
circumstances that prevented filing the request.430 
The unchastity of a wife discovered after a marriage, could not serve as 
a reason for divorce, even if it turned out that she had pretended to the 
groom to be chaste before the marriage. Marriage cases that were 
forcefully contracted due to deception or insanity of one or both spouses 
were treated in a criminal court. Verdicts regarding forcefully contracted 
marriages or frauds were reported to the ecclesiastical court for a 
decision on the validity or invalidity of the marriage, but also to 
determine the responsibility of those clerics who married the couple.431 
The formal rule of Article 1012 of Regulations of Punishments makes an 
ecclesiastical court dependent on the verdict of the criminal court in 
matters of  compulsion and fraud. But in cases when the accused has 
disappeared or died, the criminal proceedings were logically terminated 
and the ecclesiastical court could not make a criminal conviction 
concerning the fault of the defendant. In such cases, the Holy Synod was 
left to decree its decision contrary to Article 1012.432 
Cases of insanity upon entry into marriage were initiated in the 
Diocesan Consistory, if it was proved that when entering into marriage, 
insanity by hereditary or by organic predisposition was hidden. If there 
was an indication of force or fraud, such cases were treated in the 
criminal court. Diocesan Consistories (diocesan authorities) based their 
decisions in these cases on the canonical rules and decrees of the Holy 
Synod, after which they submitted these decisions to the Synod for 
approval.  Secular criminal courts gave a decision about criminal or 
incorrect practices, about forgery and deception, according to which a 
marriage could be recognized as invalid. Some of these cases, e.g., 
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polygamy, incest, compulsion and insanity, if they had previously been 
started in a secular court, could not be resolved before the opinion of the 
ecclesiastical court.433 If the ecclesiastical court declared the marriage to 
be illegal and invalid, then the diocesan authorities together with the 
local authorities would dissolve such marriages. Further, by the decision 
of a court, the guilty party in an illegal marriage would be subjected to 
penance.434  
After the dissolution of a bigamous illicit union, the former union was 
restored if the former spouse did not refuse and wished its restoration. 
When both sides were guilty, their former union was restored without 
additional considerations being made. 435  In some cases when the 
marriage was dissolved, in cases of bigamy and abandonment of a 
spouse, the person found guilty was condemned to celibacy. 436  All 
children begotten in an invalid marriage were considered illegitimate. If 
the marriage was dissolved because of fraud or abuse, the fate of the 
children begotten in such marriage, as well as the fate of the aggrieved 
party rested at the special discretion of the highest authority of Russia.437 
 
 
Adultery of one of the spouses 
 
A legitimate reason for the dissolution of marriage was the adultery of 
one of the spouses.438 Dissolution of the marriage was made with the 
formal request of a spouse. 439   The case was subject to diocesan 
authorities of the diocese where the spouse (i.e., the husband) had a 
residence permit. The marriage was dissolved with the approval of the 
                                                
433 Боровиковский 1902, 26–27. 
434  Article 38. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 4; 
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Synod, which also gave permission to the petitioner to enter into a new 
marriage. Claims for adultery could have a dual purpose: it concerned 
private prosecution of the party who was guilty in adultery and was a 
criminal case.  The case should be adjudicated in the criminal court 
within two years after the perpetration of the crime; or these claims were 
intended to dissolve the marriage and were subject to ecclesiastical 
punishment. In the latter case, the claims must be presented in a 
ecclesiastical court.440  
One must assume that both these claims were incompatible since it 
was impossible to present a double punishment in two courts for the 
same crime. When the accusation of adultery was brought against both 
sides and both sides were guilty, dissolution of the marriage did not take 
place. Therefore, these kinds of cases were instituted by a private lawsuit 
in the ecclesiastical court, with the purpose of dissolving the marriage.441 
Therefore, in cases where such a claim was presented, the 
ecclesiastical court was first and foremost responsible for encouraging 
both sides to reconcile, and only if this attempt was to no avail, to start a 
formal procedure, during which it still sought an opportunity to reconcile 
the parties. To achieve this goal, it was decided that the court would 
require the couple to make a personal appearance.442 
Since the proof of adultery (acts, witnesses, etc.) is usually to be found 
at the place where the adultery occurred, another difficulty relating to the 
collection of evidence arose. In the Diocesan Consistories, such cases 
started between the parties who made pleads following the old form, 
which remained from the decree of 1723. The old form meant a court 
register that recorded the speeches of the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Regarding the discussion of evidence, the ecclesiastical court was 
restricted compared with the secular. It was possible that the secular 
criminal court recognized adultery as proved by introducing new charters 
that allowed free discussion considering the evidences, whereas the 
ecclesiastical court was the opposite and did not find adultery proven. 
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This theory was especially insufficient when applied to adultery, which 
eliminated the evidence of eyewitnesses.443 
 
 
Incapacity for conjugal relationship 
 
This defect was considered to be the reason for divorce only in the case 
when it is a natural defect or when it started before the marriage.444 
Therefore, the reason for termination was based on a condition that 
existed from the very moment that the marriage was concluded, but 
which was discovered during it.445 In these kinds of cases, the main basis 
for the solution was the inspection and conclusion of the medical experts 
in the local Medical Department and in the Medical Council.446 A. D. 
Kosortov interpreted the juridical practice of that time, from the 
standpoint of a naturalist and Medical Council. For sexual life, the 
following was required a) on the part of men: the ability to copulate 
(potentia coeundi), and the ability to fertilize (potentia foecundandi) and 
b) on the part of women: the ability to copulate, the ability to conceive 
(potentia concipiendi), the ability to gestate (potentia gestandi), and the 
ability to give birth (potentia generandi). However, in terms of the 
legislation of that time, only the first aspect was essential for both men 
and women as a condition of marriage, and only marriage without this 
prerequisite could be terminated.447 
                                                
443 Победоносцев 2003, 104. 
444  Article 241. Устав духовных консистории 1843, 93. The Russian word 
“неспособность,” literarily “inability” in this context means only the physical 
inability to perform sexual intercourse. All other physical and mental inabilities, 
such as madness or venereal disease, which de facto made marital cohabitation 
impossible, were not considered to be a reason for divorce. See Григоровский 
1908, 233; Красножен 1899, 19. 
445 Булгаков 1993, 1173. 
446 Победоносцев 2003, 100. 
447 Косортов 1916, 88. Kosortov made an important note when he criticized the 
practice of the Medical Council and the decision of the Holy Synod in one 
particular case from 1905–1906. After six years of marriage a man filed a case for 
divorce due to his wife’s inability to bear children. The Medical Council 
concluded that this inability started before the marriage. The Holy Synod from 
other hand did not recognize this inability and asked the Council whether the 
wife had potentia coeundi, in which case she was technically fertile. Kosortov’s 
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A court verdict sentencing one of the spouses to 
punishment which results in the loss of civil rights and 
the means of existence or sentencing to live in Siberia 
 
Both spouses had the right to request a divorce, and the innocent spouse 
could choose whether he or she followed the convicted spouse. Deportees 
could submit the requests after two years from the date when the court 
verdict came into force, as specified in the first paragraph, Article 182 of 
the Charter about exiles.448 A request for divorce should be submitted to 
the diocesan authorities at the place where the marriage was contracted. 
The Diocesan Consistory or the court, giving its decision concerning the 
divorce, reported about the dissolution of marriage to the provincial 
government and the Synod.449  
 
 
Absence of a spouse for over five years  
 
In this case, the remaining spouse could request a divorce from the 
diocesan authorities and permission to enter into a new marriage.450 This 
rule extended to the wives of the lower rank military personnel’s who 
disappeared during wartime without any information and persons taken 
prisoner. 451  Russian Orthodox wives of foreign prisoners whom they 
married in Russia, were allowed to remarry if their husbands were sent 
abroad to their homelands and were absent for more than two years.452  
In cases of the joint entrance of the spouses into monasteries by mutual 
                                                                                                                    
main criticism was understanding a marriage only as potentia coeundi; in that 
case, the law should allow for castrated males and hermaphrodites to enter into 
marriage as well.  The practice of potentia coeundi was also against the meaning 
of Article 4 of the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire, which forbade marriages 
after a person turned eighty. Косортов 1916, 89–90 
448 Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 14, 248. 
449 Ивановский 1900, 252. If both spouses were deprived of civil rights, one 
must understand by this that their marriage remains valid. Law No. 27231. 
Полное Собрание Законов Российской Империи 1818, 68. 
450 Булгаков 1993, 1195. 
451  Ивановский 1900, 255; Article 56. Свод законов Российской Империи 
1912, T. 10, Ч. 1,  
452 Article 77. Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1,  
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agreement, the Russian Code of Laws did not list it as a reason for 
dissolution of the marriage.453 However, it is clear that this law was not 
observed in practice, since the Spiritual Regulation allowed the 
aforementioned practice,454 and the canonical rules knew in addition the 
practice of dissolution of marriage due to the election of the husband as 
bishop.455 
The Russian Code of Laws mentioned the following rules as well 
concerning permission to remarry: if after holy baptism of the non-
Christian wife, the husband did not agree to have her as his wife or he did 
not give her a testimony, or it turned out that his wife, before holy 
baptism, was forced not to cohabit with the husband;456 if the newly 
baptized husband did not want to live with an unbaptized wife;457 and 
marriages between the Orthodox and resettled to the distant places of 
Molokans458 which were terminated at the request of the first, were given 
a permission to remarry from the diocesan authorities. Molokan wives 
who converted to Orthodoxy were entitled the same rights. Wives who 
voluntarily castrated themselves were permitted, at their request, to enter 
into marriage with others as well.459 
It took seventy-four years to reform the Charter of Diocesan 
Consistories; the new edition was approved by the Holy Synod on May 1, 
1917 with definition No. 2547. According to the new edition of the 
Charter of Diocesan Consistories, a marriage could be dissolved at the 
request of one of the spouses in the case of the conviction of the other; or 
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Духовный регламент 1897, 116.  
455 See canons 12 and 48 of Trullo. 
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by sending the spouse to penal servitude or sentencing him or her to live 
in a remote place; or by the unknown absence of the other. Marriage was 
dissolved based on the claims of spouses in an ecclesiastical court. An 
action for divorce may have been made due to the inability of one of the 
spouses to engage in marital cohabitation or due to insulting the sanctity 
of marriage by committing adultery by one or both spouses. An action for 
divorce was started by the spouse by filing a request to diocesan 
authorities, paying the stamp tax and application fees, and providing an 
extract from parish registers about the marriage and copies of the 
lawsuit. 
Upon receiving the lawsuit, the Diocesan Consistory sent it to the 
rectors of parishes, in lieu of place of residence of the spouses, with the 
hope that they should stop their disagreements by means of Christian 
reconciliation and remain in the marital union. Appeals from spouses 
continued until the completion of the divorce process and did not delay 
the further progress of the case and its resolution. A party that wished to 
appeal a decision made by the Diocesan Consistory, was free to do so. 
After incapacity for conjugal relations had been proved, a marriage was 
dissolved along with a ban placed on the incapable spouse from entering 
into a new marriage. If the violation of the sanctity of marriage by 
adultery of one or by both spouses was proven, then the marriage was 
dissolved. Divorced spouses in their first or second marriage were 
granted the right to enter into a new marriage. Before entering into a new 
marriage, persons guilty of violation of the sanctity of marriage by 
committing adultery were, according to the degree of guilt and remorse, 
subjected to ecclesiastical penance at the discretion of the ecclesiastical 
court, in accordance with the rules of the Church. In cases where the 
sanctity of a new marriage had been violated by committing adultery for 
the second time,  the guilty spouse was condemned to perpetual celibacy 
and was subjected to ecclesiastical penance.460 
A document of the Pre-Conciliar Board from August 1917 revealed that 
the fourth department of the Pre-Conciliar Board concentrated on the 
reforms of the ecclesiastical court. The fourth department among other 
things edited 175 articles of the project of ecclesiastical punitive 
statutes. 461  The Punitive statutes had a section on crimes against 
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marriages and family unity; the rules of the statutes were combined from 
the articles of the penal code and canons of the Orthodox Church. The 
punitive statutes punished a person who, according to the court verdict, 
brought about a marriage as a result of pressure or threats or forced 
somebody into a state of perfect unconsciousness or temporary insanity, 
or entered into marriage with an obviously insane person. The 
punishment for a layperson in these cases was excommunication from 
Communion for ten years. A layperson who according to the court verdict 
was convicted of bigamy was punished with excommunication from 
Communion for eight years. 
Marriages of laypersons in prohibited degrees of kinship or entering 
into a fourth marriage, or if a layperson caused a spouse or children 
injury or carried out serious beatings, torture or torment was punished 
with excommunication from Communion for seven years. Where a 
marriage between an adopted child and an adoptive parent had taken 
place, the parent was punished with excommunication from Communion 
for four years.  Entering into marriage without the consent of parents was 
punished with excommunication from Communion for three years. In all 
the above cases, if the offender was a cleric, he was excluded from the 
clergy and deprived of holy orders and monastic status.  The only illegal 
act whereby clerics were sentenced to prohibition from the priestly 
service for up to one year with the appointment to other ecclesiastical 
obedience, such as to work in the church choir, was the act of forcing 
their children into marriage or tonsuring them and forcing them into the 
monasticism or forcing them to follow monastic obedience.  If the 
offender was a deacon or other church minister, he was sentenced to 
other ecclesiastical obedience for up to one year. A layperson was 
punished with excommunication from Communion for five years.462 
There were also penalties with regard to the duties that were 
contravened with the blessing of marriages, the wedding of a cleric 
without adherence to prescribed rules and other precautions which were 
not permitted, as well as blessing someone’s marriage who came to the 
parish temporarily without a proper certificate of freedom to marry. 
When the offense was committed for the first time, the offender was 
subjected to reprimand by adding him to a special record; for a second 
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time the priest was excluded from the clergy for three months and given 
lesser ecclesiastical duties. A cleric could also be found guilty of marrying 
outside the church, as well as marrying a person who served in public 
service without the permission of their superiors, or blessing marriages 
during days that were prohibited by the Church. In these cases, first time 
offenders were verbally chastised, while second time offenders were 
sentenced to ecclesiastical obedience for one month.463 
Clerics who wed couples who were already married or were 
condemned to live in celibacy, or couples who were prohibited in the first 
four degree of kinship or in spiritual kinship, were also guilty of a 
punishable offense. If the offense was committed due to non-compliance 
of precautions, then the offender was sentenced to ecclesiastical 
obedience to a bishop’s residence or to a monastery for six months. If the 
cleric knew in the aforementioned cases about the committed illegal 
marriage, despite the punishment that he received from the civil court, he 
was excluded from the clergy and deprived of holy orders. Priests who 
married a person whose marriage was dissolved due to adultery and was 
married without the permission of diocesan authorities and before the 
end of the penitential period, were sentenced to ecclesiastical obedience 
for three months if this was a first–time  offense, and was prohibited 
from serving and demoted  to the rank of psalter for up to one year for a 
second offense. If a priest married a couple who were more than eighty 
years, he was verbally condemned in doing so if it was the first time, 
while second-time offenders were sentenced to ecclesiastical obedience 
for three months.464 
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4. EXAMINATION OF GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
IN THE PRE-CONCILIAR PERIOD 
 
 
Historical background of the question 
 
 
The Pre-Conciliar Commission gathered on December 13, 1906 to start a 
series of actions in order to reach a solution regarding the reformation of 
grounds for divorce. A number of scholarly Russian canon lawyers, such 
as A. I. Almasov, Professor N. N. Glubovski, Professor–Archpriest M. I. 
Gortšakov, Professor N. A. Zaozerski, Professor M. E. Krasnožen and S. 
P. Grigorovski participated in the first meeting.465 The secretary of the 
meeting, S. G. Runkevitš, gave an account of three critical questions that 
the preparatory commission should address: 1. The transfer of divorce 
cases to the civil court; 2. The practicality of the divorce process in force 
at the time; and 3. Reconsideration of the grounds for divorce. Further, 
canonist S. P. Grigorovski noted to the Pre-Conciliar Commission that 
the current Russian law allowed divorce in the cases of adultery, 
incapacity for conjugal relationship, conviction of one of the spouses to 
exile and unknown absence. The Commission was asked whether to leave 
them in force or add new grounds to them.466 
Bearing in mind these questions, the secretary of the preparatory 
commission underlined that following the introduction in 1864 of new 
legal regulations, the Holy Synod recognized the need to proceed to a 
fundamental transformation of the entire ecclesiastical court. For such an 
action, they sought royal permission for the establishment of a special 
committee, which would consist of spiritual and secular persons who 
would seek to transform the ecclesiastical court according to the 
principles of legal regulations, as far as these grounds were applicable to 
the ecclesiastical court. The committee found that it would be more 
desirable if petitions for divorce due to incapacity for conjugal relations 
or in cases of adultery should be addressed to the diocesan bishop, who 
would then exhort the spouses to remain in the marital union. If the 
exhortation did not succeed, then a person was ordered to turn to the 
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civil court and make a formal application for divorce. In the event of 
recognizing the incapacity for conjugal relationship the civil court would 
inform the diocesan bishop of its decision regarding divorce. A person 
wishing to divorce due to the violation of the sanctity of marriage by 
committing adultery would also address the petition to the diocesan 
bishop, who would follow the same procedure. The committee in its 
examination particularly emphasized that the starting point for the 
aforementioned question should be the sacramental nature of marriage 
in the Orthodox Church. From the above procedure a conclusion was 
reached that marriage could be terminated only by the spiritual 
authorities who had the authority to perform such a sacrament and 
determine whether the marriage was lawfully contracted and whether the 
state of sacrament had ended in the particular case.467 
Valuable information regarding what was the actual process at the 
time is found in the Memoirs of the Last Archpriest of the Russian Army 
and Navy by Georgi Šavelski, who worked in the Holy Synod between 
1915–1917.  From Šavelski’s memoirs it is known that the Holy Synod 
held meetings on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays from 11 am to 1 pm. 
In urgent cases, meetings were arranged at other times as well, 
sometimes in the evening. Cases that came to the Synod were “digested” 
in the Synodal Chancery beforehand, and only later were presented to the 
secretaries and chief secretary of the Chancellery during the meetings of 
the Synod.468  
Members of the Synod discussed new divorce cases at each meeting. 
Archpriest Šavelski recalled the following: “Now it is terrible to recall that 
the discussion and solution of adulterous cases occupied so much of the 
time of the highest governing body of the Church. Yes, divorce cases 
actually occupied the Synod in most of its meetings!”469 Matrimonial 
matters might have been different in Russia at this time if the dissolution 
of marriages could have been handled at the local level by the bishop and 
his office.   
In Šavelski’s opinion, before the Revolution cases were dealt with in a 
strange, unnecessary and pointless order in which all divorce cases from 
regional offices were submitted for approval to the Holy Synod. In some 
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dioceses the number of divorce cases reached up to thousands a year, and 
every year the number increased.  However, the majority of such cases 
were solved and prepared by the local Synodal offices, which contradicted 
to some extent the very ecclesiastical nature of bishops and their 
dioceses. The bishop and their office could not annul the sacrament itself; 
on the other hand, the Synod officials had such power and their decisions 
were approved with the signatures of the members of the Holy Synod.470  
A definition was made by the Holy Synod dating from 28 February 
1907, and under its guidance was formed a special committee to prepare 
a project regarding the grounds for divorce for the future divorce law. 
This committee had eight meetings in March – May 1907 during which 
they prepared to update and change the current definitions of the 
grounds for divorce in the Russian Orthodox Church. The results of the 
meetings developed into a project concerned with the grounds for 
divorce.471 After the meetings, each member of the Holy Synod prepared a 
review regarding previously drawn provisions of the meetings of the 
preparatory commission. Metropolitan Vladimir of Moscow and 
Kolomenskoe, in his statement 9 December1908, noted that it was 
necessary to determine exactly in the preliminary discussion of the 
project from which point of view it would be desirable to examine the 
questions in the Holy Synod.  It was his opinion that the points of view 
could be considered 1. from a medical, namely from the physical point of 
view; 2. from the point of view of civil law; and 3. from the point of view 
of daily life.472 
Archbishop Guri of Novgorod and Staroruski in his statement from 16 
October 1907, noted that the existing legislation on divorce was intended 
to reduce the possible number of divorces.  If divorce was made too easy 
it could shake the foundations of the family and public life and might give 
rise to a careless attitude toward marriage. The archbishop also noted 
that it was widely acknowledged that from the social and moral point of 
view, freedom in the dissolution of marriages and the excessive difficulty 
of divorce were equally harmful. As long as marriage was an institution 
sanctified by the Orthodox Church, and as long as marriage was a 
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sacrament, the basis of marriage laws should include ecclesiastical 
regulations that were in full accordance with the canons.  
Archbishop Guri continued analyzing the work of the project and 
remarked that their decisions should correlate with the canonical rules of 
the Orthodox Church and this would rebuild the practice of divorce which 
existed in Russia before the reforms of Peter the Great. It was noted that 
even the legislation of the Byzantine Church recognized more reasons for 
divorce than what existed in the Russian Orthodox Church at that time. 
According to the new rules, divorce was given only in the case when a 
family was at the point of break up (due to abuse), or when the marriage 
virtually ceased to exist (due to sickness, madness or for malicious 
abandonment), i.e. any hope for the restoration of marriage was lost. 
Archbishop Guri admitted that the new blueprint of the divorce laws was 
imbued with the spirit of humanity. This new blueprint concentrated on 
the situation in which further action or progress by spouses seemed 
impossible, and where marital life was unhappy, in most cases due to the 
fault of one side.473 
Besides the minutes of meetings of the Pre-Conciliar period, there 
were a number of serious studies on the subject of divorce.474 
On 5 March 1909 Professor Ilja Berdnikov published his findings, 
providing us with the most abstract introduction to the subject that was 
discussed in the Holy Synod and generally in Pre-Conciliar period. 
Professor Berdnikov approaches the problem from ancient and 
contemporary viewpoints. His study gives a perfect example of the use of 
ancient laws in modern times to approach a fundamental problem in 
Orthodox canon law. He stated that divorce in the practice of the ancient 
Church did not allow divorcees to contract new marriages; instead, 
ecclesiastical discipline persuaded them to reconcile and to resume their 
                                                
473 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 12. 
474 Some of them, like I. I. Sokolov’s study About the Reasons for Divorce in 
Byzantium from the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Fifteenth Century, was partly used as 
a report for the meeting of a special committee under the Holy Synod in 1909. 
Other studies were: Ilja Berdnikov’s For the Question of the Reason for Divorce 
(About the Draft of a Special Meeting of the Holy Synod in 1907); Nikolai 
Suvorov’s Remark to the Draft of the Grounds for Divorce, Constituted by the 
Special Meeting of the Holy Synod; Nikolai Zaozerski’s What is the Basis of 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters? and Malicious 
Abandonment of a Spouse by the Other as a Reason for Dissolution of 
Marriage. 
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interrupted marital communication. It is clear that here Berdnikov was 
referring to Apostolic Canon 48, Canon 87 of Trullo, Canon 115 of 
Carthage and Canons 9 and 77 of Basil the Great. 475  Ecclesiastical 
discipline in ancient times was strict concerning divorce due to adultery 
as we have seen in the second chapter. It was natural not to expect from 
that time other, less justifiable permissions, for reasons to divorce. In the 
ancient Church, priests were guided in the question of divorce with the 
literal commandments of the Lord and the Apostles. In support of this 
idea, indications were found in the testimonies of the ancient fathers and 
teachers of the Church – Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–215), 
Theophilus of Antioch (died between 183–185), Gregory the Nazianzus 
(ca. 329–390), Asterius of Amasea (ca. 350–410) and others.476  
Berdnikov saw as well the importance of the Byzantine legal tradition 
for the future of Russian marriage law. One such law was Justinian 
Novella 117, which established a practice prohibiting free divorce, with 
the view that persons who violated this law were to be confined to a 
monastery and deprived of the right to enter into a new marriage. 
However, this law, according to Berdnikov, was impossible to execute in 
the already morally relaxed society of the Byzantine Empire.477 
Probably knowing already Archbishop Guri’s statement from 16 
October 1907, Berdikov continued to observe the question of free 
divorces. Such a question from the Byzantine legal, and to some extent, 
from the canonical point of view started to develop after Justinian II 
thought that it was better to restore the freedom of divorce by mutual 
agreement of the spouses. Church authorities for their part continued to 
                                                
475 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 63, 505–506; Ράλλη 1853, T. III, 568–569; Ράλλη 1854, T. 
IV, 120–121, 239–240. 
476 See more in Zhisman 1864, 101–102. 
477 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 14. The first manifestation of the influence 
of ecclesiastical discipline on divorce legislation of Byzantine emperors was seen 
in a gradual restriction of so-called free divorce by mutual consent of the 
spouses, without specifying the particular reason for divorce. At first, the 
emperors tried to create some obstacle, indicating in the law the reasons one 
could give to divorce either to the husband or to the wife, without undergoing 
any disadvantageous consequences from it. In the Empire there were two types 
of divorces, repudia justa and repudia injusta – a legal divorce, i.e. under the 
conditions stated in the law, and illegal divorce, contracted illegally, without 
paying attention to the standards specified in the law. РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 
417. Л, 14 
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insist on inadmissibility of free divorce without a legitimate ground, 
which was expressed in Canon 87 of Trullo.478 This canonical insistence 
was then adopted in the Ekloga of the Emperor Leo III Isaurian (ca. 
685–741), and his son Constantine in the eighth century. The Ekloga of 
Leo and Constantine with their regulations regarding marriage, adapted 
by far the most canonical discipline from all the other monuments of 
Byzantine legislation. Legislative Byzantine monuments from the end of 
the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century, namely Procheiron 
nomos of Basil the Macedonian from 870, Eisagoge of Emperors Basil, 
Leo and Alexander from 884 and the Basilika from 905–911, prohibited 
both free divorce at the discretion of the spouses and the second marriage 
of a divorced spouse who committed such a divorce.479  
Was the prohibition of free divorce then no more than a legal theory 
during the tenth century or was it followed in practice? Berdnikov 
thought that the Ekloga could not immediately abolish the custom of free 
divorce, yet it promoted streamlining it. In the opinion of the Russian 
canonist, at the end of the twelfth century, Byzantine society did not 
know anymore the practice of free divorce.480 It must be said that such a 
view is only a presumption, though it can be justified if one pays close 
attention to the commentary of Alexios Aristenos (died after 1166) on 
Canon 9 of Basil the Great, a commentator of canons who actually lived 
at the time of the Emperor John II Komenos (1087–1143): “Σήµερον δὲ 
οὒτε ἀνὴρ, οὒτε γυνὴ διαλύειν τὸ συνοικέσιον δύναται, εἰ µή τις αἰτία 
εὒλογος ὒπεστιν, ἀφ’ ὧν ῥητῶς ἡ Ἰουστινιάνειος νοµοθετεῖ νεαρά [At 
present, neither husband nor wife can dissolve the marriage without such 
blessed reason that the Justinian Novella directly points to].”481 
Parallel ideas can indeed be found between the question of divorce 
during the Byzantine period and twentieth century Russia. Byzantine 
laws on divorce aimed at stopping personal arbitrariness in the 
dissolutions of marriages and providing grounds for divorce, and these 
laws were respected by the Church as well. The purpose was obvious: to 
help and strengthen the bonds of marriage and to ensure family peace 
and order. For the sake of this good and beneficent goal, the Church 
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479 Православная энциклопедия 2003, T. VI, 162–164. 
480 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 15. 
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authority took the responsibility of controlling this issue not just in the 
Byzantine Empire, but in Russia as well. If anyone got divorced for a 
legitimate reason, the Church could not punish the divorcee with a 
penance. A person who followed the law could not deprive the divorcee of 
his rights to enter into a new marriage. When Emperor Leо the 
Philosopher in his 111 and 112 Novella, and after him Emperor 
Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078–1081) allowed divorce on specific 
grounds, afterwards ecclesiastical lawyers began to speak out more 
openly in favor of divorce.482 The previously mentioned change in the 
positions of canon lawyers can be seen in Balsamon’s commentary to rule 
30, chapter 13 of Nomokanon, and in Blastares’ commentary to rule 26 of 
the third (Γ) chapter of his Alphabetical Collection.483  
Solemn evidence of total solidarity of ecclesiastical authorities with 
secular authorities in the matter of regulating the subject of divorce can 
be found in Berdnikov’s quoted fact that the Justinian laws regarding the 
grounds for divorce were placed in Photian Nomokanon on a par with 
ecclesiastical rules to guide the divorce practice at that time.484 Regarding 
this, Berdnikov added the view that the Church on the basis of secular 
Byzantine laws considered such reasons to be an adaptation of oikonomia 
to the spirit of the time, showing leniency towards human weakness.485 
                                                
482 Zachariae 1857, 213, 216. 
483 Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 330; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 198. 
484 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 15. 
485  РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 15–16. It should be noted that the 
ecclesiastical authorities, in cases of divorces, practiced leniency with regard to 
the weaknesses of human nature even before the divorce laws of the Christian 
emperors. For example, Origen stated that for the Christian it could sometimes 
be very difficult to meet the strict requirement of the commandments of the 
Gospel regarding the indissolubility of the marriage bond except in cases of 
adultery. Origen gave the example of a husband having to live with a wife who is 
hostile and tries to take his life by poisoning him, or tries to kill the fetus or sets 
his house on fire. From his argument it is clear to see that Origen leaned towards 
leniency in the case of an unfortunate husband who is put into such a critical 
situation. Church father Epiphany also mentions other reasons for divorce 
between Christians in addition to adultery. For more about oikonomia, see: 
᾿Αλιβιζάτος ᾿Α. – ῾Η οἰκονοµία κατὰ τὸ κανονικὸν δίκαιον τῆς ᾿Ορθοδόξου 
᾿Εκκλησίας. ᾿Αθῆναι, 1949; Κοτσώνης ῾Ι., ᾿Αρχιεπ. – Προβλήµατα τῆς 
᾿Εκκλησιαστικῆς Οἰκονοµίας. ᾿Αθῆναι, 1957; Хвостов В. М. – Опыт 
характеристики понятий aequitas и aequum jus в римской классической 
юриспруденции. Москва, 1895; Erickson J. H. – ‟Oikonomia in Byzantine 
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The Church was not the only institution to practice “legal” leniency. For 
example, Christian emperors also issued legislations on additional causes 
for divorce, which the ecclesiastical authorities then quietly accepted.486 
In spite of the practice of leniency in the Byzantine Church, courtrooms 
and in jurisprudence, Metrophanes Kritopoulos (ca. 1589–1639), 
Patriarch of Alexandria between 1636 and 1639, claimed in his work 
Orthodox Confession of Faith (1624) that divorce was permitted only 
because of the sin of adultery, in exact accordance with the 
commandment of the Gospel.487 
Before Professor Berdnikov indicated the particular grounds for 
divorce which were allowed by the Nomokanon in the ancient Church, he 
found it appropriate to ask whether there was a theoretical basis and a 
practical use to adopt the ancient canonical and Byzantine legal tradition 
in a new Russian marriage law? This opinion was treated skeptically by 
one of the respected Russian canonists, Nikolai Suvorov (1848–1909). 
This can be clearly seen in Suvorov’s study entitled “Remark to the Draft 
of the Grounds for Divorce, Constituted by the Special Meeting of the 
Holy Synod”, which was criticized by Professor Berdnikov. Suvorov saw 
that the grounds on which the project stood did not differ that much from 
previous proposals and so would not  improve procedural divorce law.488 
To him, neither the Church’s teaching on marriage as a sacrament, nor 
the canons of the Eastern Church could serve as a basis for a divorce law 
that would meet the needs and requirements of modern life. Efforts to 
                                                                                                                    
Canon Law.” – Law, Churchand Society: Essays in Honor of Stephan Kuttner. 
Ed. by K. Pennington and R. Somerville, 225–236. Philadelphia, 1977. 
486 See, for example, the Ekloga of Leo, title II, chapter 12. Zachariae 1852, 20. 
Other emperors who issued legislations based on oikonomia, were Theodosius II 
and Valentinian III. For an indepth study of ”διαζύγιον κατὰ συναίνεσιν,” 
divorce by consent, see Zhisman 1864, 99–119. 
487 Pelikan 2003, 528. The title Confession (οµολογία) is used in accordance with 
several earlier Eastern Orthodox affirmations of faith, which dealt with the 
Christian doctrines. Metrophanes Kritopoulos’ Confession is known for its 
Protestant influence, since the author studied in the University of Helmstedt, a 
major center of Lutheran Reformation. The Confession adopted the spirit of 
ecumenical goodwill and of doctrinal flexibility. (Pelikan 2003, 475.) Compare 
Kritopoulos’ teaching with the commentary of Rudder’s author to the Apostolic 
Canon 48: “If any layman who has divorced his wife takes another, or one 
divorced by another man, let him be excommunicated.” The Rudder 1983, 76. 
488 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 16; Суворов 1908, 49. 
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find in the canons of the Eastern Church justification for individual 
grounds for divorce would always be in vain, because the canons were 
established during times when the Church preserved discipline and strict 
moral beliefs that originated in the first three centuries of Christianity.  
For these reasons Suvorov thought that carrying out such strictness 
within the  contemporary discipline of Church life would be 
impossible.489  
Berdnikov, on the other hand, argued that when there was a question 
of improving some legal institution whether in the field of public or 
private law, it is common to turn to the past of this institution, to try and 
find out its legal nature and its historical forms of development. 
Berdnikov was also wary of Professor Suvorov’s risky statement that the 
rules of the ancient Church and the laws of the Byzantine emperors have 
already outlived their days and were not applicable to modern conditions 
of life anymore. These fundamentals were, however, approved in their 
essential features in the draft of the Civil Code of 1902, and published 
with the Church’s influence. It introduced the Nomokanon as an addition 
to these rules. Berdnikov stressed that ignoring these laws was not 
possible regarding the Orthodox view on the matter. In the 
aforementioned laws were instructions for almost all the private reasons 
for divorce which were debated in the early twentieth century.490 
When studying the planned reasons for divorce, it is worthwhile to 
note that the Civil Code did not separate divorce cases for different 
categories. They were all under one title “Divorce at the Request of One of 
the Spouses.”491 Meanwhile, in the Charter of Diocesan Consistories, 
divorce cases were submitted by only one of two types of cases at the 
request of the spouses. According to the Charter of Diocesan Consistory, 
there was no difference between these categories of cases and other 
matters concerning divorce. They both initiated a legal action only upon 
the request of the spouses.  
Professor Berdnikov suggested that during the grouping of reasons for 
divorce, especially if it was found necessary to increase the number of 
reasons for divorce and to introduce sub-divisional categories for them, 
                                                
489 Суворов 1908, 49. 
490 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 17. 
491 “О расторжение браков по просьбе одного из супругов.” Article 45. Свод 
законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 5. 
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this should be done in the spirit of norms which were already provided by 
the Byzantine laws.492 Both Professor Berdnikov and Professor Suvorov 
examined these sub-divisional categories from the legal, practical and 
canonical points of view, as can be seen in the following subsections.  
 
 
 
4.1  Adultery 
 
 
According to Saint John Chrysostom, a universal Church father, any 
sexual act must take place within marital union, and in order for 
intercourse to be legitimate, it must be chaste.493 The antonym for such 
faithfulness is adultery. Adultery (µοιχεία) was considered in the 
Byzantine law and in the ancient ecclesiastical rules as extra–marital 
carnal copulation, from the wife’s part with all other men, and by the 
husband with another married woman. Regarding adultery, canonist 
Berdnikov, for example, did not mention that the latter “unequal” judicial 
practice, examined in the second chapter of our study, left an option for a 
man to commit a crime of adultery with another unmarried woman. This 
can be actually understood in the light of the teaching of Basil the Great. 
Basil the Great and Byzantine law, according to his ninth canon, prohibits 
women from seeking divorce from her husband, despite how badly the 
husband insulted matrimonial fidelity.494  
Adultery was also seen as an apparent reason for divorce in the Pre-
Conciliar Commission in 13 December 1906, when Professor Zaozerski 
expressed the opinion that according to strict canonical sense, only 
                                                
492 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 21. 
493 Trenham 2013, 160. 
494 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 120–121. Saint John Chrysostom provides guidance for 
married Christians with regard to sexual desire and intercourse. He refers to the 
teaching of Saint Paul, who “permitted the enjoyment of this desire,” but also 
“often laid down rules for lawful intercourse.” These rules were given, according 
to Saint John, to secure the virtue of the body, which is a temple of the soul. 
Concerning desire, Chrysostom explains that some are necessary (ἀναγκαῖαι), 
some natural (φυσικαί), some neither of the two. Desire itself is not a sin, but 
becomes sinful when it goes beyond the laws of marriage. The body has a natural 
desire, not for fornication, nor for adultery, but for pleasure. Trenham 2013, 
159–160. 
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fornication was a valid reason for divorce. When considering testimonies 
and witnesses, a question considering the function of formal testimonies 
could be asked. According to the Russian civil law of that time, 
testimonies were strictly divided into two categories: primary and 
secondary. If the plaintiff brings just the primary without the secondary 
testimony, the lawsuit could be respected, leading to the dissolution of 
marriage. This did not work vice versa and, as Professor M. E. Krasnožen 
noted, the Holy Synod occasionally indicated not holding strictly to 
formal testimonies, indeed canonist S. P. Grigorovski even suggested 
abandoning them.495 Almazov joined Grigorovski’s view and argued that 
what was the point of having formal testimonies in such a crime, which 
by its very essence needed to be hidden from the witnesses?496 Almazov 
agreed in principle, but only if the groom filed for premarital violation 
regarding the virginity of his wife and proved himself to be a virgin.497 
When considering the mutual adultery of spouses, canonist 
Grigorovski considered that the marriage should be dissolved in such a 
case, since the sanctity of a marriage was violated twice. This 
interpretation raises a question: Since in the cases of adultery according 
to the laws and practice of that time, the guilty spouse was condemned to 
celibacy, should, in such cases of mutual adultery, both spouses be 
condemned? Regarding mutual adultery, no such cases were found in the 
practice of the Holy Synod until the nineteenth century, and a new trend 
appeared only in the beginning of twentieth century. Yet, they were not 
dissolved, since Article 45 of the tenth volume of Code of Laws specified 
that marriage could only be dissolved in cases where the other spouse 
was adulterous, and the Holy Synod even added in their notes to such 
cases “but not both spouses.”498 This was a perfect example how the law 
could be forced to take a wrong direction, against the ancient canonical 
                                                
495  Журналы и протоколы 1907, 114, 116. This indication, however, 
contradicted the fact that the Holy Synod did not dissolve marriages because of 
adulterous behavior if there were no eyewitness testimonies. Further, the 
Charter of Diocesan Consistories provided three types of testimonies: 
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tradition, namely to not allow the dissolution of marriages when in fact 
the marriage was already an adulterous act. With regard to this, Professor 
Gortšakov asked: “If the marriage is observed solely from a religious 
point of view and the marriage is recognized exclusively as a religious 
establishment, it cannot be justified. Why must adultery be regarded as 
an occasion and a cause of divorce only when one of the spouses has 
committed it, whereas mutual adultery of the spouses is not included in 
the number of reasons? The sanctity of marriage as a sacrament and 
ecclesiastical establishment is violated by the adultery not only by one 
side, but by the mutual adultery of both spouses.”499 
Metropolitan Antoni of Saint Petersburg defined the position of the 
diocesan authority of Saint Petersburg concerning the grounds for 
divorce in the decree No. 7932, from 12 September 1908. The diocesan 
authority found that in mutual adultery, both parties were considered to 
be guilty, and neither of them had the moral right for divorce or entry 
into a new marriage after the divorce. Mutual adultery also increased the 
number of divorces, multiplied the number of children born of wayward 
parents and generally increased the number of violations of marital 
fidelity. Therefore, it sullies the image of marriage as sacred and 
transforms it from a religious–moral institution into a carnal one. Later 
this was supported with the view that when the marriage was dissolved 
on account of the fault of one of the spouses under the current law, the 
other spouse who sought a divorce would refrain from maintaining the 
illegitimate children.500 In other words, the diocesan authority of Saint 
Petersburg found the possibility of divorce in mutual adultery 
impracticable. 
When reflecting on divorce by mutual adultery, Archbishop Guri of 
Novgorod and Staroruski noted that the drafted Article did not indicate 
who possesses the right to ask for a divorce in the above matter.501 A 
Special Meeting of the Holy Synod suggested amending the existing law 
in the sense that “mutual adultery of spouses provides a reasonable basis 
for divorce; both are subject to ecclesiastical penance.”502 Berdnikov first 
approached the question of mutual adultery from the historical 
                                                
499 Журналы и протоколы 1907, 121. 
500 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 1. 
501 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 12. 
502 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 26. 
 
 
 
 
146 
perspective, pointing to the following formulation of the Special Meeting: 
“In divorce law and in the ancient practice of the Russian Orthodox 
Church until the nineteenth century, one cannot find indications that the 
adultery of one of the spouses alone could serve as a reason for divorce, 
and mutual adultery would serve as an obstacle to the marriage.”503  
Berdnikov believed that this historical inquiry was not a credible one. 
When studying the Byzantine laws regarding the expressed question, it 
can be see that they directly expressed the position that the spouse who 
was guilty of adultery was deprived of the right to grant a  divorce to the 
other spouse for the same reason.504 Berdnikov restated the words of 
Joseph von Zhisman (1820–1894) that the Church followed the same 
practice, as can be seen from Zhisman’s study Das Eherecht der 
Orientalischen Kirche.505  In the practice of the Russian Orthodox Church 
in the Diocese of Moscow, whenever a person sought a divorce on the 
grounds of adultery, the other spouse was asked under oath by 
Metropolitan Amvrosi whether  a legal action had been submitted by the 
other spouse.506 The dogmatic point of view was stated by the Special 
Meeting as follows: “If the adultery of one of the spouses as a sin violates 
the divine grace bestowed in the sacrament of marriage, the sanctity of 
the marital union as a sacrament and the ecclesiastical establishment, 
then the mutual fornication of spouses will disturb and offend the 
sanctity of marriage even more.” This can raise the following opinion: 
until the inner union of souls of the husband and wife was broken 
                                                
503 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 26. 
504 Dig. XXIV. 3.39. “Where a husband and wife accuse each other of immorality 
in court and it is declared that both of them have given cause for repudiation, the 
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through the offense of one of the spouses, the sacrament of marriage 
continued to exist. 
This syllogism would indeed be correct if the fact of adultery 
automatically meant divorce as a punishment for sin. This was not the 
case, and other than the aggrieved spouse, no one could initiate the 
question of divorce due to adultery. It would also be logical that 
fornication as a sin would be subject to the disciplinary court of the 
ecclesiastical authority and seeking a divorce due to adultery belonged 
exclusively to the injured spouse. Would such an attitude on the part of 
the ecclesiastical authorities regarding instituting divorce proceedings be 
conceivable if the adultery of one of the spouses was truly an indelible 
insult against the sanctity of marriage, violating the grace of this 
mystery?  
Here one should note the important fact that the Russian divorce 
process differed from the European one of the time in two aspects, as 
Professor Gortšakov noted in his study from 1909. First of all, in 
European countries at that time one or other principle was observed 
which determined the essence of the process: indictment or adversarial, 
i.e., trial or legal procedure in which the parties in a dispute have the 
responsibility for finding and presenting evidence.507 This appeared to be 
a problematic legal factor in the cases of possible mutual adultery when 
trying to ascertain the guilty part by evidence.   
The order of divorce proceedings in cases of mutual adultery was the 
focus during the Special Meetings. The blueprint, adopted by the Special 
Meeting, provided an opportunity to allow for both fornicators to file 
their claims at the same time or in a certain sequence. Professor 
Berdnikov believed that such a practice would be a mockery and the 
Special Meeting itself did not permit such an order, since at the end of 
the project it was recorded that “the right to sue for divorce due to 
adultery belongs to the non-guilty spouse.”508 From this can be drawn the 
conclusion that in the case of mutual adultery, a claim is started by one of 
the spouses who takes the role of the guilty party, and another offender 
must file a counterclaim or objection only at the proceedings. This 
argument still left open the question what would the other spouse request 
in the counterclaim? Whether to maintain the marriage, despite adultery 
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having been committed by both sides, or the dissolution of the existing 
marriage at the request of the first spouse or only on account of the guilt 
of the first spouse? What if, instead of an objection, the innocent spouse–
respondent declares a willingness to divorce the plaintiff–adulterer under 
special conditions, would that mean divorce by mutual agreement of the 
spouses? In conclusion to this question, Berdnikov asked whether there 
was a need to create a new ground for divorce by mutual consent of 
spousal adulterers? His opinion regarding this was very clear: there was 
not.509 
Article 256 of the Charter of Diocesan Consistories at the time was 
clear regarding perpetual celibacy: If a person was proved incapable of 
marital cohabitation, or violated the sanctity of marriage by committing 
adultery, the marriage was dissolved and the perpetrator was condemned 
to perpetual celibacy and penance according to the canons.510  This article 
obviously refers to Canon 39 of Basil the Great and adheres to a strict 
interpretation; if a woman lives with an adulterer, she is an adulteress 
from that moment on (Ἡ τῷ µοιχῷ συζῶσα, µοιχαλίς ἐστι πάντα τὸν 
χρόνον).511 
Balsamon, however, did not interpret this canon so strictly. In his 
teaching, he did not consider all women who lived with an adulterer were 
adulteresses. For example, the wife of an adulterer, while living with him, 
is not subject to penance; this canon instead refers to a married wife who 
is unfaithful to her lawful husband and begins to live with the adulterer. 
Balsamon provides a historical example from the era of Basil the Great; 
one woman, after the death of her lawful husband, wanted to marry the 
adulterer with whom she was living. Saint Basil answered this action with 
the requirement that such a woman was not permitted to do so and 
should remain under penance while living with the adulterer, despite the 
fact that she had already submitted to a fifteen-year penance for 
adultery.512 
Ecclesiastical regulations were more strict towards women in both the 
Byzantine period and in the time of the Russian Empire. From the 
beginning of the rule of Peter the Great, the old Russian penal practice of 
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sending an adulterous wife to a nunnery, was changed to exile to remote 
places such as Siberia. The tone of the penance, however, stayed the 
same; an adulteress should remain there until her death. Adulterous 
husbands, on the other hand, were more privileged in Russia. After 
committing the crime of adultery, they were only subjected to 
observation by their spiritual father; whereas wives could not even file for 
divorce on this ground.513  
The Pre-Conciliar Interdepartmental Commission which was drafting 
the charter on divorce, gathered on January 16, January 20 and on 11 
May 1917. The Chairman of the Commission was Sergi, Metropolitan of 
Finland and Vyborg. However, Archbishop of Nizhny Novgorod Ioakim 
replaced him during the session. On 16 January 1917, the Commission 
decreed that a person whose marriage was terminated due to violation of 
its sanctity by fornication or by malicious abandonment of a spouse, 
could enter into a new marriage not earlier than the completion of the 
penance imposed. The same restriction of the rights also applied to 
mutual adultery. A person whose marriage was terminated twice due to 
adultery was condemned to perpetual celibacy.514 As noted before, the 
new edition of the Charter of Diocesan Consistories was approved by the 
definition of the Holy Synod from 1 May 1917 according to ruling No. 
2547.  
 
 
 
4.2 Incapacity for Conjugal Relationship or 
Childbearing 
 
 
During the Pre-Conciliar Commission in 13 December 1906, Professor 
and canonist A. I. Almazov noted that incapacity for a conjugal 
relationship should be constituted from a much broader viewpoint as a 
reason for divorce, since the law at that time merely saw incapacity from 
the technical point of view, i.e., it was a legal ground only when the 
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person was incapable of a conjugal relationship for physical reasons. 
However, in Almazov’s view the lawmakers forget that there is a physical 
condition which made a physical relationship between the spouses 
possible, but on the other side made the more moral connection between 
the spouses impossible. Such a condition was syphilis, which from the 
ecclesiastical point of view stopped  a full marital relationship. As a 
result, from such a marital relationship there was no offspring, therefore, 
no marriage. Professor M. E. Krasnožen did not agree with such a 
viewpoint and referred to cases where syphilis had been cured. This, 
however, was an exception.515  
It should be pointed out that the decrees at the time required a three-
year period of living in marriage while suffering from an incapacity to 
have a conjugal relationship, after which the divorce process could be 
started.516 It might be asked why the time period could not have been 
reduced to one year, as though a pre-marital or natural incapacity might 
disappear after a longer period? Guidelines on this subject were not 
available in the practice of the Synod.517 From this one can come to the 
conclusion that a marriage should be dissolved not only on account of the 
inability to fulfill marital cohabitation of one of the spouses, but in the 
event that these physical defects affect both parties. 
According to the opinion of the diocesan authority of Saint Petersburg, 
the law relating to divorce on the grounds of the incapacity for conjugal 
relationship or childbearing, regardless of when this incapacity started, 
did not justify the right for both spouses to enter into a new marriage. 
This could lead to a possible abuse of the law. If the incapacity for 
conjugal relationship was biological or inborn, it must already have 
occurred before the marriage.518 The current law at the time regarding 
incapacity was formulated as the following: “This reason cannot be the 
basis for a claim for divorce if the inability of one of the spouses is not 
natural.”519 This outcome was not clear, as V. I. Dobrovolski pointed out 
in his study from 1903. The incapacity to have a conjugal relationship 
may continue throughout marital cohabitation, but at the same time it 
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might not be a physical incapacity. The term “natural incapacity,” used by 
law, was incorrect, since it was necessary only that it was premarital and 
that the marriage lasted at least three years.520 
The diocesan authority of Saint Petersburg saw that pathological 
incapacity could be a temporary phenomenon and curable, and could also 
occur after marriage, even after already having children. Examining 
mental incapacity, the same authority did not see it as a subjective reason 
for divorce, since it was difficult to prove and would open up a wide scope 
for arbitrariness.521 However, they hoped that in the future divorce law, 
the incapacity to have children would be introduced as a reason for 
divorce.522 
Metropolitan Vladimir of Moscow and Kolomenskoe stressed that it 
would be unthinkable to accept impotentiam coeundi (“incapacity for 
conjugal relationship”) as a sufficient reason for a divorce in the case of 
its occurrence after entering into a marriage. The doctors who had 
prepared the proposed law admitted that such an incapacity might also 
disappear, causing only a temporary unfortunate condition. They found it 
necessary to allow for the spouse whose marriage was dissolved due to a 
diseased state, to only enter into a new marriage after providing a 
medical certificate showing that the disease was over.  
As for impotentia generandi (“incapacity for childbearing”), 
Metropolitan Vladimir noted that if the Church were to permit such a 
new reason for divorce, then it would enter a non-ecclesiastical path 
which went against the Gospel. Moreover, it would also show that by 
recognizing the three-year or even less infertility of the marriage as a 
sufficient ground for termination, the Church would have forgotten about 
the marriages of the great saints — the Ancestors of God, Joachim and 
Anna, the holy righteous Zechariah and Elizabeth, the mother of the 
prophet Samuel, and others.523 Archbishop Guri paid attention to the 
following paragraph: “about mental, so-called subjective incapacity, 
which develops only in relation to a particular person and cannot take 
place when dealing with other persons.” Archbishop Guri asked whether 
this quotation was an odium capitale inter conjuges, known in the 
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Protestant Church as “an insuperable aversion of the spouses to each 
other,” a reason unknown to Orthodox canon law.524 This reason for 
divorce had a legal statute in the Austrian civil law of 1811 and in 
Romanian civil law of 1864, concerning divorce cases of Orthodox 
spouses.525  One can ask whether this reason is known in the Orthodox 
canon law, or in the civil legislation that dealt with the divorce cases of 
Orthodox spouses.  If this was the case, then it is a new motive for 
divorce, as the article regarding the incapacity for conjugal relationship 
and childbearing clearly refers to physical disability. 
The incapacity to have a  conjugal relationship was acknowledged as a 
reason for divorce in the Byzantine law, in the Basilika and the 
Nomokanon of Photios526 in the sense of an incapacity to fulfill carnal 
cohabitation that occurred after entering into marriage. Emperor 
Justinian was the initiator of a constitution in 528 which replaced the 
existing two-year term with a three-year period concerning incapacity.527 
Such Russian canonists as Suvorov, Berdnikov and Krasnožen agreed 
with the fact that this was done because some husbands who were 
impotent for more than two years, later turned out to be able to sire 
children.528 
If there had been a method to recognize incapacity before marriage, it 
would have been recognized as an obstacle to a legal marriage in 
Byzantine legislation, as it eliminates the natural conditions for marriage. 
However, if an incapacity was recognized after the marriage, the only 
option was to allow the healthy spouse to divorce the party incapable of 
matrimonial life. The ecclesiastical law of the Russian Orthodox 
Church529 was formulated in the same sense, and the civil law530 as well, 
with the particularity that in addition to physical incapacity, it also 
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distinguished incapacity which occurred before the marriage. Berdnikov 
thought that the Special Meeting of the Synod expanded the scope of the 
meaning of incapacity so as to make it unworkable under the ruling of 
medical expertise. The Special Meeting offered to adopt as grounds for 
divorce an incapacity which not only occurred before marriage, but which 
might start after it. This addition was justified by the fact that it was often 
difficult for professionals to determine whether it was premarital or 
postnuptial incapacity that was in question. That is why medical expertise 
in such cases was forced “to make a rough estimate.”531 
Berdnikov, nevertheless, suggested that medical experts did not have 
any difficulties in ascertaining the form of the diseased state when 
examining cases. The legislator on the other hand will have in mind a 
simple phenomenon, commonly found in life. If here is added incapacity 
which started after the marriage, one must assume that this includes such 
cases of incapacity about which one can no longer be sure whether it 
started before or after the marriage. There was also a possibility for such 
cases in which one or both of the spouses is unable to continue living a 
normal marital life. Incapacity arising during the period of marriage 
could be the result of sexual fatigue or of a dissolute life. This type of 
incapacity cannot in Berdnikov’s opinion be equated with natural and 
premarital impotence.  The latter case is of a permanent nature, the first 
is only temporary. A temporary state of incapacity was never recognized 
as grounds for divorce and did not qualify as such. Being recognized as 
such would be completely in disagreement with the spirit of ecclesiastical 
discipline, which grants leniency only in cases of positive necessity and 
not to the detriment of the general rule or situation. With regard to 
incapacity of a mental and subjective kind, these cannot be subject to 
regulation. The law sets standards for the ordinary phenomena of life, 
and not for exceptional circumstances in the field of psycho–pathology.532 
It is also interesting to see that Western-European civil law at the time 
held a view where it tried to find, so to speak, a way out of the artificial 
practical difficulty created by the incapacity for a conjugal relationship of 
one of the spouses. In the German Code of Law and in the Hungarian 
matrimonial legislation at the time, as Suvorov clarifies, incapacity was 
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one of the grounds that dissolved a marriage.533 This was believed to be 
heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic canon law, which views 
incapacity not as a grounds for divorce, but as an obstacle which tears it 
apart, a reason which recognizes that the marriage de facto never took 
place and is therefore invalid.534 Suvorov for his part feared that such a 
broad understanding of incapacity would open the door wide to 
arbitrariness and promiscuity.535 
Canonist Suvorov continued to examine the views of medical experts 
that took part in the working group of the Special Meeting of the Holy 
Synod. He agreed with the findings that reasoned that in many cases it 
was indeed difficult to ascertain whether the incapacity of a person 
occurred before the marriage or after. Both cases of inabilities to 
matrimonial life were considered to have the same impact. Suvorov, 
however, asked, with the assumption of post–nuptial incapacity as a 
reason for divorce, whether the ecclesiastical court in such cases would 
more often encounter misuses with which it would have to struggle, and 
perhaps not always successfully?536 The Russian canonist concluded his 
views with the judgment that since  mental incapacity is a broad and 
uncertain subject connected with the physical incapacity after entering 
into marriage, it was unlikely to be a helpful innovation for Russian 
legislation.537 
Medical experts additionally made an interesting point when 
recognizing incapacity as a reason for divorce, not only in the sense of 
facultas coeundi but also generandi. They based their views on the 
following statement:  
 
In a marriage, in its substance, the existence of the ability 
generandi rather than coeundi is much more important, since 
childbearing is the main purpose of a marriage. Therefore it is 
necessary to recognize the incapacity for sexual intercourse and 
fertility as equally founded reasons for divorce. [Currently]The 
Church dissolves the marriage due to the incapacity of one of the 
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spouses for copulation, but at the same time avoids dissolution of 
marriage in the case of the incapacity to bear children, as if it [the 
Church] blesses only the desire of the spouses for carnal 
pleasure.538 
 
The above view however, particularly the point that “childbearing is 
the main purpose of a marriage” was stretched in Berdnikov’s comments, 
as shown when comparing his statement to the biblical meaning of a 
marriage (1 Cor. 7:1–2, 5). On the other hand, childlessness would give a 
married couple the easiest way to reach a divorce in the case of their 
mutual desire to separate. This can be argued from another perspective 
as well. For example, this ease would represent a direct danger to the 
community of that time in cases when a wife could just artificially make a 
healthy body incapable of giving birth through medication. This was 
supported by both Berdnikov and Suvorov, who had the same opinion of 
maintaining the existing divorce law regarding incapacity.539 It can be 
asked, would it have been relevant to add to the Russian matrimonial law 
at that time the permission for a legal divorce in the case of voluntary or 
enforced castration? 
The Interdepartmental Commission stated on 16 January 1917 that a 
spouse whose marriage was terminated by his or her incapacity for 
conjugal relationship, could enter into a new marriage with the 
permission given to him or her by the Diocesan Court which annulled the 
prior marriage and which recognized such an incapacity. A petition for 
permission to enter into a new marriage could not be instituted earlier 
than after the expiration of three years of the former marriage.540  
Jatskevitš made an explanatory note regarding the above formulation. 
He explained that in past years, such cases were forwarded from the Holy 
Synod to the Medical Council through the office of the Procurator of the 
Holy Synod. The examination of these cases showed that many divorce 
cases involved a real incapacity for conjugal relationship, but the inability 
in some cases was recognized without any investigation, as Jatskevitš 
pointed out. For that reason it would be logical and, in some cases, even 
necessary to delay the permission to remarry for three years. Runkevitš 
explained that in the meetings the grounds for divorce stated that many 
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couples got married at a very young age and for the first three years of 
marital life they did not engage in conjugal union. Since a period of three 
years was required before initiating a divorce case, the three-year period 
was now set up as a deadline to make a request for divorce and for the 
restoration of rights to enter into a new marriage.541 M. A. Ostroumov 
made canonical observations and clarified that the three-year period was 
taken from the Kormtšaja Kniga, which itself was adopted from 
Byzantine legislation. After  this clarification, the above request was 
accepted without any changes.542 
In 11 May 1917 the Interdepartmental Commission, basing its views on 
the sub-commission’s suggestion, noted that a spouse had the right to ask 
for a divorce in matters related to copulation or childbearing, regardless 
of when this incapacity started, either before or after the marriage, and 
regardless of its origin, either organic or neuro–psychological.  However, 
this did not apply when the incapacity to copulate or bear children 
occurred after the couple had had children from their marriage, or when 
the incapacity to copulate or bear children depended on age.543 
The Commission’s expression “the spouse whose marriage was 
terminated due to incapacity to engage in a conjugal relationship, may 
enter into a new marriage, except with the permission of the court, on the 
basis of a medical statement regarding the terminations of incapacity,”544 
started a broad debate in the meeting. A. P. Pilkin noted that recognizing 
the dissolution of a marriage due the incapacity for conjugal relationship 
in the presented form would create legislation which was unknown to any 
law, except for the Jewish, i.e. the Mosaic Law. Pilkin also noted the 
statement in the explanatory note to the project of the Ministry of Justice 
concerning divorce and to the regulations of religious rights of Jews 
regarding divorce due to infertility in marital life. He came to the 
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conclusion that the drafted law had lost its practical value. During the 
drafting of the Civil Code, rabbis were interviewed with the purpose of 
finding out essential reasons for a divorce among Russia’s Jewish 
population. The rabbis responded that in the Jewish understanding, 
divorce due to infertility in marital life was not found anymore. An 
attempt by one of the spouses to demand a divorce for the  
aforementioned reason would be met with opposition from the rabbi and 
the entire community, because from the moral viewpoint of modern 
Jewish intellectuals, such a divorce was considered inadmissible. 545 
Archpriest M. P. Tšeltsov clarified that childbearing was not the only goal 
in marriage; it was only one of the purposes. The main purpose of 
marriage aims at the mutual improvement of spouses.546  
The proposed ground was put to the vote. After hearing all the 
comments, a majority was in favor of recognizing the incapacity for a 
conjugal relationship as a valid reason.547 When discussing additional 
conditions, a further definition was voted by the majority: “A spouse has 
the right to ask for a divorce if the other spouse during the marriage fails 
to engage in sexual relations, there are no children from the marriage, 
and the incapacity lasts for at least two years, regardless of the age [of the 
other spouse].”548 
Since a medical examination of a judicial nature was debated, the Pre-
Conciliar decision to allow divorce due to incapacity during the marriage 
might have been a more complex issue from the technical viewpoint than 
it seemed. In 1916 in the Medical Board of Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and in the physicians’ offices resolved cases regarding incapacity clearly 
showed that the decisions often depended on the “human factor” – on 
professional skills and on familiarity with the formal side of things of 
medical experts. It was not unusual that cases of an identical nature 
received a totally different resolution depending on the circumstances of 
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individual characters.549 One can also ask whether a better formulation in 
this case could be for example, “The validity of a marriage could be 
challenged by a spouse, who, when entering into marriage, did not know 
about such personal features of another spouse, which would prevent him 
or her from entering into marital union.” Such a formulation would not 
necessarily categorize parties as “guilty” or “innocent.” 
 
 
4.3  Unknown Absence of One of the Spouses 
 
 
Regarding the dissolution of the marriage due to the absence of one of 
the spouses, the diocesan authority of Saint Petersburg considered that 
such a problem should be posed in such a way that the ecclesiastical court 
would guarantee that the absence was valid and not fictitious.550 The 
Metropolitan of Moscow clarified that the unknown absence of one of the 
spouses existed earlier in Russian ecclesiastical and civil law, establishing 
a five-year period for absence. In the plan concerning the grounds for 
divorce, unknown absence was proposed to be reduced to three years, 
and in the case of soldiers who went missing in war, to two years. Divorce 
due to unknown absence should not be allowed in Metropolitan 
Vladimir’s viewpoint, who cited Canon 31 of Saint Basil the Great, in 
which such a prohibition can be clearly seen.551 The diocesan authority of 
Saint Petersburg, on the other hand, concluded its view by stating that 
the absence of one of the spouses and the mental illness of a spouse 
should be adopted in the future divorce law without any changes.552 
It should be clarified here that the absence of a spouse for over five 
years, as seen already in chapter three, existed as a reason for legal 
divorce in Russia at the time. The Code of Laws with  Article 54 ruled a 
five-year waiting period for the missing person before granting a right for 
the other spouse to remarry.553 However, in 1906 due to the war between 
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Russia and Japan, Article 56 was revised in such a way that not only the 
wives of the lower rank soldiers, but also wives of any military personnel 
could file for divorce after a two-year absence of their spouse. 
Interestingly, the aforementioned reform concerned not just Orthodox 
spouses, but also Old Believers, dissidents and Lutherans.554 The Pre-
Conciliar Commission mainly discussed expanding the reformed article’s 
value to concern all Russian Orthodox spouses, and in such a way 
lowering the waiting period for spouses to remarry. 
In Byzantine-Roman laws, unknown absence (άποδηµία) was 
distinguished from the home and place of residence of the ordinary 
citizen and soldier. In the latter case, the wife of a husband who absents 
himself from home for a long journey, could have married another man. 
She was not subject to severe condemnation if afterwards the husband 
returned.555  Ecclesiastical regulations verify this fact, as Metropolitan 
Vladimir pointed out, in Canon 31 and 36 of Basil the Great and Canon 
93 of Trullo.556 
This particular reason for divorce was discussed during the Special 
Meeting of the Holy Synod and was in close connection to another 
discussed issue – the abandonment of one spouse by the other.557 It was 
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confirmed that the contemporary practice of the ecclesiastical courts 
distorted the proper understanding of the above reason for divorce when 
it called it an unknown absence of one of the spouses, rather than the 
abandonment of one spouse by the other. It was also expressed that the 
law of 1895 was directed precisely to eliminate such misunderstandings. 
Berdnikov gave the impression that such mixing of two specific reasons 
for divorce could not be tolerated. Under unknown absence was not 
meant the intentional abandonment of a spouse, with the purpose of 
interrupting marital cohabitation, but instead a disappearance of a 
person that could not be foreseen by anyone. In such cases, divorce was 
given to the spouse who had remained at home and had assumed that the 
absent spouse was dead. There was no assumption about the guiltiness of 
a missing spouse, nor about a spouse remaining at home.558 
Canonist Suvorov, for his part, did not consider it practical to use 
canonical rules to justify a divorce law which would take into 
consideration the needs of modern life. He could not allow the 
incoherence which the drafters permitted. The incoherence in Suvorov’s 
opinion concerned circumstances in which a particular canon could be 
interpreted in the drafter’s opinion to fit any engineered regulation, even 
if it was only partly suitable for that purpose. However, when the canon 
could not be directly used in the planner’s regulation, it was not 
mentioned. One could apply this way of thinking, for example, to the case 
in which changing the five- year period of absence to three years was 
discussed. Such an “economy” could not be justified by the canons in 
Suvorov’s opinion.559 Even though canonist Suvorov did not accept the 
aforementioned interpretation of the canons, it could be justified by 
twentieth-century circumstances in which the flow of information was 
faster. However, on the other hand the planned three-year period was not 
practical in cases where one of the spouses was sentenced to 
imprisonment in a house of correction for five to six years. The drafters 
did not, however, mention this option. 
There was also another kind of absence which required more 
attention, namely an intentional, arranged absence of a spouse with the 
aim of achieving an easy divorce. The Special Meeting of the Holy Synod 
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considered the dissolution of marriage on the basis of unknown absence 
to be an incomplete form of procedure, and called for greater strictness in 
searching for missing persons. Canonist Berdnikov believed that the 
unfortunate phenomenon of fictitious absence did not match with the 
proposal drafted by the Special Meeting of shortening the period for 
divorce due the unknown absence, since in spite of indications to the 
contrary, abandoned spouses could be suspected of involvement in 
fictitious absences.560 
Regarding fictitious absence, we might ask whether the purpose of the 
ecclesiastical courts was to search for a missing spouse in such divorce 
cases. The purpose was in the fact for the court to legally establish the 
validity of an unknown absence of a spouse who had left the family. 
Hence, a person requesting a divorce on the grounds of unknown absence 
must attach to the request a certificate of the civil court, which declared a 
spouse to be missing.561 Suvorov, however, found this notion impossible 
to accept. He emphasized that marriage was not a private matter in which 
spouses were interested. The court for its part, depending on the 
character of the case, was obliged to undertake the investigation, without 
being limited to the formal establishment of the fact alleged by the 
plaintiff, but starting from the idea that marriage was an institution that 
the government should support.562 It can be argued whether the above 
view was suited to the ecclesiastical court rather than the secular court. If 
the ecclesiastical court did not have all the appropriate legal means and 
the authority to search for the actual residence of the absent spouse, then 
from this followed a new argument in favor of transferring divorce cases 
from the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court to the secular court. 
 
 
 
4.4  Physical and Mental Illness 
 
 
On 13 December 1906, the Pre-Conciliar Commission discussed mental 
illness as a reason for divorce. Professor and canonist M. E. Krasnožen 
                                                
560 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 22. 
561 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 22. 
562 Суворов 1908, 17–18. 
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noted that the mental illness of one of the spouses was not accepted as a 
legal reason for divorce in Russia at the time, and that some psychiatrists 
believed that mental illness was curable, and hence a such it was not a 
valid reason. 563  Canonist Almazov noted that long–term mental and 
incurable physical illness could lead to fornication by the other spouse.564  
The discussion regarding mental illness in Russia at the time was 
raised by the Medical Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the 
Holy Synod. Their consideration of the issue was based on the fact that 
from the medical point of view, insanity meant mental and civil death if it 
became long lasting and was uncured. It also inevitably weighs down the 
other spouse. Psychiatrists have provided many examples of cases in 
which for one spouse, the mental illness of the other was more tragic than 
the actual death of a sick spouse. In 1896 during the sixth Pirogov 
Congress565 in Kiev, Doctor S. I. Steinberg for the first time in Russia 
officially raised the question about the need to include mental illness as a 
legal reason for divorce.566  
Steinberg’s report caused a lively discussion, after which the Congress 
passed the question to Russian psychiatric and legal societies and the 
collected material was subsequently presented in the seventh Pirogov 
Congress.567 On this issue, the board of  the Pirogov Congress received 
                                                
563 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 114. 
564 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 115. 
565 In Russian “Пироговские съезды” was a congress of doctors held in the 
Russian Empire in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century. These meetings 
were organized in 1883 under the patronage of “the Society of Russian doctors in 
memory of N. I. Pirogov,” better known as the Pirogov Society (“Пироговское 
общество”). In Russia in the period from 1885 to 1913 twelve Pirogov 
Congresses were organized. The Pirogov Congresses discussed not only medical 
but also political issues. For more, see the periodical Pirogov Medical Society 
(“Пироговского общества врачей”) printed in Moscow between 1895 and 1908. 
566 Розенбах 1899, 53. 
567 P. Ja. Rozenbah, however, came to the conclusion in his 1899 article “Divorce 
Due to Insanity,” published by the Ministry of Justice, that divorce due to mental 
illness should be allowed in Russia. His view was motivated by a fact that in 
insanity a sick person will die spiritually. Regarding alcoholism, Rozenbah found 
that the reason to be the impossibility of cohabitation between the spouses, 
which did not just bring about the moral decline one of the spouses, but was also 
a risk to the entire family. Rozenbah concluded his article by stating that it was 
not just the mental illness of a spouse that was a valid reason for divorce, but 
alcoholism as well. (Розенбах 1899, 68–69.) It should also be noted that insanity 
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responses from the psychiatric societies of Saint Petersburg, Moscow and 
Kazan, and from the scientific meetings of doctors of mental and nervous 
diseases clinics in Saint Petersburg and the Law Society of Saint 
Petersburg. All these societies came to the following propositions: the 
incurable mental illness of one of the spouses should be recognized as a 
legal reason for divorce only in those cases when it had continued for at 
least five years.568 Only the healthy spouse could raise a petition for a 
divorce and no less than three psychiatric experts should say whether the 
illness was incurable or not. The decision on divorce was decreed by the 
court on the basis of expertise. The children of divorced parents 
remained until their adulthood under the care of the healthy spouse and 
retained full inheritance rights. Divorce was allowed only on the 
condition that the care of the mentally ill spouse was secured at the 
expense of the healthy spouse or at public expense.569 
In the learned societies, as well in the following Pirogov Congresses, 
objections to the above provisions can be categorized into three groups: 1. 
the sacramental aspect; 2. inability to initiate a divorce case, and 3. 
additional reasons. With reference to the first group, marriage as a 
sacrament of the Church, based on solid canonical rules, could be 
changed only by the Church. Here it should be noted that judging from 
the cases that the Medical Council received from the Holy Synod, the 
Church did not see  divorce due to mental illness as contradictory to 
canons.570 Regarding the second group, the vast majority of the Russian 
population, namely the peasantry, were considered unable to initiate a 
divorce case in cases where one of the spouses was insane, and it was 
seen  that there were no reasons to constitute a law for a small minority. 
However, it was also mentioned that according to the statistics of the 
Medical Council, the majority of the divorce cases (60%) relating to 
incapacity for conjugal relationship due to mental illness were made by 
                                                                                                                    
and alcoholism as a reason for divorce was approved by the Evangelical Church 
in Russia at that period. Способин 1881, 116. 
568  Some of the societies allowed even less than a three-year period for 
continuous mental illness if it was proved to be undoubtedly incurable. 
Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 131. 
569 The Law Society of Saint Petersburg made the following addition: “If the 
insanity of one of the spouses arises due to the fault of the other spouse, then 
divorce is not allowed.” Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 131–132. 
570 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 132. 
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peasants.571 Regarding the third group the question might be asked why 
only cases of incurable insanity, and why should not other serious 
diseases like hemiplegia, 572  paraplegia, 573  etc., serve as a reason for 
divorce? In both these mentioned diseases the ill spouse needed nursing 
care and often could not participate physiologically in the marriage.574 
The insanity of one of the spouses could also be caused by the other 
spouse, and thus should be considered from both the legal as well as the 
medical point of view. From the medical standpoint, the aforementioned 
cases might be considered exceptional and unusual, but in the beginning 
of the twentieth century such cases usually resulted in a criminal trial 
rather than the divorce process. The insanity of one of the spouses caused 
by the other could, for example, occur from a traumatic head injury. If in 
such cases the use of violence was proven on the husband’s or from the 
wife’s side, then it would be difficult to justify the nature of the mental 
illness in such a case, since its origins were in malicious violence. Here 
lies the core problem of such a difficult task as reforming the law 
regarding divorce in Russia: a reason for divorce could be intentionally 
inflicted and start a criminal trial which did not always end in divorce, 
even though the injury caused should be accepted as a legal reason for 
divorce. One practical difficulty would be an intentionally caused head 
injury causing an “insane” state of mind, making a divorce plea null and 
void.  
Mental illness could also originate from physical factors, however. The 
Medical Council considered these as combinations of conditions in which 
various heredity and chronic diseases, especially syphilis and chronic 
poisoning from alcohol, morphine, etc. should be in first place.575 Based 
                                                
571 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 132. 
572 Hemiplegia is paralysis of the arm, leg, and trunk on the same side of the 
body. 
573 Paraplegia is an impairment in the motor or sensory function of the lower 
extremities. 
574 Here, the Medical Council noted that incurable mental illness did not only 
need nursing care, but the ill spouse would lose the ability of mental 
communication with others. Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 132. 
575 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 134. Almost all Western-European 
legal codexes that allowed insanity as a reason for divorce, also allowed 
alcoholism as a valid reason. (Розенбах 1899, 68.) A review of the history of 
mental illness in the Poltava province during the nineteenth century shows that 
mental illness could also occur from such reasons as: the impact of various 
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on the foregoing, the Medical Council recognized that the introduction of 
the insanity of one of the spouses as a legal reason for divorce was not 
only timely, but also necessary. Periodic and circular psychosis may serve 
as a legitimate reason for divorce in cases when after five years of 
existence of the disease it is recognized by experts as incurable by the 
signs shown of mental weakness.576 
Professors of canon law who were represented in the Pre-Conciliar 
Commission gave their opinions on the topic as well. Professors M. I. 
Gortšakov and M. E. Krasnožen stood unanimously in favor of accepting 
mental illness as a reason for divorce. Professor Krasnožen pointed to the 
five-year period which was given by Byzantine law for the possible 
healing of an insane spouse, after which a divorce was possible, although 
Krasnožen did not mention the sources for this law. From Constantine 
                                                                                                                    
national calamities, economic conditions of life, the significance of nationality 
and nation (Jews, in comparison with other nationalities, gave the highest 
percentage for having mental illnesses, 0.55%), marital status (especially the 
incidence of psychosis among unmarried men and widows). Мальцев 1902, 
523–530.  
576 The Medical Council concluded their study with a statement that the decision 
about divorce should be decided by no less than three experts, i.e. psychiatrists. 
(Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 135.) The Western European legal 
practice at the time differed a great deal among different countries. The most 
liberal divorce laws were found in Zurich in 1854, where among numerous 
diseases, mental illness was one of the legal reasons for divorce. In 1876, 
according to Article 92 of the Genevan Codex, these reasons were permitted 
throughout Switzerland. The Matrimonial Causes Act of England did not 
include insanity as a valid reason for divorce. However, actions for divorce due to 
the insanity of one of the spouses were sometimes solved in a positive way, 
depending on the condition of the case. In France during the period of revolution 
in 1792, a law was passed that permitted divorce due to insanity, though in 1816 
the law was changed. A civil law of 1882 which regulated divorce matters did not 
give insanity as one of the reasons. In 1878, a French deputy Naket tried to 
introduce insanity as a grounds for divorce ground; he was supported by deputy 
Louis Gile, who proposed a paragraph that the insanity of one of the spouses 
which lasted at least two years and was recognized as incurable, could be given 
as a reason for divorce. This proposal was sent to the Commission of 
Psychiatrists for consideration, though they did not approve it. This started an 
intense debate in the medico–psychological society of Paris and in the French 
professional journals, where only a few French psychiatrists approved of 
uncured insanity as a reason for divorce. See Михаил 1906, 852; Розенбах 1899, 
56–57. 
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Harmenopoulos’577 (1320 – ca. 1385) Hexabiblos,578 in the 15th title of 
the fourth book we can read all the reasons for divorce that were in use in 
fourteenth century Byzantine Empire. The fifth chapter of the 15th title 
decrees that if one person becomes insane, then the marriage is 
terminated by virtue of the 111th and 112th Novellas of Leo the Wise, by 
which divorce comes into force after three years after the beginning of the 
insanity of the wife if it not did occur by the fault of the husband or his 
relatives, and after five years in the case of the illness of the husband. If 
the insanity of one of the spouses is determined on the day of marriage, 
then the marriage is immediately terminated.579 
Should the same practice of Byzantine law from the canonical 
standpoint also be applied in Russia? Archimandrite Mihail in his 1906 
article, “Insanity as a Reason for Divorce,” mentioned that the Russian 
Orthodox Church always followed the norms of the Greek Church and its 
Nomokanon. As mentioned earlier, Emperor Leo’s 111 and 112 Novellas 
allowed divorce on the grounds of the insanity of one of the spouses. Yet, 
as the Nomokanon became the legal source of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, Novellas 111 and 112 although they were not included in any 
Russian legislative works,  were nevertheless followed even in the 
eighteenth century and were given completely legitimate status. This can 
                                                
577 A Byzantine lawyer and canonist. His exact dates are unknown. In 1345 he 
was a judge in Thessalonica,  and up to 1349 received the title of nomophylax (in 
Greek “νοµοφύλαξ,” literarily ”the guardian of law,” was an office originated by 
Constantine IX in 1043; the office quickly changed character after its creation, 
and became a position between the state and church administration) and the 
office of a judge of the “royal secret.” The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1991, 
1491; Православная энциклопедия 2001, T. III, 322. 
578 In Greek “Εξάβιβλος,” a set of Byzantine civil and criminal laws. It was 
intended primarily as a practical guide for judges. The basis of the work came 
from Procheiron, a collection of Byzantine laws. It incorporated excerpts from 
Isagoge, novels of emperors, laws of the Patriarchs, a treatise of Julian of 
Ascalon on urban development, collections of the Small Synopsis (composed 
from the materials of Michael Attaleiates) and Peira’s (Πεῖρα, literarily 
“experience”), a collection of court decisions from the eleventh century. 
Harmenopouls reorganized this material into an independent compilation by 
making its construction easier. The composition of Hexabiblos consists of six 
books, which in turn are divided into titles (chapters), and the titles into 
paragraphs. Hexabiblos concerns canon law in its laws about marriage and in 
the additions to the fourth title, which refers to the ordination of bishops and 
presbyters. Православная энциклопедия 2001, T. III, 322. 
579 Соколов 1911, 87. 
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be clearly seen in the Synodal decree from 22 March 1723, which says 
that the illness of one of the spouses should be testified by doctors before 
the dissolution of the marriage. On 18 December 1725, the Diocesan 
Consistory of Moscow gave permission for a wife to divorce as her 
husband had suffered from insanity for 15 years since entering into 
marriage. This marriage was interestingly dissolved on the grounds of 
Kormtšaja kniga.580  
Sometimes in Russia, however, the practice of divorce due to mental 
illness was challenged. This happened, for example, in the teachings of 
Metropolitan Danil, a great zealot of fidelity and defender of the 
indissolubility of marriages. He thought that marriage should not be 
terminated in the case of insanity or the contagious diseases of one of the 
spouses, citing here the Biblical teaching of Job, who suffered many years 
from leprosy. 581  Professor Zaozerski had the same viewpoint about 
insanity and cited Canon 15 of Saint Timothy of Alexandria to prove his 
case.582 In an unusual way Constantine Harmenopoulos in his fourth 
book of Hexabiblos, in the seventh chapter of the 15th title contradicts 
himself in his own fifth chapter by stating that every man who wants to 
take another wife in the case of insanity of his current one, is an 
adulterer, therefore supporting the meaning of Canon 15 of Saint 
Timothy of Alexandria.583 
According to Byzantine-Roman law, insanity (µανία) was considered 
an obstacle to marriage, but if it happened during the married life, it did 
not prevent its continuation.584 A healthy spouse  was even encouraged to 
bear the illness of the other spouse patiently.585 In accordance with this, 
Professor Berdnikov reminded that Canon 15 of Saint Timothy of 
Alexandria should be understood in the same way. This canon, which is a 
                                                
580 Михаил 1906, 851. 
581 Михаил 1906, 850. 
582 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 136.  
583 Соколов 1911, 87. 
584 Dig. XXIII 2.16.2. “Insanity prevents marriage being contracted, because 
consent is required; but once validly contracted, it does not invalidate the 
marriage.” Watson 1985. Vol. 2, 659; Basilika XXVIII 5.16. Scheltema 1962. Vol. 
IV, 1348.   
585 Dig. XXIV 3.22.7. Watson 1985. Vol. 2, 721–722; Basilika XXVIII 8. 22. 
Scheltema 1962. Vol. IV, 1378–1380.  
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question to Saint Timothy, asks: “If a wife is so betaken of spirits that she 
will wear irons, while her husband say, ‘I can’t contain myself, and I want 
to take another wife,’ ought he to take another, or not? Timothy answers 
that adultery is involved in this matter, and I have no reply to make 
concerning it, nor can I find any by thinking about it.”586 If nervous 
attacks of insanity were so strong, making the cohabitation of couples 
impossible and no hope for recovery of a sick spouse is given, then the 
other spouse was allowed to divorce. This law was subsequently 
confirmed by Novellas 111587 and 112588 of Emperor Leo the Philosopher. 
to the uniqueness of this, which canonist Berdnikov also brought up, was 
the fact that Nomokanon in chapter 13, title 30 did not recognize insanity 
as a reason for divorce, because Novella 117 of Emperor Justinian already 
addressed this question.589  
The Nomokanon mentions that, by law, insanity did not dissolve 
marriage, since Justinian’s Novella 117 clearly points out that: “οὺτε διὰ 
µανίαν εὺλόγως λύεται γάµος, τῆς περὶ ῥεπουδίων ριζ’. νεαρᾶς ῥητὰς 
αὶτίας λεγούσης.”590 However, the Nomokanon lists all the rules of the 
Roman law which speak in favor of this particular reason for divorce. The 
practical significance of Emperor Leo the Philosopher’s novellas was 
confirmed by the fact that their substance was repeated in a later novella 
of Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates, as well as with references to 
these novellas by later canonists, as Berdnikov clarified. 591  When 
referring to later canonists, this can be seen especially in Balsamon’s 
commentary to the thirteenth title, chapter 30 of the Nomokanon, and 
                                                
586 The Rudder 1983, 898–899. 
587 “If a wife should lose her mind and this is due to the malice of her husband, or 
without anyone else having caused it by witchcraft with her husband’s 
knowledge, and her affliction should last more than three years, the marriage 
may be dissolved, and the husband shall be at liberty to marry again.” Scott 1932, 
293. 
588 “When the husband becomes insane during marriage it cannot be dissolved 
until after the expiration of five years; but after this period has elapsed, it may be 
dissolved if he still remains demented.” Scott 1932, 295. 
589 “Номоканон не признает сумашествие основанием к разводу, потому что 
об нем упомянуто в 117 новелле импeратора Юстиниана.” РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 
445. Д. 417. Л, 19. 
590 Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 330. 
591 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 19. 
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Matthew Blastares’ commentary in title 26. 592  When considering a 
request for a divorce on the grounds of insanity, attention must be paid to 
the fact whether the insanity had occurred through the fault of one of the 
spouses, and if this assumption was confirmed, then the guilty spouse, 
besides ecclesiastical repentance, was subject to all the consequences of a 
divorce. After a divorce, an insane spouse was given over to the care of 
relatives; if there were no relatives, the insane spouse was given over to 
the care of the local bishop.593 
The Special Meeting of the Holy Synod summarized incurable mental 
illness as follows: it permanently removed the person from the normal 
track of life, separated them from society and made them mentally alien 
to society and their families. For such a person, the Special Meeting saw 
that the only possibility was effective care, a treatment which could be 
given only by a special medical institution. The Editorial Commission for 
the preparation of a new Civil Code refrained from the assumption of this 
ground for divorce, referring to the difficulty of determining incurable 
illness in each particular case. In Berdnikov’s opinion the assumption of 
this reason for divorce would not be a big risk: First, because it was 
already recognized for a long time, and secondly, because during the last 
decade, Russia were well acquainted with the characteristics of this 
disease. For its treatment mental health professionals had in their hands 
a lot of material for a correct evaluation of particular cases of this disease 
and its curability.594 One could, however, see that mental illness might 
introduce some dissonance into the system of reasons for divorce, as all 
the other reasons stemmed from culpability. In the case of mental illness, 
the patient was hence innocent and blameless. A similar way of thinking 
was expressed by Berdnikov’s critic, canonist Suvorov.595 
During the Pre-Conciliar Commission, S. P. Grigorovski focused on 
the legal aspect and said that in any legal provision there should be no 
virtually non-existent conditions. The condition for a divorce in this case 
                                                
592 Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 331; Ράλλη 1859, T. VI, 198. 
593 Scott 1932, 293–294. 
594 Therefore, Berdnikov suggested that before the divorce, the patient would be 
put into a special hospital to observe the nature and progress of his disease and 
to properly assess it from the viewpoint of its curability. РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. 
Д. 417. Л, 25. 
595 Суворов 1908, 24. 
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rested with the question of who would be responsible for the sick 
spouse.596 How is the fulfillment of this condition ensured? Before whom 
is the person who accepts this condition responsible and in whose care 
will lie the obligation to guard the interests of a sick spouse? Gortšakov 
suggested that the spouse who is seeking a divorce should promise to 
nurse a sick spouse. In this the marriage will be terminated only in cases 
where the sick spouse will be properly treated. This condition was 
accepted unanimously in the Pre-Conciliar  Commission, the period when 
the divorce could be sought was set from three to five years, depending 
on the condition of a sick spouse. Contagious diseases such as leprosy 
and syphilis, if they were legally testified, were also included as reasons 
for divorce.597 The above reasons, as we have seen previously, could not 
be justified by the canons, since leprosy as a reason for divorce was 
specified only in the Ekloga of Leo III Isaurian, in the 12th and 13th 
chapters of the second title. According to this law, a husband would be 
granted a  divorce if the wife suffered from leprosy (λωβή ἐστιν), the wife 
could be divorced from her husband similarly if he suffered from this 
same illness (λωβός).598 Hence, suffering from leprosy and syphilis as a 
reason for divorce was instituted in Russia in the sense of stewardship, 
the theology of oikonomia which the Orthodox canon law followed. 
On 12 September 1908 the diocesan authority of Saint Petersburg 
suggested that in the cases of divorce due to the mental illness of one of 
the spouses, the healthy spouse who sought a divorce must provide 
financial support for the mentally ill spouse. This was considered the  
sphere of civil rather than ecclesiastical law. 599  The Metropolitan of 
Moscow paid attention to the spiritual side of the human situation. He 
stated that mental illness was not tantamount to spiritual death and, 
therefore, was not different from any other disease which is taken care of 
by the medical treatment. It cannot destroy the sacrament of marriage.600 
By this argument, mental instability cannot affect the spiritual side of a 
human and does not mean that the spouses are unable to make the gift of 
                                                
596 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 136. 
597 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 136. 
598 II. 12–13. Zachariae 1852, 21–22. 
599 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 1. 
600 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 6. 
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grace, i.e. make the sanctity of marriage fruitful.601 Such thinking was 
criticized by Archimandrite Mihail. He referred to the metaphysical 
connection between spouses after death. Insanity will automatically end 
such a connection. In his opinion, an insane spouse does not have a soul; 
there is no consciousness, such a spouse is dead in the spiritual sense, 
hence there is no marriage.602 One can of course argue under which 
conditions the sacramental state of the marriage ends. Does it 
automatically end after various conditions of inability? Or does only the 
civil part end? Paradoxically, the same metaphysical condition to which 
Archimandrite Mihail referred can be viewed from Saint Paul’s point of 
view when he presupposes that marriage does not end after death, “love 
never fails” (Cor. 13:8). This is even more clearly expressed in John 
Meyendorff’s theology: 
By affirming that the priest is the minister of the marriage, as he is 
also the minister of the Eucharist, the Orthodox Church implicitly 
integrates marriage in the eternal Mystery, where the boundaries 
between heaven and earth are broken and where human decision and 
action acquire an eternal dimension.603  
If the marriage however is viewed only as an earthly affair, mainly as a 
human agreement, then the human “body” must be taken into 
consideration as well. In cases where a disorder of the human body 
prevails the very meaning of marriage, a view where “two becomes one,” 
is placed in jeopardy. Such a possibility, however, is not discussed in the 
Eastern Orthodox Canons. The diocesan authority of Saint Petersburg 
nevertheless considered it possible to accept it also in ecclesiastical law. 
Their motivation for this was that it would be done in the name of 
humanity.604 Introducing a mental illness as a reason for divorce would 
in Archbishop Guri’s opinion facilitate divorce.605 He required as well 
that the spouse who made the claim, must present a certificate of support 
                                                
601 Meyendorff 2000, 54. 
602 Михаил 1906, 835. 
603 Meyendorff 2000, 23. 
604 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 1. The original Russian text regarding the 
terminology for “humanity" uses a word “человеколюбие” instead of oikonomia 
(икономия), which is identical in meaning. 
605 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 12. 
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for the mentally ill spouse. For the wealthy classes such a requirement 
should have been enforceable by law.606 
Saint Petersburg’s diocesan authority considered it impossible to 
recognize syphilis as a cause for divorce. Nevertheless, they agreed that a 
healthy spouse whose partner had syphilis could remarry. On the same 
grounds, the diocesan authority found it sufficient to recognize a divorce 
based on leprosy, where the disease would jeopardize the life of the 
spouse and of descendants.607 Divorce from a spouse  with syphilis was 
recommended, and the infected spouse should be condemned to 
perpetual celibacy. Both leprosy was and syphilis were regarded as  valid 
reasons for divorce.608 
Contagious diseases in Metropolitan Vladimir’s arguments were, 
however, recognized only in the pre-marital sphere. He proposed that the 
government issued a relevant law for syphilitics, lepers, etc., which could 
prohibit such marriage and hence protect others from infection and 
prevent the birth of diseased offspring. These diseases, he argued, could 
not dissolve Christian marital union, because Christ had established 
marital union, and Christ himself did not recognize contagious diseases, 
such as leprosy, as a reason for divorce. Therefore, from the ecclesiastical 
point of view, the proposed new reasons for divorce should in his opinion 
be clearly rejected. Metropolitan Vladimir also applied the same 
strictness to cruelty as a reason for divorce, citing Canon 9 of Saint Basil 
the Great.609 However, canonist Berdnikov accepted syphilis as a reason 
for divorce in the interest of protecting the health of a family. The 
conditions of defining a specific illness in the draft of the Special Meeting 
were made with sufficient precaution.610 
                                                
606 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 13. Attention was also paid to cases where, 
for example, a poor peasant woman requested a divorce, but was not unable to 
provide a livelihood for the sick spouse. Archbishop Guri suggested that the 
dissolution of the marriage by insanity should not be so categorical dependent 
on obligations to provide a livelihood for a sick spouse.  
607 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 1. 
608 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 3. 
609 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 7. Archbishop Aleksi of Tver and Kašinsk 
in his statement from November 5, 1907, saw it necessary to add that in the case 
of syphilis, the spouse who sues for divorce should provide material security and 
treatment for the sick spouse. РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 11. 
610 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 25. Berdnikov, as well as Archbishop 
Aleksi, suggested that it would perhaps be necessary to deal with the material 
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In the opening meeting of the Interdepartmental Commission on 
January 16, 1917, the assembly was reminded that in the preceding 
meeting, the Commission had mentioned syphilis, leprosy and other 
incurable loathsome diseases as valid reasons for divorce. A. P. Pilkin 
proposed that “the spouse has the right to ask for a divorce if the other 
spouse is contaminated with an incurable, obnoxious and contagious 
disease that poses a risk to offspring and the life of the other spouse.”611 
The basis for such a particular article was that the defined diseases, like 
syphilis and leprosy, made by their very nature marital cohabitation 
impossible. The Interdepartmental Commission ultimately decided that a 
spouse whose marriage was terminated due to insanity, or a spouse who 
suffered from leprosy or syphilis, could enter into a new marriage with a 
preliminary permission of the diocesan court, if the diseased condition 
had ended; 612  and a spouse whose marriage was terminated due to 
violation of the sanctity of marriage by unnatural vices, was deprived of 
the right to enter into a new marriage.613 
The conclusions of the sub-commissions that were based on decisions 
of medical professionals were reported on May 11, 1917.  The sub-
commissions suggested that a spouse had a right to ask for a divorce in 
cases where marital cohabitation was violated or was not realized because 
of the unnatural inclinations of the other spouse. A. P. Pilkin indicated 
possible difficulties in situations when the investigation of such cases 
would go to court. 614  This was, however, rather a strange argument, 
                                                                                                                    
aspect as well regarding provision for children who may be left without resources 
due to a divorce. He also asked whether there is a need to include in the 
conditions for divorce an obligation for guilty spouses to give a certain portion of 
their funds for the maintenance of the former family if they have enough funds 
to do that, or to assign a legal separation rather than a full divorce, since in 
separation the mother and father are not exempt from the obligation to provide 
for their children and each other.  
611 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 1–3.  
612 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 32–33. 
613 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 33. 
614 For example, such issues as “self–abuse” should undoubtedly be discussed by 
competent authorities when speaking about reasons for divorce. The sub-
commission used the term “unnatural inclinations” to cover a person’s tendency 
or urge to act in an unnatural way, which in twentieth-century Russia could 
meant self–abuse, homosexuality, pedophilia, etc. РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 
422. Л, 8. 
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because there was a clear need for medical examinations since the court 
was spiritual, and for the resolution of divorce issues medical 
examinations was crucial. Such medical experts did not resolve divorce 
cases, they only illuminated the issues. 
The question of ensuring a livelihood for a spouse seeking a divorce 
due to the mental illness of the other spouse was raised earlier when the 
question was developed in one of the committees of the preparatory 
commission. It was recognized that this question would be difficult to 
resolve as a separate case, even in those cases where the healthy spouse 
had no resources. Therefore, in Behterev’s and Pilkin’s оpinions, the 
divorcee should be required to care for a sick spouse and there should not 
be a clause in the law allowing for cases where the divorced spouse might 
not wish or would be unable to ensure a livelihood for a sick spouse.615 
The Interdepartmental Commission concluded their views on May 11, 
1917 that the incurable mental illness of a spouse served as a reason for 
divorce at the request of the healthy spouse. The spouse had the right to 
ask for a divorce in the case of the constant incurable mental illness of the 
other spouse which continued for at least three years, and at least five 
years in cases where the mentally ill spouse had lucid intervals. Recovery 
from mental illness eliminated the right to seek a divorce, but did not 
invalidate the termination of a marriage which had already taken place.616 
 
 
 
4.5  Abandonment of a Spouse 
 
 
The prospective divorce law regarding the abandonment of a spouse was 
considered to create great instability in many marriages, especially in the 
marriages of couples who lacked serious commitment.617 For this reason 
Archbishop Guri considered that malicious abandonment should be 
introduced as a new reason for divorce.618 To justify consideration of 
intentional abandonment, Metropolitan of Moscow Vladimir used the 
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616 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 422. Л, 9. 
617 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 2. 
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Old Testament Jews as an example: Moses allowed husbands to reject 
their wives, giving them a certificate of divorce.619  Metropolitan Vladimir 
challenged the views of the committee and accused them of believing that 
abandoning a spouse was recognized as a valid reason for divorce in the 
rules of Basil the Great. Such a view, however, was perhaps inspired by 
the professor of canon law, Nikolai Zaozerski’s article “What is the Basis 
of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters?” published in 
Theological Bulletin (Богословский Вестник) in 1902. Professor 
Zaozerski was accused by members of the committee that his article 
openly declared that the planned marriage law reforms of the Russian 
Orthodox Church were intended to “make it convenient in Christ.”620  
However, after studying Zaozerski’s article, it can be seen that the 
particular quotation to which Metropolitan Vladimir referred dealt with 
the canonical basis of lifelong celibacy.  Canonist Zaozerski, in the light of 
the immutability of the law, attempted to point out the possibility of 
mitigating it on the basis of other canonical considerations, and on the 
basis of his proposed changes, namely, the double punishment of 
adulterers. Zaozerski emphasized that his purpose was not to weaken the 
force of the law of the Gospel, but only to mitigate the punishment for 
violating it.621  
In opposition to Zaozerski, Metropolitan Vladimir noted that 
Zaozerski’s canonical analysis was not made without stretching the facts 
and that the canonist failed to mention Canon 48 of Basil the Great in his 
article. Vladimir was concerned that if Canon 48 of Basil the Great was 
viewed together with Canon 9 of the same saint, then the results would 
not be the same. Hence, it would be improper to claim that Basil the 
Great recognized the abandonment of a spouse as a valid reason for 
divorce. Further, the Metropolitan had even more difficulties with the 
views of Professor Zaozerski on other rules, e.g., Canons 35 and 46 of 
Basil the Great.622 
Pilkin noted during the Interdepartmental Commission's meeting on 
January 16, 1917 that the proposed inclusion of abandonment of a spouse 
among the reasons for divorce caused the most disagreement between the 
                                                
619 See Matthew 19:8–9; Mark 10:2–9; Luke 16:18 
620 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 8. 
621 Заозерский 1902, 295–296. 
622 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 9. 
 
 
 
 
176 
members of the Pre-Conciliar Commission. A practice already existed 
whereby the abandonment of a spouse which lasted for at least five years, 
was considered a sufficient reason for divorce. Main objections to the 
proposed reason for divorce came down to observations regarding the 
lack of canonical rules to support it; the creation of new possibilities for 
an easy divorce in this way would result in greater instability in marital 
unions. Extremely divergent interpretations regarding Canons 9, 35 and 
46 of Saint Basil the Great were also noted, which indicated that the 
canons did not seem to provide as indisputable rules as at first appeared . 
Rather, the canons were only mandatory for such period of time when 
they appeared, and with progress, they lost their value and could only be 
viewed as historical monuments. As for the approval of divorce in cases of 
malicious abandonment by a spouse in the practice of the Orthodox 
Church, the most significant decisions regarding the matter related to the 
earliest times. Pilkin, for example, noted that malicious abandonment is 
contained in a document of Patriarch Neophytos I of Constantinople.623  
According to the Commission’s proposed document, a wife whose 
husband leaves her for at least three years, taking no interest in her and 
providing no funds for her maintenance, could, if she wished, obtain a 
legal divorce and the right to enter into another marriage.  Pilkin noted 
that an analogous decision was made by the Ecumenical Patriarch 
Joachim III in a document from 1882, which stated that a divorce is 
possible in cases where the husband was absent for three years and did 
not take care of his wife and children. It was suggested that for Russian 
legislation it would be necessary to include the proposed reason in the 
group of other reasons for divorce, because daily life and society 
demanded it. The main concern was that spouses who have lived 
separately for a minimum of five years might manage to be reunited with 
the family again. This, however, was believed by most to be virtually 
impossible. Pilkin relied on these aforesaid reasons to leave malicious 
abandonment as a reason for divorce in force.624 
S. Utin, a member of the Pre-Conciliar Commission, did not support 
Pilkin’s view on canons and said that the canons did not conform to the 
teaching of the Orthodox Church. According to Utin, it was necessary to 
distinguish two aspects in the canons: 1. the material part, relating to the 
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substance of the case; and 2. the legal proceedings. The first part of Utin’s 
opinion remained obligatory for that period of time. He continued to 
declare that when the other spouse leaves, the marital life will de facto 
end. This was known in Roman and Mosaic Law (Deuteronomy 24:1), but 
cannot find its place in the current canons of the Orthodox Church. 
Therefore, from a strictly canonical point of view, divorce is only 
permissible in the case of adultery of one of the spouses. Utin concluded 
his thoughts with a remark that from a practical point of view, the 
inclusion of malicious abandonment among the reasons for divorce was 
not tenable, since, in most cases, the divorce was necessary because the 
spouses did not get along or because one of them violated the sanctity of 
marriage by adultery, was incapable of marital cohabitation or had a 
serious, incurable disease.625 
V. I. Jatskevitš, a Pre-Conciliar member, for his part recommended 
that malicious abandonment needed to remain in the divorce charter. 
Jatskevitš based his views on the fact that under the existing reason for 
divorce, malicious abandonment was most often included as the reason 
for absence of one of the spouses. He was convinced that in cases where 
one of the spouses was abandoned, an unknown absence was occasionally 
used as an excuse to evade the Office of the Chief Prosecutor.626 As we 
can see, in practice the difference between unknown absence and 
malicious abandonment was relatively small. Unknown absence could 
serve as a proxy for malicious abandonment, which was not accepted as a 
legal reason for divorce at that time. But was there a place in Orthodox 
canon law to “force” the law to apply to a range of different reasons? Here 
we should make a distinction between norms that have universal 
authority and norms that have local authority. The first is more flexible, 
each local Church being able to modify its own law; the latter promotes a 
set of norms and values that bind the local Churches and their faithful to 
follow them. In this sense, canon law originates and remains firmly tied 
to a hierarchy of values.  In this regard, in the reformed Russian marriage 
law, spouses who seek divorce because of a fictional unknown absence, 
would not have to use the unknown absence as a reason in cases where 
the true reason for divorce was abandonment, which is considered an 
adulterous act against the sanctity of marriage.  
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M. A. Ostroumov declared himself opposed to allowing malicious 
abandonment as a reason for divorce. Ostroumov believed that the use of 
malicious abandonment as a reason for divorce would be contrary to the 
canons and teaching of the Orthodox Church. Ostroumov, however, did 
not mention or provide a more detailed commentary on the canons. He 
stated that malicious abandonment as a reason would eventually affect 
the destiny of the State and suggested that in such cases, it would be 
more appropriate to give a fine or some other kind of penalty. The 
chairman of the session, Archbishop Ioakim agreed with Ostroumov’s 
views. He noted that Jatskevitš’s stance did not meet the practice of the 
Diocesan administration of Nizhny Novgorod. During his period of work 
in the diocese, only one case out of many was indeed malicious 
abandonment rather than unknown absence.627 
Under the title “Abandonment of a spouse,” or “Malicious 
abandonment of a spouse,” as it was referred to by the Russian canonists, 
meant actual abandonment by one spouse of the other, separate living for 
a long period, or secret or explicit rejection of joint matrimonial 
cohabitation. Professor Suvorov noted that abandonment did not have a 
canonical basis, unlike the case dealt with by the Preparatory 
Commission’s session in the Department of the Ecclesiastical Court 
(Suvorov likely meant the meeting of December 13, 1906628) suggested. It 
was not a valid reason for divorce in almost any European country at that 
time. Furthermore, it was not proposed for the Editing Commissions of 
the new Civil Code in Russia.629  
Malicious abandonment as a reason for divorce was known in Russia 
only in the charter of the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church. Such cases were 
rare in the ecclesiastical courts, since it was impossible at that time to 
establish some sort of definition or general principles for systematic 
solutions for such cases. During the meeting of the Special Committee 
from March 21, 1907, a juridical consultant of the Holy Synod, expressed 
the notion that it was necessary to place cases under the guidance of a 
single ecclesiastical authority, the Holy Synod.630 This indication was not 
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entirely clear and did not resolve the existing problem, since divorce 
cases were mainly solved under the guidance of the Holy Synod. 
The canonical debate concerning malicious abandonment as a reason 
for divorce apparently started in 1904, when Professor Zaozerski started 
the discussion by publishing his study in the Theological Journal 
(Богословский вестник). Zaozerski’s argument was that malicious 
abandonment (malitiosa desertio) by one of the spouses was a crime 
equal to adultery, which was expressed by the fact that the wife left her 
husband’s house (or the husband left his wife and his family), lived alone 
and despite the exhortation by the abandoned party, persisted in living 
apart.  Zaozerski saw that the above reason was recognized as such in the 
canon law of the Eastern Church, since it was regulated in Byzantine civil 
law. Here he seems to rely on Balsamon’s commentary to Canon 93 of 
Trullo, which mentions the Justinian law that the wife or the husband 
should wait for five years if either of them was taken into captivity and it 
was unclear whether he or she was alive. After five years they could 
remarry:  “Ἡ µέντοι κβ’. [22th Novella] Ἰουστινιάνειος νεαρὰ, ἢτοι τὸ έ. 
κεφ. [5th chapter] τοῦ ζ’.  [7th title] τίτλου τοῦ κή. βιβλίου [28th book of 
Basilika] διορίζεται ἐπὶ πενταετίαν ἀναµένειν τὴν γυναῖκα, ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα, 
ὃταν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν αἰχµαλςτισθῇ, και ἀδηλία ἐστὶ τῆς τούτου ζωῆς. µετὰ δὲ 
τὴν πενταετίαν ἓτερον  συναλλάττειν γάµον.” Similarly, this was 
recognized in the ancient Rus’ law throughout the fifteenth century, and 
was excluded from the grounds of divorce only at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.631 
Zaozerski made the following definition, which merits examination: 
“Upon divorce through malicious abandonment, it is necessary to certify 
that the abandonment is in fact malicious. When requesting divorce in 
such case, a spouse must notify the Consistory of the absence of the other 
spouse, after which divorce should be ordered in a year. A wife who 
illegally leaves her husband, upon returning must provide evidence of her 
faithful behavior during her absence, otherwise, the husband may 
demand a divorce.”632 Interestingly, the charter of Evangelical Church 
allowed divorce due to long–term absences even at the request of an 
absence spouse, if he could not come back home.633 Zaozerski’s essential 
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idea was to prove that is was timely in Russian society to improve divorce 
law and procedure. In his opinion, the malicious abandonment of a 
spouse had a firm canonical and historical base.  
In the meeting of the Preparatory Commission on December 13, 1906, 
Professor Zaozerski for the most part used his previous article as the 
basis for a canonical analysis of the case of malicious abandonment. 
Reflecting on Canon 9 of Basil the Great, which stated that “The man, […] 
whom she has left is pardonable, and a woman who cohabits with him is 
not to be condemned,”634 he summarized that malicious abandonment is 
a crime against marital fidelity. Professor Zaozerski continued the 
attempt to justify his views by referring to the Scriptures, which, in his 
opinion, allowed for the abandoned husband to enter into a second 
marriage.635 
Zaozerski referred to his analysis of Canons 35 and 46 of Saint Basil 
the Great. Canon 35 provides that if a wife leaves her husband, an 
examination must be made to ascertain the cause and reason she left 
him. If the wife left without a valid reason, she was subjected to penance 
and the husband was pardoned.636 Canon 46 stated that a woman who 
unintentionally married a man who had been abandoned by his wife for a 
time, and afterwards left him because his former wife returned, has 
committed fornication, albeit accidentally. In this case a woman was 
allowed in principle to enter into a second marriage, though Basil the 
Great considered that it was better for her to remain single.637 As can be 
seen, all three canons speak about the case where a wife leaves her 
husband and his home. In the first case, Professor Zaozerski considered 
desertion to be malicious, which was connected with a wife’s fornication. 
In the second case, abandonment was not indicated as a motive or 
purpose; as a consequence, it destroyed a marital union. In the last case, 
                                                
634 The Rudder 1983, 797. 
635 Заозерский 1904, T. 3. No. 10, 320. “He who cleaves to a harlot is one body 
with her.” (1 Corinthians 6:16) “If a man divorces his wife, and she goes from 
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know, O wife, whether you will save your husband?” (1 Corinthians 7:16)  
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abandonment was already a temporary absence of the wife from her 
husband, without a connection to any malicious or unlawful intention to 
break the marriage or even without any quarrel between the spouses. The 
marital union between them is reestablished by the return of the wife, 
even though during her absence, the husband had initiated an unlawful 
cohabitation with another woman.638 
Which of these three cases could serve as a basis for divorce that could 
give a husband the right to remarry? It should be noted that in the first 
case, Canon 9 speaks clearly about fornication in the sense of a woman 
leaving her husband and joining another man: “Ὣστε ἡ καταλιποῦσα, 
µοιχαλὶς, εἰ ἐπ’ ἄλλον ἦλθεν ἂνδρα. ὁ δὲ καταλειφθεὶς, συγγνωστὸς, καὶ ἡ 
συνοικοῦσα τῷ τοιύτῳ οὐ κατακρίνεται.”639 The tone of the canon is so 
straightforward that it does not give rise to doubts: in order to achieve 
the dissolution of marriage according to this rule, it is necessary to prove 
not only the fact of abandonment of the husband by his wife, but also her 
unlawful union with another man. Canonist Zaozerski, however, opposed 
such a categorical interpretation. He considered that the intentional 
abandonment of the husband to be more important, because the 
established ecclesiastical practice did not allow deliberate abandonment 
of the husband, no matter how difficult the wife’s life was with him. That 
being said, fornication was considered only as a circumstance, 
aggravating earlier misconduct, i.e., deliberate abandonment, and was 
viewed only as a secondary crime. The professor then claimed that the 
husband was granted the right to enter into a second marriage simply by 
stating that he was abandoned. By the common rules of the Church, the 
second marriage was subject to two years of penance as well.640 
This practice, although not fully approved by Basil the Great, was 
approved in his Canon 35 if sufficient reason for abandonment could be 
given. If there was a clear reason, the husband could enter into a second 
marriage without being subject to excommunication from the Church. 
How, then, should the ecclesiastical court deal with those cases where the 
husband was abandoned with sufficient reason? The Church Father does 
                                                
638 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 126. 
639 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 121. For maltiosa desertio, abandonment, Basil the Great 
uses the Greek word ἐγκατάλειψις.  For more, see Zaozerski’s definition on this. 
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not give a direct answer, but a comparison of Canons 9 and 35 concludes 
that a husband who was the guilty party in his abandonment is unworthy 
of leniency. What did leniency mean in this case? Was it in relation to the 
second marriage or to communion? Zaozerski found that the husband 
was unworthy of leniency in both cases, though the Church could not 
deprive him of the right to marry during the period the aforementioned 
canons were decreed; it could only approve or refuse to contract the 
marriage.641 
Zaozerski discovered that the correct interpretation of these canons 
can be found if one consults the Byzantine commentator Aristine. 
Aristine interpreted Canon 35 of Basil the Great stating that, “She, who 
abandoned her husband and without the reason left him, should be under 
penance and even more so if she marries another man, for then she is 
condemned as an adulteress, according to the ninth rule. And the 
husband left by her is worthy of pardon and therefore is not subjected to 
penance [even] if he will take another [spouse.]”642 
Worthy of attention is the fact that Saint Basil the Great in both rules 
does not discuss so much a question of the right of the husband 
abandoned by his wife to remarry,  i.e. marriage as an event, but about 
the case which is subject to moral evaluation from the standpoint of the 
Gospel. From the point of view of civil law at the time, the right of the 
husband who was abandoned by his wife to marry another woman did 
not give rise to any doubts. From the point of view of the law, the wife 
was considered so attached to the house of her husband that its arbitrary 
abandonment by itself destroyed marriage and freed her from her 
husband’s power over her. Vice versa, the residence of a new bride in the 
groom's house, without any concluded rites within a year, kept her under 
the groom’s power. Such a position of a wife in ancient society can be 
understood from the standpoint of the written and customary norms of 
civil law that Christians evaluated in terms of the teachings of the Gospel 
and the moral teaching of the Old Testament. This consequently created 
Christian or Church discipline and a basis for the ecclesiastical court. 
Zaozerski’s views regarding the regulations of Byzantine civil law that 
were praiseworthy and welcomed by ecclesiastical court – and vice versa, 
ideas that were subject to open condemnation – are understandable.  If 
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the rules and laws were concerned with the principles of right and wrong, 
since Basil the Great himself in Canon 9 does not raise a question about 
the legality or illegality of a certain type of cohabitation, he considered it 
from the moral and Gospel perspective. This can be clearly seen in the 
following passage: “A woman who is cohabiting with a man who has been 
left can be accounted an adulteress. For the fault here lies in the woman 
who divorced her husband.” 643  The tolerance for husbands is also 
expressed in Canon 46 of Saint Basil. Concerning the bigamy of a 
husband, Basil observes it with complete indifference, as if it were 
perfectly legal. In this canon, Saint Basil states that a harlot is every 
woman who enters into marriage, albeit unwittingly, with a man who has 
been left by his lawful wife, even if temporarily, and later, on account of 
his wife's returning, will be let go. Basil does not condemn the second 
wife, who lives with a man abandoned by his first wife, and says that such 
a wife is a harlot (έπόρνευσε), albeit unwittingly.644  
To clarify this canon, it should be taken into account that Basil the 
Great in his Canon 9 speaks of a man who has been completely 
abandoned (διόλου) by his wife, who no longer wishes to return to him. 
Therefore, Saint Basil pardons such a man, nor does he condemn the 
woman who entered into a second marriage with him either. In Canon 
46, however, he speaks of a wife who, for some reason, has temporarily 
(πρός καιρόν) left her husband. Therefore, if any woman enters into 
marriage with a man whose lawful wife has temporarily abandoned him, 
and that woman knew about it, then she is guilty of adultery because she 
usurped someone else's husband, as written at the end of Canon 9. If she 
did not know about it, because, for example, she came from another area 
or city, and the wife who temporarily abandoned him subsequently 
returns, in such cases the first marriage will be restored. In that case the 
second wife is guilty of fornication, though unwittingly (έν αγνοία). As 
this woman had no intention of committing fornication, but legally 
entered into marriage, she is consequently not forbidden to remarry 
another person. However, having said that, it would be better that she 
remains unmarried, concludes Basil.645  
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Zonaras, an exegete of the Holy Canons, made it clear as well that such 
an interpretation is also known in the requirements of civil law, 
according to which when entering into marriage, attention should not be 
given to what is permitted, but to what is fair (ού τό έπιτετραµµένον, 
άλλα τό εύπρεπές).646 In his canon Basil the Great also used the Gospel 
teaching of the Savior: “Whoever marries a woman who is divorced 
commits adultery” (Matthew 5:32) when speaking about abandonment 
(ἀπόλυσις) by one of the spouses of the other (except in the cases of 
fornication), and by this he makes clear what kind of abandonment he 
means.647  
This canon raises a question: Why does the church father not 
condemn the bigamy of the husband as heavily as that of a woman? 
Professor Zaozerski tried to answer this question and believed that the 
answer could be found by studying Basils’ Canon 9.  By this canon and on 
the basis of the established ecclesiastical custom, a wife must be faithful 
to her husband, even if he is living in fornication. Only the husband who 
has completely abandoned his wife for another woman makes himself 
and the woman an adulterer and adulteress. Hence Zaozerski made one 
important conclusion: from a moral point of view, on which Saint Basil 
the Great likely based his views, the decisive abandonment by a husband 
of his wife can be seen as a more grievous sin than a casual affair, a 
temporary lapse in which the husband does not leave his wife. Similarly, 
abandonment by a husband of his wife and his home was considered a 
much more serious crime than a thoughtless lapse of  an affair.648 Hence, 
malicious abandonment was to a greater extent a legal reason for divorce 
than temporary, albeit proven, adultery.649 
The practice of Spiritual Consistories in Russia failed to honor 
Zaozerski’s standpoint. A good example of this was the absurd practice in 
which the Consistory required evidence of sexual intercourse proved by 
actual eyewitnesses in order to grant divorce on the grounds of 
adultery.650 
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648 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 128 
649 Заозерский 1904, T. 3. No. 10, 326. 
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Studying the canons of Basil the Great, canonist Zaozerski came to the 
conclusion that malicious abandonment of a spouse was indeed a morally 
legal reason for divorce and was even greater than an occasionally 
committed adultery. Canonist Zaozerski, however, found that in 
Byzantine law before 870 and in the rules of Saint Basil, unknown 
absence meant only the absence of the husband and only gave the wife 
the right to enter into a new marriage. This fact conflicted with Basil’s 
Canon 31, which Aristenus, for example, thinks is clear – “Σαφης.” 
Aristenus continued his interpretation summarizing the meaning of the 
canon by saying: “Ἡ πρὸ τοῦ πληροφορηθῆναι θανεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα ἄλλῳ 
γαµουµένη, µοιχᾶται.” [[A wife] who marries another before ascertaining 
the death of her husband, commits adultery.]651  
According to Byzantine ecclesiastical discipline, it was enough for a 
husband to state that his wife was absent from home for a long enough 
period in order to receive the right to enter into a new marriage. A wife, 
however, had to wait for her missing husband until she could prove his 
death, which only then gave her the right to enter into a new marriage. 
Professor Zaozerski regarded this position as an axiom of canon law for 
those Byzantine emperors who wished to reform the divorce law 
according to the Gospel and canonical inspiration. 652  Malicious 
abandonment was also constantly affirmed in the history of Byzantine 
jurisprudence, except during the period of Leo III Isaurian (740–870), 
when his set of laws, the Ekloga, were in force. Justification for malicious 
abandonment was therefore found in the Procheiron nomos of Basil the 
Makedonian, which returned to the roots of Justinian law, not only 
completely reconstituting it, but also making further steps towards 
equality concerning responsibility for marital fidelity for both husband 
and wife. In reality, Zaozerski admitted that this was not followed in legal 
practice. Instead, the Ekloga was re–published and modified with new 
laws, particularly with laws from Procheiron nomos, often published side 
by side with the laws of the Ekloga.653 This fact is indeed clearly seen in 
the Slavic version of the Nomokanon, in the 48th chapter of the printed 
Kormtšaja kniga. 654  Professor Zaozerski nonetheless presented three 
                                                
651 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 173. 
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cases in which Byzantine canonist Demetrios Chomatenos, Archbishop of 
Ohrid, interpreted Justinian law 117 as being in favor of malicious 
abandonment (maltioso desertio) as a reason for divorce.655  
Using these three medieval divorce proceedings as a justification for 
divorce on the grounds of malitioso desertio was highly disputed by other 
Russian canonists at the time. Their main argument that divorce in the 
aforementioned cases was motivated using the Justinian novella, is also 
found in the Basillika of Leo, which refers to a wife’s willful 
abandonment of the conjugal bed (ἡ κοίτη) and her stay in someone else’s 
house at least one night. Such a conviction by witnesses of abandonment, 
adopted by the ecclesiastical court as well, was made on the grounds of 
the wife’s adulterous life.656 
Zaozerski also noted that in draft of the Civil Code from 1809, one of 
the reasons for divorce was “A wife’s running away (побег) and hiding 
from her husband.”657  However, a year later in the draft of the Civil Code, 
the only mention about running away was law §270, which ordered not to 
treat the case as a crime when a wife was forced to depart for a crime 
committed by her husband.658 
During the twentieth century a prevailing Russian practice concerning 
a fictitious marriage is clearly seen in the following Preparatory 
Commissions remark: “The wife living apart from her husband” and “the 
husband who refuses to accept a wife” have become common 
phenomena, acquiring for itself, so to speak, the rights of citizenship even 
in the eyes of the Governing Senate. The only remnant of legal guarantees 
under such duties is the rights of the wife to claim for herself 
maintenance from her husband who refuses to cohabit with her, and the 
right of the husband to refuse to grant maintenance to his wife who does 
not want to cohabit with him. Meanwhile, escape from an abnormal 
situation (a fictitious marriage) is simple: a long separate cohabitation is 
in itself convincing proof of the end of a marriage. The ecclesiastical court 
here should not separate a husband from his wife and vice versa, because 
they are already parted, but its duty is only to state that on account of 
                                                
655 Заозерский 1904, T. 3. No. 10, 336–341. 
656 See I. I. Sokolov’s and I. Berdnikov’s commentary in Соколов 1911, 133; 
РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 29. 
657 Заозерский 1904, T. 3. No. 11, 431. 
658 Проект Гражданскаго Уложения Российской Империи 1810, 104–105. 
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separation the dissolution of the marriage has already taken place. In 
particular, for the legislative power there is no formal difficulty in 
publishing our proposed law. In reality, it is not about the establishment 
of the new law, but about the restoration of the old, based on a very stable 
canonical, ecclesiastical and civil foundation.659 
From this statement, Zaozerski considered that by accepting malicious 
abandonment, which he believed was based on the canons of Basil the 
Great, the Church and civil law would eventually be reformed. At the end 
of the discussion, the meeting of the Preparatory Commission made a 
unanimous decision to establish a five-year period before a divorce can 
be granted in cases of malicious abandonment.660 
The five-year period could, to some extent, be motivated by the 
findings of canonical cases from Byzantine legal practice, such as the case 
that was sent for resolution to the Patriarch of Constantinople Manuel II 
(1244–1255), from whom was asked the following question: “Some [men] 
have left their wives due to hatred or for whatever reason (διὰ µῖσος, ἢ 
ἄλλην ὁποιανδήτινα αἰτιαν) and live in a foreign country; their wives 
remain in this position for five or more years. Their husbands do not 
return and it is unknown where they live. Should such wives marry other 
husbands?”  The Patriarch gave the following answer: “Husbands, leaving 
their wives for whatever reason and living in a foreign country deserve 
excommunication (ἀφορισµοῦ εἰσιν ἄξιοι), if staying carefree and are 
unwilling to return to their wives. Now, if there is no news about them, 
[and] at least the search [of them] took place on the initiative of their 
wives, and five years pass since their husbands went missing, whether 
they are prisoners or otherwise disappear, then their wives can without 
hindrance enter into marriage with another husband under the existing 
law, and those wives whose husbands are still alive must search for 
them.”661 
Professor Zaozerski’s attempt to prove that malicious abandonment 
was truly a legitimate reason for divorce on the basis of regulations of the 
ancient Church was a complete failure in Berdnikov’s and Suvorov's 
opinion. Professor Suvorov believed that the canonist made a  mistake in 
understanding the ancient regulations of the Church, confusing divorce 
                                                
659 Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний 1907, 129–130. 
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as an act that destroys marital union with the actual abandonment of 
another spouses without the destruction of marital union. The Special 
Meeting in one of its sessions stated that it was common that shortly after 
the dissolution of the marriage by the unknown absence of a spouse, a 
missing person returned home. Herein some cases the malicious absence 
of a spouse was hidden under an unknown absence. The malice of such 
untraceable absentees was found only after the spouse’s return to his 
home to seek permission to remarry.662 
Of course, it is impossible to think that in ancient times in the 
Byzantine Empire the abandonment of spouses did not take place. There 
were, of course, cases of women escaping from the beatings and ill 
treatment of their husbands. These cases were guided by the rules of 
Basil the Great and later by the rules of the Council of Trullo. However, 
such cases  did not constitute a particular reason for divorce. They were 
considered in life and in judicial practice in relation to other motives to 
divorce. Such motives were unknown absence, the willful running away 
of a wife, and so on. This is clearly shown in the three medieval divorce 
proceedings in the Greek Church presented by Professor Zaozerski. 
Zaozerski did not clarify clearly enough the nature of the 
abandonment in his canonical analysis. First of all, it should be 
established what an abandonment is, no matter what it is called: 
malignant, malicious, intentional, or simply abandonment. For 
legislators who had to legislate on this subject, there was no doubt that 
under the notion of abandonment must not be understood the legal 
termination of marriage, but the actual withdrawal of one spouse from 
the other without any act, public or private, which would have expressed 
the will to terminate the marriage and without requesting a divorce. 
Hence, one spouse actually abandons the other without breaking the legal 
relationship, which is established by a marital union, and which therefore 
continues to exist. 
Interestingly, Professor Suvorov referred to the very same Canon 9 of 
Saint Basil the Great as canonist Zaozerski, when trying to justify the the 
impossibility of malicious abandonment as a cause for divorce from the 
                                                
662 This example can also be found in Sergi Grigorovski’s study from 1908, in the 
Collection of Ecclesiastical and Civil Laws on Marriage and Divorce, 
Legitimation, Adoption and about Illegitimate Children, with Additions and 
Elucidations on Circular or Individual Decrees of the Holy Synod. See 
Григоровский 1908, 253–255. 
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canonical viewpoint. The idea of the aforementioned canon is the 
following: the decision of the Lord with respect to the order of the sense 
applies equally to men and women so far as it concerns the prohibition of 
divorce except on the ground of fornication (περὶ τοῦ µὴ ἐξεῖναι γάµου 
ἐξίστασθαι παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας). Many strict sayings can be found 
about adulteresses in the canon, based on the teaching of the Apostle 
Paul and the Prophet Jeremiah. Men were obliged not to keep them at 
their homes and not to continue to cohabit with them. If they did so, they 
were found to be foolish and impious.663 On the other hand, the canon 
commands that men who are guilty of adultery or of acts of fornication 
must must be kept by their wives. Therefore, the Church Father says he 
does not know whether one can call directly an adulteress the woman 
who lives with a husband whose wife has left him, since here the fault is 
on the side of the woman who left her husband (τὸ γὰρ ἔγκληµα ἐνταῦθα 
τῆς ἀπολυσάσης τὸν ἄνδρα) and not on the one who took her place. Here 
it might be asked why did the woman walk away from the marriage 
(ἀπέστη τοῦ γάµου)? Possibly because her husband beat her, and she 
could not stand the blows? Perhaps because she could not bear the loss of 
property? Maybe because her husband lived in fornication? In this case 
the Church custom did not allow for the wife to be separated from the 
unfaithful husband (ἀπίστου ἀνδρὸς χωρίζεσθαι οὐ προσετάχθη γυνή), 
but obliged her to stay with him, given the uncertainty of the final 
outcome. Here the teaching of Paul the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:16) is referred 
to.664 
Canon 9 of Saint Basil the Great speaks about divorce in the sense of 
breaking the legal relationship between the spouses, but not in terms of 
actual abandonment of one of the spouses by the other. Byzantine law did 
not have at the time any official divorce forms, except the private 
expression of the unwillingness to live in a marriage, following the 
ancient Mosaic Law.665 One can only wonder how it was possible to find 
in Canon 9 the notion of the actual abandonment of another spouse 
without prior separation as a sufficient reason for divorce. 
Karl Eduard Zachariae von Lingenthal (1812–1894) in his study 
Geschichte des Griechisch–römischen rechts (History of the Greco–
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Roman law) of 1892, described that the following terminologies: “λίσις, 
ἀπόλυσις, διάλυσις, διάζευξις, χωρισµὸς τοῦ γάµου,” were used for 
divorce in the Byzantine Empire, and they always meant a legal 
termination or dissolution of marriage. According to the law, such 
spouses continued to live together rather than actually separate. 666 
Therefore, in all official and private collections of the Byzantine laws, a 
set of laws on divorce are placed under the heading: “περὶ λύσεως 
γάµων,”667 and as Professor Suvorov points out, most occasions for the 
termination of marriage start with the phrases: “λύεται ὁ ἀνἡρ ἀπό 
γυναικὸς (the man is separated [“dissolved”] from the woman); διαλύεται 
ό γάµος (the marriage is dissolved) […in such cases…]; or ἀιτίαι τῆς 
διαλύσεως (the reasons for divorce) […are such and such…].”668  
Canonist Suvorov, who was highly influenced in his commentaries by 
von Lingenthal’s famous study in Byzantine law, noted that the husband 
who sent his wife a certificate of divorce could marry again without 
committing adultery.669 Thus, one can interpret Canon 9 to speak about 
legal not factual abandonment.670 If the husband who sent his wife a 
certificate of divorce was not condemned for marrying another woman, 
then he and the woman who took the place of his first wife would not be 
condemned. The situation is different if the initiative for divorce came 
from the husband, namely if a husband divorces his wife by sending her a 
certificate of divorce, and after that marries another – in such a case he is 
an adulterer. Basil the Great speaks in the same sense in his 77th canon: 
                                                
666 Zachariae 1892, 76. Here one should note the Greek words and phrases in the 
ninth canon of Basil the Great that correspond to the Russian word for 
abandonment or leaving, оставление, which were used and translated by 
Suvorov. Such words are: “ἀπολυσάσης τὸν ἄνδρα – оставила мужа,” “ἀπέστη 
τοῦ γάµου – отсутипла от брака,” “διαζεχθῆναι συνοιποῦντος – разводиться с 
сожителем,” “χωριζεσθαι – отделяться,” “ἀποστάς τῆς γυναικὸς ἐπ’ ἄλλην ἢλθε 
– отсупив от жены возметь себе другую жену,” “γάµου ἐξίστασθαι – выходит 
из брака.” (Суворов 1908, 30.) The translation of the phrase “γάµου 
ἐξίστασθαι” was challenged by Professor Zaozerski, who argued that it was 
incorrect and used out of the context. See Заозерский 1908, 251–252.  
667  Ekloga II, Zachariae 1852, 15; Epanagoge XXI, Zachariae 1852, 135; Ο 
Πρόχειρος νόµος XI, Zachariae 1837, 72. 
668 Суворов 1908, 31. 
669 Суворов 1908, 31; Zachariae 1892, 77. 
670 Заозерский 1908, 252.  
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“Ὁ µέντοι καταλιµπάνων τὴν νοµίµως αὐτῷ συναφθεῖσαν γυναῖκα καὶ 
ἑτέραν ἀγόµενος, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου ἀπόφασιν, τῷ τῆς µοιχείας 
ὑπόκειται κρίµατι.”671 A man who abandons his legally wedded wife, and 
marries another woman is liable to the judgment of adultery, 672  but 
logically the woman is guilty in adultery as well, since she divorced from 
her husband (sending him a certificate of divorce), for whatever reason: 
cruel treatment, extravagance, fornication, and so on.673 
For a complete canonical analysis of the subject it is necessary to 
analyze Canon 87 of Trullo as well, since its foundation are based on 
Canons 9, 35, and 77 of Basil the Great. The Trullan canon even states in 
the beginning that: “A woman who has abandoned her husband is an 
adulteress if she has betaken herself to another man, according to the 
sacred and divine Basil.”674 Canon 87 of Trullo consequently speaks 1. 
about the wife who left her husband, 2. about the wife who left her 
husband without any reason, 3. about the husband who left his legal wife 
to marry another. Abandonment here is understood in the same sense as 
in the canons of Basil the Great, i.e. in the sense of the legal dissolution of 
marriage. This was the case, even though at the time of the Trullan 
council the Justinian divorce law that was adopted in Nomokanon did 
not exist. It opened a possibility for innocent divorced spouses to 
remarry. Zonaras, for example, interpreted this canon as the following: 
 
Now therefore, the woman who walks away from her husband for 
no reason, according to the rules, deserves a penance, i.e. a 
penance given for committing adultery if she will be with another 
[man]. Her husband may receive forgiveness and be worthy of the 
ecclesiastical communion. Thus, in the opposite case it can be 
concluded that if she without reason walked away from her 
husband, who, perhaps to an extent, was angry with her or treated 
her poorly, or if she had any other reasons on her husband’s part, 
[in that case] she will be innocent, if she made [herself] the wife of 
another. [In that case] the husband should be subjected to a 
penance, because he was the culprit in the sin of his wife. The rule 
says: but he who leaves his wife and takes another [wife], 
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according to the word of the Lord, is guilty of adultery, and [the 
rule] further adds, how such [a person] should be punished and 
corrected. Apparently, these fathers admit the contradiction with 
Basil the Great, because the husband, while still 
married, copulated with another wife, called an adulteress, and it 
is said that he should banish her from his home. But the first wife 
should take back her fornicating husband, because he [Basil the 
Great] says, we have no rights to subject the husband to the guilt 
of adultery, because the sin was committed free from marriage. 
These rules do not contradict each other, since Basil the Great 
speaks about falling into fornication while being  married, and of 
copulation with another, free from being a husband. But the 
current rule [Canon 87 of Trullo] speaks about [a husband] who 
without reason banished his wife and brought another to his 
house as a legal wife. The Lord in his Gospel called such a man an 
adulterer.675 
 
Professor Suvorov considered that Zonaras’ (and Balsamon’s) 
interpretation “deviated from the true meaning of the canons.” 676 
Suvorov’s accusations can be justified if Zonaras’ interpretation of 
adultery could be applied not only to the case of falling into fornication 
during the existence of a previous marriage, but also contracting a new 
marriage by dissolving the former one. 677  We can find grounds for 
Suvorov’s view, since Zonaras himself in his commentary to Canon 35 of 
Saint Basil cited Basil’s Canon 9, and did not recognize it as legal for a 
wife to dissolve the marriage because of the husband’s violence, adultery 
or even his infidelity: “Ἐν δὲ τῷ Θ’. κεφαλαίῳ ὁ ἅγιοσ οὗτος, οὔτε τὸ 
τύπτεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, οὔτε τὸ εἰς χρήµατα ζηµιοῦσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ 
τὸ πορνεύειν ἴσως τὸν ἄνδρα, εὐλογους αἰτίας ἔκρινεν εἰς τὸ ἀποστῆναι 
τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ γάµου, οὐδὲ µὴν τὸ ἂπιστον εἶναι.”678 With reference to 
Balsamon, it is hard to find in his interpretation a difference between 
abandonment for a legitimate reason and abandonment without 
legitimate reason. Hence, he explains Canon 87 of Trullo in the sense that 
any abandonment of a husband, even for a legitimate reason, was not 
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677 See the ninth canon of Basil the Great. 
678 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 179. 
 
 
 
 
193 
permissible without the permission of a court.679 Suvorov thought that 
the correct way, rather than the interpretations of Zonaras and 
Balsamon, was to see that under the “ἀναχωρήσις” in the Trullan Canon 
87, was meant the divorce of a wife from her husband without the reason 
of fornication – “χωρίς λόγου πορνείας.”680  
Unfortunately, in the session of the Special Meeting, it was not 
clarified how the Diocesan authorities would act in cases of “runaways,” 
i.e. whether they could remarry or not. The Diocesan bishops of the Holy 
Synod were instructed that these runaways could be allowed to enter into 
marriage only if they presented serious proof that their unknown absence 
did not mean concealing their whereabouts from the other spouse but 
was caused by other valid reasons.681 The Special Meeting considered that 
in essence the intentional abandonment of one of the spouses was a 
crime against matrimonial fidelity, which entailed a profound 
disintegration of the family. In view of this highly destructive influence of 
malicious abandonment to the institution of marriage, Berdnikov 
considered the recognition of this phenomenon as a naturally legitimate 
reason for divorce at the request of one of the spouses in such a formula 
as was offered by the Special Meeting. However, Berdnikov also noted 
that attention should be paid to the technical preparation of divorce 
                                                
679 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 507–510. 
680 Суворов 1908, 38. An interesting historical note was also made by canonist 
Suvorov: In Germany in the fifteenth century during the era of the Reformation 
movement, the disappearance of a person and malicious abandonment became a 
trend of the time. A spouse who was bored or uncomfortable in married life 
might in some cases run away into another territory, i.e. to another German 
State. The small size of territories encouraged the possibility of escape, and 
because of the solidarity of these territorial governments was not difficult to 
grant the status of fugitive during this time of religious strife. Malicious 
abandonment of many different types (desertio and quasi-desertio) had always 
had an independent status in all Protestant statutes. Certain Lutheran 
theologians even used the concept of desertion to justify divorce in some other 
cases, for example, in cases of abuse and attempts on one’s life. In such cases, 
theologians demanded the expulsion of the criminal spouse from the territory, so 
that he or she was considered a deserter. The German Civil Code at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, having replaced all regional laws, classified 
malicious abandonment (bösliche verlassung) in the first category of grounds for 
divorce, along with adultery, bigamy, unnatural vices and attempt on another’s 
life. Суворов 1908, 40–41. 
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proceedings on the specified subject, as was the case in Western 
European countries at the time.682 
Berdnikov suggested that it was necessary for the new divorce 
procedure to bring in a claim for the restoration of marital cohabitation. 
If within a certain period of time when the spouses lived separately, a 
court order to resume the disturbed matrimonial life was not received, 
then it would serve as a basis for a request to dissolve the marriage. An 
action for the renewal of marital cohabitation should be considered in the 
secular court, which would consider the requests and claims about 
spouses living separately. In Berdnikov’s view, a legitimized practice of 
separate living between two spouses would be desirable only by their 
mutual agreement. This was motivated with a view that would accurately 
determine the procedure of parenting and material support for the other 
spouse who lived separately.683 Parenting and alimony rights were not 
just part of a legal problem in Russia; it was part of a much wider 
question of gender consciousness, closely related to the liberation 
movement in the beginning of twentieth century. Ariadna Tyrkova, a 
woman activist described in detail in her memoirs “На путях к свободе”  
(On the Road to Freedom) the difficulties that any single mother and 
divorcee could confront. A broken marriage that resulted in separate 
living was a difficult move at that time on the wife’s part, since the “twin 
sanctions” – the civil law of the Russian Empire and social custom made 
such a move emotionally disturbing or distressing. Apart from social 
                                                
682  It is possible that Berdnikov was influenced in his views by Professor 
Suvorov. See Суворов 1908, 42. 
683  РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 30. At first, the appeal practice in 
nineteenth century Russia did not categorically allow a court order regarding 
alimony for wives who lived separately from their husbands (see, for example, 
decisions from 1868, No. 461 and 1875, No. 291). However, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century we can already find changes in court decisions. With the 
decision from 1906, No. 8, the court ordered that, “if such marital cohabitation 
which was meant by the law was impossible, there was no reason to deprive the 
wife of the right to demand alimony from her husband.” Having thus established 
in its decision that spouses living separately was an everyday fact that the court 
had to consider and somehow normalize, the Senate started to order a number of 
instructions regarding the regulation of the aforementioned relations. 
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sanctions, women also faced severe economic pressure if they ended up 
living without the support of their husbands.684  
Interestingly, when Professor Berdnikov brought up the question of 
alimony, the administrative practice actually provided such support in 
cases when husbands: exhibited erratic behavior, e.g. drunkenness, 
beatings, extortion and embezzlement of property; treated their wife 
badly; failed to provide for the family; were violent; committed adultery; 
were vagrant; had mental disorders; had sexually transmitted diseases;  
were unable to fulfill conjugal life.685 
Alimonies were issued from three months to three years, or until 
certain conditions were reached, for example, after the husband exhibited 
proper behavior or his income level rose, etc. 686  How then did 
Berdnikov’s proposal differ from actual divorce, since from the legal 
perspective it was close to being complete separation, i.e. a divorce? 
Perhaps in many cases, separate living would be positively necessary in 
order to stop, at least for a time, a family upheaval. It might be very 
useful in that it could force the other spouse to reconcile and restore 
normal marital life. It could in many cases replace divorce.687 
Abandonment of a spouse was also related to reasons that could occur, 
for example, from deviating from the Orthodox faith of one or other of 
the spouses. In such a case abandoning the other spouse is motivated not 
by personal arbitrariness or the inconveniences of life, but by the 
supreme principle of freedom of conscience. Such abandonment as a 
reason for divorce merges with a reason that stems from disagreements, 
enmities, strife and oppression between the spouses, initiated by 
different religious beliefs. 
                                                
684 Ruthchild 2010, 35. It should be noted that where dissolution of the marriage 
was granted, the wife was not in all cases the injured party. For example, 
Tyrkova’s future nemesis, Alexandra Kollontai, exclaimed to her friend that she 
“hated marriage. It was an idiotic, meaningless life.” Such an act of leaving 
matrimonial life could “liberate” one, yet at the same time it brought with it the 
prospect of poverty. 
685 Быховский 1912, 48. 
686 Быховский 1912, 48–49. 
687 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 30–31. Berdnikov offered to introduce a 
rule that in certain cases, before permitting a divorce, a pre-assigned legal 
separation for a certain period of time was necessary, since the possibility of 
reconciliation always existed. The only question was to put this rule correctly 
through a competent court, which in Berdnikov’s view was a secular one.  
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In Russia at the time, in cases where there was no possibility for an 
abandoned spouse to prove marital infidelity, the spouse was denied the 
opportunity to obtain a formal divorce, hence, their marriage existed only 
on paper. To include malicious abandonment among the reasons for 
divorce was not only desirable from the point of view of private interests, 
but from the point of view of public law as well. Regarding the interest of 
public good, which was one of the State Church’s own priorities, it would 
be impossible to assert that the State was interested in the preservation of 
those marriages where the marriage did not actually exist anymore. 
Foreseeing this, the Commission voted in favor of adding malicious 
abandonment to the divorce charter as a valid reason for divorce. The 
Commission accepted A. V. Vilev’s idea that determining precisely when 
abandonment took place could serve as a justification for divorce.688 
 
 
 
4.6  Abandonment of the Orthodox Faith 
 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, among other questions related 
to Orthodox canon law, the question of religious freedom of Russian 
subjects was debated in various circles from different viewpoints. 689 
These debates led to a reformed law that was published in the Special 
Journal of Committee of Ministers on April 17, 1905, in the following 
form: 
 
1. [A person] falling away from the Orthodox faith to other Christian 
confession or creed shall not be prosecuted and this should not 
entail any disadvantage implications in relation to private or civil 
                                                
688 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 13–15. S. Utin’s proposition to expand the 
timeframe from five years to ten, after which a spouse who was maliciously 
abandoned could seek a divorce, and V. G. Ignatievna’s proposal to reduce it to 
two to three years, were not accepted.  
689  For more on this issue, see Бердников И. – Наши Новые Законы и 
Законопроекты о Свободе Совести; Eugene M. Avrutin – Returning to 
Judaism after the 1905 Law on Religious Freedom in Tsarist Russia; Laura 
Engelstein – The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin–
de–Siècle Russia: Ithaca, 1992; and Olga Crisp and Linda Edmondson, eds., Civil 
Rights in Imperial Russia: Oxford, 1989. 
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rights. A person who upon reaching adulthood leaves the 
Orthodox Church, is recognized as belonging to the religion or 
creed which he or she choses; 
2. When a spouse who professes the same Christian faith [as the 
other spouse] converts to another religion, all the children who 
have not reached adulthood, remain in the same faith professed 
by the other spouse. When both spouses convert, children under 
14 years of age follow the faith of their parents. Children who have 
reached the age of 14, remain in their former religion; 
3. In addition to these rules, establish that the persons who are 
registered as Orthodox Christians but in reality profess non-
Christian faith to which they or their ancestors belonged before 
joining the Orthodox Church, are subject to exclusion, at their 
own request, from [the list of] Orthodox Christians; 
4. To allow for Christians of all confessions to educate and baptize 
by the rites of their faith those non-baptized foundlings and 
children of unknown parents whom they have adopted.690 
 
Among the diocesan authorities, one of the permitted reasons for 
divorce from the ecclesiastical point of view was the abandonment of the 
Orthodox faith.691 During the Pre-Conciliar period the diocesan authority 
of Saint Petersburg placed great importance on the fact that it should be 
made clear that the right to ask for a divorce belonged only to the 
Orthodox spouse. Otherwise, it would be possible to abuse the law. Thus, 
it was seen as desirable that in order to guard the Orthodox faith, the 
divorcing Orthodox spouse should receive a legal part of the 
belongings.692 Abandonment of the Orthodox faith might only become a 
reason for divorce when the party who remained an unbeliever did not 
agree to continue marital cohabitation with the other spouse, who 
adopted Christianity, or first agreed, but afterwards began to repress the 
religious conscience of the converted spouse, and harassing and opposing 
the Christian education of the children.693 An analogy to this can be found 
in Canon 72 of Trullo.694  
                                                
690 Бердников 1914, 19–20. 
691 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 2. Compare this to  apostolic teaching 
“Reject a divisive man after the first and second admonition.” (Tit. 3:10) 
692 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 2. 
693 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 19. 
694 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 471–472. 
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Abandonment of the Orthodox faith was the only reason in the entire 
project that Metropolitan Vladimir of Moscow and Kolomenskoe 
supported. In his belief, it responded to the needs and requirements of 
the human spirit. Logically, it could be a much clearer and more 
convincing reason for believers, since if the spiritual union between the 
spouses in a such primary area of life as religion would stop, then there 
would be nothing to give to a sexual relation, and it would thus become a 
purely animal act. The Metropolitan regretted that there was little or no 
consideration of the sacramental side of marriage in the arguments of the 
planned reforms.695 Archbishop Aleksi of Tver and Kašinsk suggested to 
add the opinion of Metropolitan Jevlogi of Holm regarding the 
abandonment of the Orthodox faith: “Marriage shall be terminated also 
in the case if the spouse who remains faithful to Orthodoxy is unwilling to 
continue marital cohabitation with a lapsed spouse, due to disorders in 
family relations.”696 
The Special Meeting of the Holy Synod formulated the issue as 
follows: “The Orthodox spouse whose marriage was dissolved due to 
deviation of the other spouse from Orthodoxy, is given the right to 
remarry.”697 Regarding this, the Meeting did not explore all sides of the 
question. It did not pay attention to those cases of mixed marriages 
where non-Orthodox spouses converted to Orthodoxy, and cases where 
one of the spouses abandoned Orthodoxy and joined a non-Christian 
faith. One could argue that these cases and aspects of the question should 
have been included in the formula of the new law.The Meeting also 
found, among other things, that deviation of one of the Orthodox spouses 
from Orthodoxy could not in itself serve as a basis for divorce. In the case 
of a mixed marriage between a believing spouse and a nonbeliever, from 
the perspective of the Orthodox faithful this marriage was not allowed to 
be terminated.698 Once a Christian spouse notices and experiences that 
the nonbelieving spouse offends religious belief, and promotes the 
                                                
695 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 9. 
696 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 11. 
697 Суворов 1908, 45. 
698 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 30. For Berdnikov, the starting point of 
reasoning regarding mixed marriages was the commandment of the Apostle in 1 
Corinthians 7:12–14. Berdnikov concluded from this that religious interests 
should stand in the foreground when dealing with the divorce cases of mixed–
marriage couples.  
 
 
 
 
199 
customs of a non-Christian faith, then termination of marriage with the 
nonbeliever could be possible. 
The unity of faith and of confession between the spouses can be 
argued as the origin for this whole question. Canonist Berdnikov in his 
arguments operates on the basis of Canon 72 of Trullo, Canon 31 of 
Laodicea and Canon 30 of Carthage. In his remarks, the canonical 
tradition of the Orthodox Church in the strict sense could not allow 
mixed marriages with Catholics, Protestants and other Christian 
denominations.699 This fact was also observed by S. Tšistoserbov, who 
pointed out that marriage, as a whole juris divini communicatio between 
the spouses, should require a unity of religion, since different religions 
should serve as an impediment to marriage on the basis of 
impedimentum disparitatis cultus.700 Such a strict view was also met in 
the Ecclesiastical Bulletin, when in 1909 Metropolitan of Volyn Antoni 
suggested adopting a general rule, by which Orthodox Christians were 
forbidden to marry even other Christians. Answering such a request, the 
Holy Synod did not approve it; it justified its opinion by stating that the 
Church does not have a right to take something which is granted it by 
civil law. Such a prohibition would also act against the Church and would 
not bring any religious–moral benefit to the people.701  
The strict policy of mixed marriages was followed in the Greek 
Orthodox Church at the time. The Russian Orthodox Church, as 
Berdnikov noted, deviated however from this strict norm by the desire of 
the State and in recognition of its political views, but with the 
indispensable condition that the non-Orthodox party in the mixed 
marriage did not promise to constrain the religious conscience of the 
Orthodox spouse by mocking, threatening or propagandizing non-
Orthodox confession. The children should also be raised in the Orthodox 
faith and the same principles should be followed when the Orthodox 
spouse falls into heterodoxy, as already seen. Professor Berdnikov paid 
attention as well to the nature of adopting Judaism, Islam or any other 
non-Christian faiths of one of the spouses, as an action which 
consequently terminated the marriage at the request of Orthodox spouse 
                                                
699 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 31. Compare with The Rudder 1983, 565, 
621.  
700 Чистосербов 1903, 489. 
701 Вопрос о смешанных браках 1910, 1169. 
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as a result of different religions. Falling into heterodoxy on the other 
hand was not seen as a reason for divorce in itself, but only in cases 
where the heterodox spouse did not want to continue marital life.702 
We can here pay attention to the fact that the respected Russian 
canonist used the term “falling from the Orthodox faith” (отпадание от 
православной веры), when describing the process of a person who 
might have been forced to join the Orthodox Church and afterwards 
returned to the former faith of his or her ancestors. Although the decree 
of April 17, 1905 allowed individuals the freedom to return to their 
previous creed, Article 3 of the statute made such a return confusing for 
those Russian subjects who originally belonged to one of the non-
Christian confessions (Judaism, Islam, Budhism) traditionally tolerated 
by the State.703  
 
Eugene M. Avrutin in his article “Returning to Judaism after the 1905 
Law on Religious Freedom in Tsarist Russia,” paints a rather realistic 
picture regarding the 1905 decree and how it was applied in Russia at the 
time:   
 
The law did not allow all non-Christians to return to their former 
religions, “only those individuals who were formally registered as 
Russian Orthodox, but who in reality continued to confess a non-
Christian faith that they or their ancestors belonged to prior to 
converting to Orthodoxy.” Baptized Jews who wished to return to 
Judaism not only needed to prove that they or their “ancestors” 
(predki) were Jewish, they also had to demonstrate that they had 
in fact continued to observe their ancestral religion prior to the 
April statute. The law allowed only those Jews who had converted 
to Russian Orthodoxy for “pragmatic” or insincere reasons to 
return legally to Judaism (those persons who were considered 
nominal “Christians”). To put it another way, the law permitted 
legal transfer to petitioners who had not observed their baptismal 
                                                
702 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 31. 
703  Avrutin 2006, 102. The Department of Spiritual Affairs and Foreign 
Confessions reported that 409 Jews who had converted to Orthodoxy returned 
to Judaism between April 17, 1905 and January 1, 1908. In 1909 and 1910, 67 
and 69 Jews respectively were permitted to transfer. Only 684 former Jews 
returned to Judaism by 1912, which was a relatively small number when 
compared to other non-Orthodox Christians transfer rates: 2,932 individuals 
transferred to Catholicism, 1,500 to Lutheranism, and 2,106 to Old Belief.  
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obligations and who had continued to practice their former 
religion; it did not permit any new conversions to Judaism.704  
 
Professor Suvorov noted that it should not be the very fact of changing 
the religion or deviation from Orthodoxy that should be a reason for 
divorce, but the unwillingness of the lapsed spouse to continue the 
marriage with the spouse who remained faithful to Orthodoxy. 
Consequently, the planned reason gained an addition which did not 
conform to its essence. If the reason for divorce was not the  fact of 
deviation, then it should not be mentioned as a motive; what should be 
given as the motive was the real reason, i.e., the unwillingness of the 
lapsed spouse to live with the Orthodox spouse.705 When the proposed 
draft is observed from Suvorov’s point of view, it can also be asked 
whether it concerned both reasons, unwillingness to live together 
and constraint, or rather one reason should be given. Canonist Suvorov 
answered this by referring to a court practice of the Ecclesiastical 
Department regarding leaving the Orthodoxy for another religion and 
constraining the religious conscience as reasons for divorce. He 
mentioned that although Russian civil law at the time did not mention 
them, such cases were met and resolved on the basis of the words of the 
Apostle Paul. Sometimes, however, divorce was permitted as well for the 
Orthodox believer who was unwilling to live with the spouse who 
transferred to another religion.706  
From the point of view of Russian civil law, the draft could present 
some difficulty. The case of a spouse who remained in the former faith 
during the other spouse’s deviation from it, could occur not only with 
Orthodox Russian subjects, but with non-Orthodox subjects as well. For 
example, one Lutheran spouse may convert to Catholicism in the Polish 
provinces, or one of the Catholic spouses may adopt Lutheranism in the 
Baltic provinces and constrain the religious freedom of a spouse who 
remained in the former faith. Professor Suvorov did not deny the 
importance of the question concerning Orthodox spouses who lived in 
the Polish provinces, Chełm Land and in the nine West–Russian 
provinces. However, he thought that civil law should take a look at the 
                                                
704 Avrutin 2006, 101. 
705 Суворов 1908, 45. 
706 Суворов 1908, 46. 
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question from a broader view. He wished that a Special Meeting could 
formulate the concerned law in such a form which would protect the 
religious freedom of spouses, no matter which denomination they 
belonged to.707 
In the conclusion, canonist Suvorov summarized that even if we are 
only concerned with the Orthodox ecclesiastical court’s jurisdiction over 
individuals within the realms of its competence, the draft should have a 
different formulation which will emphasize not the fact of the deviation, 
but the unwillingness of the fallen spouse to continue cohabitation with 
an Orthodox spouse and constraining the religious conscience of the 
latter. Secondly, the proposed draft would also embrace those mixed 
marriages  in which one of the spouses belonged to Orthodoxy.708 
In the meeting of the interdepartmental commission from January 16, 
1917, Jatskevitš, due to the considerations of S. G. Runkevitš regarding 
the abandonment of a spouse, considered it necessary to draw attention 
to the abandonment of the Orthodox faith in favor of Old Belief or any 
other sect which did not confess the Lord Jesus Christ as the true Son of 
God, the Redeemer of the world. This meant a sect that did not accept 
properly administered and unrepeated water baptism, or rejected marital 
union. In Jatskevitš’ opinion, seeking divorce in those cases belonged to 
the spouse remaining in Orthodoxy. This raises a question: Who would 
determine the respective nature of the dissolution of marriages of 
sectarians? Archbishop Ioakim answered Jatskevitš that there was 
nothing dogmatic in this matter and only an indication was given in the 
teaching of the Church that blessing the continuation of such marriages 
was an obstacle. V. P. Šein asked if the dogmatic characteristics of the 
sects could be replaced by an authoritative definition given by the Church 
authorities.709   
                                                
707 Суворов 1908, 47. French legislation at the time subsumed under the rubric 
excès, sévices et injures graves, all sorts of violence and cruelty by one spouse 
towards the other that was based on religious matters. French legislation 
decreed even a decision that if one of the Protestant spouses, namely the wife, 
changed her faith from Lutheranism to Catholicism, a husband could obtain a 
divorce as soon he was able to prove that he married her because of her 
Protestant faith, and the wife in this sense caused him  a heavy offense.  
708 Суворов 1908, 50. 
709 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 20, 23, 24. V. G. Ignatev supported Šein’s 
view and stated that there was no doubt that the question of the nature of sects 
belonged to the competence of spiritual authority. 
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I. D. Morduhaj-Boltovskoj made an important remark from the 
juridical point of view. He stressed that the reason for falling from 
Orthodoxy into a sect will be established by the Holy Synod and not by 
the legislative institutions. This was also the case regarding contagious 
diseases as grounds for divorce. Deciding how contagious disease 
provides such a reason, will depend on the conscience of the court. In his 
opinion, the Holy Synod will not publish a list of diseases on this matter, 
just as it probably will not publish a list of different sects, as Pilkin 
suggested before,710 or that defining the nature of the sect would depend 
on the court. 711  The Holy Synod may in that respect act only as a 
legislative body and not as a higher administrative authority. It would be 
necessary either to keep the current wording, or completely abandon this 
cause for divorce.712 
From the above discussion, regarding which institution should take 
care of the cases where a spouse has abandoned the Orthodox faith, we 
can see that the general opinion was that these cases should be decided 
by the spiritual authorities. However, it should also be noted that this 
part dealt with the area where the Holy Synod was the legislative 
institution de facto, rather than being an administrative institution and 
thus it was understood to have a legislative rather than an interpretive 
role. The Commission ended up adopting the following form: “An 
Orthodox spouse has the right to ask for a divorce in cases where the 
other lapsed spouse joins the Old Belief sect, or a sect, which distorts, 
according to the ecclesiastical court, the very essence of the Christian 
faith and rejects the marital union.”713 
 
 
                                                
710 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 24. A. P. Pilkin suggested that a list of sects 
should be compiled. In certain cases, when there would be a claim for divorce 
due to the “falling” of one of the spouses from Orthodoxy into a sect, the only 
question in such case would be whether that sect belonged among those listed.  
711 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 24. S. Utin supported the view that the 
definition of the nature of the sects should be a matter of ecclesiastical authority 
and secular authorities should not be involved in this matter.  
712 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 26. 
713 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 28. Orthodox subjects were also prohibited 
from entering into marriage with persons whose previous marriage was annulled 
due to abandonment of Orthodoxy. 
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4.7  Other Reasons 
 
 
On October 16, 1907 Archbishop Guri proposed that the planned reasons 
for divorce should be supplemented with “obscenity as a reason for 
divorce for the innocent spouse,”714 and with “administrative exile of 
spouses punished by society for their vicious behavior.”715 On January 20, 
1917 the Interdepartmental Commission discussed terms for the 
restoration of a marriage. It was decided that “by a joint petition, the 
marriage of divorced spouses could be restored by the definition of the 
Diocesan Court regarding the second wedding, if neither of the former 
spouses had remarried. Otherwise, divorced spouses whose new marriage 
was ended by the death or divorce of their second spouses, were not 
condemned to perpetual celibacy. They could marry in compliance with 
the general rules if from the day of the dissolution of their marriage, 
conditions did not arise that constituted an obstacle to the conclusion of 
their marriage.”716 
Analyzing the foregoing clause, we can notice that the rule of law 
departed from the path of church-civil relations and entered into the 
sphere of purely ecclesiastical affairs. The article underlines the fact that 
a marriage which was to be restored, was legally contracted according to 
the rules of the Church immediately after the couples entered into 
marriage. This decision of the Interdepartmental Commission 
established a new phenomenon in Russian marriage law. There were also 
other articles in Code of Laws that addressed marriage contracts. To 
avoid any confusion, Runkevitš suggested eliminating the reason from 
the bill, or at least, to exclude the words “second wedding,” replacing it 
with “under existing Church order.” He paid attention to two cases: a) 
                                                
714 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 12. The Russian Penal Code included 
obscenity in the category of crimes that particularly insulted morality. If a spouse 
was convicted of this offense, his or her marriage remained valid in the Russian 
legal practice. According to Article 994 of the Penal Code, unmarried couples 
engaged in illegal cohabitation by mutual consent were found to be guilty of 
obscenity. If they were Christians, they were subjected to ecclesiastical 
repentance by order of their spiritual leader. See Уложения о наказаниях 1897, 
437–439. 
715 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 12. 
716 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 17. 
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whether the former spouse did not remarry, and b) if the new marriage 
was stopped by the death of the second spouse.717 Here it can be seen that 
the first case relates to the restoration of the broken marriage, in the 
second, it relates to the material consequences of divorce and remarriage. 
A. P. Pilkin explained, the phrase “to marry only in compliance with 
the general rules” raised a number of questions in the Interdepartmental 
Commission. This phrase not only indicated the necessity to marry and 
obey the ecclesiastical rules, but also to follow the civil law on questions 
of marital impediments. Professor M. A. Ostroumov shared Pilkin’s idea 
and noted that the Syntagma of Matthew Blastares provided 
commentary regarding the time for the restoration of a dissolved 
marriage, namely, that the husband of an adulterous wife could take her 
back after two years. By this was meant that for two years she was forced 
to live in a nunnery. S. Utin clarified that the procedure for the 
restoration of a dissolved marriage “without a wedding” was not a well-
established phenomenon. It was a liturgical question which was not 
convenient to include in the draft law as such due to the introduction of 
the State’s legislative enactments. Runkevitš’s believed that the foremost 
reason regarding this issue was that granting the right to re-marry 
“without a wedding” belonged only to ecclesiastical authority. If it was 
established with the law enacted by the State’s Duma and the State’s 
Council, then it would not, in his opinion, be established by 
competence.718 Logically, such a situation would mean that to change the 
aforementioned order required re-applying it to the State’s Department 
of Justice. 
On May 11, 1917 the Interdepartmental Commission noted a sub-
committee’s standpoint that an article should be introduced into the new 
law about habitual alcoholism as a reason for divorce in the following 
form: “A spouse has the right to ask for divorce if the habitual 
intemperance of the other spouse creates deep disorder for the marital 
life.” The article was adopted unanimously with the addition of including 
experts to evaluate habitual intemperance. Expert opinion would 
eventually clarify each case and help the decision of the court.719 
                                                
717 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 18. 
718 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 227. Л, 19–20. 
719 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 422. Л, 9. 
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Cruel treatment of a spouse as a basis for divorce was considered to be 
a loose concept by all the metropolitans of the Holy Synod. It might lead 
to despotism by judges who dealt with such divorce cases in future.720 
Metropolitans did not wish to see it in the future law, since it could lead 
to severe weakening of the moral foundations of family life and to 
considerable arbitrariness in divorce cases. This was also the case in the 
mutual adultery of spouses and in cases of pathological and mental 
incapacity for conjugal relationships. 721  Byzantine laws, however, 
considered an attempt on the other spouse’s life to be grounds for 
divorce, because by this act, marital fidelity was violated more than in the 
case of adultery. In cases where the spouse used physical actions to hurt, 
damage, or kill, marital life became impossible. 722  In the law of 
Theodosius II and Valentinian III, as noted in the Preparatory 
Commission, among the reasons for divorce was mentioned beatings 
inflicted by the husband, as well as “audacious hands” lifted by the wife 
against her husband. However, in the later Justinian Novella 118, chapter 
14, the emperor removed removed family violence as a grounds for 
divorce, treating it as a personal insult to be penalized with a fine.723 The 
latter law was as well closely related to the canon 9 of Basil the Great as 
can be seen. 
The question of cruel treatment as a reason for divorce, which was 
brought up in the sessions of the Holy Synod, was interestingly added to 
the project of the Civil Code of that time. As can be seen in the project of 
the Civil Code from 1910, Article 284, paragraph 3, divorce was allowed 
in the case of “encroachment by one of the spouses on the life of the other 
or cruel treatment which is dangerous to the life and health of the other 
spouse .”724  The draft referred to the Synodal definition from 1723 and to 
the instruction of the Commission of the Civil Code from 1766. In the 
commentary to the project of the Civil Code, an attempt on the spouse’s 
life and cruel treatment was defined as  “Such action of one spouse in 
relation to another, not only eliminates the possibility of their life 
together, but also makes a serious, deep and lasting shock to matrimonial 
                                                
720 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 2. 
721 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417, Л. 3. 
722 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 112–120. 
723 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 20. 
724 Гражданское уложение 1910, 264. 
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union, and that is why the victim should be given the right to demand a 
termination of the marriage itself.”725 
Professor Berdnikov noted in his study that cruel treatment of one of 
the spouses was not recognized as a reason for divorce by the canons of 
the Orthodox Church.726 If, however, the beatings were frequent and 
systematic and had the character of torture, threatening the health and 
life of the tortured, then they started to resemble in their criminal nature 
an attempt on another’s life, and therefore in his opinion should be 
recognized as a reason for divorce. In such cases canonist Berdnikov saw 
it as appropriate to establish first a legal separation as a measure, which 
would partly replace divorce.727 
For Professor Suvorov, cruel treatment as a motive for divorce gave a 
reason to explore this question more closely. In his belief, it was 
impossible to justify divorce law by applying canonical rules. He pointed 
to the commentary of Zonaras on Canon 87 of Trullo, where the 
Byzantine canonist reasoned that if a wife without any reason walked 
away from her husband, who might have been bad–tempered with her, or 
treated her poorly, or if the wife had any other reasons against her 
husband, then she will be innocent in marrying a second time. Suvorov 
saw that Zonaras’ previously mentioned idea argued against the canons 
of Basil the Great and the very meaning of the council of Trullo, and his 
commentary therefore could not consequently be used in modern times. 
What then can be said about the judicial divorce practice in tenth–
century Byzantium and its possible interpretation in twentieth-century 
Russia? Byzantine canonist Balsamon went even further in his 
commentary regarding the foregoing canon. He imagined divorce not as a 
private act between spouses, as it was until the tenth century, but as a 
result of a judicial decision.  Without a legitimate reason, a wife cannot 
leave her husband without the court’s permission.728  
However, it can be expected that Zonaras exemplified the judicial 
practice of his time; this fact was also recognized by canonist Suvorov. To 
verify this supposition, an answer should be sought from Epanagoge, a 
Byzantine law book from the tenth century. In Epanagoge, in addition to 
                                                
725 Гражданское уложение 1910, 265. 
726 Compare this to Canon 9 of Basil the Great. 
727 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 28. 
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those reasons which are mentioned in Justinian’s  Novella 117, it is 
decreed that if a wife was able to prove that her cohabitant was guilty of 
murder, produced harmful drugs, was a vagrant and practiced sinful 
burial rites (τάφους),729 counterfeited coins, robbed graves, blasphemed, 
robbed or that he was one of those who were called “ἀπέλατῶν,”730 or that 
he was selling free people into slavery, or subjected a wife to whippings. 
In that case the law gave her the right to divorce and remove her 
dowry.731  
The reasons that were granted to a husband for divorce were primarily 
the same as those granted to a wife, with the exception of specific actions, 
such as the wife raising audacious hands against her husband (ἐὰν τὰς 
τολµηρὰς αὐτῆς χεῖρας τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐπιβάλοι), or she kills her fetus, and thus 
saddens her husband and takes from him the hope of children 
(µηχανῆσαι τὸ ἐξεπίτηδες ἀµβλῶναι καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα λυπῆσαι κα ἀφελέσθαι 
τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς παισὶν ἐλπίδος), or before entering into marriage with her 
husband, promises herself to someone else (ἕως συνέστηκε τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν 
συνοικέσιον πρὸς ἑτέρους περὶ γάµων ἑαυτῆς διαλέγοιτο).732 The content 
of these additional regulations were not original or newly penned by the 
author of Epanagoge. They were taken from the legislation that preceded 
Novella 117 of the Theodosian law of 449 that was repeated in the 
Justinian Novella 22. Suvorov explained that this was the reason why in 
the Nomokanon only those reasons for divorce are applied that are 
mentioned in Novella 117. Suvorov asked hypothetically whether the 
same Patriarch Photios could officially publish the Nomokanon with the 
divorce law that was in accordance with the earlier Justinian  Novella 117 
and participate later in the drafting of Epanagoge, which deviates 
significantly from the Nomokanon on this subject?  
                                                
729 This can also be translated “martyr cults.” Be that as it may, it was an act that 
was considered to be sinful. 
730 Men who were cattle thieves, who exercised the art of driving off cattle. Those 
who stole cattle were more severely punished than those who stole smaller 
things. The punishment was condemnation to the mines, relegation to doing 
public work or death if done when armed. Mac Chombaich De Colquhon 1854, 
671. 
731 Epanagoge XXI, 6. Zachariae 1852, 142. 
732 Epanagoge XXI, 6. Zachariae 1852, 141. 
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Suvorov concluded his opinion stating that in spite of the additional 
reasons for dissolution of marriages permitted by Justinian, these 
additional reasons were not approved by the common legal consciousness 
of the Orthodox east. 733  The latter view can be accepted from the 
standpoint that in the later editions of Epanagoge, the aforementioned 
paragraphs were not adopted either in other private collections, or even 
in the Epanagoge aucta,734  a compilation that greatly expanded and 
supplemented the original Epanagoge.  
Canonists Berdnikov and Suvorov added some new reasons to the 
above-mentioned discussion. These reasons were: monastic vows, killing 
of the fetus and intentional interference with fertility, entering into 
marriage with godchildren, conviction of one of the spouses to a sentence 
that was connected to disfranchisement, and bigamy and unnatural 
vices.735  
Professor Berdnikov thought that the proposed reason by the Special 
Meeting formulation736 regarding the conviction of one of the spouses to 
a sentence that was connected to disfranchisement as a reason for divorce 
was less convincing than the idea already expressed in Article 50 of the 
                                                
733 Суворов 1908, 27. 
734 A law book that consists of 54 titles and an appendix; it is based on the 
Epanagoge and, from Title 17 onward, the Procheiron. The Oxford Dictionary of 
Byzantium 1991, 704. 
735 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 19. According to Roman law, deprivation of 
citizenship rights (servitus poenae et deportatio) was connected to criminal 
penalties like condemnation to forced labor and imprisonment. These criminal 
penalties necessarily entailed the destruction of a marriage. Emperor Justinian, 
however, abolished such heavy punishment. After this, only the committing of 
serious criminal offenses could serve as a reason for divorce. Other reasons, 
besides adultery, were murder, making poisonous drugs, treason or evil 
willfulness against the emperor, counterfeiting coins, grave robbery and 
sacrilege. The obligation to prove guilt belonged to the side who sought a 
divorce. By unnatural vices Berdnikov meant sodomy and bestiality. Canons do 
not contain specific guidelines about divorce on account of these these vices, 
because they were heavily punished by the ancient Criminal Law. РГИА. Ф. 796. 
ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 28. 
736 “In the case of a conviction by the Criminal Court of one of the spouses to a 
sentence that is connected to  disfranchisement, if an innocent spouse cannot 
follow the convicted to the place of exile, the spouse will have the right to ask for 
a divorce.” Суворов 1908, 18–19. 
 
 
 
 
210 
Code of Laws. 737  Suvorov criticized the drafters by saying that their 
formulation did not express to whom the legal action belonged when the 
other spouse was punished by disfranchisement. In his opinion, this was 
so obvious to the drafters that they did not see any reason to specify it, 
even though the draft plan was titled To whom belongs the right for legal 
action? This was, however, in contrast with the law from 1892, which 
allowed legal action in the mentioned cases for both guilty and innocent 
parties.738 
When considering the monastic vows, if one of the spouses felt a 
calling tο monastic life, then Byzantine law did not prevent him or her 
from carrying out that wish according to  the respect given to monastic 
life as a superior way of living. Entering into monastic life by one of the 
spouses was seen as separation from the world and was recognized as a 
fact that breaks a marriage, as a natural death would. Since the Byzantine 
civil laws did not impede the spouse from remaining in the world to enter 
into a new marriage, therefore the policy of the Church followed the same 
practice.739 The practice of joint entry into monasticism was known and 
allowed as well.740 Summa summarum, Byzantine laws granted the right 
for one of the spouses to enter into monasticism, as seen above. By one of 
the spouses taking monastic vows this freed the other spouse from the 
marital relationship, as in the case of the death of a spouse. In Russia 
since Peter I, entering into monastic life was allowed for both spouses at 
the same time only if they did not have children who required parental 
care. Berdnikov considered that it was possible to abandon such a 
practice; thus, monasticism that was accepted by one of the spouses 
should be included in the number of reasons for divorce bona gratia.741 
Professor Berdnikov thought that the intentional killing of a fetus 
should be recognized as a reason for divorce in the future, especially since 
it was a fashionable tendency at the time for couples to enter into 
marriage and not have children. It was not in accordance with the divine 
purpose of marriage, and therefore violated the marital union. It also 
directly affects a spouse who wanted to have offspring. Killing the fetus 
                                                
737 Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 10, Ч. 1, 5. 
738 Суворов 1908, 20. 
739 Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 422. 
740 Epanagoge XXI.I. Zachariae 1852, 135. 
741 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 417. Л, 25. 
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was recognized as a reason for divorce in the 22nd Justinian Novella. 
Emperor Leo the Philosopher in his Novella 31 confirmed the former 
Justinian ruling. This law was also introduced in the Nomokanon.742 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
742 XIII. 10. Ράλλη 1852, T. I, 312. 
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5. DEFINITIONS OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN 
CHURCH COUNCIL CONCERNING 
MATRIMONIAL MATTERS 
 
5.1  Regarding Kinship 
 
 
Regarding the question of kinship and affinity in the Russian Orthodox 
Church during the Synodal period, the official journal of the Holy Synod, 
Church Bulletin in number 44 in 1896 instructed that if cases of kinship 
or affinity occurred, a priest should not wed the parties before seeking 
instructions from the Diocesan bishop.743 
The Special Commission of the All-Russian Church Council, under the 
chairmanship of His Eminence Serafim, Bishop of Serdobol assembled 
on September 6, 1917. Bishop Ioasaf of Dmitrovsky District, Moscow 
Oblast mentioned to the Commission the practice of the Russian Church 
at that time, which allowed marriages in the fifth degree of kinship and in 
the fourth degree of bi–lineage affinity. He then posed a question 
regarding authorization of marriages in the fourth degree of kinship. 
This, according to the bishop, brought many difficulties and troubles to 
each parish priest who served in the Western territories of Russia where 
Orthodox faithful lived alongside of Catholics and Protestants, whose 
marriages in the fourth degree were freely contracted. Hence, the 
requirement to marry in the fourth degree was often asked; not 
permitting them caused dissatisfaction, irritation, and sometimes even 
falling into heterodoxy. These exigencies were also encountered in the 
diocese of Moscow, where the bishop served at that time.744 In Russia, by 
the Synodal decree of the Holy Synod from January 19, 1810, marriages 
were allowed in the fifth decree of kinship, that is, to marry a cousin was 
forbidden, to marry a cousin’s daughter was, however, allowed with the 
recognition of the local bishop.745 What was then the practice at the time 
and suggestions to resolve such cases? 
                                                
743 Калашников 1902, 391. 
744 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 316, Л. 19. 
745 Калашников 1899, 37; Григоровский 1908, 15. 
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In Bishop Ioasaf’s view, such cases should not be treated differently. 
Due to repeated petitions that were submitted by the bishops of the 
western dioceses, the Holy Synod decided to allow private resolution of 
marriages in the fourth degree. These permissions were given 
confidentially for specific areas of the Empire; Iosaf pointed out that in 
1904 bishops were granted the right to allow marriages in the fourth 
degree of bi–lineage affinity, except for marriage with the sister of a 
fiancée (brother’s wife) and with the sister of a son–in–law (sister’s 
husband). In the diocese of Riga, even these marriages were allowed.746 
Due to the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church was largely involved 
with the State, Church laws relating to important questions of the 
internal church order were often issued with the seal of His Majesty and 
approved by the State Council, or the Committee of Ministers. Such a 
case was, for example, the explanatory register (объяснительный 
реестр) of the ancient names of kinship, which can be found in the 
Kormtšaja’s edition from 1786.747 But if the letter of the old church law 
still remained intact, then its force in the practice of the Holy Synod 
increasingly weakened. The Synod did not terminate marriages anymore 
in those degrees of kinship which were previously forbidden, like the fifth 
degree of kinship and the fourth degree of bi-lineage affinity. Marriages 
in further degrees were not dissolved by the Synod even in cases when 
spouses themselves cited the illegal degree of kinship between them.748  
In this respect, and generally in the history of the issue regarding the 
limits of kinship prohibiting marriage, a noteworthy case was the 
marriage between Count Musin–Pushkin to a Brjus, who were related in 
the sixth degree of kinship. The divorce case was started in 1804 at the 
request filed by the wife in Saint Petersburg’s Diocesan Consistory. The 
case was settled so that the marriage should be dissolved. However the 
Synod, which had the final decision, took the opposite view. The Synod 
justified its decision by stating that as in Kormtšaja kniga such 
marriages were considered forbidden, this was the reason why Brjus and 
Musin-Pushkin should not have been married in the first place. But as 
their marriage was contracted in  1793 with the consent of the Countess 
Brjus, who asked for a divorce eleven years later referring to her painful 
                                                
746 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 316, Л. 23. 
747 Горчаков 1880, 105. 
748 Павлов 1887, 152–153. 
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condition because of her sense of guilt, the Synod underlined that the 
canons of the ecumenical and local councils did not provide for divorces 
of such marriages, and ordered the Diocesan authorities not to dissolve 
such marriages, but rather to subject the married couple to penance.749 
The Synod based its decision on the writings of Ioannos Chartophylax 
of Ioanopoulos. The document of the patriarch was published in the 
Syntagma of Canons of G. Ralles and M. Pottles, and also in the 51st title 
of Kormtšaja, to which the Synod referred in its decision.750  In the 
writings, the patriarch instructs an unnamed metropolitan with the 
following decision (ψήφισµα): leave the marriage in force, but subject the 
spouses to a two-year penance. As mentioned before, this patriarchal 
decree was not addressed to those who were in the sixth degree of 
kinship, but to those who were in the seventh degree.751  On this basis, it 
can be concluded that the Synod enacted the decision against the ancient 
rules of Kormtšaja, confusing the degrees of kinship. However, the Holy 
Synod at the time gave lenience to some couples to stay in the marriage 
who were in the fifth or sixth degree of kinship with each other. This 
lenience was given only at the will of the spouses – there was no cases 
where the marriage was ordered to continue against the will of the 
spouses, as was the case in the Brjus and Musin-Pushkin marriage.752  
Marriages in the fourth degree of bi-lineage affinity were forbidden in 
nineteenth-century Russia according to the draft of the civil code (1810), 
Article 124.753  However, with numerous applications coming to the Holy 
Synod in 1864 concerning permission to marry in the fourth degree of 
bi–lineage affinity, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church took 
the case under consideration. With the edict from January 13, 1864, the 
Holy Synod asked the opinion of Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow, who 
voted against the renewal of the ancient canonical practice in Russia, 
citing the strict canonical-dogmatic teaching of Orthodox canon law, 
where husband and wife are considered one. Until the death of the 
respected metropolitan (November 19, 1867), his opinion had a decisive 
                                                
749 See the appendix X in Горчаков 1880, 38–46. 
750 Павлов 1887, 153. 
751 Regarding the discussion to which period this decree should relate, see Ράλλη 
1855, T. V, 92; Zhisman 1864, 38; Павлов 1887, 114–116. 
752 Павлов 1887, 154. 
753 Проект 1810, 50.  
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role in the practice of the Holy Synod. This was soon changed; in 1870 
the Synodal practice of the Russian Orthodox Church started to accept 
marriages in the fourth degree of bi–lineage affinity, as respected 
Canonist Pavlov noted.754  However, the practice during the history of the 
Synod knew cases where marriages in the fourth decree of bi–lineage 
affinity were still prohibited. For example, on October 11, 1885, the Holy 
Synod ruled with decree No. 3553 that a non-commissioned officer, 
Avraam Rezuntsov, could not marry his deceased wife’s cousin. On the 
same date, according to decree No. 3557, it was ruled that a peasant, 
Gavril Korotan, could not marry his cousin’s widow. On October 15, 1885, 
the Holy Synod ruled in decree No. 3580 that a peasant, Iakov Ignatiev, 
could not enter into marriage with his stepmother’s niece.755 On October 
21, 1885, with decree No. 3665 the Holy Synod ruled that a retired 
soldier, Ivan Kostenka, could not enter into marriage with his stepfather’s 
niece. A theological journal of that time, Pastoral Interlocutor, noted that 
these decisions merited special attention, since the fourth decree of bi-
lineage affinity was not always seen as practical or useful.756 
Here one should also bear in mind that the right to allow marriages in 
the fourth degree to which bishop Iosaf referred, was actually granted for 
the first time on May 13, 1903, with circular edict No. 5. On June 20, 
1904, with circular edict No. 13, it became generally recognized in the 
Russian Orthodox Church, replacing the old rule of the Holy Synod of 
January 19, 1810 regarding the prohibition of marriages in the fourth 
degree of bi–lineage affinity.757 The relationship chart of the old rule from 
1810, which existed until 1903, can be seen in Scheme 11 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
754 Павлов 1887, 202. 
755  However, on December 13, 1876, a decree was issued by the Bishop of 
Jaroslavl, whereby such marriages were permitted. Калашников 1902, 392. 
756 Свод указаний 1899, 213–214. 
757 Григоровский 1908, 32. 
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Consequently, the old rule ruled that the marriage of my brother to my 
wife’s niece was legal because it was in the fifth degree of bi–lineage 
affinity, since in the husband’s subfamily, two degrees existed and in the 
wife’s subfamily three. In the same way the marriage of my nephew with 
my wife’s niece was legal, because in both subfamilies three degrees 
existed, making the relationship legal in the sixth degree. Marriages in 
the trilineage affinity were prohibited in the first decree, according to the 
rules of the Holy Synod from April 25, 1841, and March 28, 1859.758 The 
Synod obviously based its views on the rule in the Fifty Titles of 
Kormtšaja, which says that “еже от трехродных, сие в первом точию 
степени запрещается по закону: обычай убо запрещает и прочее.”759 
Regarding marriages in the second and in the third degree of trilineage 
affinity, the Synod ruled that the Diocesan bishops could permit such 
marriages for legitimate reasons (decree of 1841), or according to 
necessity (decree of 1859).760 
It is impossible not to notice a significant difference between the old 
decree of January 19, 1810, and the two later decrees. The decree of 1810 
gave the right to the Diocesan bishops to give permission to marry in the 
fifth, sixth and in the seventh degree of kinship and affinity, stating that, 
“the Eminences have to give permission for that.”761 The wording in the 
decree of 1841 was changed from “have to” to “by legitimate reasons; 
according to necessity” in the later decree of 1859. According to the 
precise meaning of the 1810 law, there was no other choice for bishops 
than to allow marriages in other degrees of kinship and affinity beyond 
the fourth degree. Thus, episcopal permission itself as stated in the 
decree of 1810, which permits marriage according to specified degrees of 
kinship and affinity, was not in the proper sense a dispensation. The rule 
of April 25, 1841, determined that the Diocesan bishops should not 
prohibit marriages beyond the third degree of trilineage affinity, but the 
decree of 1859 allowed for such a dispensation by the bishops: they had a 
right not to allow marriages in the second and in the third degrees of 
trilineage affinity, as can be understood from the wording of the decree: 
                                                
758 Калашников 1902, 391. 
759 Калашников 1899, 40. 
760 Руководственные 1879, 443–444.  
761 Павлов 1887, 161. 
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“to not prohibit in any case marriages between the persons in fourth 
degree of trilineage affinity.”762 
Since the fourth degree of trilineage affinity was never prohibited by 
the canons or by the later decrees of the Greek Church, one of the 
possible reasons why the Synod spoke about the fourth degree of 
trilineage affinity could be the mistranslation of the original rule in the 
Kormtšaja. The original rule in Greek states, “Τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τριγενείας εἰς 
γάµον συνάπτειν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ τετάρτου βαθµοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα,”763 
meaning that it is necessary that those who are in trilineage affinity will 
enter into marriage from the fourth degree and further. Kormtšaja 
translates this as “аще от трехродных превышает четвертый степень, 
прощено бывает,” expressing the notion that marriage in the fourth 
degree of trilineage affinity is not yet prohibited.764  This contradicts the 
fact that such a prohibition never existed in the Greek Church. This is 
clearly expressed in the Synodal “τόµος” of Patriarch Gregorios VI of 
Constantinople of February 10, 1839: “καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκ τριγενείας µέχρι τοῦ 
τετάρτου, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἁγίου βαπτίσµατος.”765  The expression “µέχρι το 
τετάρτου βαθµοῦ” should be understood in the same sense as “[εἰς µὲν 
τὴν ἐξ αῖµατος συγγένειαν] µέχρι τοῦ ὀγδόου βαθµοῦ” that was expressed 
in the same tome earlier.766  Hence, from this naturally follows that there 
is no canonical basis to put marriage in the fourth degree on the same 
level with marriages in the second and third degrees, i.e., prohibiting the 
parish clergy from performing such marriages without the bishop’s 
permission. 
Bishop Ioasaf continued by stating that the demands of life go on and 
that it is impossible to ignore them; he provided a historical background 
to the question in which he identified a variety of practices in the history 
of the Orthodox Church. Until the fifth century, marriages in the fourth 
degree of kinship were permitted, but after that they were banned. Under 
the Emperor Justinian the Great they were again allowed. The Council of 
Trullo in Canon 54 prohibited such relations, later the Church rules 
                                                
762 Павлов 1887, 161. 
763 Павлов 1887, 39. 
764 Павлов 1887, 39. 
765 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 175. 
766 Ράλλη 1855, T. V, 175. 
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extended the prohibition to the seventh degree. He then asked if the All-
Russian Church Council would consider, because of the extreme anxiety 
of modern people, to allow a general authorization of marriages in the 
fourth degree of kinship in order to avoid unnecessary difficulties of no 
benefit to the Church and that could even result in the abandonment of 
the Orthodox faith. Bishop Ioasaf concluded his views by stating that the 
religious grounds for prohibiting such marriages were not strong. The 
Western Christian nations do not speak against the admissibility of such 
marriages. 767   The All-Russian Church Council left Bishop Iosaf’s 
proposal regarding the allowance of marriages in the fourth degree of 
kinship without taking any action, but during the Council the Holy Synod 
adopted a practice, as seen  from subsequent cases, that permitted 
marriages in the fourth degree of affinity.  
When studying Canon 54 of Trullo in the Russian Orthodox context, it 
is important to be attentive as to how the fourth degree of kinship that 
Bishop Iosaf mentioned, was understood at the time in Russia. The canon 
reads: “[…] he who shall marry his father’s daughter [τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἐξαδέλφη] 
[…] falls under the canon of seven years, provided they openly separate 
from this unlawful union.” 768  The canon’s most important word, 
“ἐξαδέλφη,” is debatable. One could think that it means the daughter of a 
brother or a sister, a niece, and forbid the marriage as with the third 
degree of kinship. Others might think that it refers to the daughter of an 
uncle or aunt, a cousin, i.e. a marriage forbidden within the fourth degree 
of consanguinity.769  
The term “cousin,” ”ἐξαδέλφη,-[ός],” according to the definition of the 
Greek lexicon Λεξικόν της ελληνικής γλώσσης, a work of a famous Greek 
scholar, Byzantios Skarlatos, in 1852, can mean either born from a 
brother or sister to me, i.e., a nephew or niece, as well as born from 
brothers and sisters who are related to each other, i.e. cousins (ὁ υίὸς τοῦ 
ἡ τῆς ὰδελφ., ὁ υίὸς τοῦ θείου ἡ τῆς θείας). When speaking about a 
nephew or niece, “ὰδελφιδοῦς,-[ῆ]” was also used, for cousins – 
”ὰνεψιὸς,-[ὰ].”770  The term “ἐξαδέλφη, ἐξάδελφός” appeared in a period 
                                                
767 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 316, Л. 24. 
768 Schaff 2007, 390–391; Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 432. 
769 Schaff 2007, 390–391. 
770 Σκαρλάτος 1852, 445. 
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when it became customary to invent completely new words in the written 
language that were up till then used in common everyday parlance, as the 
Russian canonist Laškarev in the nineteenth century saw it.771 
When it was published in Russia for the first time as a complete text of 
canons, the first editions of the Book of Rule (Книга правил) used the 
word “ἐξαδέλφη” in Canon 54 of Trullo to mean the furthest distance of 
kinship that was prohibited for marriage. It was translated as “дщерь 
брата,” – nephew, niece. This is how the well-known Russian canonist 
Archimandrite Ioann translates the word and says in his commentary 
that a marriage not only in the fourth degree (запрещено вступат в брак 
не только двоюродным), but in the fifth degree (но и детям их) as well 
was only forbidden between the eighth and ninth centuries.772 Canon 54 
stresses the special closeness of the relationship between the parties in 
the given case, forbidding a marriage not only with “ἐξαδέλφη” but with 
“τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἐξαδέλφη” – not simply with “a” niece but with “one’s own” 
niece. This qualification has a significantly important meaning, as can be 
seen from the following interpretation of Canonist Troitski:  
 
One can call a cousin (двоюрoдная сестра) a niece since I share a 
common uncle with her and she is in effect, a “co-cousin” with me 
but in no way can she be called my own niece, since she is not my, 
but my uncle’s own niece. Thus, the history of the term 
“ἐξαδέλφη” leads us to the same conclusion to which we arrived in 
analyzing the lexical structure of this word, that Canon 54 forbids 
                                                
771 Canonist Laškarev points to Phrinichi, a writer from the Roman period, who 
gives to the word “ἐξάδελφός” another meaning in his work Epitome diction 
atticarum sive ecloga. Phrinichi mentions that he who wants to speak in an 
archaic way, should avoid the words and phrases that he mentions. In the end he 
also mentions that the word “ἐξάδελφός” should not be used and instead 
“ὰνεψιὸς” is preferable (ἐξάδελφός ὰποδιοποµπητέον, ὰνεψιὸς δε ρητέον). In a 
written form the term “ἐξαδέλφη, ἐξάδελφός” can also be found in the 
Septuagint, in the Book of Tobit. In the Greek text of Tobit, 1:21, the phrase “my 
brother Anael’s son” is expressed periphrastically as “τὸν Ἀναὴλ υἱὸν τοῦ 
ἀδελφοῦ µου,” but in the next paragraph, 1:22, “[and he was] my brother’s son” 
was changed to [ἦν δὲ] “ἐξάδελφός µου.” In the aforementioned sentence, the 
word “ἐξάδελφός” logically means a nephew. Лашкарев 1869, 97. 
772  Иоанн 1851, 435, 437–439. Between the tenth and eleventh centuries 
marriages started to be prohibited in the sixth degree, seventh degree was 
prohibited from the twelth century in ecclesiastical and civil law of Byzantium. 
Иоанн 1851, 440. 
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a marriage only in the third degree of consanguinity. The context 
in which we find this word in Canon 54 leads us to the same 
conclusion, as well as the history of consanguine relationship as 
impediments to marriage.773 
 
In the sources of canon law, the word “ἐξάδελφός, ἐξαδέλφη” does not 
appear before the Trullan Council; the Trullan Council used it for the first 
time in Canon 54. In the terminology of Byzantine law it appeared for the 
first time in Ekloga. But after the Council in Trullo, and the publication 
of Ekloga, the word “ἐξάδελφός, ἐξαδέλφη” was very often used in the 
editions of civil laws of the Byzantine, and always meant cousins.774 
In the editions of canon law, the word “ἐξάδελφός, ἐξαδέλφη” is used 
for the first time in the conciliar “τόµος” of Patriarch Sisinnius II of 
Constantinople, prohibiting marriages between relatives on one side, and 
with the cousins from the other, as already seen in the second chapter of 
this study.775 From the translations of Canon 54, not only in the Russian 
Book of Rule, but also in some Latin editions, such as in Συνοδικὸν [sive 
pandectæ canonum ss. Apostolorum, et conciliorum ab Ecclesia Græca 
receptorum] by the known English canonist Beveridge, and in some 
editions of interpretations of Zonaras of 1618, the word “ἐξάδελφός, 
ἐξαδέλφη” is translated as nephew, niece – “fratris sui filia [matrimonii 
focietatem coierit]”.776 Canonist Laškarev believed that such a variation in 
translation was motivated by the Book of Tobit.777 
Russian canonist Pavlov agreed with Laškarev, but added valuable 
information about the use of this canon in the practice of the Holy Synod 
in the Russian Church. The Synodal mandate from the eighteenth 
century defined that: “Children not born from the lawful wife, when 
married, are considered to be equal to legitimate children regarding the 
degree of kinship.” Later this edition was accepted for the draft of the 
Civil Code from 1814 as well. The Commission entrusted with this draft 
understood the paragraph to mean that, “Marriage is prohibited in the 
vertical line between all the ascending and descending relatives, in the 
                                                
773 Тройцкий 1929, 295. 
774 Лашкарев 1869, 98–99; Павлов 1897, 162. 
775 Лашкарев 1869, 100. 
776 Тройцкий 1929, 291. 
777 Лашкарев 1869, 101. 
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lateral line only to the second degree.”  As Pavlov noted, the poor 
understanding of Canon 54, which prohibits marriage in the fourth 
degree of kinship in the lateral line, was the reason why the Holy Synod 
did not dissolve the marriage of a widower and his illegitimate cousin on 
October 30, 1775.778   
Pavlov also noted that to distinguish generations, numerical order was 
added in the Byzantine laws regarding cousins. So “ἐξαδέλφη πρώτη” is a 
first cousin, “ἐξαδέλφη δευτέρα,” a second cousin. In the Russian 
Nomokanon these names were translated unintelligibly as “сестрина 
первая сестра,” sister’s first sister and “второсестрина,” the second 
sister.779 Nevertheless, canonist S. V. Troitski did not agree with Laškarev 
and Pavlov. He referred to philological, historical, and contextual factors 
in his analysis of Canon 54. Even before the age of computers, Canonist 
Troitski was able to create a complicated mathematical method of 
determining “yes” or “no” or “maybe,” when calculating the prohibited 
degrees for marriage.780  
It would seem that the clear position of Byzantine law’s understanding 
of the term “ἐξάδελφός, ἐξαδέλφη,” and likewise, the position of Canonist 
Laškarev and Pavlov, is communis opinio doctorum.  Тhe word 
“ἐξάδελφός, ἐξαδέλφη” should be understood in Russian to mean 
“cousin,” not “nephew” or “niece.” This would also be the possible answer 
as to why the All-Russian Church Council took no action concerning 
Bishop Iosaf’s proposal regarding the allowance of marriages in the 
fourth degree of kinship: Bishop Iosaf did not understood that Canon 54 
prohibits marriages not just in the third, but also the fourth degree of 
kinship, i.e., with the first cousin. 
On December 13, 1917, Serafim, Bishop of Serdobolsk, who temporary 
adminstered the diocese of Finland, wrote a petition (No. 5737) to the 
Holy Synod. In the petition, he introduced a case in which a peasant, Iosif 
Harjunen, from the village of Varpakylä, approached the Diocesan 
Consistory of Finland with a petition on October 9, 1917, to allow him to 
enter into a legal marriage with the sister of his brother’s wife, Evdokia 
Makkonen, a peasant from the village of Moisenvaara. Bishop Serafim 
noted that with decree No. 7662 of the Holy Synod of July 18, 1906, the 
                                                
778 Павлов 1887, 182–185. 
779 Павлов 1897, 162. 
780 Тройцкий 1929, 301–303. 
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discretion of allowing spouses to enter into marriage with the sister of a 
brother’s wife and with the sister of a husband’s sister was granted to the 
head of the Finnish diocese. Before granting permission, these 
resolutions were to be submitted to the discernment and approval of the 
Holy Synod. Upon consideration of this request, the Diocesan Consistory 
of Finland reported that it would submit the request of Iosif Harjunen, 
who was in the fourth degree of affinity, for the consideration and 
approval of the Holy Synod.  
With decree No. 32 of January 1918, the office of the Holy Synod in 
Petrograd decided to allow Iosif Harjunen to marry Evdokia Makkonen, 
the his brother’s wife’s sister, if no other legal obstacles existed.781  On 
January 8, 1918, there was a similar case, a petition to Metropolitan 
Benjamin of Petrograd and Gdov from the peasant, Grigori Zubov, from 
Jasher village, Petrograd province. Grigori was initially denied the right 
to enter into a lawful marriage with his brother’s wife’s sister, Olimpiada 
Guseva, by the local bishop.782 The relationship chart named Scheme 12 
in this study helps to understand the issue better. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
781 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 117. Л, 1–2. 
782 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 117. Л, 3. 
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SCHEME 12 
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As result, the Petrograd office of the Holy Synod from an unknown 
date in January 1918, determined to inform the Diocesan authorities of 
Petrograd to give the peasant, Grigor Zubov, the right to enter into a 
lawful marriage with Olimpiada Guseva.783 Altogether, in 1918 there were 
eight petitions in which the Holy Synod allowed marriages with the sister 
of the bride. In the fourth degree of affinity are also included the cases of 
marriages with a brother–in–law’s sister (husband’s sister), of which 
Holy Synod received twelve in 1918. On January 15, 1918, Feodosy, 
Bishop of Smolensk presented the case of Gavril Druzhin to the Holy 
Synod. The future bride of Gavril was related in the fourth degree of 
affinity to him, i.e., a brother–in–law’s sister. The diocesan authorities of 
Smolensk considered it desirable to permit the marriage of Druzhin with 
his chosen bride, since marriages in the fourth degree of affinity were 
repeatedly permitted by the Holy Synod. With decree No. 241 some time 
in April 1918, the office of the Holy Synod in Petrograd decided to allow 
the marriage.784 
On January 14, 1918, the Holy Synod received a petition (No. 280) 
from Ivan Shamshurin, a peasant from the village of Kiasova, since the 
local priest did not want to allow him a new marriage. Shamshurin was a 
widower after a second marriage and intended to enter into a third legal 
religious marriage with a chosen bride who happened to be his niece, the 
wife of the deceased nephew of his previous deceased wife. The 
relationship is represented in Scheme 13:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
783 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 117. Л, 6. 
784 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 118. Л, 7, 10. 
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SCHEME 13 
 
 
The Holy Synod with decree No. 262 of April 28, 1918, as seen in the 
petition of Shamshurin, defined an explanation of kinship between him 
and his chosen bride as follows: the petitioner makes one kin, the brother 
of his deceased wife to his deceased son, makes second kin, and the 
widowed wife of the latter, the third kin. Therefore, Ivan Shamshurin 
with his chosen bride are in the third degree of trilineage affinity. As 
mentioned before, with the circular decrees of the Holy Synod from April 
25, 1841, and March 28, 1859, the Diocesan bishops were permitted to 
allow marriages in the second and in the third degree of trilineage 
affinity. Hence, the Petrograd office of the Holy Synod informed the 
Diocesan administration of Vyatsk to allow the third marriage of Ivan 
Shamshurin with his chosen bride.785 
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5.2  Divorce, and Civil and Unlawful Marriages 
 
 
Unlawful marriages 
 
From the unknown date of April 1918, the Consistory of Petrograd 
received a petition of peasant Tihon Moskalev, whose first three wives 
had passed away, to permit him to enter into a fourth marriage. The 
Consistory noted that according to Article 21 of the Code of Laws and 
Article 205 of the Diocesan Consistory, fourth marriages were not 
permitted and therefore Tihon Moskalev could not enter into a fourth 
marriage.786 Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church fought for many 
years against the practice of entering into a fourth marriage. The Council 
of 1572 approved the fourth marriage of Ioann Groznyi by giving him a 
penance, but at the same time paradoxically threatened with 
excommunication anyone who dared to enter into a fourth marriage. 
Later, according to the instruction of Patriarch Adrian from December 
26, 1697 to archpriests, a fourth marriage was prohibited by Article 64. 
Even in 1767, the Holy Synod dissolved a number of marriages applying 
decree No. 12856.787  
Between January 4 and April 12, 1918, the Holy Synod received five 
cases regarding marriage with a cousin. The office of the Holy Synod in 
Petrograd took into account that according to ecclesiastical rules and the 
circulation decree stated by the Holy Synod on January 19, 1810 (No. 
24091), marriages in the fourth degree of kinship were prohibited. 
Therefore, all five cases were left without further consideration.788 This 
rule was also applied in five789 cases of petitions to marry a deceased 
wife’s sister790 and in one case of marrying a deceased wife’s niece.791 
                                                
786 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 116. Л, 1–2. 
787 Юридическия заметки 1869, 44. 
788 РГИА. Ф. 831. Оп. 1. Д. 119. Л, 2, 4, 8, 10. 
789 Cases were between January 27 and April 12, 1918. 
790 РГИА. Ф. 831. Оп. 1. Д. 120. Л, 2, 5, 10, 15. 
791  О разрешении Петру Кириченку вступать в брак с племянницею 
умершей его жены Параскевою Колодкиною. РГИА. Ф. 831. Оп. 1. Д. 121. Л, 
3. 
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Prohibition to marry a deceased wife’s niece was certainly an abnormal 
practice during a time which allowed marriage with the sister of a fiancée 
(brother’s wife) and with the sister of a son–in–law (sister’s husband) in 
the diocese of Riga. However, this prohibition was probably based on the 
practice of the Holy Synod and on the rules which prohibited marriages 
in the first degree of trilineage affinity. Nor on January 25, 1918 (No. 
334), did the Holy Synod give its approval to Jelisei Hohotov from the 
province of Kharkov to marry his deceased brother’s wife, referring to the 
above rule from 1810.792 
 
 
The social aspect of family life 
 
To understand better the social aspect of family life in Russia and 
women’s status in society, we should examine the statistics and historical 
beliefs of that period. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia 
had one of the highest birth rates in Europe as well as the highest child 
mortality rates.793  People in the countryside usually married between the 
age of sixteen and eighteen for the woman, and the age of eighteen and 
twenty years old for the man. Young newlyweds did not form an 
independent ‘new family,’ but instead attached themselves to the 
‘extended family’ formed from the three preceding generations. 
Marriages in Russia were not based on mutual feelings and romantic 
sentiments, but were decided and established by tradition and the will of 
the parents of the marriage parties.794 This did not seem to discourage 
marriage since almost everyone who reached the legal age to enter into 
marriage in the Russian Empire were eventually married.  At the end of 
the nineteenth century, only 4% of men and 5% of women between the 
ages of 45 and 49 were still unmarried.795 However, at the same time, 
extended families faced widespread division in Russia. Russia’s social 
development divided many of these patriarchal families as urban 
expansion drew much of the rural population into the cities. Males left 
                                                
792 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 123. Л, 1–2. 
793 Жиромская 2000, 27. 
794 Белякова 2004, 196. 
795 Жиромская, 2000, 35. For a comparison, the numbers in France at the same 
time were 12% and 11%. 
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their families in search of employment, resulting in rapid destruction of 
patriarchal families and an increase in the divorce rates. Official divorce 
rates were nevertheless very low and did not contain prolonged absence. 
For example, in 1913 in the Russian Empire, among a population of 98.5 
million Orthodox Christians, 3,791 divorces were sought and granted by 
the State (0.038%),796 which clearly shows that a lawful divorce was hard 
to achieve. 
Families were particularly heavily affected by the First World War, 
when husbands were sent to the front with a consequent sharp rise in the 
number of widows. Villages faced not only economic, but also 
demographic crises. In 1917 there were 65% fewer marriages contracted 
in the Russian Empire than in 1913.797 The question about maintaining 
marriage reached a new level. In the cities demographic processes gave 
rise to a new – in comparison with the villages – creation: the ‘nuclear 
family.’  A nuclear family was a family of children and parents where the 
birth rate was lower than average in Russia at that time. If the average 
Russian family in the entire Empire consisted of 5–7 children, a family in 
Saint Petersburg consisted of 1–2 children.798  
The nature of marriage also changed in the cities, where the number of 
unmarried people rose. 799  A previously unknown group of people, 
‘unmarried women,’ was now found in the cities. Nevertheless, strict 
divorce laws led to the fact that although the divorce rate steadily 
increased in the whole country, it remained negligible when compared 
with the total number of marriages. The number of illegitimate children 
in Russia also rose.  By ‘illegitimate children’ is meant the children of 
parents who had not entered into legal marriage, i.e., the marriage was 
not blessed by the Church. In 1867 in Saint Petersburg there were 19,342 
newborn children, of which 4,305 were illegitimate. In 1889 the number 
was 28,640 newborns, of which 7,907 were illegitimate. Interestingly, in 
1906 in Moscow there were more illegitimate children than in Saint 
Petersburg: 43,801 legitimate 13,466 and illegitimate, while in Saint 
Petersburg of the 43,153 births, 11,927 were illegitimate.800  
                                                
796 Жиромская, 2000, 50. 
797 Жиромская, 2000, 73. 
798 Жиромская, 2000, 46. 
799 Жиромская, 2000, 34. 
800 Урланис 1968, 77. 
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The reduction of legal marriages, the increasing number of unlawful 
relationships and illegitimate births and infanticides slowly affected the 
entire society. A. D. Sposobin noted in his book Divorce in Russia that 
the strict divorce law resulted in a decline in moral values in society. 
Sposobin wrote that the institution of marriage at that time was a union 
in which the individual found happiness or destruction. The risk involved 
in getting married was huge; it was an irreparable and irreversible step. 
In society at large people did not want to risk it. This resulted in illegal 
relations where people could find almost all the benefits of marriage. This 
was an equally strong motive for men and for women. 801   These 
phenomena indicated that ‘traditional marriages’ in the Russian Empire 
were in a state of crisis. The increasing number of abortions among 
working-class families in the late nineteenth century testifies to 
Sposobin’s view as well.802 
Women’s rights and the feminist movement were also much-discussed 
phenomena before the Russian Revolution of 1917. “Revolutions have 
served as impediments to women’s rights, as was the case with the 
French Revolution” Rochelle Ruthchild states in her study Equality & 
Revolution. Women’s Rights in the Russian Empire, 1905–1917.803 In 
Russia however, the Revolution of 1905 and February 1917 stimulated the 
movement of women’s activism.  
 
Finnish women won suffrage as part of a national independence 
revolt against Russian authority. The February Revolution began 
with women’s demonstrations on International Women’s Day. 
While these revolutions increased the hopes for greater rights, 
they brought challenges that had to be overcome. The toppling of 
the tsar did not in itself bring the hoped–for democratic freedoms 
for women. The dual authorities, the Soviets and the Provisional 
Government, that emerged with the end of the autocracy both 
temporized on women’s suffrage.804 
 
                                                
801 Способин 1881, 173–174. 
802 Урланис 1968, 88; In 1893 in Kharkiv, the number of abortions from all 
births was 22.1%, in Saint Petersburg 20%. Жиромская, 2000, 44.  
803 Ruthchild 2010, 240. 
804 Ruthchild 2010, 240.  
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We have already explored the practice of abortion, which spread 
rapidly among the workers. Educated female doctors were in favor of the 
legalization of the practice of abortion, which could not but lead to 
protests among Orthodox believers. In 1906 Metropolitan Vladimir wrote 
in his sermons about the importance of drawing in women to preserve 
Orthodoxy and the morals of the people. With an overall deterioration of 
the situation in the country, and with the calling of the male population 
to the front, women became the main force in the Russian Church.805 
Knowing all the aforementioned reasons regarding the women’s 
movement, what could the Church possible have against this movement? 
The question of women in society and their role in the Church was raised 
in the first sessions of the All-Russian Church Council on October 23, 
1917, in the Department of Church Discipline. It is particularly interesting 
to examine the point of view of one of the members of the session, I. I. 
Galahov:  A woman was not interested in the movement of women’s 
rights by her own will, nor did she voluntarily leave her family, 
motherhood, or the role of housewife.  She was forced to do so because of 
circumstances that were completely beyond her control. In Galahov’s 
view, a woman would be in an entirely different position with respect to 
the question of marriage and family if she had complete economic 
independence from men. Then she would be wholly free to choose for 
herself a marriage or celibacy: and under such conditions she would be 
on a par with men – a party equally responsible for all the anomalies of 
modern family life. He ended his statement by saying that the Church 
should pray for God’s blessing for the success of women’s effort in 
winning their independence.806 
 
 
Civil divorce 
 
An extract from the definition of the Holy Synod from January 31, 1918 
was forwarded to the office of the All-Russian Church Council, where it 
referred to the report of the Metropolitan of Petrograd from December 
21, 1917 considering the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars, 
published in the 36th number of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' 
                                                
805 Белякова 2004, 430. 
806 Белякова 2004, 435. 
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Government newspaper (Временного Рабочего и Крестьянского 
Правительства) on December 19, 1917. The decree abolished all religious 
divorce cases in the ecclesiastical courts and transferred them to the 
jurisdiction of civil courts, making them a purely civil matter.  The Holy 
Synod also heard a report of the Secretary of the Diocesan Consistory of 
Vladimir, considering the opposition from the local authorities in 
counties to divorce suits, because of the above–mentioned decree. Local 
authorities refused to execute the order of the Consistory in Vadimir.807 
This decree was published without communication with the authority of 
the Orthodox Church and was described as being in complete disregard 
of the requirements of the Christian faith.808 The Commissariat’s decree 
permitted divorce in the civil court at the request of both spouses or of 
one of them. Moreover, by the above decree, entering into marriage was 
fairly simple, just requiring a document from the civil court. Divorced 
spouses could enter into a new marriage for an unlimited number of 
times, without any prohibition.  
The Holy Synod, after discussing these issues, found that the 
disposition of the government to transfer divorce cases to the jurisdiction 
of the civil courts on account of the law which established civil marriage, 
did not relate to ecclesiastical marriages, which were concluded 
according to the rules of the Church and subjected to termination on 
grounds accepted by the Church. Bringing divorce cases to the Diocesan 
Consistories, the Holy Synod saw that they would be subject to 
nullification or cessation by applicants or by their lawful representatives. 
That was sufficient reason why it was not considered possible, by the 
action of the Consistory, to transfer such cases to the civil courts. In 
addition, because of the difficulties for the Diocesan Consistory to 
maintain relations with the government or public institutions in divorce 
cases, it seemed to be appropriate to use existing ecclesiastical bodies for 
this means, especially parish priests to handle the required documents 
with the civil authorities and  execute the orders of the ecclesiastical 
court. With the above statement, the Holy Synod notified bishops, 
Synodal Offices and the Office of All-Russian Church Council with 
circular decrees.809 
                                                
807 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 18. 
808 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 3. 
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The decree of the Council of People’s Commissars left the ecclesiastical 
court of the Russian Orthodox Church in a problematic situation: how 
would the divorce process be carried out and how would divorce cases be 
treated? How, moreover, would the Church deal with its faithful who 
wanted an ecclesiastical divorce, when at the same time civilian 
authorities categorically demanded the transfer of all divorce cases from 
Diocesan Consistories to the civil courts?  
Considering the issue of ecclesiastical divorce, the All-Russian Church 
Council over a period of four months began to solve the above issue. On 
February 18, 1918, a meeting of the Department of the Ecclesiastical 
Court stated that distribution of court cases, as well as divorce cases 
between the Holy Synod and the Supreme Church Council was not well-
founded and was difficult to implement. In view of these reasons, the 
Department considered that the All-Russian Church Council should 
adopt the following resolution: All the cases of the ecclesiastical court 
and, in particular, cases regarding the dissolution of religious marriages 
and recognizing them as illegal and invalid, were subject to consideration 
and resolution by the Holy Synod until such time as the All-Russian 
Church Council would adopt new regulations regarding the ecclesiastical 
court.810 
The question of civil marriage in Russia was not a new one; 
discussions concerning it started in the nineteenth century and it was 
actively observed in the studies of Orthodox canon law as well. For 
example, canonist Suvorov in the conclusion to his books Civil Marriage, 
which can be seen as a summary of the whole discussion during that 
time, discusses civil marriage and its relation to the parish registers.811 
The All-Russian Church Council, which was very concerned about the 
salvation of the faithful of the Orthodox Church, urged its followers not to 
embark on a path of sin that leads to destruction. It urged them to keep 
the ecclesiastical laws, and recalled that those who violate the 
ecclesiastical decrees brought the wrath of God and the Church’s 
condemnation on themselves.  It also noted that the new marriage decree 
                                                
810 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 258. Л, 83. The Chairman of the All-Russian Church 
Council, Metropolitan Arseni of Novgorod, forwarded to the Holy Synod a 
conciliar definition, accepted on March 4, 1918, regarding the decree of the 
Council of People’s Commissars on divorce and civil marriage. РГИА. Ф. 796. 
ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 4. 
811 Суворов 1896, 135–136. 
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of the State was aimed to overthrow the ecclesiastical laws, and this could 
not be accepted by the Church. The All-Russian Church Council, after 
reviewing the marriage and divorce decrees issued by the Council of 
People’s Commissars, issued the following general rules: 
 
a) Marriage, blessed by the Church, cannot be terminated by 
the civil authorities. The Church does not recognize such 
termination as valid. Those who dissolve a religious 
marriage with a simple statement at the secular 
authorities are responsible for insulting the sacrament of 
marriage.  
b) Orthodox Christians whose marriages were blessed by the 
Church and not dissolved by the Church authorities, if 
entering into a new civil marriage only on the grounds of 
civil divorce, were guilty of polygamy and adultery. Such 
marital cohabitation would never obtain the recognition or 
the consecration of the church and would be a great sin. It 
is punished, according to the ecclesiastical rules, with 
penance and excommunication from the Holy Mysteries 
that were set in Canon 87 of Trullo and in Canon 77 of 
Basil the Great.812 
 
Contracting a civilian marriage could not replace the wedding as a 
holy sacrament, which sanctifies and strengthens the marital union of 
husband and wife with the power of grace. Therefore, marital 
cohabitation on the basis of a single record in the civil registers, or so-
called civil marriages, should also be blessed with a church wedding. 
Celebrating a wedding is possible only when there are no canonical 
impediments to the marriage.813 
The Patriarch and the Holy Synod in the presence of the Higher 
Church Council heard the above case on March 15, 1918 and decreed that 
the decision should be printed in the Church Bulletin and sent to the 
Diocesan metropolitans as a guide.814 The conciliar decision underwent 
                                                
812 Canon 77 of Basil the Great was also cited in the decision of the Holy Synod 
from October 24, 1852, regarding entering into a new marriage while the 
previous one  still existed. In such a case the Holy Synod decreed seven years of 
penance, which was reduced to three and a half in cases where the guilty party 
was sentenced by criminal law as well. Григоровский 1908, 108. 
813 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 4–5. 
814 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 1–2. 
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even further development. When considering the question of polygamy, 
when a spouse enters into a new marriage not blessed by the Church, i.e., 
into civil marriage, the Russian Orthodox Church in 1918 took a more 
tolerant stand regarding the regulations and punishment in comparison 
with the former practice. In the past, the Holy Synod condemned cases of 
polygamy and adulterous behavior to perpetual celibacy, in conformity 
with a circular decree from June 28, 1888. This decision was particularly 
motivated by the fact that such marriages were increasingly contracted at 
that time. In such cases one should bear in mind that a spouse who 
entered into a new marriage while the former marriage was still valid or 
was not dissolved, committed a crime.815 However, on May 28, 1904 
Russian marriage law was changed. In this law adulterers were not 
condemned adulterer to perpetual celibacy but were instead subjected to 
seven years of penance. However, this ruling caused an outcry among 
women, primarily for financial reasons: they were deprived of rights and 
the maintenance of their husbands, and could not enter into new 
marriages.816 This discussion can be dated back as far as 1828, when the 
President of the Holy Synod, Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow allowed 
with Synodal decree No. 1687 General-Adjutant Kleijnmihel to enter into 
a new marriage. Later, in 1867, according to the Commission Report of 
the Holy Synod, some members supported an amendment of the law.817 
The political status of the upper class might have been a factor as to 
how marriage law was interpreted and possibly changed during Russia’s 
history. There were many Westerners in the upper class at the time who 
had close connections with Western Europe. Russian civil authorities 
might ignore Byzantine laws concerning prohibited degrees to some 
extent just because they were not always convenient for royal persons 
who married foreign royalty who were often related to each other in 
affinity. It might also have been possible that some upper-class families 
would pressure the ecclesiastical authorities to grant them the desired 
divorce, as one can speculate in General-Adjutant Kleijnmihel’s case. 
                                                
815 Завьялов 1901, 263. 
816  Белякова 2011, 418. However, in 1753, the government considerably 
strengthened married women’s control over their own property. However, this 
seemed to affect mainly noblewomen and the dowry they brought with them into 
the marriage. Interestingly, women at the time in Russia had more rights in this 
regard than English or French women. Moss 2005, 305. 
817 Григоровский 1908, 221. 
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Catherine the Great’s love affairs were widely known and give us a 
glimpse of the upper-class’s social lifestyle in eighteenth-century Russia, 
which assumedly continued throughout the nineteenth century as well. 
However, her adultery did not terminate her marriage because of her 
important status as the empress.818 
The transition from ecclesiastical to civil marriage is a phenomenon 
that touched the lives of the general Russian population. However, this 
process continues to be outside the attention of researchers, and 
demographers mention it only occasionally. In fact, it had a bigger 
influence in the mass resignation of the population from the Church than 
the well-known Bolshevik campaign to confiscate relics and church 
property. The important materials on the subject can be divided into two 
groups: 1. Cases reflecting the preparation of the reform of the 
ecclesiastical court and its function in the divorce process; and 2. Divorce 
cases which were directly dealt with in the Synod. 
The main issue was the organization of the ecclesiastical court, which 
the All-Russian Church Council ended in not adopting in its resolution, 
and the Consistory in charge of the court was abolished at the time. Who 
and how should execute the judgments was not quite clear, and the 
backlog of divorce cases was enormous; in the Kharkiv Consistory in 1917 
alone 1,163 divorce cases appeared.819  
Each divorce case that is stored in the archives of РГИА and ГАРФ has 
dramatic individual features which represent various aspects of domestic 
drama. Especially the Synod examined cases that triggered one of the 
spouse’s disagreement about the Diocesan Courts decision. The Synod 
also received cases when the decision was made without the participation 
of the respondent. The trial procedure itself required the presence of both 
parties. The non-appearance of the defendant postponed the trial for six 
months. During the civil war, it was impossible to bring to the court a 
man who was in the war zone where there was no mail service. In most 
divorce cases, the case was transferred to the court not when the divorce 
occurred, but when one of the parties wished to remarry.  
                                                
818 One of the men that Catherine took up with, Sergei Saltykov, may have been 
the father of Catherine’s son, who later became the Emperor Paul. Catherine also 
had a daughter in 1757 with her lover of Polish origin, Stanislas Poniatowski. 
Later she gave birth to a boy – Count Aleksei Bobrinskoi – the father of her latest 
lover, the Guards officer Grigori Orlov. Moss 2005, 269.   
819 Белякова 2011, 417–418 
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Subsequent to the new government’s decree, cases regarding the 
termination of ecclesiastical marriages still came to the Synod for 
approval. In 1918, the estimated numbers of divorce cases handled by the 
Synod continued to grow in February – April to 145, in May to 46, in 
June to 44, in July to 62, and in November to 73. The decree of the 
Council of People’s Commissars was not at first taken seriously by the 
public either. More importantly, even a second marriage still required a 
wedding ceremony in order to recognize its legitimacy in the eyes of 
society.820 
One Orthodox journal wrote, “The disintegration of the family . . . is 
one of the most grievous social ills of the present time,” a sentiment that 
had been earlier expressed by famous Russian writers, such as 
Dostojevski and Tolstoi. The most sweeping proposals for changes in 
family life, as Walter G. Moss notes, came from socialists like Lenin, 
Krupskaia, and Kollontai, who were able to put their ideas on civil 
marriage into practice after the 1917 Revolution.821  And as seen from the 
pre-revolutionary women’s movement, some of the ideas regarding 
family values were uncommonly radical for the time not just in Russia, 
but in Europe as well.822  
 
 
Ecclesiastical divorce 
 
The Orthodox Church was forced to deal with the State’s new marriage 
law, not necessarily because it had a legal power that the Church 
recognized, but because the divorce numbers among the faithful were 
increasing as never before in Russia’s history. On March 8, 1918, the 
Department of the Ecclesiastical Court considered that the new rules 
about termination of marriage should be applied as soon as possible. V. 
                                                
820 Белякова 2011, 417–418. 
821 Moss 2005, 542. 
822  For more about women in the Russian Revolution, see: Engel, Barbara 
Alpern. Women in Russia, 1700–2000. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004; Stoff, Laurie. They Fought for the Motherland: Russia's Women 
Soldiers in World War I and the Revolution. Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 2006; Clements, Barbara Evans. “Working–Class and Peasant Women 
in the Russia Revolution, 1917–1923.” – Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society 8 (2): 215–235.  
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F. Tverdin was concerned about the fact that the civil authorities 
categorically demanded that divorce cases be discontinued in the 
Consistories. He recommended how the Secretary of the Consistory 
should act in these cases. According to his views, most divorcing spouses 
wished to receive an ecclesiastical divorce. They did not want to divorce 
in the civil court, bearing in mind that getting a divorce and entering into 
a new religious marriage could not be done after the marriage had been 
terminated by the civil power. Tverdin asked whether it would be possible 
to rename divorce cases that were, according to the decree of Council of 
People’s Commissars, subject for transfer to the civil authority. He 
suggested that the divorce cases should be renamed “permission to enter 
into a new religious marriage.” In such a form, these cases could remain 
in the Consistory. 
V. V. Radzimovski found it more suitable to return to the model of the 
Interdepartmental Commission, where matrimonial matters were 
examined from the following viewpoints: increasing the number of 
reasons for divorce; eliminating the formalities of such cases; and the 
establishment of special regulations of proceedings for matrimonial 
cases. A developed proposal of the Interdepartmental Commission was 
not, however, implemented. The main reason was the lack of financial 
support to establish such a proposed court. Further difficulties were the 
lack of knowledgeable persons to establish new courts. It was required 
that developed proposals should have been introduced for the approval of 
the legislative institutions: the State Duma and the Council of State. The 
Interdepartmental Commission set up three Sudebniks823 to explore the 
proposals further. The third Sudebnik dealt with matrimonial matters, 
introducing new requirements for a simplified workflow as well as new 
grounds for divorce. Radzimovski suggested that the department should 
establish temporary regulations for divorce and shorten the third 
Sudebnik. He admitted that such work would require a lot of time. At the 
end of the meeting, the Department approved the idea to give the 
drafting of the law to Radzimovski, with the help of V. F. Trelin and P. P. 
Smerdynski, in participation with the Departments’ clerks.824  
In the meeting of the Department of the Ecclesiastical Court of April 8, 
1918, Radzimovski reported about the adoption of the draft of a law 
                                                
823 In Russian “Судебник,” translates into the Code of Law. 
824 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. Оп. 1. Д. 258. Л, 93–94. 
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developed by the All-Russian Church Council. Although there were 
controversial points, the Council adopted it unanimously.  A member of 
the Department, V. V. Radzimovski indicated that in order to fulfill the 
task of drawing up the rules of the divorce process, some instruction was 
needed. The Department of the Ecclesiastical Court suggested 
introducing new rules of divorce proceedings in the manner of the 
Supreme Ecclesiastical Control. However, the All-Russian Church 
Council requested knowledge of how divorce cases would be dealt with 
and suggested that they would be brought to the parish–level. At the 
same time it expressed a desire that the new grounds for the termination 
of marriages which were blessed by the Church were not put into effect 
until the new rules for divorce proceedings were published. As has 
already been shown, the rules of legal proceedings were not considered at 
the Council. Therefore, it was necessary to decide who or which instance 
would solve the divorce cases and develop the rules of the process itself. 
S. P. Rudnev proposed choosing several members from the Council of 
Bishops, adding as well elected members from the parishes to form a 
special commission to resolve divorce cases. Examining appeals in a 
commission, Rudnev saw it possible to join the commission with other 
members of the Council of Bishops. Radzimovski indicated that divorce 
cases often did not require any particular examination. A special 
investigation in Radzimovski’s opinion was required in two cases: in 
adultery, and in cases of abuse and moral deviation between the spouses. 
Therefore, it was assumed that many cases would be dealt with in the 
countryside courts.825 
Metropolitan Sergi pointed out that the Diocesan Consistories suffered 
from slow office work because they were overburdened with cases. “In the 
Councils of Bishops there will also be a lot of cases, while the number of 
members remains the same and most members are elected for a specified 
period of time. There is no doubt that the productivity of the work in the 
Council of Bishops will fall,” the Metropolitan explained.  It was also 
noted that if these Councils were all of a sudden entrusted with the task 
of judging by the new method, they would not cope with the work and the 
office work would be even slower than it was in the Diocesan 
Consistories. The Metropolitan believed that a new beginning could be 
possible, even if only for divorce cases.  
                                                
825 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. Оп. 1. Д. 258. Л, 126–127. 
 
 
 
 
240 
The Department noted that 1. The old episcopal establishments and 
forms of judicial process did not comply with the new provisions of the 
dissolution of marriages; 2. The establishment of the ecclesiastical court 
needed to be presented to the All-Russian Church Council; 3. 
Establishing temporary judicial places to control divorce cases according 
to procedures developed by the Department was not considered 
reasonable and did not adequately represent the situation of the cases. 
The Department of the Ecclesiastical Court concluded the meeting by 
requesting the Board of the All-Russian Church Council to introduce new 
regulations considering the ecclesiastical courts.826 
The urgent need to reform divorce procedures and the divorce law 
itself was heard. On April 20, 1918, the All-Russian Church Council under 
the vice-chairmanship of the Archpriest N. A. Ljubimov, came up with a 
detailed definition about the grounds for the dissolution of marriages 
which had been blessed by the Church.827  The definition clarified the 
very meaning of the marriage, stating that  the “conjugal union of 
husband and wife, blessed and strengthened in the sacrament of 
matrimony by the power of grace must, among all Orthodox Christian 
married partners, be held inviolable and sacred. Having submitted their 
lives and destiny to the will of God, they must bear both the joys and 
sorrows of married life until the end of the days, trying to implement the 
words of our Lord and Savior ‘Therefore what God has joined together, 
let not man separate.’”828 
It was decided that the Church tolerated the dissolution of marriage 
only in clemency for human weakness, and concern for people’s 
salvation. The dissolution of marriage should be possible in order to 
prevent unavoidable crimes and to relieve unbearable misery which 
rends apart the matrimonial union or prevents the possibility of its 
realization. A matrimonial union blessed by the Church could be 
dissolved in no way except by a decision of the Church Court, initiated by 
a petition of one of the spouses on specific grounds, properly 
substantiated and in accordance with the conditions specified in the 
                                                
826 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. Оп. 1. Д. 258. Л, 127. 
827 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 19. 
828 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 21. See Matthew 19:6. 
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following articles.829 Divorce was possible only on duly proved occasions 
which were in compliance with the grounds set in the following 
conciliarly defined Articles of the Russian Orthodox Church: 
 
1. Falling away from the Orthodox faith; 
2. Adultery and unnatural vices; 
3. Incapacity for conjugal relationship; 
4. Contracting of leprosy or syphilis; 
5. Unknown absence (desertion); 
6. Sentence of one of the spouses to punishment resulting in loss of 
civil rights and means of support;830 
7. Attempt upon the life or health of a spouse or children; 
8. Snokhatšestvo,831 procurement, deriving of profit from obscenity 
or lewd acts; 
9. Bigamy. 
 
When resolving cases of dissolution of religious marriages and 
recognizing such marriages as invalid in the ecclesiastical court of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the resolutions of the civil authorities on 
religious marriages no longer had legal force for the ecclesiastical court. 
Facts determined by a civil court could, however, be taken into account. 
The ecclesiastical court resolved marriage cases only upon the 
                                                
829 The project of the All-Russian Church Council from August 3, 1918 stated that 
marriages blessed by the Church had to be respected as valid until they were 
terminated, or otherwise the decision of the ecclesiastical eourt did not enter 
into legal force. A divorce entered into legal force only after it was implemented 
by bishops, or if the case was approved after consideration by the ecclesiastical 
court. ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 36. 
830 The Diocesan authority of Kharkov, regarding a case in which both of the 
spouses were converted from Judaism to Orthodoxy, and later the wife was sent 
to Siberia and deprived of the rights and privileges of a free inhabitant, ordered 
that the husband could enter into a new marriage without being formally 
divorced from his wife. The Holy Synod however overruled this decision, 
explaining that the spouses were joined to Orthodoxy through baptism and 
chrismation, and that it was recorded in the parish register as well. With decree 
No. 516 from March 20, 1870, the Holy Synod ordered that the spouses should 
undergo a divorce process, according to the civil law. Калашников 1899, 113. 
831 In Russian “снохачество” referred to illicit sexual relations between the male 
head of a Russian peasant family/household and his daughter–in–law during 
the absence of his son. 
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presentation of verbal or written explanations of litigant spouses or their 
legal representatives.832  
In cases where one of the spouses had fallen away from the Orthodox 
faith, the right to petition a Church Court for a release from the marriage 
bond and the dissolution of marriage belonged to the spouse who had 
remained in the Orthodox faith.833  The innocent party was entitled to 
petition for the dissolution of marriage in the event of a violation of the 
sanctity of marriage on the part of the other spouse through adultery or 
unnatural vices. Adultery committed by both spouses did not prevent the 
bringing of a suit for the dissolution of marriage by either spouse. A 
petition for the dissolution of marriage on the grounds of adultery could 
be initiated not later than three years from the time when the violation of 
the sanctity of marriage by adultery was made known to the spouse 
initiating the petition for divorce. In the event that the violation of the 
sanctity of marriage involved habitual adulterous relations, then the 
petition could be initiated at many time while such habitual adulterous 
relations existed or continued, and also for a period of not more than 
three years after the habitual adulterous relations had ceased. However, 
the initiation of the suit for the dissolution of marriage was not permitted 
                                                
832 The written petition regarding the dissolution of a marriage should contain 
instructions and indications of the Court of Bishops as well. Compound grounds 
for the petition of nullity were not allowed to be drawn up. Dissolution of 
marriage cases were examined behind closed doors. Only persons involved in the 
case or their representatives were allowed in the court. Unauthorized persons 
were allowed at the request of parties, but not more than three persons from 
each side. Litigating spouses or their representatives could be present during all 
actions of the court, with the exception of the meeting of judges; they were also 
give an explanation for each judicial action and evidence and could observe the 
case during the process. During the examination of the divorce cases, the court 
had the right, regardless of the evidence presented by the parties, to collect for 
the clarification of the case necessary information from the parish clergy and 
parish councils. A case regarding the annulment of a marriage could be raised, 
based on the applications of the spouses themselves, their legal representatives, 
and the spiritual authorities of parish councils, if the marriage was contracted in 
violation of the rules of the Church. ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 36, 39. 
833 When asking for the dissolution of a marriage due to one of the spouses 
lapsing from Orthodoxy, a proper certificate of such apostasy should be 
presented. In light of the administrative process of divorce itself, the All-Russian 
Church Council stated that in dissolution of marriages that were blessed by the 
Church when one or both spouses were Orthodox, the divorce case and 
proceedings were subject to the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical and Episcopal 
Court. ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 37, 39. 
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if from the time of the commission of adultery or from the time habitual 
adulterous relations have ended, a period of ten years had elapsed.834 
Adultery committed by one spouse could not serve as grounds for the 
dissolution of marriage if performed with the consent or at the suggestion 
of the other spouse, having the intention by this act to obtain grounds for 
the dissolution of marriage. 
The incapacity of one of the spouses for a conjugal relationship could 
serve as a reason for the other spouse seeking a divorce, only if the 
incapacity started before the marriage and was not conditioned by old 
age. Where dissolution of a marriage due to the incapacity of a spouse to 
have conjugal relations or due to syphilis was concerned, proper medical 
certificates and other documents relating to these matters were required 
as well. At this point, incapacity due to old age was still possible 
according to the regulations of the Russian Church. Regarding the 
question of old age, the Holy Synod decreed on February 20, 1861 that if 
they were contracted by persons who were unsuitable for each other, or 
significantly unequal in years and they asked to marry, the inescapable 
duty of all priests should be to present them with all the facts that could 
occur later due to difference in years. If they then still wished to get 
married, then the priest was obliged to marry them without hindrance.835 
The All-Russian Church Council considered that the case of the 
dissolution of the marriage by premarital incapacity for conjugal 
relationship could be initiated at the earliest at two years from the time of 
entering into marriage.836  
                                                
834 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 21. When one of the spouses was living 
abroad, the case was treated based on the permanent residence of the other 
spouse. If both spouses were living abroad, such divorce cases were treated in 
the Diocesan Court of Petrograd. When the cases arose in a foreign diocese, a 
double payment was charged by the ecclesiastical court. Petition for the 
dissolution of a marriage needed to come directly from the spouse who was 
seeking the divorce. This rule also applied to those who were denied, according 
to the civil law, the right to start an action (minors being in custody due 
to profligacy, or under guardianship due to deafness or dumbness). All further 
action required for the prosecution of a divorce cases could be carried out by the 
spouses’ attorneys as well. ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 37–39. 
835 Калашников 1902, 48. 
836  РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 22. The indicated period was not 
obligatory in the event that the inability to have conjugal relations on the part of 
one spouse was undoubtedly the result of  the absence or abnormal anatomical 
construction of the genital organs. ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 39. 
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The inability to have conjugal relations on the part of one of the 
spouses which commences after the marriage could serve as grounds for 
the dissolution of marriage provided it resulted from bodily mutilation 
intentionally performed for that purpose by the spouse himself or by 
someone else with the spouse’s consent. Diseases, such as leprosy, gave 
the right to request a divorce both for the healthy spouse and for the 
spouse afflicted with leprosy. The contracting of syphilis served as 
grounds for the dissolution of marriage on the petition of the unaffected 
spouse if further conjugal relations served as a danger to the health of the 
unaffected spouse and children.837  
In the nineteenth century, the Holy Synod saw in the decree from 
February 25, 1868 that there was no dissolution of marriage in the strict 
sense in cases where wives who intentionally “castrated” themselves 
(female circumcision) entered into a new marriage. This view was also 
adopted for those who, according to Article 201 of the Penal Code, were 
subjected to disfranchisement838 which led to the destruction of their 
previous marriage. The Synod permitted circumcised wives to remarry 
with the permission of the Diocesan authority.839 Later this rule was 
revised to mean only women who were sent to Siberia because of 
belonging to the heretical female circumcision movement. After they 
condemned their beliefs, they were allowed to enter into marriage 
according to Article 186 of the Charter on Exiles. 840  Before the 
reformation of the grounds regarding incapacity, the general practice 
knew only the rule regarding natural incapacity, that if started before the 
marriage, the marriage could be dissolved after a period of  three years.841    
The All-Russian Church Council determined that absence, if it lasted 
at least three years, became a valid reason for dissolving a marriage. The 
three-year period was reduced to two years in cases where: 1. The spouse 
was lost or missing as a result of acts of war or a public uprising and; 2. 
the spouse was aboard a ship lost at sea and has not been heard of since 
the loss. The indicated period of years was computed as being from the 
                                                
837 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 22. 
838 Уложение о наказаниях 1892, 189–193; Тимашев 1916, 115. 
839 Григоровский 1908, 234. 
840 Свод законов Российской Империи 1912, T. 14, 248. 
841 Калашников 1902, 55.  
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end of a calendar year during which the last information from the 
missing spouse was received.842  
We can see that this was not a particularly new ground for divorce, 
since the Holy Synod on February 27, 1884, decreed that the wives of 
soldiers of lower ranks whose husbands disappeared during the war or 
were taking to captivity843 could dissolve their marriage after five years 
from the beginning of the absence.844 Later the practice of a five-year 
period was reaffirmed in more detailed way with the decree from January 
14, 1895.845 
A petition for the dissolution of marriage based on a sentence of a 
court which deprived a spouse of all civil rights and means of existence 
could be initiated by the spouse of the sentenced person only when the 
sentence became effective. It could be instituted also by the convicted 
spouse, according to the rules set out in Article 181 and in the first 
paragraph of Article 182 of the Charter on Exiles.846 The pardoning of a 
sentenced person or a delay in execution while awaiting appeal 
eliminated the right to petition for the dissolution of marriage but it did 
not nullify any existing decision concerning the dissolution of 
                                                
842 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 21. The court decision regarding the 
termination of the marriage by unknown absence of those persons who 
participated in war or disappeared in connection with military operations, could 
not be used as grounds for the dissolution of marriage earlier than one year after 
the cessation of the war. It also required an appropriate certificate. ГАРФ. Ф. 
3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 39. 
843 Among the ancient people, persons taken into captivity were usually forced 
into slavery if their countrymen did not ransom them within a short period of 
time. Therefore, captivity dissolved the marriage automatically, without the will 
of the spouses. Emperor Justinian gave permission to seek a divorce for the 
innocent party, i.e., the party who was left without a spouse. The innocent party 
could then enter into marriage after five years dating from the beginning of 
captivity. Emperor Leo the Philosopher found this law inhuman in respect of the 
captive and ordered the wife to wait for the return of the captive, no matter how 
much time she had to wait, even in cases where she had not received any oral or 
written information from the captive. According to Balsamon’s commentary on 
Canon 93 of Trullo, Emperor Leo’s law was indeed practiced in the Byzantine 
Empire. Dig. XXIV. 2.1. Watson 1985, Vol. 2, 714; Zachariae 1857, 119–120, 
Ράλλη 1852, T. II, 524–527. 
844 Калашников 1902, 55. 
845 Калашников 1902, 62–65. 
846 Свод Законов Российской Империи 1912, Т. 14, 247–248. 
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marriage.847 In the event of a sentence with the loss of civil rights and the 
means of existence, a marriage was not dissolved if the conjugal life of the 
spouses continued or was resumed after the release of the sentenced 
spouse from confinement. The innocent spouse was entitled to petition 
for a dissolution of marriage in cases of attempted murder of one of the 
spouses or of children by the other and of intentional infliction of severe 
injuries by one spouse.848 The innocent spouse was entitled to petition for 
the dissolution of marriage in cases of incest or procurement by one 
spouse of the other, the inclination to earn one’s living by lewd acts or the 
realization of profit from lewdness and in the event where the other 
spouse contracts a bigamous marriage.849 
The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church in its decrees 
starting from February 1918 no longer proposed perpetual celibacy as a 
penance in matters of infidelity. This can be seen from the divorce cases 
regarding adultery, which were solved without the participation of a 
respondent. On July 17, 1918 the Holy Synod received one such case from 
the Diocesan authorities of Moscow regarding the dissolution of marriage 
                                                
847 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 22. In the journal Ecclesiastical Social 
Life of November 2, 1907, an unsettled divorce case was mentioned in which the 
husband was first sentenced to punishment and then sent to Siberia. His wife did 
not want to follow him and eventually they got divorced. The wife entered into a 
new marriage; and after a while the husband was pardoned. Coming back from 
Siberia, the ex–wife applied for a divorce and claimed that she wanted to be 
reunited with her first husband. The local Diocesan Consistory did not know how 
to resolve the case and sent it to the Holy Synod. Should the Synod restore the 
first marriage by simply recognizing it on paper or conclude a new wedding in 
church? There might be a risk with the first option of falling into contradiction, 
since the second marriage is blessed by the Holy Synod and would then become 
illegal. This action would indeed be close to the Roman Catholic practice. The 
second option raises a question regarding the repeatability of the practice. The 
article concluded with views on how the aforementioned case should be resolved 
– not by the ecclesiastical laws and canons, but though the teaching of the 
Scripture. Леонтович 1907, 1353–1356. 
848 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 23. The Council also made a note that 
marriages should be dissolved only if the ecclesiastical court thought that 
continuation of marital life would be unbearable for the spouse seeking a 
divorce. In cases of an attempt on the life or health of a spouse or children, a 
copy of the corresponding sentence or the decisions of the judicial authorities 
needed to be included if the spouses appealed to the judiciary. ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. 
ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 39. 
849 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 23. 
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of a petitioner due to the adultery of his wife. The case was ruled in favor 
of the petitioner and gave permission for him to enter into a new 
marriage; the adulterous wife, on the other hand, was condemned to 
penance.850  
It was not always clear to the Synod on what grounds the marriage of 
the spouses should be dissolved. One such example can be found from a 
case that was sent to the Holy Synod for resolution on June 19, 1918 by 
the Metropolitan of Vladimir. The case regarded a petition of a peasant 
Paraskeva Naumova, to grant her a certificate for the right to enter into a 
new marriage, her previous marriage having been terminated in 1915 as a 
result of the adultery of her husband. The marriage was terminated by 
the decision of the Diocesan authorities. The Holy Synod decreed on June 
25, 1918 that it did not matter that the adultery of the husband was 
proven by the Diocesan authorities of Vladimir, for the case was not 
approved by the Holy Synod. Further, without the participation of the 
defendant in the legal process and considering that the residence of the 
defendant was unknown for nearly three years after the printed 
publication to trace him, a norm which was set by the All-Russian Church 
Council on April 20, 1918, such a situation instead – unknown absence – 
was considered sufficient reason for dissolution of marriage.851  
The other case that was sent to the Holy Synod on April 11, 1918 by the 
Diocesan authorities of Finland, considered a case where a husband, Ipati 
Lukin, wanted to dissolve his marriage due to the adultery of his wife and 
her unknown domicile in Russia, to where she had moved with her new 
partner. On June 8, 1918 the Holy Synod gave him the permission that he 
requested. Other permissions where one of the spouses committed a 
crime against the sanctity of marriage, after which they disappeared, 
were given relatively freely. In some of the cases, no crimes were 
committed against the marriage; the other spouse just simply 
disappeared. One such case was on June 7, 1918, where Maria Sidorova 
was given permission to initiate a divorce process against her husband, 
whose lifestyle was dissolute and, further, he was hiding from his wife.852 
Altogether, there were sixteen divorce cases regarding adultery that were 
solved without the participation of the respondent and that were 
                                                
850 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 107, Л. 3. 
851 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 107, Л. 9. 
852 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 107, Л. 25, 38. 
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addressed to the newly–elected Patriarch of Moscow and the Holy Synod 
between February and October 1918. 
The All-Russian Church Council, however, did not explore all the 
possible cases in its April definition. For example, the question 
concerning mental illness and malicious abandonment of the other 
spouse were still not confirmed as canonical reasons for divorce. 
Regarding cases of mental illness, on March 29, 1918, the Holy Synod and 
the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church examined the divorce case 
of a peasant, Ivan Kachalin, presented by the Metropolitan of Tula, due to 
the post–nuptial mental illness of Kachalin’s wife. The Holy Synod 
decreed that under the current law (which was not necessarily in force 
anymore at that time),853 only premarital insanity of one of the spouses 
constituted insanity. Kachalin’s application was transferred to the 
Department of the All-Russian Church Council of the Russian Orthodox 
Church for consideration when the new reasons for divorce were 
examined.854 
On August 2, 1918, the Department of the Ecclesiastical Court 
gathered to formulate administrative procedure regarding the 
termination of marital unions that were blessed by the Church.855 Bishop 
Serafim expressed the view that the reason for malicious abandonment 
should be maintained as a ground for divorce. For such a decision, 
Serafim cited Canon 93 of Trullo, Canons 9, 31 and 46 of Saint Basil the 
Great, the commentaries of Zonara, Balsamon and known canonist, 
Bishop Nikodim of Dalmatia. Having read Canon 93 of Trullo during the 
meeting, Bishop Serafim particularly stressed the case of soldier’s wives 
whose husbands were long–term absentees who remarried.856 He then 
examined the following explanation according to this practice:  
 
                                                
853 Article 37, Свод Законов Российской Империи 1912, Т. 10. Ч. 1, 4. 
854 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 110. Л, 1, 3. 
855 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 36. On August 3, 1918, with protocol No. 
138, the Conciliar Council (Соборный Совет) decided to propose to the All-
Russian Church Council to transfer the project of general regulations and 
administrative work regarding divorces and dissolution of marriages blessed by 
the Church, to the Department of the Ecclesiastical Court. This proposition was 
accepted a few days later on August 10, 1918.  
856 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 265. Л, 96–97. 
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With some additions, here are repeated literally the 31st, 36th and 
46th canons of Basil the Great. The case here is about a wife of a 
soldier, who does not know whether he is alive. There may be only 
a slight leniency applied towards the wife, because with strong 
probability, it can be assumed that her husband, a soldier, did die. 
The rule, therefore, supposes that such a wife can marry a second 
time, if any news about her first husband was not received for a 
long period of time and when the assumption of his death is quite 
justified. The wife in this case is forgiven her sin (a second 
marriage before the return of the first husband). Her second 
husband is forgiven as well, entering with the same conviction (if 
this is the case) into illegal marriage with her. The marriage is 
dissolved if the first husband is alive, comes back, but does not 
want to take his wife back. In that case his wife is released, and as 
such, she is not allowed to marry again.857 
 
Continuing his reading of Canon 9 of Basil the Great, Seraphim turned 
his attention to Zonara’s commentary. In his commentary, Zonara 
pointed out that marriage should not be dissolved except on the grounds 
of adultery. A wife who left her husband and joined with another man 
was considered an adulteress; in the same way a husband who left his 
wife and joined with another woman also committed adultery. Zonara 
clarified that this was the practice during the time of Basil the Great, and 
only later after the Justinian period were some new reasons for divorce 
added to the seventh title, the 28th book of Basilika.858 On the basis of 
canons and their interpretation that Bishop Serafim presented during the 
meeting, he came to the conclusion that malicious abandonment can be 
associated with unknown absence, which has an analogy with death and 
adultery, and this can be a valid reason for divorce and by no means will 
it  be contrary to the canons.859  
Serafim discussed the possibility of the mental illness of one of the 
spouses as a reason for dissolution of marriage. From the canonical 
perspective, insanity as a reason for divorce would not in his opinion be 
wrong.  He turned his attention to Canon 15 of Saint Timothy and found 
that it hardly contained any prohibition concerning this question. As seen 
before, Professor Berdnikov in his interpretation of this canon mentioned 
                                                
857 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 265. Л, 98. 
858 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 121–122. 
859 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 265. Л, 98. 
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Novellas 111 and 112 of Emperor Leo the Philosopher, which gave the 
right for a spouse to dissolve the marriage if the other spouse suffered 
frominsanity. Bishop Serafim continued his reflections on Balsamon’s 
commentary on the above canon, 860  who interestingly — contrary to 
Serafim’s views — condemned dissolving such marriages, since the 
dissolution of marriage did not give someone the right to enter into a 
legal marriage with another.861 
Bishop Serafim’s canonical views were not implemented in practice in 
case No. 578, from August 22, 1918, when the Holy Synod and the 
Patriarch examined the case dated on June 19, 1918, presented by the 
Metropolitan of Voronezh, regarding the future of the divorce cases of 
spouses Juryn, Pochersk, Cherny, Ljapyn, Vostrikov and Udodov, due to 
the mental illness of their wives.  The Holy Synod authorized the 
Diocesan administration of Voronezh to resolve the case about the health 
status of the wives of the spouses, based on the available data. The 
decision must have been made without the opinion of the Medical 
Council under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, since the Council no 
longer existed at that time. For guidance in making a decision on these 
matters, the Holy Synod stated again that according to the law, insanity 
did not serve as a basis for the dissolution of marriage. It recognized it as 
valid only in cases where it was pre-marital.862 
On September 2, 1918, however, the Church Council produced 
additional grounds for divorce, which the Holy Synod accepted with 
decree No. 324 on September 17, 1918.863 The additions consisted of the 
following definitions: 1. Such properly proved incurable mental illness of 
a spouse that eliminated the possibility of a continuation of marital life; 
2. Malicious abandonment of a spouse was a valid reason for divorce if 
the ecclesiastical court saw that such a reason made it impossible to 
continue marital life; 3. Recovery from a mental illness that occurred 
before the decision of the ecclesiastical court on divorce did not 
invalidate a decision which had already taken place; 4. The right to seek a 
                                                
860 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 265. Л, 99–100. 
861 Ράλλη 1854, T. IV, 340. 
862 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 110. Л, 6. 
863 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 25. 
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divorce in the case of malicious abandonment belonged to the spouse 
who was abandoned.864 
On December 9, 1918, the Holy Synod together with the Patriarch 
examined case No. 1163 of a peasant, Taras Starostin, from the province 
of Tula, regarding divorce from his mentally ill wife for which the 
Diocesan administration of Tula did not give permission. The decision of 
the Diocesan administration was motivated by the fact that mental illness 
started after the marriage. The explanatory presentation (No. 1663) of the 
Metropolitan of Tula from November 10, 1918, reported the inability to 
deliver a review of the aforesaid case, after taking the matter to the 
Commissariat of Justice in June 1918. The Holy Synod noted that by the 
decision of the All-Russian Church Council of September 2, 1918, one of 
the reasons for a divorce blessed by the Church was the incurable mental 
illness of a spouse.  The new regulation considered that the mental illness 
of one of the spouses should be appropriately proved and should be of 
such a nature that it eliminated the possibility of continuing married life.  
The Holy Synod resolved the case of Taras Starostin, stating that he 
should either take his case from the Commissariat of Justice and return it 
to the Diocesan administration, or file a new case on the grounds of the 
mental illness of his wife. If his case is returned from the Commissariat of 
Justice, he should re–examine it or consider filing a new case by 
following the instruction of the definition of the All-Russian Church 
Council from September 2, 1918, regarding the grounds for the 
dissolution of marriages blessed by the church.865 From this point, with 
the above decree of the Holy Synod, mental illness was seen as a valid 
legal reason for divorce in the Russian Orthodox Church. Clearly, 
Starostin’s case acted as a precedent for this. 
By the end of December, 1918, the Russian Orthodox Church 
published new rules for proceedings on the termination of religious 
marriages, known as “Guidelines of regulations, when removing blessing 
from the religious marriage.” By this it was decreed that removing 
blessing from the religious marital union was done only with the power of 
the bishop, if it was the fault of one of the spouses that the marital union 
truly collapsed or it was impossible for the spouses to live together any 
longer because of the illness of one of them. The spiritual father’s 
                                                
864 РГИА. Ф. 796. ОП. 445. Д. 780. Л, 27. 
865 РГИА. Ф. 831. ОП. 1. Д. 110. Л, 9. 
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conclusion and interrogations of the witnesses were given exceptional 
importance in cases where the circumstances of the spouses were 
unknown to the priest. The conclusion of the spiritual father was 
important, since the decision to remove the blessing from religious 
marriage was based upon it. The spiritual father was able to make certain 
conclusions on marriage cases which concerned the removal of the 
blessing from the religious marriage. For him it was not necessary to wait 
for instructions from the office of the Metropolitan each time.866 
The spiritual father’s role in the divorce process itself was actually 
decreed in the project of the All-Russian Church Council on August 3, 
1918. It was desired that divorce cases based on the reasons of adultery, 
disease, and an attempt upon the life or health of the spouse or children, 
could not be resolved substantially without all possible measures being 
taken, such as pastoral exhortation of spouses. Pastoral exhortation was 
used so that the couples would stop their disagreement through Christian 
reconciliation and thus remain in the marital union. However, if a divorce 
case was started in a lawful order by one of the spouses, it was 
discontinued in the case of the death of one or both of the spouses or the 
dissolution of their marriage, in the case of reconciliation between the 
                                                
866 According to the instructions, the removal of the Church’s blessing from the 
marriage on account of the absence of one of the spouses was made at the place 
of residence of the applicant and at the place of the wedding of a new marriage. 
On all other occasions, in the place of residence of a spouse who was guilty of 
destroying the marital union or in the place of residence of the mentally ill 
spouse. In the petition to remove the blessing from the religious marriage it was 
necessary to indicate: a) the time and the sacrament of the marriage. One of the 
above reasons for removing the blessing from the religious marriage and the 
detailed and correct statement of the circumstances under which the collapse of 
the marital union took place was also needed; b) the people who knew both 
spouses and had the opportunity to observe their lives and who could confirm 
the circumstances set out in the petition, including their addresses, as well to 
indicate if there were other documents on which the petitioner sought the 
removal of the blessing of religious marriage, and the address of the petitioner, 
the other spouse and his spiritual father. The marriage certificate, the certificate 
of civil divorce and the birth register were also required. However, if it was 
impossible to obtain the birth register, a certificate with the signature of two 
individuals, certified by the priest with the seal of the Church replaced it. Listed 
reasons were considered sufficient for dissolution of marriage and such reasons 
as: the dissimilar characters of the two parties, the mutual consent of the 
spouses to separate, entering into a new marriage, etc., were not accepted or 
regarded as sufficient reasons. РГИА. Ф. 796. Оп. 445. Д. 456. Л, 16–17. 
 
 
 
 
253 
spouses, or in the case in which the  petitioners refused to proceed with 
the divorce case.867 
After analyzing the All-Russian Church Council’s above definitions of 
reasons for divorce, we can divide these reasons into two categories: 
 
1. Reasons that do not depend on the will of the spouses and do not 
entail advantageous consequences for any of the parties.868 
2. Reasons that are made on the part of one of the spouses by 
committing adultery and offending the marital union. Therefore it 
brings upon him various kinds of unfavorable consequences, 
including the prohibition of a new marriage.869 
 
To the first category were applied such reasons that were accepted as 
the ground for divorce, since they violated the natural conditions of 
proper matrimonial life. These reasons were: unknown absence, 
incapacity for conjugal relationship, the sentencing of one of the spouses 
to punishment resulting in loss of civil rights and means of support, 
physical illness, such as syphilis and leprosy, and mental illness. To the 
second category was applied reasons that have one way or another 
flagrantly violated the moral basis of the marital union and marital 
fidelity. To the latter category can be included adultery, abandonment of 
the Orthodox faith, bigamy, unnatural vices, snokhatšestvo and attempt 
on the life or health of the spouse or children. One might wonder why 
killing the fetus and intentional interference with fertility were not also in 
the list of reasons. 
Taking into account the ‘framework’ 870  that the canons of the 
Orthodox Church provides, this reality provides  theologians and 
canonists freedom for interpretations of the context, serving at the same 
time the locality of the Church, the place and time of its communities. 
This gives a dual purpose for the ministry of canon law: genuine 
                                                
867 ГАРФ. Ф. 3431. ОП. 1. Д. 264. Л, 36. 
868 This is known in canon law as “repudia sine damno” (“repudiation without 
damage”). 
869 This is known as “repudia cum damno” (“repudiation with damage”). 
870 By frame here is understood the canonical context regarding marriage and 
divorce that is discussed in the second chapter. 
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Christian freedom and good order.871 In addition, the ideal purpose of 
every ecclesiastical law should be such that the faithful can understand its 
true meaning and values. In this way compliance with such laws becomes 
a moral action in the mind of the faithful that would implant a sense of 
right and wrong. 
This raises a fundamental question in the field of canon law: how does 
the local Church create new decrees and regulations to govern itself? This 
problem can be also approached with a counter question: how does the 
Church identify and envision itself? The Church does not just consist of 
individuals of the same faith; it is a body of one person in many persons. 
This oneness also applies to questions of dogma in the Orthodox Church. 
Once the Church has identified itself as a social body, a place of 
sacraments, the legal norms and decrees in this action play an essential 
role. With the help of rules, the Church advises its faithful to establish 
appropriate social balances that oblige the spiritual growth of its 
members in the very operation of the Church. Such rules included 
updated regulations concerning the dissolution of marriage. They were 
precisely decreed to establish an admirable social balance during the 
deepest social crisis that Russian society had undergone. The new rules 
were decreed by contemplating the Orthodox understanding of leniency 
towards human weakness. The oikonomos himself, or in our case, the 
Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, brought deliverance to 
situations where the canonical structures were out of order or had started 
to collapse. This said, leniency in this case was more than the law could 
offer and there is no single exact answer how the concept of oikonomia 
operated here. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, many of the newly-adopted 
reasons for divorce were added from Byzantine law. The answer to 
problems was actively sought from ancient canonical practice, no matter 
that Russian society itself was radically transforming due to the 1917 
Revolution. Russian canonists like Berdnikov and Krasnožen openly 
supported such a practice, proving in their studies that such a 
development would be more fruitful for the Church at the beginning of a 
new era, under the Patriarch of Moscow. Krasnožen clearly expressed this 
thought in his commentary to the draft of a new Criminal Code, saying 
that the Emperor Justinian was not ashamed to harmonize his Novella 
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131 with the canons of the Church. 872 As we look more closely, this 
approach was directly suggested in the legislation of Justinian. 873 
Krasnožen clearly saw here a harmony between the State and the Church, 
especially regarding the law. Not only did the later Byzantine Emperors 
follow Justinian examples, but the Russian Emperors too, not only for 
the good of the Orthodox Church, but also for the Russian State and the 
Russian people.874 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
872 Красножен 1909, 63. 
873 Zhisman 1864, 20. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
The transformation of the family in twentieth–century Russia created 
questions of a practical nature and raised other questions of a more 
theoretical kind. Family was and is the primary social unit and source of 
the reproduction of society; it is an educational, interpretative 
environment in which the ideological, cultural and moral foundations of 
society are formed and fixed. It is remarkable that the Synod of the 
Russian Orthodox Church was able to maintain as much control as it did 
over the laws governing marriage for almost two hundred years. The 
assumption that a Russian citizen was Orthodox, made Orthodoxy a loyal 
partner to the State and thus made a religious marriage the only form 
available. One could say that it did a lot of harm both to the Church and 
to the conscience of individuals.  
There is no question that stable marriages were of interest to the State. 
The Synodal period was saturated by laws emanating both from the 
Church and the State; all such laws were in effect part of the fundamental 
laws of the Empire. The procedure and the conditions for entering into a 
valid or lawful marriage and the procedures and requirements for the 
dissolution of marriage more or less reflected the laws of the Church with 
more than occasional infringements by the State. Such things as, for 
example, penalties following criminal acts involving marriage, fell within 
the jurisdiction of the State. As for the Synod, the decisions on the 
validity of marriages, especially those within close degrees of 
relationship, were inconsistent. 
In examining the norms of marriage law, it can be clearly seen that the 
Russian civil law and the Charter of Diocesan Consistory at the 
beginning of twentieth century were in many ways influenced by the laws 
of the Byzantine emperors and the Slavic Nomokanon. For example, 
according to the law, the only valid marriage for an Orthodox Christian 
was a religious one with another Christian. Marriage with non-Christians 
was prohibited. Yet, the influence of the ancient ecclesiastical regulations 
were not exactly applied in the case of norms regulating divorce. After the 
reforms of Peter the Great and the development of Russian civil law, 
regulations regarding matrimony were transferred from the jurisdiction 
of the Church to civil law. However, in the cases of kinship and affinity as 
an impediment to marriage, Russian civil law referred directly to the 
ecclesiastical regulations and ordered that such issues needed to be 
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guided by the regulations of the Church. The ecclesiastical regulations in 
Russia regarding kinship and affinity were modified in comparison with 
the strict tradition of ancient Orthodox canon law. Later the norms of 
affinity were relaxed even more in the practice of the Holy Synod in 1918, 
due to the social demands coming from the Western parts of the Empire, 
which were in close relation with Western Christians. 
Transformation of the ecclesiastical regulations into purely civil 
legislation made divorce practices more complex. From the time of Peter 
the Great to the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian divorce law 
was stricter than in ancient Russia. The Holy Synod had a key role in this 
process, the State granting divorces only in cases when the Synod 
supported them. Hence, the religious institution of marriage was 
protected by the Russian judiciary during the entire eighteenth, 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Over time this bureaucratic 
movement of managing divorce cases led to marriage in the Russian 
Empire being placed in a state of crisis: the risk involved in getting 
married was too big and the mass of people did not want to take this risk. 
This can be understood when the strict divorce laws are examined. By the 
Russian laws of the twentieth century, marriage could be dissolved in 
cases of proven adultery; pre-marital incapacity for conjugal relationship; 
the sentence of one of the spouses to punishment or exile to Siberia 
resulting in loss of civil rights and means of support; and the unknown 
absence of one of the spouses for least five years. Divorce was also 
permitted in the case of the consent of both spouses to enter monastic life 
if they did not have young children.  
Indeed, Russian divorce norms acquired a ludicrous juridical aspect 
when dealing with the cases of proven adultery, for the recognition of the 
fault by the defendant was not considered to be evidence or a legal reason 
for divorce. The Charter of Diocesan Consistory claimed that the main 
evidence of the crime should be considered the testimony of two or three 
eyewitnesses, or children begotten outside of a lawful marriage. Here we 
encounter the most delicate point, a judicial farce which was debated in 
the Pre-Conciliar period and at the All-Russian Church Council of 1917–
1918: adultery proven by eyewitnesses. 
Along with the State’s conservative regulations regarding reasons for 
divorce and the impracticality of their management, the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases and mental illness were also constantly 
debated at medical congresses. The position of illegitimate children and 
abandoned families required legislative intervention as well. It is clear 
that the question of divorce was to become the subject of public policy. 
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From the second half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of 
twentieth century, various legal studies on the issue of divorce were 
released in Russia. During the first decade of the twentieth century, a 
number of canonical studies of marriage and divorce were also released. 
From the understanding that marriage was a civil institution followed an 
insistence that the government should change this institute to reflect the 
needs of society. The denominational status of the State did not conflict 
with this idea; the State could delegate to the Church matrimonial cases 
not because it recognized its right to manage them at their own 
discretion, but because for the State it was more convenient and more 
beneficial to allocate such cases to a special government’s instance, in this 
case the Orthodox Church. Such reasoning was based on the general 
principle that approved of different courts with general and specific tasks, 
in this case, ecclesiastical.  
This created a situation in the State wherein canon lawyers started to 
demand the improvement of divorce regulations in order to respond to 
the needs of society and the canonical norms of the Church. The Church 
had to decide to allow indulgence, liberalization, modernization, 
abandoning the purely formal approach to matrimonial issues. Should 
the Church in cases where the family had completely disintegrated, 
recognize this fact and allow divorce, thus preventing many of life’s 
tragedies? It was decided to examine these questions in the All-Russian 
Church Council, a Church Council that had not gathered since the 
reforms of Peter the Great. Before the Council, the Church established 
preparatory commissions, meetings and working groups to prepare for 
the General Council; included in them were a number of canon law 
scholars and professors from religious academies and universities. The 
Pre-Conciliar period of the All-Russian Church Council started in 1906, 
but in 1917, its work still remained unfinished. Members of this period 
suggested that apart from the traditional grounds for divorce (the 
adultery of a spouse as specified in Scripture), among the reasons for 
divorce should be added the incapacity for conjugal relations or 
childbearing, a disease which eliminated the possibility of conjugal 
relations and had a detrimental effect on the offspring (leprosy, syphilis, 
postnuptial madness, etc.); malicious abandonment by one of the spouses 
that lasted for five years or more; administrative exile through a decision 
of the court; cruel treatment, abandonment of the Orthodox faith and 
spousal abuse with determination of guilt by a civil court. 
Not every participant in the commissions and meetings agreed with 
the aforementioned reasons. Professorial members of the commissions 
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nonetheless provided a valuable contribution to show the canonicity of 
the aforementioned reasons. Analyzing these reasons from the canonical 
point of view, we can see that incapacity for a conjugal relationship was 
already acknowledged in chapter 13, title 4 of Nomokanon of Photios. 
Insanity is mentioned in Canon 15 of Saint Timothy of Alexandria, its 
rather neutral message suggesting bearing the illness of the other spouse, 
and Ekloga of Leo III Isaurian, in the 12th and 13th chapters of the 
second title permitted divorce due to the leprosy of one of the spouses.  
Malicious abandonment of a spouse was one of the most discussed 
topics. The canons that were used to support this reason in the 
professors’ arguments were Canons 9, 35, 46 and 77 of Saint Basil the 
Great and Canon 87 of Trullo. The canons of Basil the Great diverged in 
their messages, and their interpretations were often misconstrued by the 
other members of the commissions. Malicious abandonment was 
supported by some Greek Church fathers already in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries as we observed; however, the commentary to Canon 
87 of Trullo required court permission even if the abandonment was for a 
legitimate reason. 
From the ecclesiastical point of view, abandonment of the Orthodox 
faith was considered an allowable reason and was unanimously 
supported by Pre-Conciliar members. Repression of the religious 
conscience of another spouse was also closely related to this issue and 
was motivated with such reality as unity of faith and unity of confessions 
between the spouses. This reason was supported by Canon 72 of Trullo, 
Canon 31 of Laodicea and Canon 30 of Cathage. A phenomenon which 
reflected the confrontation between the pastoral aspect and the canonical 
tradition was the fact that cruel treatment of a spouse was considered a 
vague concept by all the metropolitans of the Holy Synod in the early 
twentieth century. Some canonists wished to drop it from the future law, 
since it could lead to a severe weakening of the moral foundations of 
family life and to considerable arbitrariness in divorce cases. 
Nevertheless, Zonaras’ commentary to Canon 87 of Trullo clearly 
supported this reason for divorce, even if the canon’s authoritative 
commentary argued against the regulations of Basil the Great. The 
evidence that Zonaras testified to a judicial practice of his time can be 
found in the Epanagoge, chapter 21, title 6. 
In the context of early twentieth-century Russian Orthodoxy, we must 
point out that due to rapidly changing conditions of the world over the 
past hundred years and the challenges that the Church’s life faced back 
then, there might not necessarily be rules for every conceivable situation. 
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One can perhaps say that the principle of true faithfulness to canons 
includes the possibility, or rather the need to clarify, supplement and 
even examine materials inherited from previous ecumenical councils. 
Thus, it is also understandable how some customs that serve a specific 
principle can be respected, even though it may differ from the strictly 
formal point of view in a corresponding canon, because it is the principle 
and the particular objective that should be served, promoted and 
respected. Good examples are provided here by Basil the Great, who 
apparently accepted the simultaneous existence of customs and canons 
that differed somewhat, but aimed at the same goal, and Zonaras too is a 
similar case.  
One can argue that the bureaucratic manner of handling divorce cases 
in the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church during the nineteenth 
and twentieth century were not ideal in serving to develop the 
community, since the very laws were viewed as too strict and sometimes 
even absurd. In other words, the manner in which the laws were applied 
and adopted failed to bring about through its values the overall wellbeing 
of the community. Since the civil law in Russia was closely tied to the 
rules of the Orthodox Church during the period that is examined in this 
study, it provides a possibility of studying the rules inside and outside the 
Church. Having said that, in the Orthodox Church only the ecclesial 
approach can do full justice to the texts of canons, since they were created 
in a specific ecclesiastical context. It is this field where the norms were 
born.  
When the All-Russian Church Council finally started its work, it 
encountered new problems at the end of 1917. The Soviet authorities 
began an active fight with the Church, part of which was the fight against 
the ecclesiastical court of the Orthodox Church. With the decree from 
December 19, 1917, the Soviet State abolished all religious divorce cases 
in ecclesiastical courts and transferred them to the jurisdiction of civil 
courts, making them purely a civil matter. The question of civil marriage 
in Russia was not new, for the discussion regarding it had already started 
in the nineteenth century. Still, the Church was not ready for it and with 
this forced action the Church was facing a new kind of struggle for the 
first time in its history; how would matrimonial cases and divorce cases 
be dealt with in a new society which was antagonistic  towards traditional 
Christian family values? 
The contrast between the ease of getting a divorce in the new civil 
courts and the slowness of the ecclesiastical divorce process within 
strictly limited reasons affected the overall cultural and demographic 
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situation. The All-Russian Church Council started to be extremely 
concerned about the new situation and salvation of the faithful of the 
Orthodox Church and urged its faithful not to embark on a path of sin, 
which was how civil marriage was viewed. The first response from the 
Church to the new situation was a dictate to those who wished to contract 
a civil marriage or dissolve their religious marriage in the civil court. The 
Church Council decreed that such persons should be punished with 
penance and excommunication from the Holy Mysteries that had been 
established in Canon 87 of Trullo and in Canon 77 of Basil the Great. 
Later in April 1918, the Russian Orthodox Church published new rules 
regarding the norms on marriage and divorce. Special attention was paid 
to the reasons according to which the religious marriage could be 
dissolved. These reasons were amended later in December 1918. 
Here we can see that the canonical spirit and the norms set in the Pre-
Conciliar period were retained in this matter, and reasons that were not 
justified by the canons and their authoritative commentaries were not 
accepted as lawful reasons for ecclesiastical divorce. These reasons could 
be, for example, dissimilarity of character, the mutual consent of the 
spouses to divorce, the conclusion of new marriage, and so on. We cannot 
emphasize enough the legacy of the conciliar tradition that has an 
extremely demanding and important practical role in the Church’s life: 
this tradition exists in order to preserve unity in order to create the right 
relation between faith and life. Canonicity cannot be merely passive 
obedience, because it cannot be just a legalistic, formalistic attitude. 
Canonicity could rather be described as active obedience or creative 
fidelity. Fidelity to the canonical heritage requires the active reception 
and understanding of this principle. In this sense, the preservation and 
respect of canons is always more than a mechanical repetition or 
imitation: it includes responsibility for the actual goal of serving and 
promoting the canons. 
In the Soviet State in 1918, the Orthodox Church did not immediately 
abolish its previous bureaucratic model, especially when resolving the 
divorce cases. The form of a petition was retained, and one of the above 
reasons was necessary, as well as a detailed and correct statement of the 
circumstances under which the collapse of the marital union took place . 
On the other hand, the new ‘divorce model’ of the Russian Orthodox 
Church was more transparent, incorporating the pastoral aspect as well.  
Such evidence can be seen from the fact that the divorcing spouses’ 
spiritual father’s opinion was given exceptional importance, since the 
decision to remove the blessing from religious marriage was based on it. 
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The debates on the dissolution of marriage continued in the Council even 
after they were informed that the government decreed the separation of 
Church and State. The final resolution on the grounds for the dissolution 
of marriage may sound as if the Council expected the Church to remain as 
it was in the past, with complete jurisdiction over marriage.  
If we put the bureaucratic model aside, the decisions of the All-
Russian Church Council were not only made out of fidelity to the laws of 
the local Church or formal loyalty to the canonical tradition, but also 
followed the practical principles of tradition. This principle should 
therefore be faithful to the context in which it is found. This makes it 
possible to take into account the fact that canons will not be perfectly 
observed. On the other hand, the holy canons always pay attention to the 
conditions under which they are observed and where they should be 
implemented.  
The task of a Church regarding the formulation of norms for daily life 
that correspond to the norm of its faith, is associated not only with the 
problem of actual ecclesiastical order, but with the ability of the Church 
to respond to new issues of the day, remembering its history and keeping 
a living relationship with its tradition. This fidelity to its present, past and 
future creates the preconditions for internal Church dialogue. The Pre-
Conciliar movement of the early twentieth century in Russia is of special 
interest for Orthodox canon law because it included the first and only 
experience in the Russian Orthodox Church regarding open discussion 
with the elements of dialogue touching all sides of Church life. The most 
distinctive part of this discussion was the church–wide discussion about 
the canonical tradition, particularly issues regarding marriage and 
divorce. Participants of the Pre-Conciliar movement shared a view 
regarding rejection of the Synodal system and a desire to build a church 
life on the traditional canonical forms. Nonetheless, this positive view on 
the participants’ part often met with difficulties, since the questions were 
frequently about fundamentally different ideals of marital life, which, 
paradoxically, could be justified by reference to the same canons. 
How was the fundamental unity between canon law and the social and 
moral problems of marriage in twentieth-century Russia seen? The 
sacramental teaching of marriage in the Orthodox Church defines many 
of the values that canons of the Church promote. From another 
perspective, they also create obligations that have important and widely 
applicable implications in the field of morality. How was mutual 
understanding and a well-balanced relationship between canons, human 
weakness and morals sought in the preparatory period of the All-Russian 
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Church Council? It is clear that there was mutual interest on both sides – 
modern medicine at that time gave totally new reflections to such 
problems which during the Byzantine period were already considered 
legal. Although, they were not mentioned in the canons themselves, the 
Church accepted these human weaknesses since they were included in 
Byzantine law. 
Elements of dialogue, no doubt, were present in the Pre-Conciliar 
movement as it was alive in the spirit of a quest for canonical creativity. 
These elements suggest that it opened some important aspects and 
dimensions of dialogue as a method of searching for necessary standards 
in Church life that should correspond to its faith. How then can these 
questions be measured? The experience of the All-Russian Church 
Council of 1917–1918 occupies an exceptional position in the history of 
the Russian Church in the light of the tradition of the ancient councils. 
From the analysis of Russian canonical opinions, it can be ascertained 
that generally all eras of canonical creativity contain two similarities. On 
the one hand, it is of interest to the modern mind of the Church and its 
issues and problems; on the other, it is manifested in an interest in the 
canons, in rules as sources of tradition and a desire to understand what is 
actually said about the canonical tradition. This is the premise for 
canonical dialogue. 
Finally, in our study we have seen that every law in the Orthodox 
Church must be first defined by theological reflections, in order to be 
fully recognized by the community of the faithful and by the bishops of 
the Church. It is they (and the Church) who have the power to use the 
practice of oikonomia and akribeia, which gives the power to accept or 
deny a particular canonical case. This however, does not mean that the 
Church cannot have a legal system, in fact quite the opposite; it should 
have a legal system in the ecclesial sense. The Christian community, the 
Church, is the community of love and therefore its law should remain 
tightly bound to theology.  
If there is anything to be learned from the Russian experience it is that 
pro forma compliance with the legal requirements for solemnizing 
marriages in the Church did not always result in happy marriages nor did 
unhappy marriages end only after all the procedures for their dissolution 
were carried out. When examining regulations regarding matrimonial 
norms in the Pre-Conciliar period and in the All-Russian Church Council, 
the question of conditions under which canons were examined and where 
and how they were implemented was particularly important for this 
subject. However, the search for the Church’s canonical tradition and 
 
 
 
 
264 
position on marriage and divorce acquired a new meaning and a new 
content at the Council – it created a dialogic approach in the Russian 
canonical thought. 
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